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Abstract
This thesis examines how best Kuwait might reform its arbitration legislation to meet 
modern needs. Yet, the particular focus of the study is the relationship between the 
Kuwaiti national courts and commercial (voluntary) arbitration, with particular emphasis 
on how national courts can serve arbitration, and when the court should intervene in 
arbitration. On the one hand, the court provides valuable assistance and support to the 
arbitration by staying court proceedings, appointing arbitrators when required, and 
generally providing assistance in the conduct of the reference. Such support and 
assistance is very important to guarantee both the effectiveness and efficiency o f the 
arbitral agreement, the arbitral process and the ultimate award. On the other hand, the 
court must have jurisdiction to intervene in the arbitral process and to scrutinise the 
award in order to ensure the fairness, integrity, legality and neutrality o f the arbitral 
process. It is argued that court supervision o f arbitration is the price that has to be paid for 
the support and assistance o f the court to arbitration.
This study is divided into two parts, the support given by the court to arbitration, and the 
control exercised by the court over arbitration. The arbitration agreement should also be 
closely examined in order to understand the relationship between the court and 
arbitration, as the arbitration agreement is the foundation stone of arbitration. These parts 
are divided into five chapters. Chapter one is an introductory chapter. It highlights 
generally the role of arbitration, the value o f arbitration for foreign investors, the link 
between arbitration and trade and the importance of the relationship between the court 
and arbitration. It also introduces the arbitral system in Kuwait, the UNCITRAL Model 
Law on International Commercial Ai’bitration and the English Arbitration Act 1996. 
Chapter two is devoted to examining the most important aspects o f the arbitration 
agreement. It is divided into four sections, namely, the definition and nature of arbitration 
and the arbitration agreement, the autonomous nature o f the arbitration agreement, 
arbitrability and formality. Chapter three addresses the modes o f assistance and support 
given by the court to arbitration. It is split into six sections as follow; the general 
principles o f an Arbitration Act, enforcing an arbitration agreement, extending 
contractual time- bars, the constitution of the arbitral tribunal, the conduct o f the arbitral 
proceedings and the enforcement o f the arbitral award. Chapter four considers the judicial 
supervision o f arbitration. It deals with judicial supervision over the arbitration 
agreement, the conduct o f the arbitral tribunal and the arbitral award, while chapter five 
contains the conclusion o f this thesis.
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Preface
Commercial arbitration has proved a very popular means o f resolving disputes in 
international traded Recent studies by economists have emphasised its role in trade and 
market integration^. As the great majority of commercial contracts contain arbitration 
agreements, legal scholars argue that commercial arbitration fosters the needs of 
business^. It serves trade and is dependent on it"^ . There is a clear relationship between the 
arbitral environment and the efficacy of trade relations. As Kuwait aims to attract 
investment and capital inflow^ it should consider an effective arbitration regime as one of 
the important elements for promoting investment. Such a regime is an effective 
instrument of connnercial policy^
Kuwait has noticed^ that the development o f international and domestic business activity 
during the last century is closely related to the increasing availability o f arbitration as a 
means o f dispute resolution. Furthermore, most countries and businesses around the 
world have realised the benefit of arbitration as a successful method o f settling a range of 
disputes. There is, moreover, a trend, which dates back to the second part o f the last 
century, to promote arbitration on a world wide basis, and to drive towards greater 
uniformity in the national mles that govern arbitration®. Therefore this thesis suggests that 
Kuwait may have to seek to reform its arbitral provisions^ not only to meet the modern
' A. Casella, ‘Arbitration in International Trade’, Working Paper no. 4136 (NBER, Aug 1992). It is 
available at <http://papers.nber.org/papers/W4136> [Last visited 5 July 2003], 1-43, at p I. See also, A. 
Casella, ‘On Market Integration and the Development o f Institutions: The Case o f International 
Commercial Arbitration’ (1996) 40 EER 155-186, at 156
 ^Dr A. Maniruzzaman, ‘International Commercial Arbitration in the Asia Pacific’ (2002) 30 (11) IBL 508- 
513 at p 508.
 ^A. Casella, ‘Arbitration in International Trade’, op. cit., p i.
J. Werner, ‘The Trade Explosion and Some Likely Effects on International Arbitration’ (1997) 4 (7) J. Int 
Arb 5-16, at p5.
 ^See Kuwait’s New Direct Foreign Capital Investment law (Law No. 8/2001).
^This is because o f the fact that commercial arbitration plays a significant role in commercial and trade 
climate. See H. Yu, ‘Total Separation o f  International Commercial Arbitration and National Court 
R egim e’ (1998) 15 (2) J. Int. Arb. 145-166.
 ^Ministry o f Justice, The State o f  Kuwait arbitration System, p 1.
® See for instance New York Convention 1958 and UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules as a clear examples for a 
movement toward a unified legal frame work for the fair and efficient settlement o f disputes arising in 
commercial trade and transaction.
 ^ Such step may be seen as a further step in creating an attractive investment climate. Since, effective and 
sufficient mechanism o f resolving disputes is a vital guarantee for the investor that will ensure the 
compliance o f provided protection in trade and investment. Arbitration helps to improve international 
economic relations by providing a mechanism, which plays an important role to reduce the risk o f  
transnational commerce. See, H. Holtzmann and J. Neuhaus, A guide to the UNCITRAL Model Law on 
International Commercial Arbitration: legislative history and commentary^ Deventer: Kluwer Law and 
Taxation Publishers; The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Instituut, c l989  Deventer, Boston, The Hague, Kluwer 
Law and Taxation Publishers, T.M.C. Asser Instituut. 1989, p2. See also General Assembly Resolution 
stressing on the “value o f arbitration” in 40/72 A/40/53.
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trends in this sector, but also to provide a healthy arbitration system, so as to make 
Kuwait an attractive venue for arbitration. Having a successfril arbitral system helps to 
attract investment, as investors can have confidence that their contracts are underpinned 
by an effective, neutral form o f dispute resolution. Equally, being recognised as an 
important centre of commercial arbitration also contributes to the economic health o f the 
nation, as is illustrated by the example of London.
The success of the arbitration system will partly depend on the roles o f the parties, the 
arbitral tribunal and the court, but above all on the role o f arbitration legislation, which 
must ensure that each element functions effectively. This thesis focuses on the role o f the 
court. It suggests that the nature o f the relationship between arbitration and the courts is 
potentially very important for the users o f arbitration, because they may be directly 
affected by it. The users o f arbitration tend to desire to achieve as much freedom as 
possible from legal restrictions. They also have a particular interest in resolving their 
disputes within the minimum period possible that is consistent with the stability of their 
legal positions. Thus the users of arbitration before investing their money in particular 
states may well take the relationship between the courts and arbitration into 
consideration. So Kuwait should thinlc about how it could provide an arbitral 
enviromnent conducive to the goals mentioned above. The legal enviromnent might look 
to develop arbitration rules which meet those objectives, as well as the objectives o f 
arbitration and justice therein. In addition, it should meet the interests of the legal system, 
of which arbitration is merely a part. Finally, it should keep up with cunent developments 
in the arbitral field across the world.
The recent tendency towards modernisation and harmonisation of the ai'bitration regimes 
of the world provides much material against which the regime in Kuwait can be judged. 
This study will particularly examine the UNCITRAL Model Law, since the Model Law 
was developed in order to assist states in reforming and modernising their law on 
arbitration. The success o f the Model Law has played a vital role in the process o f 
standardising the rules that govern arbitration procedures in various countries, and would 
be a useful legislative guide for any country interested in modernising its arbitration law.
This thesis will investigate whether Kuwait should adopt the UNCITRAL Model Law, in 
whole or in part, in order to take the necessary steps towards modernising the legal 
system o f Kuwait. Reference will be made to those Arabic states have which have
XVI
already adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law - e.g. Egypt, Balirain and Tunisia. A second 
source o f comparison is English law. Arbitration in England is as old as its legal 
history England has been for centuries one of the important centi'es of arbitration, if  not 
the most important. It has boasted statutes in the field o f arbitration since 1697, and has 
witnessed several major statutory reforms between 1889 and 1996, culminating in the 
Arbitration Act 1996, the new foundation of English arbitration law. It has been said,
“ The 1996 Act is the most extensive statutory reform o f English 
arbitration law, its scope exceeding any previous English statue on 
arbitration. It restates, with important modifications, the law and the 
practice o f English arbitration, both common law and statute, running 
dnonologically tlnough each stage o f an arbitration, from the 
arbitration agreement, the appointment of the arbitration tribunal, the 
conduct of the arbitration, the award, to the Court’s recognition and 
enforcement o f the award”
The structure o f the Arbitration Act in 1996 is very clear and comprehensible, set out in a 
logical order, and expressed in clear language that can be fully understood by any 
layman. It therefore provides the best benclimark for a modern arbitration statute.
This research then addresses the following themes:
• How can the court support arbitration?
• How should the court supervise arbitration?
• Can any recommendations be made to improve the legal system of Kuwait in this area, 
drawing from other models in existence?
Therefore, this thesis will consider the adequacy o f the current Kuwaiti arbitration 
system, by reference, in particular to the Model Law and the English Arbitration Act 
1996. The aim of this thesis is to explore the relationship between the courts and 
arbitration, so that the relationship might operate with maximum efficiency. This study 
will attempt to identify the defects of the arbitration system in Kuwait and to look for 
means o f improvement.
G. William, ‘United Kingdom National Report’ Yearbook, vol. II, 1977, p 90 
" V. Veeder, ‘National Report on England’ Intl. Handbook on Comm. Arb., Supp. 23, March 1997, p 1.
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It is hoped that this study will be helpfiil to Kuwait in helping the development o f the 
legal system. One aim would be to help create a user-friendly arbitration regime, which 
does not deter investment and capital inflow. Another would be to seek to establish the 
state as a centre o f commercial arbitration. A third would be to contribute to the 
modernisation o f the Kuwaiti arbitration system.
xvin
Chapter One:
General Introduction
1. The Role of Arbitration
Delivering justice is a cardinal duty of any state. It should spare no effort in attaining this 
goal. For this reason, each state has its own legal system and courts. In addition to this, 
most states allow litigants to submit their existing or future disputes to individuals whom 
they trust in order to settle their case outside the competent court. Arbitration, like 
litigation, is a means of dispute resolution. It could be ai'gued that judges and aibitrators 
are partners, jointly responsible to administer justice - judges in the public system and 
arbitrators in the private system. Arbitrators, like judges, must judicially determine the 
matter in disputed Those who might wish to invest in Kuwait might wish to know how 
any dispute, arising from the contracts they enter, could be settled there. Disputes could, 
o f course, be settled by litigation. On the other hand, arbitration is available as an 
alternative to litigation. There are several reasons why parties may prefer arbitration.
1.1 Freedom to Choose the Arbitrators
Parties to an arbitration agreement are free to choose their arbitrator(s). Arbitrators, 
unlike judges, are not appointed by the State, but by the parties to the arbitration 
agreement, or by an institution chosen by the parties. Thus ai'bitrators can be chosen for 
their particular expertise, and may, indeed, not be lawyers. Or an arbitrator may be an 
expert in a particular area of law, or in the particular system o f law which governs 
substance o f the dispute, it being entirely possible that this might not be the law of 
Kuwait. Moreover, in international commercial arbitration it is commonplace to have a 
three-arbitrator tribunal, admitting the possibility that a variety o f disciplines and/or legal 
cultures might be represented on the tribunal.
 ^ It should be mentioned that arbitration, unlike national court systems. Is a commercially oriented product 
that flourishes on the basis o f market forces. See e.g., H. Yu, ‘Total Separation o f International 
Commercial Arbitration and National Court Regime p 145.
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1.2 Procedural Flexibility
The parties to an arbitration agreement are regarded as masters o f the arbitral 
proceedings, and so can choose the most suitable procedure, determining the degree o f 
formality or informality of the arbitral process. So an adversarial or inquisitorial 
procedure may be adopted, or a procedure combining elements of the two. They may 
decide on the type o f evidence to be considered, e.g. whether oral evidence should be 
heard, and streamlined modes o f proof may be adopted. So, arbitration as a private 
system o f adjudication, offers much greater procedural flexibility than litigation.
1.3 Enforceability of Arbitral Award
Another factor in favour of arbitration is the enforceability o f the arbitral award in other 
states. As a result of the 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement o f Foreign Arbitral Awards, well over 100 states round the world, including 
all major trading nations, have agreed to recognise and enforce foreign arbitral awards. 
No judgement convention has anything like this scope, and it is often easier to enforce a 
foreign arbitral award than a foreign court judgement.
1.4 Privacy and Confidentiality
In arbitration the dispute is resolved in private, whereas by contrast, court justice is 
administered in public. Aibitration proceedings are not open to the public, who do not 
have the right to attend the hearings. Moreover, privacy offers the arbitrating parties the 
advantage o f not revealing the fact o f their conflict, or disclosing sensitive infoimation to 
the outside world.
1.5 Disadvantages
There are, o f course, disadvantages in choosing arbitration. For example, while certain 
types o f arbitration are specifically designed to be low-cost, and this can be partly true 
even o f international commercial arbitration if  special expedited procedures can be 
adopted, more typically international commercial arbitration is more expensive than 
litigation. This is because the parties must meet the fees o f the arbitrator(s) and the 
expenses of the tribunal. There may also be extra delays in resolving the dispute by 
arbitration. Jurisdictional issues may arise, which could never arise in litigation. For 
example, one party may challenge the question of the validity of the arbitration
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agreement, or the method o f appointing the arbitral tribunal. Moreover, an arbitral 
tribunal can only sit when arbitrators are available.
Yet many believe that the advantages o f arbitration outweigh its disadvantages. Expense 
and delay are also features of court action. In practice, a good arbitral tribunal can control 
the proceedings to avoid undue delays and cost. It may be indeed be bound by legislation 
to adopt procedures suitable to the circumstances of the particular case, avoiding 
unnecessary delays or expense, as in the case of the English Arbitration Act 1996 ss.l 
and 3 3 (l)(b )l
2. The Value of Arbitration for Foreign Investors
Since Kuwait aims to develop its investment infrastructure, attracting domestic and 
foreign investment, a conducive legal environment for investment has to be provided. 
Many investors prefer arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism^. This preference is 
not only because of the advantages of arbitration noted above, but also because foreign 
investors are wary o f litigating in the other party’s “home” couit'^. When investors enter 
into foreign trade and investment transactions, they hope that there will be no future 
disputes. At the same time, the possibility of future dispute is seen as one of the dangers 
of such transactions. The danger is greater when the investors cannot be confident that 
reliable procedures are available to resolve any such future disputes promptly and fairly. 
It has been said;
“When the risk is increased because effective dispute resolution 
procedures are not available, businesses react in one o f two ways: 
either to refuse to enter into the transaction because the risks are too
 ^ In any event, it may argue that arbitration, as a legitimate method of dispute resolution, offers the chance 
to avoid going to the court. This by itself may justify resorting to arbitration rather than litigation. See W. 
Park, ‘The Interaction o f  Courts and Arbitrators in England: The 1996 Act as a Model for United States’ 
(1998) 1(2) Int. A.L.R. 54 -  67 at p 45, This issue w ill come again under discussion the value of  
arbitration.
 ^The Honorable A. Amissah, ‘Judicial Aspect o f  the Arbitral Process’, Paper presented in Biennial IFCAI 
Conference- Oct 24,1997, Geneva, Switzerland. It is available at 
<http://arbiter.wipo.int/events/conferences/1997/october/hoellermg2.html>, [Last visited 5 Jul 2003], This 
can be seen not only in the number o f arbitration cases, but also by the growing utilisation o f arbitration 
agreement in contracts and the expansive variety o f hansactions that are covered by these agreement. See 
M. Levin, ‘The Role o f Substantive Law in Business Arbitration and the Importance o f  Volition’ (1997) 35 
ri)A B L J 105.
Prof. Y. Taniguchi, ‘The Changing Attitude to International Commercial Dispute Settlement in Asia and 
Far East’ (1997) 2 (Jun) A.D.R.L.R. 67-77 at pp. 72-73. See also R. Tindall, ‘International Commercial 
Arbitration’ (1969) 7 (1) ABLJ 65 at p 67.
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great, or to raise the price to compensate for the additional hazard. In 
either event the free flow of trade is hampered” .^
An effective arbitration system helps to build and boost the confidence o f parties in 
dealing with each other and that enliances trade^. Thus, when investors can be sure that 
laws and procedures exist to enable future disputes to be resolved properly and 
efficiently, the conduct o f trade and investment is facilitated and may increase 
dramatically. Investors often look to arbitration as a system, which helps to improve trade 
and investment relations by providing a mechanism that decreases the risks mentioned 
above’.
So arbitration is probably the most popular mechanism for the settlement o f dispute in 
international commerce. Ai'bitration has been recognised by most legal systems and many 
international convention (e.g. the New York Convention 1958) as an acceptable dispute 
resolution method. Sir Michael Kerr points to this favourable attitude toward arbitration 
by the international community, and says:
“What matters is that international arbitration has in general given rise 
to an internationally accepted harmonised procedural jurisprudence.. .It 
is establishing a generally accepted procedure for the resolution of 
disputes which cuts right across past and present barriers between 
different procedural philosophies and legal systems”®.
Moreover, a trend emerged towards the end o f last century to spread the use of arbitration 
world-wide and to achieve uniformity in the rules governing arbitration. So one o f the
 ^ See Holtzmann & Neuhaus, op. cit., p 3.
 ^ A. Okekeifere, ‘Commercial Arbitration As the Most Effective Dispute Resolution Method: Still a Fact 
or Now a Myth?’ (1998) 15 (4) J. Int. Arb. 81-105. The view is that arbitration offers a chance for its users 
to design their method o f adjudication as they think fit and proper. In addition, arbitration would relatively 
limit the state court intervention in the disputes. It has been said tliat “Stimulated by an enormous increase 
in international commerce during the last 50 to 60 years and reluctance o f parties to litigate in foreign 
courts, an effective worldwide system o f international commercial arbitration has come into being-one that 
provides procedural rules for the conduct of international arbitration proceedings, experienced and trusted 
arbitral institutions providing impartial services, and an effective treaty network for the enforcement o f  
arbitral agreements and awards”. See M. Hoeilering, ‘International Commercial Arbitration: A Peaceful 
Method o f Dispute Settlement’ (1985) 40 (4) Arb. J. 19 at p 20.
’ A. Okekeifere, op. cit., 81-105.
® M. Kerr, Concord and Conflict in International Arbitration  (The Keating Lecture) (1996, Kings College, 
London), at p 7 cited in H. Yu, ‘Total Separation o f  International Commercial Arbitration and National 
Court Regime’, op. cit., under [(I) The Changing Face o f Arbitration].
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aims o f the UNCITRAL Model Law is to assist states in reforming and modernising their 
laws on arbitration^. It was claimed that.
“The Model Law constitutes a sound and promising basis for the 
desired harmonisation and improvement o f national law. It covers all 
stages of the arbitral process from the arbitration agreement to the 
recognition and enforcement o f the arbitral award and reflects a world­
wide consensus of the principles and important issues of international 
arbitration practice. It is acceptable to States of all regions and the 
different legal or economic systems of the world”**’.
Accordingly, if  the authorities in Kuwait wish to achieve the policy o f attracting 
investment, the arbitral system should recognise international movements in the 
arbitration field. This approach is based not only on the value o f arbitration but also the 
notable relationship between arbitration and trade, which is discussed in the coming 
paragraphs.
3. The Link between Arbitration and Trade
The last conclusion opens the question; what is the relationship between arbitration and 
investment and trade? This relationship has been recognised for a very long tim e". So the 
preamble of the English Act of 1698 states:
“Whereas it hath been found by experience, that references made by 
rule o f the court have contributed much to the ease o f the subject, in 
the determination of controversies, because the parties become there by 
obliged to submit to the awai'd o f the arbitrators... now, for promoting 
trade, and rendering the award o f arbitrators more effectual in all cases 
for the final determination of controversies referred to them by 
merchants and traders, or others, concerning matters of account of 
trade, or other matters, be it enacted.
See Explanatory Note o f by the UNCITRAL Secretariat on the Model Law on International Commercial 
Arbitration, [hereinafter cited as Explanatory Note on the Model Law] para 3.
Ibid., para 2.
Martin Odams de Zylva admits “Arbitration is an ancient institution which has been deployed as the 
principal means o f  resolving disputes since trade began”. See M. Zylva, ‘Effective Means o f  Resolving 
Distance settlement disputes’ (2001) 67 (3) Arbitration 230-239 at p 239.
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Jacques Werner is one o f those who observed the kinship between arbitration and trade. 
He said,
“International commercial arbitration serves international trade and is 
dependent on it. As all service industries, it lives or dies with the 
fortunes o f its base industry. Consequently, the evolution of 
international trade cannot leave the international arbitration community 
indifferent” *^ .
The same concept was behind Michael’s statement that “Common efforts to streamline 
and harmonize the practice o f international arbitration have served to improve the fabric 
o f international business relations”".
Arguably, this perceived relationship between arbitration and trade has played a vital role 
in international and domestic movements for developing user-friendly arbitration 
regimes. The importance o f arbitration to trade meant that the second half o f the last 
century witnessed tliree major events in the development of arbitration to encourage trade 
-  (1) the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 
adopted by the United Nations Conference on International Commercial Arbitration in 
New York in June 1958; (2) the Arbitration Rules o f the United Nations Conunission on 
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) adopted by the UN General Assembly on 15 
December 1976; and (3) the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 
adopted by UNCITRAL in Vieima on 21 June 1985 and by the UN General Assembly on 
11 December 1985. That one of the objects o f these measures has been to facilitate the 
conduct of international trade may be deduced from the UN General Assembly 
Resolution, which adopted the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. It stated
“The General Assembly...Being convinced that the establishment of 
rules for... arbitration, that are acceptable in countries with different 
legal, social and economic systems, would significantly contribute to 
the development o f harmonious international economic relations...”*"*.
" Op.cit. at p 5. See also J. Saxby, ‘A User’s Perspective o f the UNCITRAL Model Law’ (1986) 2 (2) 
Arb. Int. 164-166. Hong-lin Yu says “arbitration has had a fast growth and development fuelled by the 
expectations and tlie needs o f the international business community”. See her article under title ‘Total 
Separation o f international Commercial Arbitration and National Court Regim e’, op. cit., under [(I) The 
Changmg Face o f  Arbitration].
See M. Hoellerning, op. cit., at p 20.
*"* Resolution 31/98 adopted by the General Assemble on 15 Dec 1976.
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The UN General Assembly declared the same idea on adopting the Model Law on 
international arbitration. It states
“The General Assembly,
Recognized the value o f arbitration as a method of settling disputes 
arising in international commercial relations,
Being convinced that the establisliment o f a model law on arbitration 
that is acceptable to States with different legal, social and economic 
systems contributes to the development o f harmonisations international 
economic relations,
Being convinced that the Model Law, together with the Convention on 
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards and the 
Arbitration Rules o f United Nation Commission on International Trade 
Law, recommended by the General assembly in its resolution 31/98 of 
15 December 1976, significantly contributes to the establisliment o f a 
united legal framework for the fair and efficient settlement o f disputes 
arising in international commercial relations” *^ .
The link between arbitration and trade has to be noticed also by looking at the role of 
UNCITRAL, which was behind the advent o f these vital events, as the core legal body 
within the United Nations system in the field o f international trade law. The object o f the 
Conunission is the promotion of the progressive harmonisation and unification of 
international trade law. This function would include reducing or removing legal obstacles 
to the flow o f international trade
The role o f competent dispute settlement mechanism is vital for effective global 
economic development and liberalisation of trade and investment in any region*^. 
Investors’ confidence in a host country can be ensured tluough such mechanisms, as 
where there is confidence, there shall be co-operation. It was suggested that if  an investor
“loses confidence in the host country’s dispute settlement mechanisms, 
it is futile for the host country to expect co-operation in its economic 
development from such an investor. International commercial
Resolution 40/72 - A/40/53.
Resolution 40/71 - A/40/53.
See Dr A. Maniruzzamaman, op. cit., p 508.
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arbitration has proved to be very popular with the international 
business comimmity. Its current role in the expansion of international 
trade cannot be denied”*^ .
Thus, arbitration may make a very positive contribution to the enhancement o f closer 
economic co-operation in any region.
Ai'bitration has proved to be very popular with the business community". Most disputes 
concern business transactions between trading and investment entities from different 
countries (or the same country), such as private individuals, multinational corporations 
and governments^**. Many studies suggest that commercial arbitration has witnessed 
dramatic growth in the recent times. So bodies like UNCITRAL identified a need for 
effective modern arbitration regimes. It noted for example that:
“The view was expressed that in developing a model law, the 
Commission would be helping to bring about fairness and equality in 
business relationsliips, and that this was therefore relevant to the 
Commission’s consideration o f the legal aspects of a new international 
economic order” *^.
The Commission also stated:
“There was general support for the suggestion to proceed towards the 
drafting of a model law on international commercial arbitration. This 
was deemed desirable in view o f the manifold problems encountered in 
present arbitration practice and o f the need for a legal framework for 
equitable and rational settlement procedures for disputes arising out o f 
international trade transactions”^^ .
Ibid.
Robert Couison says, “Scholars o f business law are familiar with the recent growth o f commercial 
arbitration. But remembering that arbitration was born fi'om the desire o f businessmen to escape the long 
delays and grievous costs o f litigation, as well as to obtain the experienced judgement o f associates from 
their own industry, educators may retain a residual skepticism as to the quality o f justice dispensed in this 
“businessman’s forum”. See his article ‘Management Arbitration in Action’ (1965) 3 (1) ABLJ 31 and G. 
McKnight, ‘Teaching hiternational Aspects o f  Business Law’ (1977) 15(1) ABLJ 31-36 at p 31.
See M. Wang, ‘Are Alternative Dispute Resolution Methods Superior to Litigation in Resolving 
Disputes in International Commerce?’ (2000) 16 Arb. Int’l 189-211 at p 189.
A/34/17, para 78.
^^Ibid., para 64.
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Furthermore, the comment o f the UK on the draft text of a model law suggested that “the 
only proper objective for any law o f arbitration is to ensure that commercial men have 
their disputes decided fairly...
The importance o f arbitration to trade is emphasised by Casella,^"* who suggests that 
efficient international trade is supported not only by international instruments but also 
international coalitions of private interests. Commercial arbitration is an important 
example o f these private coalitions. He states:
“International arbitration is understood to provide a ‘supra-national’ 
jurisdiction created by international businessmen, shaped by the 
evolution o f international markets, and itself responsible for some of 
this evolution. It has been theorised as the road towards a transnational 
law, a ‘self-made economic law ’ created spontaneously by private 
traders and evolving independently of national parliaments and 
national courts”^^ .
He also believes that commercial arbitration is a jiuisdiction created by the actors in 
international trade, hence the fact that arbitration is the most frequently chosen 
mechanism for resolving disputes in international trade.
The Kuwaiti authorities must recognise the relationship between arbitration and trade. An 
effective ai'bitration regime is vital a factor in establisliing a good investment 
environment in Kuwait^^. Kuwait aims to attract investments*^^, but does not offer an 
attractive arbitral enviromnent. Lord Mustill observes,
“To these rapid changes there should have been a clear and agile 
response by the word o f international arbitration. I say, “should have 
been” because it is a fact too often overlooked that international
A/CN.9/263/ADD.2, para 3.
See A. Caseiia, ‘On Marketing Integration and the Development o f Institutions; the Case o f International 
Commercial Arbitration’, op. cit., at pp. 155-186.
^^lbid.,p  156.
Fabien Gelinas states “The overall result is a net gain in the recognition o f arbitration and arbitral 
awards in the world and therefore an improvement in the ease with which one can conduct business 
globally. There can be no doubt that there is a strong link between the quality o f a country’s legal 
fi-amework for arbitration and business decisions about investment in that countiy”. See F. Gelinas, 
‘Arbitration and Challenge o f Globalization’ (2000) 17 (4) J. Int. Arb. 117-122 at p 20.
For example, it authorizes 100 percent foreign ownership (in certain industries), it exempts foreign -  
majority owned companies from requiring a local agent, it authorizes 10 years tax holidays for new foreign 
investors, it facilitates the entry o f expatriate labor and so on.
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arbitration is at the same time the child and the servant o f international 
comiTLerce”^^ .
4. The Importance of the Relationship between the Court and Arbitration
The success of an arbitral regime demands efficiency in every aspect of the operation o f 
the system, including the scope o f the role of the court in arbitration. This thesis will 
focus on the need for achieving the optimum role of the court in arbitration. The 
relationship between the court and arbitration is key to the success o f any arbitral system. 
Arbitration camiot fanction without court support. The most serious wealmess of 
arbitration as a method o f resolving disputes is its inability to enforce its orders and 
awards without the assistance o f the court. The power to give binding effect to the legal 
consequences o f arbitration is invariably entrusted to the court by the legislature^^. The 
court may support arbitration in a number o f ways, such as enforcing the arbitration 
agreement, constituting the arbitral tribunal, facilitating the conduct of the arbitral 
proceedings and enforcing the arbitral award. Quite simply, courts are indispensable to 
the effectiveness of arbitral process^**. However, there may be a price for such assistance 
and support. The price is judicial supervision over arbitration. It is argued,
“Attractive as it may be in theory to dissociate the arbitral process 
from judicial control, the fact remains that in practice this is an 
impossible aim” *^.
So it is important that the lawmakers consider the proper function of the court in the 
arbitral process when they draft a new Arbitration Act. The relationship between national 
court and arbitration is a strategy of structure, as Lord Mustill says,
“Much more important however from the point of view of structure is 
the formal relationship between arbitration and national courts. 
Undoubtedly, the most important positive trend in arbitration since the 
Sixth Congress has been the widespread recognition that the existence
‘Keynote Speachs’, in A. Berg (ed.), International Arbitration in a Changing World, ICCA Congress 
Series, No. 6, Bahrain, Deventer: Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1993, ICCA Congress No. 6, 
Bahrain 1993, 13 at p 15,
Sir M. Kerr, ‘Arbitration and the Courts: the UNCITRAL Model Law' (1985) 34 I.C.L.Q., p 1.
Ibid.
" A/CN.9/263/ADD.2, para 4.
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of a properly balanced and properly understood relationship of this 
kind is indispensable to the success o f arbitration”^^ .
This relationship is a continuous relationship, stai'ting with the arbitration agreement 
through the arbitral proceedings, until the enforcement of the award. Not only the law of 
arbitration is concerned with this relationship^^, but also the users o f arbitration may take 
the relationship in account. However, the key question is that what is the proper 
relationship between the court and arbitration? This is the key question o f this thesis. It 
will not cover all aspect o f tlris relationship, but only the most significant.
It may be argued that the role o f the court should not exclusively be to assist the arbitral 
process. The court must supervise that process to safeguard the interests o f the legal 
system. This relationship between arbitration and the court, accordingly, may be divided 
into two branches, the first being the supportive role o f the court, the second branch being 
its supervisory role, as illustrated in the diagram below.
Extending Time Limit
Constitution Arbitral Tribunal
Conducting Arbitral Proceedings
Enforcing Arbitral Award
Supervising Arbitration 
Agreement
Enforcing Arbitration 
Agreement
Judicial Support
Court & 
Arbitration
Judicial Supervision
Supervising Arbitral 
Tribunal & Its Conducts
Supervising Arbitral 
Award
See ‘Keynote Speech’, op. cit., at p 20.
See M. Kerr, ‘Arbitration and the Courts’, op. cit., p 1. See also Sir M. Mustill & S. Boyd, The Law  
Practice o f  Commercial Arbitration, 2'“* ed., London, Butterworths, 1989, p 5.
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In principle, the focal point o f this relationship should be based on supporting party 
autonomy to the fullest extent possible. The court may then support the effectiveness of 
the arbitral process, while supervising it in the interests o f integrity of the legal system in 
general. Achieving the proper balance in this relationship should entrance the 
effectiveness o f the Kuwaiti arbitral system, entrancing the attractiveness o f Kuwait as a 
venue for arbitration.
5. Arbitration and the Legal System of Kuwait
After the independence o f Kuwait from the British protectorate, which operated between 
1899 and 1961, Kuwait developed a comprehensive legislative franrework. Since 
independence Kuwait has adopted a legal system with a civil or Roman law basis. The 
majority of Kuwaiti rules are derived from the Egyptian and French codes. So, the legal 
system in Kuwait is sometimes called a French-Egyptian system. Moreover, Article 2 of 
its constitution provides that Islamic Law is a major source of law, but not the exclusive 
source. This opens the door for the legal system to be based on Islamic Law, as well as 
allowing the possibility of benefiting from other legal systems’ experiences. Thus, it can 
be said that the legal system in Kuwait is a mixture of the Roman and Islamic traditions. 
It was submitted by Keesse, in his introduction to the legal system of Kuwait,
“Despite its many years of exposure to British political and legal 
influences, Kuwait after the treaty termination proceeded to enact 
codes and statute law which resembled far more the legislation o f civil 
law jurisdictions such as France than the laws o f common law 
jurisdictions such as Britain, and which strongly emphasised the 
accommodation o f Western legal principles to precepts o f Islamic
Kuwait permits arbitration as part of its legal system. The Kuwaiti legislature has 
recognised arbitration as a mean for the settlement o f civil and commercial disputes 
within its judicial system. As EL Ahdab says, since becoming an independent state in 
1961, the State o f Kuwait has witnessed a codification movement in all branches of the 
law, including Civil and Commercial Procedure Law 1960 (CCPL 1960)^k The basic
35 Commercial Laws o f the Middle East, vol. I, issued 1989, by Oceana publications INC., p 3 See A. El-Ahdab, Arbitration in Arabic Countries, vol. 1, Paris, 1990, p 551.
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statutory regulations on arbitration were laid down in Articles 254-266 o f CCPL 1960. 
This act was modified pursuant to Law no. 78/1980 (CCPL 1980).
The arbitration system does not distinguish between international arbitration and national 
(domestic) arbitration. However, arbitration is regarded as foreign only where the award 
is signed outside Kuwait^^ In such case it will be subject to the provisions o f Articles 199 
and 200 o f CCPL 1980 and New York Convention 1958” .
This thesis will study only Voluntary Arbitration” , which is governed by CCPL 1980 
(Article 173 -188). While arbitration offers the advantages outlined above, these may be 
undermined if  the arbitration law of a particular state is not conducive to the flexible 
operation of arbitration. In the current context, it would have to be asked whether the 
ordinary arbitration regime of Kuwait is amenable to the modern arbitration process. The 
story o f the last 20 year's has been one of the liberalisation o f arbitration regimes across 
the world to allow for greater and greater party and tribunal autonomy. The current 
Kuwaiti rules predate such developments. This work will examine whether those rules 
measure up to the demands o f a modern arbitration system, using the English Ai'bitration 
Act 1996 and the UNICTRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration as 
pai'adigms. The question will be asked whether Kuwait requires a new arbitration statute 
on the model o f the English Act.
6. Background to The Model Law
It has been suggested above that one of the main templates for any modern arbitration 
statute is the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration. It may 
assist understanding to sketch the background to this measure.
6.1 UNCITRAL
UNCITRAL is the United Nation Commission on International Trade Law. The General 
Assembly o f the United Nations established it on 17 Dec 1966. Its aim is to further the 
progressive harmonisation and unification of the law o f trade and in that respect to bear
This is according to Art. 182 (4) o f CCPL 1980, which states that the arbitral award must be rendered in 
Kuwait, otherwise the rules prescribed for the awards rendered by the arbitr al tribunal in a foreign country 
shall be applied. And Art. 183 (3) clarified the matter o f rendering as that the arbitral award is deemed as 
having rendered as of the date on which the arbitrators have signed it after it has been put in writing.
This convention is relating to Recognition and Enforcement o f Foreign Arbitral Award. Kuwait acceded 
to it in 1978 pursuant Law no. 10/1978.
This thesis is about voluntaiy (ordinai-y) arbitration apart from whether it is international or national.
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in mind the interests o f all people, in particular those of developing countries, in the 
extensive development of international trade It has been described as
“the core legal body within the United Nations system in the field of 
international trade law, [with a mandate] to co-ordinate legal activities 
in this field in order to avoid duplication of effort and promote 
efficiency, consistency and coherency in the unification and 
harmonisation of international trade law”"^ .^
Within UNCITRAL' s remit would be the harmonisation and improvement o f national 
law related to arbitration'^*, given that a fair and effective process for settling disputes is 
vital to the development of international trade. UNCITRAL recognises the value o f 
arbitration and its impact in the context of international trade law. Therefore, it has 
played a vital role in promoting significant projects in the field o f commercial dispute 
settlement'’^  For example, it produced in 1976 the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, in 
1980 the UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules, in 1985 the UNCITRAL Model Law and the 
UNCITRAL Notes on Organising Arbitral Proceedings in 1996. It has also made an 
effort to promote the 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards, and to increase the effectiveness o f the Convention, by paying 
attention to the importance o f the Convention in most o f its resolutions and educational 
programmes'*^. For instance, it was stated in General Assembly resolution 40/72 that the 
Model Law, together with the New York Convention and the UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules, considerably contributes to the establishment o f a unified legal framework for the 
fair and efficient settlement o f disputes emerging in international commercial relations'*'*.
To sum up, commercial arbitration is a field in which UNCITRAL has been particularly 
active.
See General Assembly Resolution 2205 (XXI) o f 17 Dec 1966. That was subsequent to a proposal by 
Hungary that urged the United Nations to play a more active role in removing or reducing legal obstacles 
to the flow o f international trade. See C. Fleischhaure, ‘International Arbitration Report’ (1986) 41(1) Arb. 
J. 17.
General Assembly Resolution 40/71, 40 GAOR, Supp. No. 53, A/40/53, p. 307 (adopted in 11 Dec. 
1985).
■” See Explanatory Note on the Model law, para 2.
C. Fleischhaure, op. cit., atp 17.
See Holtzmann & Neuhaus, op. cit., p 5 
See A/40/53
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6.2 The Model Law
The Model Law is a valuable example o f the contribution o f the United Nations to the 
promotion o f arbitration as a method o f resolving disputes. The Model law was regarded 
as a third major contribution and accomplishment o f the United Nations in the field of 
arbitration. Having already produced the New York Convention 1958 regarding the 
Recognition and Enforcement o f Foreign Arbitral Awards, and the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules 1976, which are used world-wide in ad hoc and administered 
arbitrations, in 1985 the General Assembly o f the United Nations adopted the 
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration. The starting point o f 
the story of the genesis the Model Law occurred when the Asian - African Legal 
Consultative Committee (AALCC) o f UNCITRAL invited UNCITRAL to consider the 
possibility o f drafting a protocol to the New York Convention 1958 with view to 
clarifying a number o f questions regarded as being o f special importance in Asia and 
Africa'*^.
UNCITRAL consequently requested its secretariat and the AALCC to prepare a study on 
these matters, in consultation with, where necessary, governments, interested 
international organisations and arbitration centres, including the international Council for 
Commercial Arbitration'**^. This committee met on 6-9 June 1977. The committee realised 
the importance o f these issues not only to the Asia/Africa region, but more generally In 
the context o f international commercial arbitration. However, it reached the view that the 
preparation of a protocol to the New York Convention 1958 was not the most adequate 
way of dealing with them'*^. This is because the New York Convention 1958 had been 
widely accepted and was deemed to be a successful instrument for facilitating the 
recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral award'*^. Thus, there was no need to alter 
or amend it. It suggested, instead o f a protocol, that a new international convention or a 
uniform law should be prepared. The unanimous view was that
See the decision by the AALCC on international commercial arbitration taken at its seventeenth session, 
Kuala Lumpur, 5 July 1976, para 3 (a), (b), (c). Those issues were that where arbiti-ating parties have 
adopted rules pertaining to the conduct o f an arbihation between the parties, whether for the ad hoc 
arbitration or for institutional arbitration, should the arbitration proceedings be conducted pursuant to those 
rules, notwithstanding provisions to the contrary in municipal laws, and should the award thus rendered be 
recognised and enforced by all Conti acting States? Another is that the exclusion in international arbitration 
o f reliance on sovereign immunity. When a government agency is a paity to a contract which contains an 
arbitration clause, it must not be able to Invoke sovereign immunity in respect o f  an arbitration pursuant to 
that agreement.
A/32/17, para 39 (4).
”  Ibid, annex II “ Report o f  Committee of the Wliole IT’, para 30.
”  A/CN. 9/169, para 5.
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“ it would be in the interests of international commercial arbitration if  
UNCITRAL would initiate steps leading to establishment o f uniform 
standards o f arbitral procedures. It was considered that the preparation 
o f a Model Law on arbitration would be the most appropriate way to 
achieve the desired uniformity. Such undertaking, if  successful, would 
also meet the concerns expressed in AALCC recommendations”'*^ .
In August 1979, UNCITRAL accepted and adopted this suggestion.
Then, the commission considered the question o f the scope o f the application of such a 
model law. There was general agreement that that the scope of the Model law should be 
restricted to international commercial arbitration in view of specific features inlierent in 
the settlement o f international disputes. This would however, not prevent States which 
wished to do so from adopting the model law provisions also for domestic arbitration^**. 
Thus, UNCITRAL asked its secretariat to prepare, in consultation with interested 
international organisations, in particular the AALCC and International Council for 
Commercial Ai’bitration, a preliminary draft of the model law on arbitration procedures, 
taking into account the provisions o f New York Convention 1958 and UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules^*. The commission at its 1981 session considered the Possible Features 
o f the Model Law Report, which was prepared by the Secretariat and decided to proceed 
with the preparation o f the Model Law via a Working Group. The working group 
composed representatives from 15 member States. The purpose o f this size was to ensure 
efficient and expeditious work^^. In addition to this, States not members o f the Working 
Group had the right to attend the sessions and participate in the deliberations^^. 
Thereafter, observers from 30 member states and 6 international organisations attended^'*. 
In August 1983 UNCITRAL decided to enlarge the working Group to include all 36 o f its 
member S ta te s^ T h e  task o f preparing the model law went thi'ough five drafts with the 
working group finally adopting the fifth draft in March 1984^ **.
Ibid., para 6.
”  A/34/17, para 79.
^fbid., para 81.
”  Ibid., para. 67.
”  This is according to para 10 (C) o f the General Assembly Resolution 31/99 o f Dec 76 [31 G.A.O.R.] 
Supp. No. 39, A / 31/39, pl82-184 .
A/CN. 9/216, para 5 and 6.
”  A/38/17, para 143.
”  The Working Group adopted the fifth draft at February 1984 session. See A/CN. 9/246.
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In August 1984, UNCITRAL requested the Secretary-General o f the UN to submit the 
draft text to all governments o f the UN and all interested international organisations for 
their comments and asked the Secretariat to prepare an analytical compilation o f all such 
comments^^. UNCITRAL met in Vienna in June 1985 to review the draft text. 
Representatives of 62 States and 18 international organisation were present as members 
or observers^^. In June 21, 1985, a final.revised draft was approved and a report made 
thereon on August 21, 1985^^. In 11 Dec 1985 the General Assembly o f the UN requested 
the Secretary General to submit the final text o f the Model Law to governments, arbitral 
institutions and other interested bodies, recommending that all states give due 
consideration to the Model Law^ **.
6.3 Is the Model law a Convention?
What is the legal nature o f the UNCITRAL Model Law? It is important to understand 
that it is not a convention or treaty. There is no treaty obligation to adopt the Model Law, 
nor enact legislation in accordance with its provisions. It is designed to provide a unified 
legal framework for the fair and efficient settlement o f disputes. Member States may 
consider the Model law and may decide to adopt it as a whole. Or they may decide to 
adopt it with some amendments or omissions, depending on what they consider 
appropriate for their legal systems in general and arbitration systems in particular, or they 
may decide not to adopt it all. The Mustill Report notes,
“Member States are under no treaty obligation to enact legislation in 
accordance with its tenns. Questions of ratification do not arise. Nor 
does participation as a member of the Working Group or the 
Commission entail any obligation to enact such legislation. The 
purpose o f the discussions was to develop a text which could be 
offered to states at large as a workmanlike and readily comprehensible 
basis for an arbitration regime broadly conforming with generally 
accepted concepts of international commercial arbitration. It was not to 
be expected that all states, whatever the characteristics o f their arbitral
’^A/CN. 9/263 It may be mentioned that in May 1984 ICCA convened a conference in Switzerland to 
discuss the text draft o f the model law. There were almost 550 practitioners and scholars in the field o f  
international commercial arbitration from 39 nations. See Holtzmann & Neuhaus, op. cit., p l3.
”  A/40/17 
”  Ibid., para 332.
General Assembly Resolution 40/72.
Ch. 1 : General Introduction 18
procedures, and of their contractual, constitutional and other laws 
directly or indirectly bearing on arbitration, would necessarily find it 
advantageous or even practicable to adopt the Model Law in its 
entirety” *^.
The question whether the unification o f arbitration law should be accomplished by a 
Model Law or a convention was considered, and the decision taken was to prepare a 
model law, rather that a convention. It was stated,
“as desirable as uniformity is in general, a model law is not necessarily 
less conducive to reaching uniform standards than a convention. Apart 
from any considerations concerning the time-consuming and costly 
procedures o f adopting and ratifying a convention, it is ultimately the 
quality o f the contents of the proposed law that determines its 
acceptability”**^.
It may be added that the Model law will become the law o f a State only if  and when the 
State enacts the Model Law. It is worth mentioning that even if  the Model Law Is 
considered as a vital factor in standardising international commercial arbitration 
procedures, and would be a useflil legislative guide for all states, it is not complete a code 
o f arbitration, as it does not deal with certain areas such as capacity and arbitrability.
7. The Arbitration Act 1996
The new English Arbitration Act 1996 came into effect in early 1997. The 1996 Act is 
considered as the most extensive statutory reform o f English arbitration law in the history 
o f UK Parliament^^. The Department of Trade and Industry [DTI] initially followed on 
the Departmental Advisory Committee’s [DAC] advice to reject the adoption o f the 
UNCITRAL Model Law as a legislative text and to maintain the existing English 
system**'*. However, it came to be recognised that users needed a new English arbitration 
statute, with many features taken from the UNCITRAL Model Law. The DAC Report of
The DAC 1989 Report, ‘A New  Arbitration Act for the United Kingdom? The Response o f the 
Departmental Advisory Committee to the UNCITRAL Model Law’, [hereinafter cited as the DAC 1989 
Report], para 9.
A/CN. 9/207
See, V. Veeder, QC, ‘England’, op. cit., p369.
Ibid., p 370.
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1989 recommended that there should be a new and improved Arbitration Act along the 
following lines^^;
a) It should comprise a statement in statutory form o f the more important principles of 
the English law o f arbitration, statutory and common law.
b) It should be set out in a logical order, and expressed in language, which is 
sufficiently clear and free from teclmicalities to be readily comprehensible to the layman.
c) It should not be limited to the subject matter o f the Model Law.
d) Consideration should be given to ensuring that such new statute should, so far as 
possible, have the same structure and language as the Model Law, so as to enhance its 
accessibility to those who are familiar with the Model Law.
So the Arbitration Act is an interesting new piece o f legislation, which may improve the 
arbitral process in England, and may mark an improvement upon the Model Law** .^ For 
this reason, it will be employed as a possible model for a new Kuwaiti statute.
The Kuwaiti authorities should take note o f the growing internationalisation in sectors 
such as economics, commerce, law and arbitration sectors, and embrace that trend. The 
aim of this thesis is not to compare civilian and common law systems, but to lay out a 
better framework for the conduct of arbitration in Kuwait than exists at present. Quite 
clearly, there is no perfect arbitral system, but it may be that there is a better one.
8. Arbitration and Party Autonomy:
One o f greatest the advantages o f arbitration is party autonomy The philosophy o f this 
principle emanates from the theory that arbitration is a consensual means o f dispute 
resolution, reflecting the will o f the parties. Indeed, the recognition o f party autonomy 
(e.g. in the appointment o f arbitrators and the determination of procedure) is one o f the 
major distinctions between ai'bitration and litigation. Embracing this principle shows the 
respect accorded by the legal system to the agreement of the parties to resolve their 
dispute by arbitration under a particular arbitral framework. It offers a degree of
DAC 1989 Report, para 108.
V. Raghaven, ‘Heightened Judicial Review o f Arbitral Award’ (1998) 15 (3) J. Int’l. Arb. 103.
This principle has been recognized wildly not only in national legislations, but also by arbitral 
institutions (e.g. ICC Rules Art. 25 and AAA Rules Art. 16). See also Redfern &Hunter, para6-03 at p 
278.
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“psychological satisfaction” to the parties giving them confidence that they are free to 
choose the most appropriate rules, arbitrators and governing law. The principle provides 
an assurance that their arbitration will be conducted according to their aspirations, and 
will meet their expectations as a means o f dispute resolution.
At the most basic level, the application of the principle o f party autonomy is seen in the 
obligation o f courts, when a party breaches an arbitration agreement by resorting to 
litigation to decline jurisdiction or stay the legal proceedings'’®. Therefore, the recognition 
and enforcement o f the arbitration agreement is one o f the effects o f party autonomy. 
Another is the duty of the arbitral tribunal to comply with the wishes of the parties, as the 
agreement o f the parties provides the source and sets the limits o f the arbitrator’s powers. 
An arbitrator may be removed if  he fails to conduct the arbitral proceedings as the parties 
have agreed, and any award may be set aside. So party autonomy not only guarantees the 
freedom of the parties, but also obliges the court and the arbitral tribunal to respect the 
will o f the parties.
Wliile not so long ago most systems featured fairly strict judicial control of arbitration®, 
there has been a trend towards promoting party autonomy to the fullest extent possible, 
and the concept now lies at the heart o f all modern systems o f arbitration. Thus highly 
developed arbitration legislation, such as the Arbitration Act 1996 and the Model Law, is 
drafted so as to give the parties to the arbitration agreement maximum freedom in 
designing the arbitration process. These measures are full of instances where provisions 
feature the phrases, “the parties are free to agree” or “unless the parties agree otherwise” . 
Indeed, s.l of the English Arbitration Act 1996, uniquely articulates the fundamental 
principles on which arbitration is based, and s. 1(b) states,
“The parties should be free to agree how their disputes are resolved, 
subject only to such safeguards as are necessary in the public 
interest”.
This provision therefore heralds to all those involved in the arbitration process, potential 
users, arbitrators, and even the courts, that party autonomy is now a central pillar o f the 
English system. Similarly, article 19 of the Model Law provides,
See the role o f the court to enforce the arbitration agreement at p 66 infra.
See The Honourable Austin N.E Amissah, ‘Judicial Aspect o f  the Arbitral Process’ paper presented in 
Biennial IFCAI Conference24 Oct 1997 Geneva, it is available at
http://arbiter.wipo.int/events/conferences/1997/october/hoellering2.html> [Last visited 5 July 2003].
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“the parties are free to agree on the procedure to be followed by the 
arbitral tribunal in conducting the proceedings”.
The Analytical Commentary on Article 19 describes the article as the most vital 
provision of the Model Law, which goes a long way towards establishing procedural 
autonomy by emphasising party autonomy in procedural matters” . It may be added that 
the legislative history of the model Law shows this principle was adopted without 
opposition, it being declared
“ ...probably the most important principle on which the Model Law 
should be based on is the freedom of the parties in order to facilitate 
the proper frinctioning o f international commercial arbitration 
according to their expectations’” ’.
O f course, giving the parties maximiun scope for designing the process, instead of 
prescribing how that process is to operate, raises the question o f how the arbitration is to 
be rescued if  the parties fail to reach agreement on vital matters. M ost modern systems 
deal with this matter by making liberal use o f default provisions, laying down 
supplementary rules which apply in the absence o f agreement, thus ensuring that the 
arbitration goes ahead and avoiding gaps in the process. So, in an important sense default 
provisions reinforce party autonomy” , by according primacy to the agreement o f the 
parties, yet ensming that failure to agree does not undermine the process. Moreover, the 
increasing presence of default rules in modern arbitration legislation testifies to the 
degree to which that legislation has embraced the principle o f party autonomy.
Yet no system can allow party autonomy to be completely free from restrictions” . As the 
drafters o f the Act 1996 point out,
“In some cases, o f course, the public interest will malce inroad on 
complete party autonomy, in much the same way as there are 
limitations on the freedom o f contract”” .
™ See A/CN.9/264, para 1. 
” SeeA/CN.9/207, para 17.
72 It was submitted that there is a very wide range o f  matters over which the parties can exercise the right 
o f  party autonomy to make an agreement: if the parties, for some reasons, do not do so, the statute provides 
satisfactory “fallback” rules. This gives official recognition to the principle party autonomy in arbitration 
procedure, with proper safeguards for both the system and tribunal. See Russell, para 2-111, at p 80.
”  See C. Chattel]ee, ‘The Reality o f the Party Autonomy Rule in International Arbitration’ (2003) 20 (6) J. 
Int. Arb. 539-560 and T. Webster, ‘Party Control in International Arbitration’ (2003) 19 (2) Arb. Int. 119-
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Thus mandatory rules must safeguard public policy, firstly by imposing limitations on 
the matters referable to arbitration (e.g. criminal matters, status, anti-trust and intellectual 
property)^^ and ensuring that party autonomy does not infringe the fundamental 
principles of a legal system or the basic moral, economic and social values o f a society” . 
In terms o f specific mandatory rules which every legal system might be expected to 
insist upon, it is suggested that every system must insist that each party must be given an 
opportunity to present his case, and that each paity must be treated equally” . Such a 
requirement restricts party autonomy. So an agreement that the tribunal should hear only 
one party would be invalid. It may be suggested that these are the only principles that 
every legal system must lay down as mandatory. It might be thought that all systems 
must, as a matter of practice, feature rules dealing with the grounds on which an 
arbitrator might be challenged and removed” , or grounds on which an award might be 
challenged and set aside^’'. Yet the content of those rules would vary from system to 
system. Equally, both the Model Law and the 1996 Act feature mandatory rules dealing 
with such matters as the form of the arbitration agreement®”, raising jurisdictional 
objections®', the securing o f evidence®^ and the obligation o f the court to stay court 
proceedings in the face o f a valid arbitration agreement®®. Yet none of these issues is 
really fundamental, and the decision whether or not to make them the subject of 
mandatory rules must ultimately be a matter o f policy. At the same time there are matters 
which are covered by mandatory provisions o f the Model Law, which are not so dealt 
with by the 1996 Act®'’. So even principles regarded as frmdamental by the Model Law, 
such as the principle o f competence- competence, or the separability of the arbitration
142. See party autonomy is under the supervision o f the national court in this thesis at p i30 infra.
”  DAC 1996 Report, para. 19.
See D. Jones, ‘Arbihation and Party Autonomy- How Free is the Choice to Arbitrate?, in G. Hartwell 
(ed.), The commercial way to justice, the 1996 International Conference o f  the Chartered Institute o f  
Arbitrators, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1997, p 121. See the question o f arbitribility in this 
thesis at p 41 infra.
”  The role o f  the public policy in arbitration is discussed in this thesis aXpI82 infra.
For instance Art. 18 o f the Model Law and sec. 33 (1) (a) o f the English Arbitration Act 1996.
”  See S.24, Articles 12-14;
”  See ss.67-71, Article 34;
See S.5, Article 7;
®’ See S.32, Article 16;
®^ See S.43, Article 27;
®® See ss. 9-11, Article 8;
®'’ E.g. Article 3 (receipt o f written communications), Article 23 (need for a statement o f  claim). Article 
24 (need for oral hearing) Article 31 (form o f  award) Article 33 (jurisdiction to correct eiTors)
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agreement, are explicitly non-mandatory in the Act®®. In the same way, numerous 
mandatory provisions in the Act find no counterpart in the Model Law®”.
Yet one can deduce a legal system's attitude to the principle o f party autonomy from its 
classification o f statutory rules into mandatory and non-mandatory. When the majority o f 
the provisions are non-mandatory, this indicates support o f this principle. Accordingly, 
there should be a balance between mandatory rules and party autonomy. Arbitration 
legislation should not limit party autonomy unless there is strong justification. It seems 
that there is no need to limit the party autonomy by stipulating that there should be an 
odd number of the arbitrators merely to avoid the case of deadlock®'®. One might 
commend the aiticulation of support for the principle of autonomy, which appears in the 
1996 Act, as this signals to possible users of the system that the law will not interfere 
unduly with their freedom of choice®®.
®® Compare Article 16 with ss.7 and 30;
®” E.g. s. 12 (power o f court to extend time limits), s.26 (effect o f death o f arbiti'ator), s.28 (liability o f  
parties for fees o f arbitrator), ss.29 and 74 (immunity o f arbitrators and arbitral institutions), s.40 (general 
duties o f parties), s.56 (power to withhold award for non-payment o f fees);
®’ See further discussion in this matter in this thesis at p 95 infra.
See the recommended general principle for the new arbitration act in Kuwait at p 62 infra.
Chapter Two:
The Arbitration Agreement
1. Introduction
The arbitration agreement has to be closely examined in order to understand the 
relationship between the court and arbitration. Not only is that agreement the foundation 
stone of arbitration, but, as Herrmann has said, it is also the most fundamental 
requirement o f arbitration’, as the existence of a valid arbitration agreement is vital to the 
success of the arbitral operation. There can be no arbitration without an arbitration 
agreement. In contrast to litigation, arbitration takes place only where there is an 
agreement by the parties to arbitrate. Accordingly, having an arbitration agreement is the 
first step towards creating a relationship between the court and arbitration, given that the 
court supports the arbitration by enforcing the arbitration agreement and its provisions. 
When the court assists arbitration, it does so not only because of the desire o f the parties 
to choose arbitration, not litigation, to resolve their existing or friture disputes, but also 
because the law permits parties to refer their disputes to arbitration.
The aim of this section is to address the most crucial aspects of the arbitration agreement. 
This would cover the nature and definition o f the arbitration agreement, the autonomous 
nature o f the arbitration agreement, the domain of arbitration and formality o f the 
arbitration agreement.
Tlris chapter is devoted to deal with these questions. It is divided into four sections, each 
dealing with a significant aspect of the arbitration agreement.
Section I: The Definition and the Nature o f an Arbitration Agreement.
Section II: The Autonomous Nature o f the Arbitration Agreement.
Section III: Arbitrability.
S ection IV : F ormality.
’ See, G. Herrmann, ‘The Arbitration Agreement as the Foundation of Arbitration and Its Recognition by 
the Courts’, in A. Berg (ed.), International Arbitration in a Changing World, ICCA Congress Series, No. 
6, Balmain, Deventer: Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1993, p 41.
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2. The Nature and Definition of Arbitration Agreement
2.1. The Nature of Arbitration Agreement
We have noted that arbitration, as a private method o f adjudication, arranged and agreed 
by parties who are involved in a dispute, is one o f a number o f available methods of 
resolving civil and commercial disputes. Most legal systems allow people, who have the 
legal capacity, to resort to arbitration in order to place their dispute in the hands o f an 
independent and impartial third party and to invest in him the powers to judge the matter. 
The decision o f the arbitral tribunal will bind the parties to the arbitration agreement.
Arbitration is a consensual dispute resolution process based on an arbitration agreement, 
albeit that an arbitration clause can be a part o f another contract. The arbitration 
agreement is the foundation stone o f arbitration, and is an agreement like any other 
agreement. The subject matter o f this contract is that the parties shall refer their present 
or future dispute to arbitration and not to the competent court. It may describe the arbitral 
tribunal and its jurisdiction, or lay out the procedure for appointment of the arbitral 
tribunal.
In general, the arbitration agreement expresses and reflects the desire of the contracting 
parties to settle their existing or future disputes by means of arbitration. This arbitration 
agreement gives the parties the right to submit their disputes to be resolved by 
arbitration. Indeed, it obliges them to go to arbitration and pai'ticipate in the arbitral 
process unless they both decide otherwise^. It also suspends the jurisdiction of the 
comfs®. An arbitration agreement creates a contractual obligation. It binds each party to 
co-operate with the other in taking appropriate steps to refer the dispute or the difference 
to arbitration, to keep the arbitral process moving until the final decision is granted by 
the arbitral tribunal, and to respect and obey the arbitral awai'd. This agreement creates a 
mutual obligation, obliging the parties to place their dispute before the arbitral tribunal to 
judge. It also binds them to go to ai'bitration and not resort to legal proceedings. 
However, the parties can ignore the arbitration agreement and resort to litigation if  they 
both decide to do so; e.g. where they consider that litigation is more appropriate than 
arbitration. Furthermore, the court may treat the parties as having waived the arbitration 
agreement where one o f the parties to the arbitration agreement litigates, and the other
 ^Sanderson v. Armour & Co., 1922 S.C. (H. L.) 117 per Lord Dunedin at 120.
® See Art. 173 (5) o f CCPL 1980, Art. 8 o f the Model Law and sec. 9 o f the Arbitration Act 1996.
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party participates in this litigation without pleading the existence of the arbitration 
agreement^ The court may also regard a party as having waived his right to arbitrate, 
even if  an application to stay the proceedings has been made, if  the court thinks that there 
has been unnecessaiy delay in raising that plea, in particular if  the plea is raised at an 
advanced stage of the litigation.
A valid arbitration agreement, suspends the jm isdiction o f the courts, the pailies being 
deemed to have waived their basic right to litigate. It has been said, “if  the parties have 
contracted to arbitration, to arbitration they must go” .^ So, when one o f the parties, 
contrary to the arbitration agreement, commences legal proceedings, the other party is 
entitled to apply for a stay. He may indirectly enforce the arbitration agreement by means 
o f the rules that govern stays o f legal proceedings^. Article 8 o f the Model Law, s.9 o f 
the English Arbitration Act 1996, and Article 174 o f CCPL 1980 each deals with the 
effect o f an arbitration agreement where a party brings an action before the court in a 
matter which is the subject of that agreement, providing that if  the other party makes a 
timeous application to the court to stay the legal proceedings, it shall grant such a stay 
and refer the parties to arbitration.
A valid arbitration agreement gives the arbitral tribunal the foundation and the authority 
to deal with the dispute, empowering it to make an award which will bind the arbitrating 
parties. In other words, the arbitral tribunal derives its jurisdiction and power from the 
arbitration agreement. Moreover, the arbitration agreement invokes the rules that govern 
the arbitration under the applicable law, in particular, the supportive and supervisory 
powers o f the court, since without a valid arbitration agreement, these rules will not be 
active.
In summary, Arbitration is a consensual dispute resolution process based on an 
arbitration agreement. This agreement reflects the decision o f the parties to settle their 
disputes by arbitration. Such agreement in principle suspends the jurisdiction o f the state 
court to deal with the disputes. This agreement is one o f the sources o f provisions that 
govern arbitral proceedings.
 ^ See Prof F. Davidson, Arbitration, op. cit., para 7.19 at p 119.
® Sanderson  v. Armour & Co., 1922 S.C, (H. L.) 117 per Lord Dunedin at 120. 
” This matter is discussed in Ch. 3, see pp. 66-81 infra.
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2.2 The Statutory Definition of Arbitration Agreement
It was submitted during drafting the Model Law, that “In contrast to court litigation, 
arbitration proceedings usually take place only if  the parties have so agreed. Therefore, 
the model law should contain provisions on this basic agreement’” .
This section is divided into two parts. The first part focuses on the definition of 
arbitration, the second on the definition of an arbitration agreement, in order to get as 
clear a picture as possible o f the problems of providing a statutory definition of these 
concepts. It will then be possible to decide whether any new Act should first define those 
terms.
(a) The Statutory Definition of Arbitration
It seems to be a difficult task to attempt to propound a universal or exhaustive definition 
o f the term ‘arbitration’. It is true that this term is widely used in most legal systems, 
appearing in national legislation and international conventions. However, there has never 
been a comprehensive definition of the term^. The Kuwaiti system, like other legal 
systems, does not provide a comprehensive answer to the question, “what is an 
arbitration”?
UNCITRAL considered the question whether the model law should expressly state a 
statutory definition of arbitration^. After deliberation between the drafters the conclusion 
was that a definition of ‘arbitration’ was unnecessary***. The UNCITRAL Model Law is 
thus a good example o f an unsuccessful attempt to define the term inclusively. The 
reasons for not attempting a comprehensive definition were declared in the Second 
Secretariat Note**, The first was that it would involve the difficult task of drawing a 
distinction between arbitration proper and types o f non-legal arbitration such as the 
Italian arbitrato irritai, the Dutch bindend advies and the German schiedsgutachten. The 
draftsmen o f the Model law were agreed that the Model law should cover arbitration 
proper, and not apply to such devices, which are labelled arbitration, but which 
determine questions of fact rather than law and, and where the decision is binding like a 
mere contract provision, rather than as an award*^. The difficulty in distinguishing
 ^A/CN.9/207, para 39.
® A/CN.9/WG11/WP. 35, para 10.
” A/CN. 9/216, para 1 (Q l-2).
Ibid., para 17 
“ A/CN. 9/WG.II/ WP. 35 para. 10 
” Ibid., para 30.
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between arbitration as conceived by the Model Law and these other mechanisms, which 
are sometimes labelled arbitration, militated against providing a comprehensive 
definition o f arbitration. The second reason was that while the term ‘arbitration’ is 
widely utilised in national legislation and international conventions, no attempt to define 
the term has yet been made*^. Thus the Model Law does not offer a definition of 
arbitration. Nor did the framers o f the English Arbitration Act 1996 seek to define the 
term arbitration*'*, as it was their conviction that any attempted definition would not 
serve any purpose *\
So, the conclusion must be that it is not an easy task for any legislature to offer a 
comprehensive definition o f arbitration, even if  that definition is required in order to 
distinguish arbitration from other types of process, so that it can be decided whether 
relevant legal rules apply. Thus, in practice, probably only the court can fill this gap, by 
determining whether there a process amounts to arbitration or not, whether there is an 
arbitration agreement, whether there is an arbitral process, and whether there is an 
arbitral award. It is able to judge these questions on a case-by-case basis, from both a 
theoretical and a practical angle.
(b) The Statutory Definition of an Arbitration Agreement
The concept o f an arbitration agreement is very clearly defined in the Model Law, the 
English Arbitration Act 1996 and the Kuwaiti CCPL 1980. Article 7(1) of the Model 
defines an arbitration agreement as “an agreement by the parties to submit to arbitration 
all or certain disputes which have arisen or which may arise between them in respect o f 
defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not” . The English Arbitration Act 1996 
s.6 (1) states that, “an arbitration agreement means an agreement to submit to arbitration 
present or future disputes (whether they are contractual or not)”. The Kuwaiti CCPL 
1980 gives its definition in Article 173 (1) as an agreement to refer to arbitration a 
present or future disputes whether they are contractual or not” .
” A/CN. 9/WG.II/WP. 35 para 10.
”  DAC Report on the Arbitration Bill, Feb 1996, [hereafter cited as DAC 1996 Report] para 18.
”  Ibid.
”  In France the Code o f Civil Procedure 1981 (CCP) provided a definition for each o f the arbitration 
clause and the arbitration submission. Art. 1442 contains that “An arbitration clause is an agreement by 
which the parties to contract undertake to submit to arbiti ation the disputes which may arise with respect to 
that contract”, and Art. 1447 states, “A submission is an agreement by which the parties to an existing 
dispute refer the matter to arbihation by one or more persons”.
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So defining the arbitration agreement in such a way emphasises the contractual basis of 
arbitration, making it clear that such an agreement is necessary for arbitration. It 
indicates that the foundation o f arbitration is an agreement to arbitrate and not a promise 
to ai’bitrate. The drafters o f the Model Law agreed that an “arbitration agreement” should 
be defined as an “agreement” rather than as an “undertaking”, so as not to raise doubts as 
to the difference between an agreement and an undertaking” . Therefore, the definition of 
arbitration agreement should characterise the legal instrument which forms the basis and 
jurisdiction o f an arbitration” as a contract” . This would show that arbitration is not only 
a judicial regime but also a contractual regime^". Although, an arbitral award illustrates 
the judicial nature o f arbitration, arbitration is a method for resolving disputes which is 
based on the desire of the contracting parties^’. The statutory definition should help stress 
why the court should support and assist the arbitral process and party autonomy, and why 
the arbitral tribunal should comply with the will o f the parties. Moreover, the definition 
should recognise an arbitration agreement relating to existing or future disputes. Tliis 
would send a clear message that there is no distinction (as to legal effect) between an 
arbitration clause and an arbitration submission, such as exists in some Latin American 
countries, so as to deprive an arbitration clause o f any legal force^l It was hoped by the 
drafters o f the Model Law that recognition o f the two types of arbitration agreement, and
”  See A/CN.9/232, para 38.
”  A/CN.9/264, para 1.
”  This would serve eliminating the idea that arbitral clause is not an agreement, it is a promise to conclude 
an arbiti ation agreement when a dispute exists. See M. Aboul-Enein, ‘The Contract: What Causes Courts 
to Disregard Agreement to Arbihate, and How Can Such Agreement Be Improved to Avoid That Fate 
According to N ew  Arab Laws o f arbitration?’ in A. Berg (ed.). International Arbitration and National 
Courts: the Never Ending Story, ICCA Congress, Series No. 10, New Delhi, Kluwer Law International, 
2000, p 19.
For the theories about the natiue o f the arbitration see for example H. Yo, ‘Total Separation of 
International Commercial Arbitration and National Court Regime’ op. cit., 145-166. See also R. David, 
Arbitration in international trade, Antwerp; Boston: Kluwer Law and Taxation Publications, cl985 , p76. 
It seems that the issue o f what is the legal nature o f  arbitration had been the subject o f  debate. However, no 
one can easily ignore the conti actual nature o f arbitration.
It was submitted “Arbitration is similar to litigation in that it involves an adjudicative process including 
the presentation o f proofs and arguments and the making o f a decision by a third party. It is different in 
other respects. Notably, the disputants, through their agreement to arbitrate, have the opportunity to design 
specific features o f the process. They can set the procedural rules, which include, for example, 
establishment o f a method foe selecting the third party decision-maker. Additionally, the disputants can 
designate the decision- making principles that are to be applied by the arbitrators in reaching their 
decision”, see M. Levin, op. cit., p l06. See also G. Moss, ‘National Rules on Arbitiability and the Validity 
o f an international Award: the Example o f  Disputes Regarding Petroleum Investment in Russia’, It is 
available at <www.chamber.se/arbitration/shared_files/ articles/arkiv/giuditta.pdf> [Last visited 5 July 
2003] 7-24 atp  15.
“  Dr. FI. Tadeusz (Rapporteur) & Prof. B. Cremades (Chairman), ‘Arbitration Agreement and Competence 
o f the Arbitial tribunal’, in P. Sanders (ed.), U ncitral’s project fo r  a model law on international 
commercial arbitration, ICCA Congress Series, N o. 2, Lausanne, Deventer: Kluwer Law and Taxation 
Publishers, 1984, p 55.
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particularly arbitration clauses given their frequent use in arbitration, would help 
promote global unification on the issue“ .
Thus the law should aclaiowledge that an arbitration agreement may arise in either o f 
two ways. The first is where parties conclude a contract including a term that disputes 
which may arise from that contract shall be decided by reference to arbitration. An 
arbitration clause is just a single term among many in an agreement, and a secondary 
term at that. Parties at the time o f concluding their contract tend rarely to contemplate 
disputes, with the result that they include as a mere formality a short model clause 
indicating their desire to refer any friture dispute to arbitration^"*. This is an agreement 
inside an agreement, the object o f which is to bind the parties to submit any future 
dispute or difference to arbitration. It is usually brief, and does not include much detail. 
There are two reasons for this. Firstly, there is usually no specific legal requirement as to 
the form of the arbitration clause^^ which thus tends simply to reflect the desire of the 
parties to submit any future dispute or difference to arbitration. Secondly, no dispute or 
difference having arisen yet, the parties have no idea about the specific dispute or 
difference that may arise. The second form is that after a dispute or difference has 
already arisen between the parties, they may agree to refer that dispute or difference to 
arbitration. The position o f the parties here is completely different, as they Icnow 
precisely the nature of their dispute when they conclude an arbitration agreement, called 
an “arbitration submission”. Thus, an arbitration agreement can be found in either an 
arbitration clause or an arbitration submission.
To sum up, the arbitration agreement is the principal basis o f arbitration. The Model 
Law, the English Arbitration Act 1996 and the Kuwaiti CCPL.1980 all essay a definition 
o f an arbitration agreement, by saying that an arbitration agreement is an agreement 
concluded by the parties to submit to arbitration present or future disputes whether they 
are contractual or not. Each definition covers both arbitration clauses and submissions, as 
well as making it clear that an arbitration agreement can be related to disputes that are 
not contractual. Any Arbitration Act should take this line.
A/CN.9/264, para 2
See M. Aboul-Eneiii, op. cit., p i9.
This is not the case in franc. Since, it requires that the arbitration clause should either appoint the 
arbitrator or arbitrators or set forth the manner in which there are to be appointed. Failure to meet such 
statutory requirement, an arbitration clause shall be null. See, Art. 1443 o f  CCP 1981. Such requirement is 
not provided in Kuwait or England or the Model Law.
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3. Autonomous Nature of the Arbitration Agreement
3.1 Introduction
The main purpose of this section is to focus on one o f the most valuable aspects o f the 
arbitration agreement. The crux o f the following discussion is whether an arbitration 
agreement is separable from the underlying commercial agreement in which it appears. 
Obviously, such an issue does not arise in the context o f an arbitration submission, as 
this is clearly an independent agreement. But an arbitration clause is a term of the main 
contract. So, should its fate follow that o f the main contract, or is the clause an 
independent agreement inside the main agreement? The latter approach expresses the 
doctrine of separability.
3.2 The Doctrine of Separability
It should be added that most legal systems now regard the arbitration clause as 
constituting a self-contained agreement ancillary to the principal contract. Tliis is Icnown 
as the doctrine of separability or the autonomy o f the arbitration clause. Tliis means that 
the principal contract, containing a clause refening future disputes or differences to 
arbitration, sets up two independent contracts. The principal contract deals with the 
rights and obligations o f the parties. The secondary or collateral contract concerns the 
agreement to refer any dispute or difference to arbitration. Thus it can be argued that 
both contracts are independent of each other. It follows from this that the termination o f 
the principal contract does not affect the arbitration clause. This is the principle of 
separability.
The principle of separability seems to be logicaP^, practical and desirable. The 
agreement to arbitrate is established in the arbitration clause, and without this agreement 
there can be no arbitration. Moreover, that clause is created with the pathology o f the 
contract in mind, and may only be brought into action when one party is claimed to be in 
breach, and the other claims to be entitled to rescind and thus 'terminate' the contract. 
Accordingly, it is logical that it should survive the termination of the contract. It is fair to 
say, however, that not every legal system has always taken that view.
See the view that the doctrine is not easy to justify as a matter o f pure logic in W. Craig et al.. 
International Chamber o f  Commerce Arbitration, 3"^  ^ed., N.Y. Oceana Publications, 2000, p 49.
Ch. 2: Arbitration Agreement 32
To sum up, the concept o f the doctrine o f separability provides that an arbitration 
agreement, even though included in and related closely to an underlying commercial 
contract, is a separate and autonomous agreement.
3.3 The Aim s.of the Doctrine of Separability
It is suggested that the most important aims o f this principle are as follows. Firstly, it 
prevents a party who desires to delay justice being done in due time achieving that object 
by questioning in court the existence or the validity o f the arbitration agreement (by 
questioning the validity of the main contract), as the invalidity of the main contract does 
not necessarily invalidate the arbitration agreement. This is one o f the consequences o f 
the principle of separability. Secondly, it invests the arbitral tribunal with jurisdiction to 
deal with the disputes between the parties. It is recognised that the main practical 
advantage o f this principle is to confer jurisdiction upon an arbitral tribunaPh The 
principle, by ensuring the survival o f the arbitration clause, gives the arbitral tribunal 
power to deal with disputes over the questions o f the initial validity or invalidity o f the 
principal contract. In other words, the principle implies the arbitral tribunal’s power to 
consider its own jurisdiction. So, when the arbitral tribunal decides that the main contract 
is null and void, this does not by itself result in the validity o f the arbitration agreement^**. 
Therefore, according to this principle, the arbitral tribunal has a proper foimdation for its 
authority to decide on the nullity of the contract. For such reason, the separability 
principle is sometimes referred to as the principle of competence-competence. This is 
because o f the direct connection between these two principles'^. It may be emphasised 
that these principles are indeed related, but quite distinct. Separability does not necessary 
imply competence-competence^'’.
Thirdly, it tends to facilitate international and domestic trade by upholding the desire o f 
the users (investors and businessmen) of the arbitration clause to resolve their disputes 
by arbitration not by litigation. Its autonomous nature would correspond with the intent 
and the will o f the parties when they conclude a main contract with an arbitral clause^'.
A. Redfern & M. Hunter, Law and Practice o f  International Commercial Arbitration, 3rd ed. London: 
Sweet & Maxwell, 1999, para 3-32 at pl55.
^®See Comraentaiy on the Articles o f the Model Law: Part II o f  the Committee’s Consultative Document 
on the Model Law, Dated October 1987,published in Arb. Int. 1990.
Redfern & blunter, op. cit., para 3-34 at pl56.
The difference between the two principles is discussed in depth in pp. 33-37 infra.
^'See, P. Sanders, Encyclopaedia o f International and Comparative Law, Vol. XIV, Chap. 12 (Arbitration), 
under the auspices o f  the International Association o f  Legal Science, Tubingen and Martinus N ijhoff 
Publishers, 1986, [Hereinafter cited as Int'l Enzycl.Comp.L], para 112 at p 62.
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It may also play a considerable role in the relationship between the court and arbitration, 
since as result o f the autonomous nature o f the arbitration agreement, the court would not 
deal with the dispute. It may have to uphold the arbitration agreement even if there is a 
challenge to the main contract.
To conclude, the autonomy of the arbitration agreement would help to ensure the smooth 
operation of arbitration^^ This principle may enable the court to support arbitration, by 
obliging it to enforce the arbitration agreement, even if  there is a challenge directed at 
the main contracTl So, a party could not avoid arbitration or delay the arbitral 
proceedings by simply alleging that the principal contract is invalid. Generally, whatever 
degree o f legal fiction is involved in this principle, it is regarded as vital to allow 
connnercial arbitration to operate effectively^''.
3.4 The Attitude of Kuwaiti Law in Relation to the Principle of Separability
There is no doubt about the practical importance of the principle o f separability, which 
has been accepted and recognised, in most legal systems in the world. It is probable that 
the users o f arbitration (or their legal advisers) may look to a legal system to observe the 
principle, in order to deliver the benefits referred to above. In spite o f these factors, 
Kuwaiti law has a negative position regarding this doctrine. Kuwaiti law does regard an 
arbitration clause as a type o f the ai'bitration agreement, akin to an arbitration 
submission. However, arbitration law does not contain any provision in relation to the 
autonomy o f the arbitration clause from the main contract. Current Kuwaiti arbitration 
rules do not address the question o f the separability o f the arbitration clause. In this 
matter they are s ilen t^M o reo v er, the courts have not provided any decision on the 
issue. It is therefore possible that the doctrine of the autonomy o f the arbitration clause 
from the main contract in which it is contained might actually be recognised, but remains 
unarticulated thus far. It is submitted that this is one o f the defects of Kuwaiti arbitration
^^See, H. Yu, ‘Five Years on: a Review o f the English Arbitration Act 1996’ (2002) 19 (3) J. Int. Arb. 
209-225 at p 213.
It was suggested that the motivating force behind the establishment o f this doctrine is the plain desire to 
uphold the validity of the arbitration agreement. See W. Craig et al., op. cit., p 49.
UK Department o f Trade and Industry Consultation Document on Proposed Clauses and Schedules for 
arbitration Bill, in Arb. Int. 1994, para 4 (Ü) at pp. 189-227.
In France, the CCP 1981 does not indicate directly to the principle o f  separablity o f the arbitration 
clause. However, it is believed that art. 1466 o f  the CCP 1981 recognises it implicitly. Since, this article 
adopts the principle o f competence-competence. Yves comments on this, and said “It implies that he has 
the power to decide on the validity o f the main contract, since the only reason why such power m the past 
was denied to arbitrators in domestic cases, in the absence o f the recognition o f  the separability o f the 
arbitral clause, was their inability to be judge o f their own jurisdiction”. See, Y. Derains, op. cit., p 8.
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law. It has not kept up with the development o f arbitration law in the world^'’. It must 
now adopt the principle o f separability in order to gain the benefits o f this principle. The 
question, is then what is the most appropriate method for adopting this principle? The 
following paragraphs will shed some light on the approaches o f English law and the 
Model Law to this point in order to recommend how Kuwaiti arbitration law might best 
be brought in line with modern thinldng on this issue.
(a) English Law
Even though the current position of English Law is established by the Act, the English 
courts played a significant role in establishing the principle o f separability in the English 
legal imagination, and in the minds o f the drafters of the Act^F The principle o f 
autonomy o f the arbitral clause was developed in England in a line of cases, starting with 
the House of Lords decision in Heyman v Darwins^^, and culminating in the judgment in 
Harbour Assurance v Kansa.^^ In that case, Steyn J. held that an arbitration clause is a 
self-contained agreement providing for the resolution of the dispute by the means of 
arbitration and not otherwise."***. This judgment establishes the nature o f an arbitration 
clause as an agreement inside an agreement. Therefore, the arbitration clause was treated 
as independent from the main contract. Thus, the arbitration clause remains executory, 
even if  the main contract is deemed invalid. This is due to the fact that the arbitration 
clause imposes a contractual obligation on the contracting parties. An arbitration 
agreement creates a mutual obligation. Each party to the agreement has to co-operate 
with the other in taking the first steps to resolve the dispute by the method they adopted. 
An arbitration clause is, “An agreement between the parties as to what will do if  and 
whenever there occurs an event o f particular kind”"**.
Thus, a true understanding of the nature o f the arbitration clause will lead logically to the 
principle o f separability, as the existence o f such a clause indicates the desire o f the 
parties to settle their future dispute by arbitration not by other means. Therefore, how
Since, there has been a clear tendency, in a great number o f  countries, to adopt the idea o f independence 
o f the arbitration agieement from the main contract. See R. David, op. cit., para 211 at p 193,
As indicated by Steyn J. in Paul Smith Ltd. v. II & s International Holding Inc. that the principle of 
separability has slowly won judicial approbation in England. See [1991] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 127. See also C. 
Svernlov, ‘Arbitration: Doctrines o f “Separability” o f the Arbitration Agreement and “Competence De La 
Competence” in English Law’ (1992) 3(5) ICCLR C94-95.
^®[1942] 1 All ER. 337.
^^[1993]QB 701.
Smith L td  v. H  & S International [1991] 2QB, 127.
Bremer Vulkan v South India Shipping [1981] lALL. ER, (HL) 289, per Lord Diplock at p 298.
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could the arbitration clause be deemed other than independent from the principal 
contract? It is clear from the above that the English courts realised the importance o f the 
principle o f separability, and the danger which might result from not adopting it, i.e. that 
the nullity of the main contract will annul the arbitral clause. So even if  it is argued that 
a contract is void due to illegality, the arbitration clause survives to confer jurisdiction on 
the arbitrator to rule on this issue"* .^
The position o f the English courts is described above, but what is the position o f the 
Arbitration Act 1996 in relation to the principle o f separability? Section 7 states,
“Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, an arbitration agreement 
which forms or was intended to form part o f another agreement 
(whether or not in writing) shall not be regai’ded as invalid, non­
existent or ineffective because that other agreement is invalid, or did 
not come into existence or has become ineffective, and it shall for that 
purpose be treated as distinct agreement” .
By virtue o f this section, an arbitration clause will remain valid and effective despite an 
allegation of illegality affecting the main contact “(which challenge if  proved would 
render the substantive agreement void)”"*^. Veeder opines,
“the doctrine of separability or autonomy, assumes a legally distinct 
agreement; and it ensures that a legal defect in the substantive contract 
does not infect with invalidity an otherwise effective arbitration clause 
physically embedded or incorporated by reference in that substantive 
contract” ."*"*
So s.7 brings English arbitration law in line with the modern principle of separability, 
which has been accepted and recognised in many countries. This section establishes the 
autonomous nature o f the arbitration agreement more comprehensively and more 
definitively than case law, although the case law had already reached a similar positioiT^ 
It has to be noted that s.7 is non-mandatory, and may be overridden by the parties. So 
this would allow that parties to agree that the arbitration agreement is not autonomous
Harbour Assurance Co. Ltd. v K am a General International Insurance Co. L td  [1993] QB. 701.
B. Harris et a l .  The Arbitration Act 1996 A Commentary, 2"^ * ed., 2000, p 79.
Intl. HandBook on Comm. Arb, siippl 23, Mai’ch 97, p.23.
D. Sutton et a l ,  Russell on arbitration, 21st ed., London; Sweet & Maxwell, 1997, [hereinafter cited as 
Russell] para 2-009, at p 33.
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from the main contract if  they wish, although it would be doubtfril whether simply 
excluding s.7 would have this effect, given the attitude o f the common law to this issue. 
Such freedom might not be found in other legal systems.
(b) The Model Law
At an early stage o f the drafting process it was suggested that “The model law take a 
clear stand in favour of separability or the autonomy of the arbitration clause, as adopted 
in modern arbitration laws”"*^ , continuing that,
“An arbitration clause, which forms part of the contract, shall be 
treated as an agreement independent o f the other terms o f the contract.
This independence may become relevant to, and facilitate, a ruling of 
the arbitral tribunal on objections that it has no jurisdiction where those 
objections relate to the existence or validity o f the arbitration clause.
Another usefiil import o f separability is that decision by the arbitral 
tribunal that the contract is null and void and not entail ipso jure  the 
invalidity of the arbitration clause”"*^.
So very early on it was agreed that the Model Law would codify the doctrine o f the 
autonomy of arbitration clause."*® It was noted, “there was general agreement that the 
model should adopt the principle of the separability or autonomy of the arbitral clause”"*^. 
So Article 16 o f the Model Law articulates the broad and vital principle o f separability, 
stating,
“for that purpose, an arbitration clause which forms part o f the contract 
shall be treated as an agreement independent of the other terms o f the 
contract. A decision by the ai’bitral tribunal that contract is null and 
void shall not entail ipso jure  the invalidity o f the arbitration clause” *^*.
A/CN.9/207 para 58.
Ibid.
See Dr. A. Broches, ‘UNICITRAL Commentary on Model Law’, Intl. HandBook on Comm. Arb, vol. 
IV suppl.l 1, Januaiy 1990, p 73.
A/CN.9/216, para34 
Art. 16 o f  the Model Law.
Ch.2: Arbitration Agreement 37
(c) W hat Is the Difference Between these Approaches?
The following paragraphs will attempt to analyse the attitude of the Model Law and 
English Arbitration Act 1996 regarding the principle o f separability and its relationship 
with the principle of competence-competence -  the power of the tribunal to rule on its 
own jurisdiction. It is quite clear that both the Model Law and English Arbitration Act 
realised the importance of the principle o f separability in arbitration. However, the 
Model Law and English Arbitration Act 1996 embodied the principle o f separability 
tlirough different structures and on different bases. In order to demonstrate this point, we 
must first consider the question of the relationship between the principle of separability 
and the principle o f competence - competence.
The following paragraphs will concentrate on the relationship between tliese principles 
under the Model Law and Arbitration Act 1996. The first question to present itself is 
whether there is any relationship between the principle o f sepaiabllity and the principle 
o f competence- competence? It is suggested that this relationship depends on the effect 
of the principle of separability. It is plain that Article 16 o f the Model Law largely 
conjoined the principles o f separability and competence - competence. The view o f the 
makers of the Model Law seems to be that these concepts are important in practice, and 
without them a party could stall the arbitration at any time merely by raising an objection 
to the arbitral tribunal's jurisdiction that “could then only be resolved in possibly lengthy 
court proceedings” *^. It may be deduced from the structure of Article 16 that the Model 
Law adopts the theory that the principle o f sepai'ability does affect the jurisdiction o f the 
arbitral tribunal. It seems that the makers o f the Model Law support the theory that the 
principle o f competence - competence is deemed a consequence of the principle of 
separability.
This theory was established clearly in the first draft o f the relevant Ai'ticle, which ran,
“For the purpose of determining whether the arbitral tribunal has 
jurisdiction, an arbitration clause which forms part of the contract shall 
be treated as an agreement independent of the other terms o f the 
contract”^^ .
Holtzmann & Neuhaus, op. cit., p 479. 
A/CN.9/WGII/WP.37.
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It would appear that the aim o f the principle of separability, here, is to invest the arbitral 
tribunal with the jurisdiction to deal with the disputes between the parties. The principle 
o f the autonomy of the arbitration clause plays a vital role in allowing the survival o f the 
arbitration clause in order to give the arbitral tribunal a power to deal with the disputes 
over the question o f the initial validity or invalidity o f the principal contract. Therefore, 
according to this principle, the arbitral tribunal will not lack foundation for its authority 
to decide on the nullity of the contract. It can be said that, in the view o f the Model Law, 
the doctrine of competence - competence complements the principle o f separability” . It 
was stated in the seventh Secretariat Note Analytical Commentary on the draft text
“The (doctrine o f separability) complements the power o f the arbitral 
tribunal to determine its own jurisdiction in that it calls for treating 
such a clause as an agreement independent of the other terms o f the 
contract” "^*.
Thus Article 16 operates on the basis that the principle of competence - competence is a 
logical outcome of the principle o f separability o f the arbitration clause” .
On the other hand, although the English Arbitration Act 1996 adopted the two principles, 
it did so in separate sections so as to differentiate between them. Section 7 establishes the 
principle of separability, while s. 30 lays down the principle o f competence - 
competence. By articulating these concepts in different sections, the English aim to 
distinguish between these principles. The English Arbitration Act is based on the view 
that there is no necessary relationship between the principles o f separability and 
competence - competence. It was said,
“it seems to us that the doctrine of separability is quite distinct from 
the question o f the degree to which the tribunal is entitled to rule on its 
own jurisdiction, so that unlike the model law, we have dealt with the 
principle of competence elsewhere in the Bill”^^ .
It was also said that the principle o f competence-competence is based on the principle o f separability. 
See M. Jalili, ‘Kompetence- Kompetence: Recent U.S. and U.K. Development’ (1996) 13 (4) J. Int. Arb. 
169-178 atp 169.
”  A/CN.9/264, para 2.
It was submitted “One o f the fundamental principles o f arbitration law is that arbitrators have the power 
to rule on their own jurisdiction. That principle is often presented as the corollary o f the principle o f the 
autonomy o f the arbitration agreement”. See J. Savage & E. Gaillard, International Commercial 
arbitration, Kluwer Law International, 1999, para 416.
DAC 1996 Report, para 43.
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The concept of the principle o f the autonomy of the arbitration clause in this context 
suggests that the validity of the ai'bitration clause will not depend on the validity o f the 
principal contract or the other terms o f the contract. The concept of the principle o f 
separability means that an arbitration clause included in an agreement shall be treated as 
an agreement separate from the main contract. Therefore, in principle, it will not 
necessarily follow the fate o f the principal contiact. To put it more simply, the 
contracting parties are bound, by virtue o f this principle, to arbitrate. However, if  the 
issue o f separability is treated as logically distinct from competence- competence, the 
possibility remains open that it might primarily be for the court to decide the issue o f the 
jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal. Thus, the English Act is careful to distinguish the 
principle o f separability from the principle o f competence- competence, which latter 
principle is of coui'se designed to give the arbitral tribunal the foundation to rule on its 
own jurisdiction
It is suggested that the approach adopted by English Arbitration Act 1996 might be 
difficult to understand. This is due to the fact that both the principle of separability and 
that o f competence - competence work side by side for the purpose o f making the arbitral 
process operative and effective. The key question is then what is the practical value o f 
the principle o f separability without the principle o f competence-competence? It is 
suggested that making each principle non-mandatory, as the English Act does, will make 
the task o f ensuring that arbitral process operates effectively more difficult. The aim o f 
such an English approach might be to offer multiple choices for the contracting parties. 
So the parties are free under the English Arbitration Act 1996, (i) to contract out o f both 
principles, or (ii) to contract out o f only one of the principles, or (hi) to contract out of 
neither. In each case, it is the responsibility of the contracting parties firstly to realise the 
importance o f each principle, and then to make a decision in this matter. If  they do not 
address this matter, both principles would apply by default. This approach is of course 
based on the principle o f party autonomy.
It would appear that the principle o f separability o f the arbitration agreement which is 
closely related to but different from, the concept o f Competence- Competence. The 
principle o f competence- competence should not be confused with the principle o f the 
autonomy o f the arbitration agreement, by which the validity o f an arbitration agreement
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is determined independently from the validity o f the main contract in which it is 
encapsulated” .
The philosophy of the principle of separability permits the arbitral tribunal to invalidate 
the basic contract (e.g., for illegality) without the risk that its decision will call into 
question the validity o f the ai’bitration clause from which it derives its authority and 
power” . Indeed, it gives the tribunal the tool with which to perform its function, by 
examining fully the pai’ties’ agreement” . The scope o f the principle o f autonomy o f the 
arbitration agreement only arises for consideration where the challenge is directed at the 
main contract, which contains the arbitration clause, and says nothing about the validity 
o f that clause itself’*’. It thus deals cases where a challenge to an arbitration clause is 
made on the basis that the main contract is invalid. Such allegations used to create,
“a major conceptual problem for an arbitral tribunal ruling on the 
validity o f an arbitration clause. If  the contract (and hence the 
arbitration clause) is invalid or is non-existent, then the basis for the 
tribunal to convene to decide whether or not the clause is valid is not 
immediately apparent” '^.
The autonomous nature of the arbitration agreement provides the solution. Since it 
recognises an obligation to go to arbitration, which is distinct from the main contract, so 
that disputes as to the scope, or even the existence, of the main contract can be 
arbitrated*’^ .
See W. Craig et a l ,  op. cit., para 5.04 at p 48. See also William W. Park when he says that the English 
Arbitration Act 1996 wisely avoids affirming separability in the same section with principle competence -  
competence, thus resisting the tendency to confuse these two concepts. See his article ‘The Interaction of 
Courts and Arbitrators’, op. cit., 54
” See P. Sanders, Int’l Enzycl.Comp.L., op. cit., para 112 at p 62. See also W. Park, ‘Determining Arbitral 
Jurisdiction: Allocation o f Tasks between Courts and Arbitrators’ (2000) 1 (Mar) A.D.R.L.J. 19-30, at pp. 
25-27 .
”  Ibid.
^^Ibid. See also, R. Merkin, Arbitration Law, London; Lloyds o f London Press, 1991, para 4.33.1, Service 
Issue N o 33; 1 Jan 2003.
*’* Redfern & Hunter, op. cit., para 5-30 at p 263.
”  R. Merkin, op. cit., para 4.33.1, Service Issue No 33; 1 Jan 2003.
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Meanwhile the concept o f competence -  competence means no more than that the 
arbitral tribunal can look into its own jurisdiction without waiting for the court to do so” . 
Accordingly, when one o f the parties alleges the arbitration clause is invalid, there is no 
need to stay the arbitral proceedings and refer such allegation to the court. The arbitral 
tribunal, by virtue o f the principle o f competence-competence, may examine the clause 
to rule on its jurisdiction. Thus, the separation o f the arbitration agreement from the 
main contract would bring the allegation against the main contract within the scope of 
the ai'bitration agreement. In other words, it permits the arbitral tribunal to deal with 
dispute and to find the principal contract invalid without thereby destroying its power to 
make an award pursuant to the arbitral clause.
(d) Conclusion
To sum up, both Model law and English Law adopted the two principles due to their 
practical importance. Llowever, the Model law does not distinguish between the two 
principles, and regards them as mandatory, whereas the English Law does distinguish 
between them and regards them as non-mandatory. It seems that principles of 
competence- competence and separability do considerable service to arbitration from 
practical angle, but each o f them is independent from the other” . It is in the interests of 
the parties to benefit h  om both of them, but it is perhaps appropriate that this should be a 
matter o f choice.
3.5 The Limitation of the Principle of Separability
Is there any limit on the principle o f separability? How far does it extend? Must an 
arbitration clause contained in an invalid contract always be given effect, on the ground 
that the validity o f the arbitration clause does not depend on the validity of the main 
contract in which it is contained? The next paragraphs will address these questions in the 
contexts o f English law and the Model Law.
”  Christopher Brown LD. v Genossenschft Oesterreichischer, [1954] 1 Q.B. 8. It submitted that this 
principle means that the arbitral tribunal has jurisdiction to decide challenges to its own jurisdiction- i.e., 
tribunal is not competent to determine challenges to the arbitration agreements on which its own authority 
to resolve the parties’ disputes is based on. See R. Smith, ‘Separability and Competence-Competence in 
International Arbitration: Ex Nihilo Nihil F itl Or Can Something Indeed Come From Nothing?' (2003) at 
[B]. It is available at <http://www.simpsonthacher.com/CM/Articles/articlesI595.asp> [last visited 
31/7/03].
There are number of legal writers who in favor o f such a distinction, for example, R. David, op. cit., para 
209 - 210 at p l92. See also J. Savage & E. Gaillard, op. cit., para 416.
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Harbour v Kansa^^ recognised the principle of separability at English common law, by 
holding that the nullity o f the main contract should not impeach directly the arbitration 
clause. But this means that the arbitration clause must itself be valid. So if  the initial 
illegality of the main contract does not directly affect or taint the arbitration clause, the 
issue o f the effect of that illegality is capable of being within the jurisdiction o f the 
arbitral tribunal. On the other hand, when the illegality o f the main contract is so extreme 
as to affect the arbitration clause, the arbitration clause cannot be enforced and will be 
deemed invalid. Thus the autonomy o f the arbitration clause is limited by public policy. 
Hoffmaim L.J. says,
“saying that arbitration clauses, because o f separability, are never 
affected by the illegality of the principal contract is as much as false 
logic as saying that they must be”^^ .
He continued saying,
“the most common examples of cases in which the groimd of invalidity 
o f the substantive obligations of the contract also necessarily entails 
the invalidity o f the arbitration clause are cases o f initial invalidity, 
such as the absence o f consensus ad idem, non est factum , mistake as 
to the person and so forth”^^ .
It can be argued that this limitation can also be found in Model law. It has been said,
“The primary o f the importance o f the principle of separability is that 
an arbitral tribunal may retain jurisdiction and issue a binding decision 
on the merits - even though the contract is null and void - as long as 
the grounds fo r  nullity do not affect the arbitration clause^’^ .^
[Emphasis added]
To illustrate this limitation as applied in both legal systems, consider this example. 
Suppose, for instance, that a party to an arbitration agreement, against whom legal 
proceedings are brought, applies to the court to stay the proceedings and refer the matter 
to arbitration. The court should grant a stay, even if  the other party alleges that the
” [1993] Q.B. 701.
”  Ibid , at 724.
”  Ibid., at 725.
”  Holtzmann & Neuhaus, op. cit., p 480.
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contract is illegal. However, if  the court is satisfied that the arbitration agreement is itself 
null and void, it will not grant a stay and consequently will deal with the dispute itself** .^ 
The two arbitral systems instruct the court to enforce the arbitration agreement even if  
there is challenge directed at the main contract or the jurisdiction o f the arbitral tribunal, 
as the arbitral tribunal has jinisdiction in the first instance to deal with such challenges™. 
However, this is not so if  the court is satisfied that the arbitration agreement is null and 
void, inoperative or incapable of being performed. The Court o f Appeal held in Harbour 
V Kansa that an arbitration clause contained in a written contract was a collateral 
agreement which fell to be construed according to its terms and the wishes of the parties; 
that the matter of initial illegality o f the contract, not directly impeaching the arbitration 
clause, was capable o f being within the jurisdiction o f the arbitrator; that whether a 
particular form of illegality rendered void both the arbitration clause and the contract 
depended upon the nature o f the illegality''*.
So in Soleimany v. Soleimany, Waller L.J. points out, “It may be that in the case of 
palpable illegality. ..an English court w ould.. .refiise to grant stay in favour o f arbitration, 
on the ground that an arbitrator could not lawfully enforce the contract..."™. Therefore, 
the court will not enforce an agreement, if  enforcement would be contrary to public 
policy. Public policy cannot be overridden by private agreement, and the aihitrating 
parties cannot do so by procuring arbitration^^. When the court finds that the illegality of 
the main contract is not such as to taint the arbitration agreement, the principle of 
separability will ensme the survival o f the arbitiation agreement. But in the event of 
inarbitrability or fundamental illegality, this principle cannot separate the life o f the 
arbitration agreement from that o f the main contract.
To sum up, by virtue o f the principle of sepai'ability, the invalidity o f the main contract 
does not invalidate the arbitration clause. Therefore, the arbitral tribimal retains 
jurisdiction to consider question o f the validity of the main contract. However, the 
principle o f separability is limited by public policy. The fact that an arbitration clause 
may not itself be tainted by the illegality o f the main contract does not mean that this is 
always so. When the main contract is fundamentally illegal, or the subject matter o f the
This is according to sec. 8 (4) o f the English arbitration Act 1996, and Art. 8 (1) o f the Model law.
Rio Algom Limited v. Sammi Steel Co. [CLOUT case no. 18].
™ [1993] Q.B. 701.
[1998] 3 W LR811.
™ Soleimany v Soleimany, [1998] 3 W.L.R. 811 at p 824 -B-. See also A. Samuel, ‘Separability o f  
Arbitration Clause- Some Awkward Questions about the Law on Contract, Conflict o f  Laws and 
Administration o f Justice’ (2000) 1 A.D.R.L.J. 36-45 at p 45.
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dispute is not referable to arbitration, this will impugn the arbitration clause directly, 
rendering it unenforceable. So the court will not stay any legal proceedings, and will set 
aside or refuse to enforce any purported arbitral award.
3.6 What Should Kuwait Do?
Broadly speaking, Kuwait should recognise the development o f a growing uniformity in 
arbitration laws around the world. Thus, it should adopt the principle o f separability, 
which has been recognised widely by legislation and courts around the world. What is 
the suitable method to adopt this principle? It is recommended that Kuwait creates a 
specific provision adopting the principle o f separability. This provision has to be non­
mandatory, giving the parties a choice as to how to design the arbitral process. This 
provision should also adopt the view that even if there is a close relationship between the 
principles o f separability and competence- competence, it is possible to distinguish 
between them. Therefore, statute must provide not only that the arbitration clause be 
deemed a separate agreement, independent from the contract in which it is contained, but 
that it is for the tribunal to decide on challenges to its jurisdiction (unless in either case 
the parties provide otherwise). However, the principles should be articulated in separate 
sections.
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4, A rbitrability
4.1 Introduction
It must be noted at the outset that the question o f what matters can be referred to 
arbitration (arbitrability) differs entirely from the question o f what disputes fall within 
the scope o f an individual arbitration agreement. The issue o f the scope of an ai'bitration 
agreement is a matter of interpretation and construction of each individual arbitration 
agreement. This point will be discussed in depth in Chapter 4™. This section will focus 
on the question the importance of this sensitive area, the domain o f arbitration and the 
role o f the court in this context.
The question o f arbitrability is vital. It is very important to the parties to an arbitration 
agreement to know whether the subject matter o f their dispute can be decided by 
arbitration under Kuwaiti law, as if  the subject matter of the dispute is not referable to 
arbitration, this leads to invalidity of the ai'bitration agreement and consequently o f the 
arbitral award. When the subject matter of the dispute is outside the domain o f 
arbitration, the Kuwaiti courts have jurisdiction to set aside the arbitral award, on the 
ground that the subject matter of the dispute is not capable o f being settled by 
arbitration^^ Thus, the awareness from the outset of the question of arbitrability on the 
part of the parties to the arbitration agreement should avoid future difficulties, such as 
the delay injustice being done and the incurring o f extra cost because o f the setting aside 
o f the arbitral award by the court. Such awareness will help the system o f arbitration as a 
private means of adjudication to be effective and successful by delivering justice in due 
time. Thus, the users of arbitration in Kuwait have to pay attention to the question of 
whether the dispute can be settled by means of arbitration according to Kuwaiti law as 
the seat o f arbitration or as the place o f enforcement o f the arbitral award.
The question o f what matters are referable to arbitration may arise in different ways and 
stages as follows:
i. If  one of the arbitrating parties initiates a legal action to resolve a dispute, and the 
other party applies to stay the court proceedings, pleading that the arbitrator lacks
”  See pp. 193-196 infra.
”  Art. 185-200 o f CCPL 1980, sec. 66 (3) Arbitration Act 1996 and Art 34 (2) (b) (i) o f the Model Law.
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the authority to determine the dispute due to the fact that the subject matter o f the 
dispute is not capable of being settled by arbitration.
ii. I f  one o f the parties objects to the progress o f the arbitral process on the basis that
the subject matter o f the dispute is not arbitrable,
iii. At the stage o f the challenge o f the arbitral award
iv. Enforcement of the arbitral award.
4.2 The Domain of Arbitration
The question o f arbitrability limits the ability o f the parties to submit to arbitration 
disputes between them. It shows the extent to which parties may submit disputes to 
arbitration. Arbitrability is one o f the questions which the coiui: will deal with. Most 
legal systems exclude from the domain o f arbitration one or more subject matters, e.g. 
intellectual property, company law or imfair competition, often by establisliing exclusive 
jurisdiction o f certain courts^^.
In general, most arbitration laws take the stance that disputes which may be 
compromised are arbitrable, or else employ public policy as the test of arbitrability™. 
Kuwait does not set out a list o f disputes which may not be settled by arbitration, but 
does use public policy to decide whether the subject matter o f a dispute is arbitrable. 
Article 173/3 of the Civil and Commercial Procedure Law states that arbitration may not 
be held in matters where a compromising conciliation may not be reached. So it must be 
possible to compromise the subject matter o f a dispute, if  that dispute is to be referred to 
arbitration. Furthermore, Article 554 o f the Civil Law clarifies the question o f what 
matters are compromisable, by providing that composition may not be concluded in 
regard to matters related to public policy™. Yet such formulas leave room for uncertainty. 
Such an approach provides little clue as to what matters are actually capable o f being 
settled by arbitration, especially for foreign businessmen who wish to know exactly the 
extent o f the domain o f arbitration. Employment o f such general formulas may force the 
users of arbitration to embark on a detailed study o f legislation and cases to determine 
whether a dispute arising out of the transaction at hand is arbitrable. In some 
circumstances, this may cause inconvenient delay.
A/CN.9/207, para 55. As R. David said, “Some varieties o f  disputes, in the different laws, are 
necessarily brought in the State courts and cannot be defened to arbitration. An agreement purporting to 
submit them to arbitration would be devoid o f  legal value”. R. David, op. cit., para 204 at p 186.
’’ P. Sanders, Int’l Enzycl. Comp.L., op. cit, para 114, at p 64.
’®This is the same as the Egyptian treatment. See Art. 11 o f Arbitration Act 1994 and 551 o f  Civil law.
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Such considerations were discussed during the drafting the Model law, but the Model 
Law does not address the issue. Despite the fact that the Model Law is designed to 
establish a legal regime for arbitration, the Working Group agreed that it should not deal 
with the question o f arbitrability. The framers o f the Model Law did consider whether it 
should set forth a list o f non- arbitrable subject matters, either as an exhaustive list or as 
an open list to be supplemented by the representative state, or whether it would be 
sufficient to express the restriction merely by reference to “ international public 
policy"™? The answer was negative” . The first Working Group Report took the view that 
any attempt to set forth a list of non-arbitrable subjects, whether as an exliaustive or open 
list, would be impractical, and would not further the cause o f harmonisation. It was also 
thought insufficient to merely refer to “ international public policy”, as that concept was 
not sufficiently clear. Accordingly, the suggestion of Secretariat to attempt to limit the 
number o f non-arbitrable subjects, or to at least list them as a means o f easy reference for 
those interested in this matter such as lawyers and businessmen, was refused.
However, that does not mean that the Model Law gives full effect to an arbitration 
agreement irrespective o f whether the subject matter of the dispute is referable to 
arbitration. In fact when the subject matter o f the dispute is not arbitrable, the arbitration 
agreement is deemed void. This may be deduced from Article 36(l)(b)(i) which indicates 
that recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may be refused if  the court finds 
that the subject matter o f the dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the 
law of the state in question. So the model law does not make any dispute arbitrable 
which would not otherwise be so under the law o f the state adopting the Model law. 
Moreover, Article 34(2)(b)(i) provides that the court may set aside an aihitral award if  it 
is satisfied that the subject matter of the dispute is not capable o f settlement by 
arbitration under the law o f that state.
Thus, the Model Law does not deal with the matter of the domain of arbitration directly, 
leaving this point to the general law of the adopting state” . However, it allows an arbitral 
award to be set aside or refused enforcement if  the subject matter of the dispute is not 
referable to arbitration under the law of the adopting state.
™ The concept o f  public policy is discussed in pp. 185-187 infra. 
”  A/CN.9/216, para 30.
”  See Art. 1 (5) o f the Model Law.
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Nonetheless, the matter o f arbitrability is an object o f possible fiitine work by 
UNCITRAL®^, which, during its Thirty —second session (Viemia 1999), noted that the 
Model Law 's treatment causes uncertainty about which disputes are arbitrable, leading to 
considerable difficulties in practice®^. It was suggested®"*, as one way o f dealing with this 
problem, that there may be an attempt to reach a world-wide consensus on a list of non 
arbitrable matters. If  that did not prove feasible, an alternative would be to agree on a 
uniform provision, laying out three or four matters that are generally considered non- 
arbitrable, and then calling upon States to list immediately thereafter any other issues 
deemed non-arbitrable by that state. It would thus be easy to access information about 
such restrictions. The difficulties o f such an undertaking are clear, but if  it worked, it 
would provide a degree o f certainty and transpai-ency. Even if  were not wholly 
successful, it would provide much useful information.
Equally, the English Arbitration Act 1996 does not attempt to deal with arbitrability. 
However, s 81 (1) states
“Nothing in this Part shall be construed as excluding the operation of 
any rule of law consistent with the provisions o f this Part, in particular, 
any rule of law as to- (a) matters which are not capable o f settlement 
by arbitration”.
This section shows that this Act is not an exhaustive code, as other rules of law that are 
still consistent with the Act will continue to be effective” . These rules may be found in 
case law or legislation” . Arbitrability is one o f the unaffected areas and is left open” . 
The court may therefore evolve and change such matters as the need arises.
Yet perhaps farther thought should be given to the treatment o f the question of 
arbitrablity. It would be beneficial to the practice of arbitration if  the Arbitration Act 
could go further than the traditional formulas, by providing certainty and easy access to 
information about the domain of arbitration, in order to avoid the possibility of
See A/CN.9/460.82
”  A/CN.9/460, para 32.
A/CN.9/460, para 33.
It was stated in 1997 Supplementary Report on the Arbitration Act 1996 in para 32 “it w ill be noted that 
in what is now section 81 it is made clear that any rule o f law relating in particular to matters which are not 
capable o f  settlement by arbitration or the refusal o f recognition or enforcement o f  an arbitral award on the 
grounds o f  public policy continues to operate”.
”  See DAC 1996 Report, para 386.
”  B. Harris et al., para [81C] at p 349,
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disappointing the users o f arbitration” . Just because the Model law is neutral on this 
controversial matter, this should not mean that all arbitration legislation must follow suit. 
The Arbitration Act should attempt to list all commercial subjects which are outside the 
domain o f arbitration. While this is not feasible in a measui'e such as the Model Law, 
which required to be adapted to a variety o f different national environments, it is possible 
in the arbitration legislation o f a particular state. Such an attempt would not only assist 
the users o f arbitration, but also serve the arbitral tribunal when it deals with the question 
o f arbitrability, as well as the court in examining the arbitrability of the subject matter o f 
the dispute when called to enforce the arbitration agreement, or to enforce or set aside 
the award.
Any such list should be based on a liberal approach towards arbitration, balancing the 
interests o f trade and commerce and the public interest. A friendly attitude toward 
arbitration would meet the object o f encouraging business and investment” . The 
philosophy of this approach is that arbitrators, as private judges, should have no less 
freedom than judges in dealing with the question of aibitrability™. The Act should 
support arbitration and have faith in the ability of arbitrators to protect public policy. In 
order to ensure that the interests of public order are protected, arbitral decisions on 
arbitrability would be subject to judicial control, with the court having the last word on
”  Since the areas o f arbitrablity vary from state to state. As stated “Arbitrability, in essence, is a matter o f  
national public policy. As public policy can differ from one countiy to another, the arbitrability o f  
particular dispute may vary considerably from jurisdiction to jurisdiction”. P. Baron & S. Liniger, ‘A 
Second Look at Arbitrability: Approaches to Arbitration in the United States, Switzerland and Germany’ 
(2003) 19(1), Arb. Int. 27-54 at p 27.
”  H. Yu, ‘From Arbitrability to A-National Principles- the U.S Experience’ (1999) 2(1) Int. A.L.R. 1-8. 
The worldwide is witnessing a movement towards expanding the domam of arbitration to include most 
commercial matters, e.g. issues o f  antitrust, company law, insolvency and intellectual propeity. See J. 
Savage & E. Gaillard, op. cit., paral617 and Redfern & Hunter, op. cit., para 3-21 at p 148. The Act should 
not exclude from the list some subjects merely because it is concerning the public policy. The era o f  hostile 
attitude arbitration and mistrust has gone away.
™ It was stated “Arbitrators should be allowed no less freedom than court o f law”. See US District Court 
E.D. Pennsylvania in matter o f Re Compudyne Co., 225 F.Supp.l004. Hong-Lin Yu says, “Generally 
speaking, though famous for the issue o f arbitiability, the Mitsubishi case was in addition regarded as a 
demonstiation o f the arbitrator's ftmction in applying public law. In other words, arbitrators are allowed to 
render private international justice on certain subjects, even though it is against American domestic public 
policy. The contribution made by these cases is a kind of recognition o f the justice provided by a 
transnational private judicial system”. See H. Yo, ‘From Arbitrability to A-National Principles- the U.S 
Experience’, op. cit., at p 7. The relationship between court and arbitration is not as a competing system o f  
dispute resolution. It has to be as a partnership in delivering justice. The American court was in the view in 
Mitsubishi case that the time o f judicial’s suspicion o f arbitration is well past. It seems that the court could 
work in a comfortable symbiosis with arbitration.
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most matters^'. It may be emphasised that this liberal attitude camiot be applied in all 
cases which must be decided by the court e.g. criminal cases. In this sort of case quite 
often the public has an interest, and so it may not be determined privately™.
4.3 Conclusion
It is understandable that there should be some limitation on the freedom to resort to 
arbitration as a private method of adjudication. Most legal systems exclude from the 
domain o f arbitration a number o f matters, often by conferring exclusive jurisdiction 
upon the comfs. Most legal systems, as in Kuwait, recognise the concept of arbitrability 
(and public policy as a norm to determine the question o f arbitrability) as a restriction of 
freedom of contract and party autonomy in the public interest, but without actual defining 
the concept. Legislation generally ignores the content o f arbitrability, and leaves its 
determination to the court in its exercise of its supervisory role over the arbitral process 
(at the stage o f the enforcement o f the arbitral award or at the stage o f appeal against the 
arbitral award). Yet the Ai'bitration Act could take a new approach to the question o f 
arbitrability by setting out a list o f all subject matters wliich are non-arbitrable. Tliis 
serves the needs o f clarity, certainty and transparency. Accordingly, the will of the parties 
would not be easily frustrated by eccentric judicial determinations o f what is arbitrable. 
The Act should adopt a liberal approach to this matter, which would stress the positive 
relationship between the court and arbitration™.
The court, a liberal approach to arbitrability, retains its power to supervise the outcome o f the arbitration 
at enforcement stage or challenging stage. The supreme court o f US stated in Mistsubishi v Soler, “Having 
permitted the arbitration to go forward, the national courts o f the United States will have the opportunity at 
the award-enforcement stages to ensure that the legitimate interest in the enforcement o f the antiti ust laws 
has been addressed”, 473 US614, 105 S.Ct. 3346.
™ Keir v Leeman [1844] 6Q.B. 308-322, R v Blakemore [1850] 14 Q.B. 544-552. Arbitration is not 
permitted if the subject o f the dispute is related to the criminal charges, but actions in respect o f the 
damages caused by the crime are referable to arbitration. This accords with Article 554/2 o f the Civil Law 
which indicates that composition may not be concluded in regard to matters related to public policy, but 
may be concluded in respect o f  financial matters resulting therefrom.
™ This possible would meet the era o f expanding world trade and commerce. See Supreme Court o f the 
United States M/S BREMEN and Unterweser Reederei, GmBH, Petitioners, v. Zapata OJf-Shore C. 407 
U.S. 1, 92 S. Ct. 1907. See P. Baron. & S. Liniger, op. cit., p 27 and Redfern & Hunter, op. cit., para 3-21 
atp 148.
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5. Formality
5.1 The Requirement of Writing
Most modem arbitration legislation requires that the ai'bitration agreement be in wilting 
and defines what constitutes writing for this purpose. Clear examples are the Model Law 
Article 7 and the Arbitration Act 1996 ss.5 and 6™. Having an arbitration agreement in 
writing serves to evidence the agreement of the parties to submit to arbitration, which 
agreement is clearly indispensable to all consensual arbitration. Moreover, the 
requirement of writing may be related to the arbitration agreement suspending the 
jiu'isdiction o f the courts. If  parties are to be regarded as having relinquished their basic 
right to litigate, their agreement probably has to be in writing™.
However, the approach to the legal significance of this requirement may be not the same. 
What is the result when the arbitration agreement does not comply with the requirement 
of writing? One system may suggest the nullification of the arbitration agreement if  it 
fails to meet this requirement'’^  while another requires the written form as a condition to 
apply the Arbitration Act. Thus the Arbitration Act 1996 s.5(1) states that the provisions 
o f the Act apply only where the arbitration agreement is in writing. However, this does 
not mean that an oral agreement to arbitrate is wholly ineffective, but rather that it is not 
an arbitration agreement as defined by the Act, which consequently does not apply to it. 
An oral agreement to arbitrate is simply governed by common law™. Equally, the Model 
Law does not seem to establish any legal consequences for non-compliance with the 
requirement of writing. No rule invalidates an arbitration agreement which does not flilfil
™ See also Art. 12 o f Egyptian Arbitration Act 1994.
™ See Redfern & Hunter, op. cit., para 3-09 at p l41 . The drafters o f the Arbitration Act 1996 stated in the 
DAC Report 1996 para 33 “there should be a requirement o f writing. An arbitration agreement has the 
important effect o f  contracting out the right to go to the court; i.e. it deprives the parties o f the basic right. 
To our minds an agreement o f such importance should be in some written form. Furthermore, the need for 
such form should help to reduce disputes as to whether or not an arbitration agreement was made as to its 
tenns”. It may be mentioned that writing is also important in international arbitration. It is necessary for 
the arbitrating parties to have a written agreement when they seek to enforce an arbitral award under the 
New York Convention 1958 art II (1). It is also required in many national laws that require an arbitration 
agreement to be in writing. See, A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.108/Add. 1, paral.
® Art. 12 o f Egyptian Arbitration Act 1994 is an example. It states, “The arbitration agreement must be in 
writing, on penalty o f nullity”. This is contrary to the old rules that writing is merely a matter o f proof. See 
Dr. A. Al-Kosheri, ‘Egypt’, Intl. Handbook on Comm. Ai'b. Suppl. 11, January 1990, at p 8.
See sec. 81 o f the Arbitration Act 1996.
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that requirement, although it would not be subject to the provisions o f the Model law'’\  
Other systems demand written agreements only for evidential purposes™. So Kuwait 
addresses the matter o f writing as the only mean to prove o f the existence o f the 
arbitration agreement. The arbitration rules do not cover the question what may 
constitute writing. This matter was left to the general provisions o f the Civil Law or 
Evidence.
A number of things can be learnt from looking at Article 7 of the Model law and s.5 of 
the English Arbitration Act 1996. Kuwait must recognise how arbitration law has 
developed in the modern world, and move towards harmonisation. One area where 
improvement can be made is in relation to the question of the requirement of writing. As 
aforementioned, most recent national laws and the Model Law demand that the 
arbitration agreement should be in wiiting, even if  each legal system formulates this rule 
in a different way. Having provided that a written agreement is required, the meaning of 
writing must be defined in the Arbitration Act, rather than leaving this vital question to 
be deduced from the provisions o f other acts such as those relating to Civil Law or 
Evidence. This would be o f great practical assistance to the users of arbitration in 
Kuwait. This opens the door to discuss what constitute writing in modern ai'bitral 
systems.
5.2 What Constitutes Writing?
The next paragraphs consider when the requirement of writing has been met - a question 
o f practical importance, as the arbitrating parties should be sure that their agreement to 
arbitrate meets the requirement o f writing as provided by the applicable law. Thus, the 
section aims to find out what constitutes writing under the Model Law, the Arbitration 
Act 1996, and asks what Kuwaiti law might learn from the other approaches to this 
question.
In fact, the framers o f  the Model Law did consider whether oral agreements (which are common in 
certain countries and trades) should be covered. They intended to cover as many types o f international 
arbitration as possible. So the provision was carefully drawn up, and it is clear that oral agreements were 
not intended to be governed by national rules outside the provisions of the Model Law, but rather to be 
enforceable only to the extent that the Model Law provides for the waiver o f  the requirement o f writing. 
See, A/CN.9/232, para 46, A /CN.9/233, para 66, A/CN.9/232 para 46 and Hotzmann & Neuhaus, op. cit.,
p. 260.
™ A clear example is the Fr ench law in relation to submission arbitration (Art. 1449 o f  CCP) and in case of  
international arbitration. Wherase Art. 1443 o f CCP requires writing for the validity o f the arbitral clause.
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(a) The Model Law
Article 7(2) o f the Model Law provides a definition of the concept o f "writing". It states,
“The arbitration agreement shall be in writing. An agreement is in 
writing if  it is contained in a document signed by the parties or in an 
exchange of letters, telex, telegrams or other means of 
telecommunication which provide a record of tlie agreement, or in an 
exchange o f statements o f claim and defence in which the existence of 
an agreement is alleged by one party and not denied by another. The 
reference in a contract to a document containing an arbitration clause 
constitutes an arbitration agreement provided that the contract is in 
writing and tlie reference is such as to make that clause part o f the 
contract” .
While the Model Law follows the 1958 New York Convention in requiring written 
form*****, it was intended in art 7(2) to establish a more detailed definition than in the 
Convention. At an early stage it was suggested that,
“the Model Law gives a more detailed definition than the one in article 
11(2) of the 1958 New York Convention, so as to make clear that it 
encompasses, for example modern means of communication and 
frequently used contract practice”****.
Thus the Model Law aimed to cover modern and future means o f communications***^. 
The Analytical Commentary on Article 7 (2) notes,
“ The definition o f written form is modelled an article 11 (2) of the New 
York Convention, but with two useful additions. It widens and clarifies 
the range o f means to which constitute a writing by the addition of 
"telex, or other means of telecommunication which provide a record of 
the agreements", in order to cover the modern and future means of 
communication” * **^,
A/CN. 9/264, para 6. 
A/CN. 9/216, para 23.
102 Hotzmann & Neuhaus, op. cit., p 263. 
A/CN 9/264, para 7.
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1) Signed document
Article 7(2) declares that an agreement is deemed to be in writing if  it is contained in 
document signed by parties. This is regarded as the classic contractual form and is 
explicitly established in New York Convention***"*. According to this Article, an 
arbitration clause in a contract contained in a document signed by only one o f the parties 
will be deemed not to be a written arbitration agreement. It was suggested that Article 
7(2) be extended to cover a bill of lading (which often is not signed by the shipper) or 
any other document signed by only one of the parties, if  that bill or document provided 
sufficient evidence of a contract*** .^ However, this suggestion was not adopted, as,
“the commission, after deliberation, did not adopt the additional 
wording because it appeared unlikely that many states would be 
prepai'ed to accept the concept of an ai'bitration agreement which 
although contained in a document, was not signed or at least consented 
to in writing by both o f the parties. It was also pointed out that there 
might be difficulties with regard to the recognition and enforcement 
under the 1958 New York Convention o f awards based on such 
agreements”***^.
2) Exchange of letters, telexes, telegrams
This alternative definition o f writing employed the words “an exchange o f letters, or 
telegrams” used by the New York Convention, adding “other means of 
telecommunication which provide a record o f the agreement” to cover modern and future 
means o f communications. The requirement o f “a record” may aim to ensure that there is 
writing involved. Accordingly, for example, an ordinary telephone conversation would 
not provide a “record”***^.
This provision seems to have the necessaiy flexibility to accommodate the wide variety 
o f ways in which business in different trades is conducted, and all modern means of 
communication actual and potential.***® Therefore, it will probably cover data appearing
See New York Convention 1958, Art. II (2).
A /40/17, para. 80.
Ibid.
See Hotzmann & Neuhaus, op. cit., p.263.
See the view o f US on the art, 7(2) in A/CN.9/263, para 4.
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on a computer screen, or in its memory disks, and all electronic transmission and 
co m m unica tion^easily  accommodating e-commerce. It has been obsei-ved,
“The question as whether electronic commerce is an acceptable means 
o f concluding valid arbitration agreement should not pose no more 
problems than have been created by the increased use o f telex and 
telecopy or facsimile. . . . [A]rticle 7(2) o f the UNCITRAL Model Law 
expressly validates the use o f any means o f telecommunication ‘which 
provides a record o f the agreement’, a wording which would cover 
most common uses o f electronic mail or electronic data interchange 
(EDI) messaging”^
It has also been noted,
“One might suggest then that despite the reference to "writing" the 
terms of paragraph 2 are met if any record of the agreement is 
maintained e.g. in the form of an electronic image on VDU, whether or 
not a paper copy is obtainable. Indeed, it might even embrace an audio 
or audio visual record o f an oral contract” ^
While recently the Commission has stated,
“ ‘W riting’ includes any form that provide a [tangible] record o f the 
agreement or is [otherwise accessible as a data message so as to usable 
for subsequent reference. [‘Data message’ means information 
generated, sent, received or stored by electronic, optical or similar 
means including, but not limited to, electronic data interchange (EDI), 
electronic mail, telegram, telex or telecopy]”
See A/CN.9/245, para 181. See also Hotzmann & Neuhaus, op. cit., p 263. 
See A/CN.9/460, para 22.
See Prof. F Davidson, Arbitration^ Edinburgh: W. Green 2000, para 3.12. 
A/CN.9/508, para 18.
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3) Exchange of Statements of Claim and Defence in which the Existence of 
an Agreement Is Alleged by one Party and not Denied by the other Party
According to Article 7(2) the requirement o f writing is also regarded as met when the 
parties have exchanged statements o f claim and defence in which the existence o f an 
agreement is alleged by one party and not denied by another. This is logical, as if there 
is no arbitration agreement between the parties, either can challenge the jurisdiction o f 
the arbitration tribunal in terms of Article 16 (2), and failure to take such action implies 
that the agreement exists, and consequently that the tribunal has jurisdiction. It was, 
indeed, asserted by Herrmann, the Secretary of UNITRAL, during the discussions o f the 
Working Group, that “a statement of claim and the reply to that claim would constitute 
an exchange o f letters for the purpose of this article... [A]n extiact from the record o f an 
arbitration tribunal would be an agreement in writing if  it was signed by the parties” * 
However, the Chairman (Mr. Loewe) said, “he did not think such an extract would 
constitute an agreement in writing unless it was signed by the parties” **"*. At any rate, 
this issue was settled in Ai'ticle 7(2). Since, for the purpose o f the Model Law, the 
requirement o f writing is satisfied by this mamier explicitly and eliminates any doubt 
about it.
Is there any discrepancy between writing as defined by Article 7(2) and the requirement 
o f Article 35(2) that a party seeking recognition or enforcement o f an arbitral award shall 
supply the original agreement or a duly certified copy thereof? The framers o f the Model 
Law were aware o f this question and sought to avoid confusion. Therefore, they stated 
“as regards this second condition, it is submitted that an exception be made for those 
cases where an original defect in form was cured by waiver or submission, for example, 
where arbitral proceedings were on the basis o f an oral agreement initiated and not 
objected to by any party. In such case the supply o f  an award, which records the waiver 
or submission, shouldsuffice''^^^. [Emphasis added].
Another question is that whether Article 7(2) is incompatible with Article 11(2) of 1958 
New York Convention? The Commission Report answered,
“It was pointed out in support o f the suggested extension that, although 
awards made pursuant to arbitration agreement evidenced in that
A/CN.9/SR.307-308, 320, 332, para 11. 
Ibid., para 10.
A/CN.9/264, para 91.
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manner would be possibly be denied enforcement under the 1958 New 
York Convention, adoption of that extension in the Model law might 
eventually lead to an interpretation o f Article II (2) of that convention 
whereby arbitration agreements evidenced in the minutes o f arbitral 
tribunals would be acceptable”****.
4) Reference in a Written Contract to a Document Containing an 
Arbitration Clause, If the Reference Makes the Clause Part of the Contract
Article 7(2) recognises this as a sort o f written agreement as a compromise between two 
bodies of opinion that ai’ose in Second Working Group Report***'. One view was that the 
text of the arbitration agreement should be before both parties in order to bind them. The 
second view was that a reference in the contract between the parties to general conditions 
or other documents containing an arbitration clause was sufficient. Thus the structure o f 
this part o f the provision article is a middle ground between these approaches. The 
solution reached was that the requirement o f written form is satisfied where an 
arbitration clause is merely referred to, provided that the contract is in writing and the 
reference makes the arbitration clause part of the contract. It was stated that as a middle 
ground between these directions, it was suggested that the document containing the 
arbitration agreement should be referred to in the contract in which such a way that it 
becomes a part o f the contract**^.
But when does an arbitration clause in another document become part o f a contract? The 
Model law does not answer this question, leaving national law to determine it. However, 
it is clear that the Model Law does not require an explicit reference to the arbitration 
clause in the contract****, but leaves this matter to the consideration of the court. It has 
been noted that the contract, which contains the reference to arbitration, must itself be in 
writing*^**. This may be contrasted with s.5(3) o f the English Arbitration Act 1996, which 
provides that incorporation by reference extends to an oral agreement or agreement by 
conduct, as we shall see later on. The framers o f the Model Law stated that the reference 
establishes an arbitration agreement if  it is as to make the clause part o f the contract and, 
of course, if the contract itself meets the requirement o f written form as defined in the
A/40/17, para 87. 
A/CN. 9/232, para 44.
A/CN.9/246, para 19. 
A/CN.9/264, para 8.
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Erst sentence of para (2)*^*. It may be added that the meaning of the condition o f the 
requirement that the reference be such as to make the arbitration clause a part o f the 
contract should not be understood as asking an explicit reference to the arbitration 
contained in a document referred to*^ .^ So, the reference need only be to the document 
and no explicit reference to the arbitration clause contained therein is required
5) Conclusion
The definition o f writing as provided by the Model Law has been criticised in some 
q u a r t e r s a n d  indeed is one of the topics for reconsideration by the Commission*^^, as 
the requirement that ai'bitration agreement should be in written form, has been often been 
considered as difficult and frustrating*'^^. The meaning of ‘w iiting’ as provided by the 
Model Law does not meet trade practice. One o f the problems is the expression 
“exchange”. It was noted that such an expression lends itself to an overly literal 
interpretation in the sense o f mutual exchange o f writings. A tacit acceptance would be, 
in principle, not sufficient. Neither would be purely oral agreement*^*'. It may be said 
that if  the test o f “exchange” is interpreted literally, there will not be an arbitration 
agreement, where a contract containing an arbitration clause is formed by one party 
sending written terms to the other party, which performs its bargain under the contract 
without returning or making any other “exchange” in writing in relation to the terms of 
the contract. In this case, there may be a tacit acceptance, but there is no exchange. 
Accordingly, this is not an arbitration agreement under the Model Law*^^.
Another problem is that an oral contract referring to a written form o f agreement, which 
contains an arbitration clause, may not meet the concept of writing under the provisions 
of Model law. So where e.g. a maritime salvage contract is concluded by radio with a 
reference to a pre-existing standard contract form containing an arbitration agreement 
(such as Lloyd’s Open Form), this may not regarded as an arbitration agreement under 
the Model Law. It has been also been noted that an arbitration clause in a sales or
Ibid., para 8.
^^ I^bid., para 19.
Ibid., para 8.
124 ^  Kaplan, ‘Is the Need for Writing as Expressed in the New York Convention and the Model Law Out 
o f  Step with Commercial Practice’ (1996) 12 Arb. Int. 27-45.
A/CN.9/460.
^^^Ibid., para 21.
^" I^bid., para 24
The same case under Arbitiation Act 1996 is recognised as an arbitration agreement in writing under 
sec. 5. See DAG Report 1996, para 36.
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purchase confirmation will meet the written form requirement o f Article 7 o f the Model 
Law only if:
i. The confirmation is signed by both paities; or
ii. A duplicate is returned, whether is signed or not; or
iii. The confirmation is subsequently accepted by means of another communication in
writing from the party who received the confirmation to the party who dispatched it. This
doe not accord with international trade practice*^^. The Commission is currently 
considering such matters in order to devise a definition o f the words “in writing” that 
meets modern trade practice.
(b) The English Arbitration Act 1996
A written agreement is generously defined in s.5. While the Act 1996 does not follow 
precisely the wording o f Article 7(2) o f the Model Law, it has almost the same definition 
o f the concept of “writing”. The requirement o f writing, under the Act, can be satisfied 
where
1 ) The Agreements Is Made in W riting (whether or not It Is Signed by the 
Parties)*
The Act 1996 thus does not follow the New York Convention and Model Law in 
requiring the signature o f the parties. This was because it was recognised that the 
requirement o f signatures on the document containing the contract would leave most 
bills o f lading, many brokers' contract notes and various other important categories o f 
contracts outside the scope of the Act****. The requirement of the signature o f  both parties 
on the document was deemed impractical, and the Act takes a more flexible approach 
than the Model Law and the New York Convention.
See A/CN.9/460, para 26.
Arbitration Act 1996, sec 5(2) (a).
DAC, A Consultative Document, Oct 1987, p 22.
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2) If the Agreement Is Made by Exchange of Communication**^ in Writing, 
or if the Agreement Is Evidenced in Writing***, or Recorded by any Means**"*
This covers all present or future means o f communications. Under these provisions, the 
arbitration agreement will be deemed in writing, if  it is made by exchange o f letters, 
faxes or e-mails; or, if  it is evidenced by recording such as by audio or video tape. This is 
a wide definition that would probably cover all forms of electronic transmission and 
communication, “and will almost certainly embrace a sound recording”**^
3) Where Parties Agree otherwise than in Writing by Reference to Terms 
which Are in Writing, they Make an Agreement in Writing****
This is designed to cover situations such as ship salvage operations, where the parties 
maice an oral agreement which incorporates by reference the terms of a written form o f 
agreement containing an arbitration clause. It would also cover agreement by conduct. 
For instance, where a party intends to make a contract on written terms which contains 
an arbitration clause, but the other party was not aware of those terms, he would be 
regai'ded as accepting them by performing the contract in accordance with them. It was 
stated in the DAC Report 1996,
“this provision [s.5(3)] would also cover agreement by conduct. For 
example, a party A may agree to buy fiom party B a quantity o f goods 
on certain terms and conditions (which include an arbitration clause) 
which are set out in writing and sent to party B, with a request that he 
signs and return the order form, or sends any document in response to 
the order form. If, which is by no means uncommon, party B fails to 
sign the order, but manufactures and delivers the goods in accordance 
with the contract to party A, who pays for them in accordance with the 
contract, this could constitute an agreement otherwise than in writing 
by reference to terms which are in writing..., and could therefore 
include an effective arbitration agreement”
Sec. 5(2)(b) o f  the Arbitration Act 1996. 
Ibid., sec 5(2)(c).
Ibid., sec 5(b).
B. Harris et a i ,  op. cit. (5H) at p 74.
Sec. 5(3) o f the Arbitration Act 1996. 
See para 36.
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It has to be mentioned that even if  the Act is clear that an arbitration clause may be 
incorporated by reference, the law does not state what is required for effective 
incorporation o f an ai’bitration clause by reference. The Act states in s.6 (2) that the 
reference in an agreement to a written form of arbitration clause or to a document 
containing an arbitration clause, establishes an ai’bitration agreement if  the reference is 
such as to make that clause part o f the agreement. Thus, a reference in unwritten 
agreement to a written form o f arbitration clause or to the document containing an 
arbitration clause, shall constitute an agreement in writing if  the reference is as to make 
that clause part o f the agreement. However, s.6 does not indicate how it is to be decided 
whether the reference is such as to make that arbitration clause part of the contract, but 
surely this is a matter of the Court to decide^^k
4) An Exchange of Written Submission in Arbitral or Legal Proceedings in 
which the Existence of the Arbitration Agreement othei*wise than in Writing 
Is Alleged by one and not Denied by other Party in his Responses**^
It seems that s.5 (5) corresponds with Article 7(2) o f the Model Law. It was stressed by 
the DAC that an allegation by a party that there is an arbitration agreement is not enough 
to constitute an arbitration agreement under this provision. There must be a response 
from the other party in which he does not deny that allegation*"***.
5.3 Conclusion
It is recommended that Kuwait adopts a broad definition of the concept of writing, 
meeting the needs of commercial practice and embracing e-commerce. It has firstly to 
encompass the use o f any telecommunication which provides a record of the agreement, 
including e-mail, or electronic data interchange (E.D.I.) messaging. Secondly, it must 
cover cases encountered in practice, such as where a party does not give written consent 
to arbitration. Oral or tacit acceptance should be deemed sufficient, if  there is a 
document, which recognises the existence o f an arbitration agreement. So, the definition 
o f writing should extend to.
DAC 1996 Report, para 42.
Sec. 5(5) o f the Arbitration Act 1996,
DAC Report 1996 para 36.
Ch.2: Arbitration Agreement 62
(a) An arbitration agreement made in writing (whether signed or not). Signature will play 
no role in the question o f the existence or the validity of the arbitration agreement, as 
long as the arbitration agreement itself is in written form.
(b) An agreement made by any means o f exchange communications, which provide a 
record o f the agreement. A record can be in any form, i.e. in documentary or electronic. 
This is important in order to reflect teclmological advances and electronic commerce. 
Furthermore, if  the agreement is evidenced in writing this shall satisfy the requirement of 
writing.
Thirdly, when parties agree otherwise than in writing (e.g. orally or by conduct) by 
reference to terms which are in writing. Reference in a contract to written form o f the 
arbitration clause or to the document containing an arbitration clause should constitute a 
valid ai'bitration agreement, provided that the contract is in wi’iting, and the reference is 
such as to make that clause part o f the agreement. This would reflect trade practice.
Fourthly, an exchange o f written submissions in arbitral or legal proceedings in which 
the existence o f an agreement otherwise than in writing is alleged by one party and not 
denied by the other in his response, should constitute an agreement in writing to the 
effect alleged. Finally, incorporation by reference shall be recognised.
By taking such steps the Kuwaiti Arbitration Act will meet practical requirements and be 
in tune with international developments and harmonisation. This would help assist the 
users o f arbitration and their legal advisers, and entrance the attractiveness of Kuwait as 
an arbitral forum.
Chapter Three:
Judicial Support for Arbitration
1. Introduction
The law o f arbitration is principally concerned with the relationship between the courts 
and arbitration. This relationship has to operate in a satisfactory way, with the court 
offering assistance and support to arbitration, respecting the fact that the parties have 
chosen arbitration instead o f litigation. Courts may give effect to this preference not only 
by abstaining from inappropriate intervention, but also by providing their power and 
authority to reinforce the arbitral process, guaranteeing both its effectiveness and 
efficiency.
The policy of legislatuies and courts in recent years has been very much in favour of 
arbitration. The new Kuwaiti Ai'bitration Act should recognise this policy and improve 
the amicable partnership between the courts and arbitration, as evidence o f such an 
amicable relationship may help persuade the users of arbitration (foreign and domestic 
investors) to invest in Kuwait, confident that any arbitration will receive judicial support 
and assistance. Supportive rules, ensuring the arbitration process is effective and 
impartial, and the arbitration system is healthy and developed, may help convince such 
users that Kuwait is an attractive place not only for investment but also arbitration. If  
clear rules ensure that the Kuwaiti courts do not obstruct arbitration, this would avoid 
any sort o f doubt or fear about judicial attitudes in Kuwait. Thus, it is recommended that 
the new Kuwaiti Arbitration Act should be brought in line with modern trends in 
arbitration, as embodied in modern, healthy legal systems such as the Model Law and the 
English Arbitration Act 1996.
The lesson to be taken from modern arbitration systems in other parts of the world is that 
an Arbitration Act may support the arbitration system in two main ways, firstly by 
establishing fundamental principles, and secondly method by enabling the courts to assist 
the arbitral process, e.g. by enforcing an arbitration agreement or by extending time 
limits for commencing ai'bitial proceedings.
This chapter will be devoted to showing how the law might best render support and 
assistance to arbitration, focussing on the question o f how the relationship between the
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court and arbitration can put on a similar basis to modern arbitration systems such as the 
Arbitration Act 1996 and the Model Law? It will be divided into six sections as follows:
Section 1 : The General Principles of the Arbitration Act.
Section 2: The Enforcement of the Arbitration Agreement.
Section 3: Extending the Contractual Time-Bars.
Section 4: The Constitution o f the Arbitral Tribunal.
Section 5: The Conduct of the Proceedings.
Section 6: The Enforcement o f the Arbitral Award.
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2. The General Principles of the Arbitration Act
2,1 Introduction
It has been observed in relation to the English Arbitration Act 1996, “Whatever new 
powers arbitrators have, those powers -  and indeed the whole Act — are subject to a 
number o f principles which, unusually, the Act sets out”*.
While one o f the aims of the English Arbitration Act 1996 is to give the arbitral tribunal 
an enlianced range o f powers which will have a significant beneficial effect on the 
English arbitration system, it is a novel feature o f the Act that it begins by reciting three 
basic principles, upon which the Act is founded. The framers o f the Act wanted it to 
proceed in a logical order. Therefore, it starts by articulating the principles o f the Act and 
ends with the provisions governing recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. The 
tliree principles laid down out in s.l seek to summarise the basis of the English 
arbitration system. These principles provide the foundation of the Act and consequently 
its provisions have to be construed accordingly.
No other arbitration statute seeks to identify such basic principles^. So this pioneering 
step seems to offer an attractive basis on which to introduce a new, properly developed 
system. It is highly recommended that Kuwait follows this structure, and establishes 
these three principles in the Act as the basis of the future practice o f arbitration in 
Kuwait. These principles deal with the object of arbitration, the question o f party 
autonomy, and the extent o f court intervention in arbitration, s.l reciting,
“The provisions of this Part are founded on the following principles, 
and shall be construed accordingly -
(a) The object o f arbitration is to obtain the fair resolution o f disputes 
by an impartial tribunal without umrecessary delay or expense;
(b) The parties should be free to agree how their disputes are 
resolved, subject only to such safeguards as are necessary in the public 
interest;
* See, B. Hai'ris et. al, op. cit., p 5.
 ^South African Law Commission has suggested on the draft Bill to follow sec. 1 o f  the English Arbitration 
Act 1996. Since, s .l o f the draft Bill sets out the principles on which the Draft Bill is based on. See 
Discussion Paper 83 project 94: Domestic Arbitration 1999. However, this draft has not yet introduced to 
the Parliament. Scotland may be another example. See s .l o f the Arbitration (Scotland) Bill.
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(c) In matters governed by this Part the court should not intervene 
except as provided by this Part”.
2.2 Recommended General Principles of the New Act
(a) The Object of Arbitration, and How Arbitrations Should Proceed?
This principle should reflect what the framers o f the Kuwaiti Arbitration Act should 
believe to be the object of arbitration as a metliod o f settlement based on tlie consent of 
the contracting parties. The 1996 Act states in s.l (a) that the object of arbitration is to 
obtain the fair resolution o f disputes by an impartial tribunal without unnecessary delay 
or cost. Tliree aims may be deduced from this provision, firstly to obtain a fair resolution 
o f dispute, secondly to have an impartial arbitral tribunal, thirdly to settle disputes 
without unnecessary delay or expense. The provision codifies a range of important 
concepts, on which the operation o f arbitration has to be based. Of course, any 
Arbitration Act would have to contain more specific provisions to help achieve these 
aims. For example, s.3 3 o f the 1996 Act elaborates the general duties of the arbitral 
tribunal, charging the arbitral tribunal to act fairly and impartially as between the parties, 
giving each party a reasonable opportunity o f presenting his case and dealing with that of 
his opponent, and to adopt procedures suitable to the circumstances of the particular 
case, avoiding umrecessary delay or expense, so as to provide a fair means for the 
resolution of the matters falling to be determined. Section 33(2) continues that the 
arbitral tribunal shall comply with that general duty in conducting the arbitral 
proceedings, in its decisions on matters o f procedure and evidence and in the exercise o f 
all other powers conferred on it. At the same time s. 40(1) charges the arbitrating parties 
to “do all things necessary for the proper and expeditious conduct o f the arbitral 
proceedings”, while s. 40(2) notes that this includes -
“(a) complying without delay with any determination of the tribunal as 
to procedural or evidential matters, or with any order or directions of 
the tribunal, and
(b) where appropriate, taking without delay any necessary steps to 
obtain a decision o f the court on a preliminary question o f jurisdiction 
or law (see sections 32 and 45)”.
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It is not enough to lay down the object o f arbitration. Other provisions, e.g. 
elaborating the duties of all actors (arbitrators and parties) in the arbitral process, are 
necessary to ensure that the object will be successfully gained. If  the new Kuwaiti Act 
states that the object o f arbitration is to achieve a fair resolution o f the dispute, 
(highlighting aspects such as fairness, impartiality, and equality o f opportunity), while 
at the same time avoiding undesirable delay or cost, a favourable initial impression 
about the goal o f the law o f arbitration in Kuwait will be communicated. However, 
this must be reinforced by substantive provisions. Therefore, it is recommended that 
Kuwait embody the spirit and words o f ss.l(a), 33 and 40 of the 1996 Act, as those 
provisions clearly establish the duties o f the arbitral tribunal and the arbitrating 
parties, as well as the spirit in which the arbitral process should be conducted.
(b) Party Autonomy
The doctrine o f party autonomy should be a cardinal element o f any developed modern 
arbitration system. This doctrine is premised on the understanding that arbitration is a 
private method of dispute resolution based on the consent o f the arbitrating parties. It 
gives the arbitrating parties significant freedom in designing the arbitral process, 
extending to where, when and how they would like their arbitration to be run, as well as 
to the choice o f arbitrators, the scope o f the arbitrators' authority, and to applicable 
substantive and procedural rules. Embracing this principle shows the respect accorded by 
the legal system to the agreement of the parties to resolve their dispute by arbitration 
under a particular arbitral framework. However, that does not mean that there should be 
no limitations or restrictions on the freedom of the parties. Their autonomy o f the parties 
should be subject to relevant considerations of public policy and legislative provisions 
designed to ensure fair proceedings. Every arbitration statute must have certain 
mandatory provisions to this effect. Thus, the drafters of the Act 1996 stated, “In some 
cases, of course, the public interest will make inroad on complete party autonomy, in 
much the same way as there are limitations on the freedom of contract”*.
The law therefore must feature mandatory rules to ensure fairness in the arbitral process 
and to safeguard the public interest. Wlien provisions are non- mandatory, the parties 
may choose to be guided by them, and those rules will allow the arbitration process to 
operate effectively in the absence of agreed procedures. At the same time however, the
DAC 1996 Report, para. 19.
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parties are free to design their own provisions if  these seem more appropriate than those 
laid down in the statute. On the other hand, when rules are mandatory, they will prevail 
regardless of the desire o f the parties.
One can deduce a legal system's attitude to the principle of party autonomy from its 
classification o f statutory rules into mandatory and non-mandatory. Wlien the majority o f 
the provisions are non-mandatory, this indicates support of this principle. One might 
commend the articulation o f support for the principle of autonomy, which appears in the 
1996 Act, as this signals to possible users o f the system that the law will not interfere 
unduly with their freedom of choice.
(c) Court Support with Minimum of Intervention
This principle deals with the role o f the court in arbitration. Modern Arbitration Acts 
restrict the scope of judicial intervention therein, clarifying its scope so that the parties 
and tribunal should know exactly the limits o f the jurisdiction o f the court to intervene in 
the arbitration"*. O f course, judicial intervention is necessary both to support arbitration 
and to secure its fairness and legitimacy. The modern philosophy is that the court should 
have a mainly supportive rather than interventionist role. Thus, Article 5 o f the Model 
law states, “In matters governed by this law, no court shall intervene except where so 
provided in this Law”. Equally, sl(c) of the English Act of 1996 provides, “In matters 
governed by this Part the court should not inteiwene except so provided by this Part” . 
The DAC states, “ Nowadays the Courts are much less inclined to intervene in the 
arbitral process than used to be the case”*.
The modern approach seems to be that any Ai'bitration Act must draw a clear distinction 
between the supportive and interventionist powers o f the court. The former are 
emphasised, while the view is take that courts should not have any power to interfere 
with the arbitral process, unless requirements o f basic justice so demand. Hence it is 
recommended that Kuwait should articulate this principle in the new Arbitration Act. 
This too would provide a clear signal to potential users o f the system.
'' See, O. Chukwmerije, ‘Judicial Supervision of the Commercial Arbitration: the English Arbitration Act 
1996’ (1999) 15 (2) Arb. Int 171-191.
 ^ DAC 1996 Report, para 21.
Ch. 3: Judicial Support to Arbitration 69
2.3 Conclusion
The lesson to be learnt from modern arbitration laws and particularly from the English 
Arbitration Act 1996 is that Kuwait should consider emphasising the Acts three 
fimdamental principles as basic features o f the new, modern and developed arbitration 
law. These tliree principles are necessary for realising and understanding the purposes of 
those involved in the arbitral process while at the same time securing the integrity o f the 
process and safeguai'ding the public interest. The statement o f such aspirations is 
valuable in reflecting the object o f arbitration, codifying the principle o f party autonomy, 
which is one of the bases o f modern arbitration systems, and delineating the natur e of the 
relationship between arbitration and the courts, while helping both the Act and the 
arbitration agreement to be understood and construed in the light o f these general 
aspirations.
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3, Enforcement of the Arbitration Agreement
3.1 Introduction
As aforementioned, the new Kuwaiti Arbitration Act should articulate important 
principles, which reflect the policies o f the new arbitration system and meet the needs of 
modern arbitration regimes. This section deals with the effect of an arbitration agreement 
when one o f the parties commences a legal action before a court in a matter within the 
scope o f the arbitration agreement. How should the act deal with a breach o f the 
arbitration agreement? Should the Act support arbitration by enforcing the arbitration 
agreement? The section looks at the current Kuwaiti rules governing the enforcement o f 
the arbitration agreement, where a legal action is commenced in breach thereof, with a 
view to determining the extent to which the Kuwaiti legal system supports the arbitration 
process in this context, and whether any recommendation needs to be made to bring 
Kuwait in line in this area with modern arbitration regimes.
Suppose that party A commences a legal action against party B. Party B believes that an 
arbitration agreement between them governs the dispute, which is the subject o f the 
proceedings. Is there any legal and procedural instrument that enables Party B, who 
wishes to enforce the arbitration agreement, to stop the court proceedings and ensure the 
reference o f the matter o f the dispute to arbitration? It is clear that in such a scenario 
Party B has number o f options. The first is that he may decide to participate in the legal 
proceedings and renounce or abandon the arbitration agreement expressly or impliedly. 
Implied waiver arise simply by B participating in the court proceedings without 
objection. His participation indicates his desire to waive his right to arbitrate, and the 
court has discretion, in these circumstances, to consider certain procedural behaviour to 
be a waiver o f the contractual right to arbitrate^.
The second option is that B may apply for a stay o f the legal proceedings. There is no 
principle that requires arbitral proceedings or the arbitration agreement to terminate if  a 
party to the agreement commences a legal action before the competent court. While 
resort to legal proceedings may constitute a repudiation of the arbitration agreement, that 
repudiation is not effective unless accepted by the other party. Thus B may seek a court 
order staying court proceedings and invoking the arbitration agreement. Such an order
See pp. 21-23 supra.
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would leave A with no option but to comply with the provisions of the arbitration 
agreement.
The focus o f this section is whether Kuwait properly supports the arbitration process in 
this context, or whether any recommendation needs to be made to bring Kuwait into line 
with arbitration regimes. We shall see therefore, how English law and the Model law 
deal with this question.
3.2 What Is an Application to Enforce the Arbitration Agreement?
Staying legal proceedings and invoking the arbitration agreement is one o f the main 
aspects of court support o f the arbitral process, indicating that the court recognises and 
gives effect to the arbitration agreement. The fact that an arbitration agreement gives 
exclusive competence to the arbitral tribunal over the subject matter of those disputes 
that the parties have agreed to refer to arbitration may be considered as an important “ 
negative ” effect of an arbitration agreement^. The agreement to refer certain questions to 
arbitration means no court may decide such questions^. The court, by virtue o f the 
principle o f party autonomy, has to respect their desire to choose this method o f 
settlement. Moreover, the parties should also follow their chosen method o f settlement. 
Accordingly, if  either commences legal proceedings before the court in breach of the 
arbitration agreement, the other should be entitled to apply for the enforcement o f that 
agreement. Most legal systems do confer such a right upon a party to an arbitration 
agreement, usually in the form o f an application to stay the legal proceedings, while 
certain legal systems also allow that party to ask the court to refer the dispute to 
arbitration. It may be suggested that the width and efficacy o f such rules may be 
regarded as a usefril indicator o f the extent to which a legal system properly supports 
arbitration.
The device o f a stay is available in modern arbitration systems. Both the English Act and 
the Model Law oblige the court to stay the legal proceedings, if  there is an arbitration 
agreement. So, the Model law states in Article 8
’ A/CN.9/264, para 1 and see pp. 21-23 supra.
® It may be noted that the existence o f the arbitration agreement does not prevent either party to fiom  
initiating judicial proceedings. This seems to be based on the giound that the parties have no right to agree 
to oust the jurisdiction o f the state court. See, Halifax v. Intuitive system [1999] 1 ALL ER (Comm.) 303 
and Scott v. Avery (1856) 5 HL case 811.
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“A court before which an action is brought in matter which the subject 
o f an arbitration agreement shall, if  a party so requested not later than 
when submitting his first statement on the substance o f the dispute, 
refer the parties to arbitration unless it finds that the agreement is null 
and void, inoperative or incapable o f being performed” .
Wliile s,9 o f the English Arbitration Act 1996 provides,
“ (1) A party to an arbitration agreement against whom legal 
proceedings are brought (whether by way o f  claim or counterclaim) in 
respect o f a matter which in respect o f a matter which under the 
agreement is to be referred to arbitration may (upon notice to the other 
parties to the proceedings) apply to the court in which the proceedings 
have been brought to stay the proceedings so far as they concern that 
matter”.
These provisions allow a party to the arbitration agreement who is being sued to enforce 
that arbitration agreement by applying to the court for a stay. Furthermore, it might be 
noted that both systems have the same approach, as the drafters o f the 1996 Act had 
Article 8 o f the Model Law in mind when they formulated s.9. This can be seen clearly 
from the statement in Patel v P a te f that the court should take into account the terms of 
Ai'ticle 8 in interpreting s.9***. However, this does not mean that 1996 Act follows the 
Model Law, slavishly, as unlike the Model Law, it is clear on the question o f who may 
seek a stay.
In Kuwait, the right to ask for arbitration can be found in Article (173/5) which provides 
exclusive jurisdiction to an arbitral tribunal to hear and decide any dispute within the 
scope o f an arbitration agreement. It states, “The court shall not have jurisdiction to hear 
disputes which have been agreed to be referred to arbitration”.
This article shows that the court is bound to enforce the arbitration agreement, although 
it does not refer to a stay. Therefore, when a party to an arbitration agreement, contrary 
to that agreement, initiates a legal action, the other party must apply for the dismissal o f 
the legal proceedings, on the ground that the court has no jurisdiction to hear the dispute 
because o f the existence o f the arbitration agreement. However, this ai'ticle does not
" [1999] (C.A) W LR322.
Ibid, see p 325. Per lord woolf.
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cover comprehensively the conditions needed to activate the arbitration agreement, e.g. 
who may apply, the question of time, and whether a stay is mandatory or not.
Modern arbitration systems deal relatively clearly with the effect o f an arbitration 
agreement when a party brings a legal action before a court in a matter is the subject of 
that agreement. Legislation should not only instruct the court to recognise and give effect 
to arbitration agreement, but also to draw its attention how the agreement may be 
enforced, indicating who may apply and within which period o f time.
3.3 Who May Apply?
Wlio has the right to seek a stay? Can any party to legal proceedings avail himself o f that 
right? It is suggested that an applicant should have to be a party to the arbitration 
agreement**, who is being sued in relation to a matter which it has been agreed to submit 
to arbitration. Therefore, not every party to legal proceedings may seek a stay. But an 
applicant for a stay must be a party to legal proceedings to avail him self of that right*^. 
A party to an arbitration agreement, who has not been sued, should not be able apply to 
become a party to the proceedings purely for the purpose of acquiring an order to stay an 
action which has been brought against another party, who has no desire for a stay. The 
applicant for a stay should have to satisfy the court that the matters in respect of which a 
stay is sought fall within the scope o f an arbitration agreement concluded between him 
and the party who has commenced legal proceedings, and that he is him self a party to 
those proceedings.
The rules governing applications for stays should be clear as to the conditions under 
which an application may be made, including the character o f any applicant. Sadly, such 
clarity is not found in current Kuwaiti legislation. In order to discover who may apply for 
a stay, one must research the general principles of the Civil and Commercial Procedure 
Law 1980. This is not helpful, especially since recent arbitration legislation elsewhere 
indicates clearly who may apply for a stay. For instance, the English Arbitration Act 
1996 s.9 makes it obvious that the only party entitled to invoke that section is a party to 
an arbitration agreement, against whom legal proceedings are taken (whether as a 
respondent to a claim or counterclaim)**. It is not clear from the wording used in the
See Art. 8 (1) o f Model Law, sec. 9 (1) o f Arbiti'ation Act 1996.
See Art. 8 0 )  o f Model Law, sec. 9 C)  o f the Arbitration Act 1996.
See B. Harris el al., para [9C] at p 84 and R. Merkin, op. cit., para 6.13, Service Issue No: 26: 6 March 
2000 .
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Model Law ‘if  a party so requests’ whether it covers both the plaintiff and defendant. 
This formula may suggest that an application to stay may be taken by either party*"*. The 
Court o f First Instance o f Hong Kong (Stone J.) confirmed such understanding and 
indicated that both plaintiff and defendant can request a stay under Model Law Article 
8(1)**. The question was whether the court had power to dismiss the action as opposed to 
staying the action under the provisions o f art 8 of the Model Law. Tianjin Shipping Co. 
Ltd (the plaintiff) argued that the case was firmly within Model Law art 8, which did not 
differentiate between the plaintiff or defendant as a seeking party. The court concluded 
that the plnase “a party” is sufficiently wide to include both plaintiff and defendant. The 
court in this case ordered a stay upon the p laintiffs application. This may be compared 
to the approach o f the with Federal Court of Canada, Trial Division (Tremblay-Lamer J.) 
in Granville Shipping Co Inc. v. Pegasus Lines Ltd^^, where the court took the view that, 
by commencing a legal action in court, the plaintiff waived its right to seek to stay the 
legal proceedings. These different results expose a lack o f clarity in the Model Law.
It is therefore suggested that the new Kuwaiti Arbitration Act should follow the model o f 
the English Act in this area.
3.4 The Role of the Court
The following paragraphs will consider the role of the court in this context. The key 
question is whether the court should have the power to refer the parties to arbitration on 
its own initiative. In Kuwait is quite clear that the court does not have any such authority. 
This relates to the fact that the Kuwaiti legal system is based on adversarial procedure*^. 
Under an adversarial system, a court may not enforce the arbitration agreement and stay 
court proceedings merely because of the existence o f the arbitration agreement. When 
one o f the parties to an arbitration agreement initiates legal action against the other, he 
exercises his basic right to litigate, and the court has no power to decline jurisdiction in 
the action simply because o f the existence of the arbitration agreement. Moreover, it has 
no power, by its own initiative, to compel a party to proceed with arbitration. It is for the 
respondent in the legal action to object to court proceedings by invoking the arbitration
See Prof. F. Davidson, Arbitration, op. cit., para 7.33 at p i34.
Hanjin Shipping Co. Ltd  v. Grand King Shipping ltd. 20 N ov 1998, Unreported Commercial List No. 
192 & 193, cited in H. Alvarez et. a i ,  op. cit., p l22.
[1996] 2 F.C.R. 853; 111 F.T.R. 189, cited in H. Alvarez et a i ,  op. cit., p 89.
In this type o f system, the function o f the state courts is to hear both sides and make a judgement. It is 
not to control the collecting o f evidence or to dictate the issues, nor to inform the litigating parties what 
should do or not to do. The role o f  the state court is in fact a passive role. In this system, the parties play 
the primaiy role in the process.
Ch. 3: Judicial Support to Arbitration 75
agreement and seeking a stay. So the court will enforce the arbitration agreement only 
upon a request from such a party. Only upon such an application can the court -  whether 
in Kuwait, England or imder the Model Law - stop the progress of the legal action, and 
leave any dispute to be decided by means o f arbitration. Only by such an application can 
a party show the court that he wants to settle the dispute by arbitration, as agreed. Thus 
the court is not permitted to invoke the provisions o f the arbitration agreement without 
any request from the appropriate party
The importance of such a request from the appropriate party is very clear. Yet Kuwait 
does not indicate clearly that a party must apply for a stay to enable the court to enforce 
the arbitration agreement. This requirement has to be deduced fiom the general 
principles of the legal system of Kuwait. By contrast, most recent arbitration legislation 
articulates this requirement very clearly, as in s.9(l) of the Arbitration Act 1996, and 
Article 8(1) o f the Model Law. O f the latter provision Denault, J. observes, “Where a 
valid arbitration agreement exists and a party requests a transfer of the dispute to 
requests at the first opportunity, Article 8 obliges the court to refer the matter to 
arbitration” ***.
So there is a trend in developed arbitration systems to deprive the court of power to refer 
the parties to arbitration on its own motion^**, reinforcing the point that the court must not 
invoke the arbitration agreement without a request from an interested party. Thus a 
party’s failure to invoke the arbitration agreement should preclude him from relying on 
that agreement, as by his silence, he may be deemed to have waived his right to arbitrate. 
Therefore, a party has to be decisive in this matter and act positively in order to invoke 
the arbitration agreement. He should be aware that the court has no power to stay judicial 
proceedings o f its own initiative, merely because of the existence of the arbitration 
agreement.
3.5 The Court "s Power to Enforce the Arbitration Agreement
In the event of an application for a stay o f legal proceedings the court should not 
automatically suspend those proceedings. It has to be fully satisfied that the application
There was a general agreement in the Model Law that Art. 8 (1) did not empower the court without a 
request o f  a party, i. e. ex officio, to refer the parties to arbitration. See A/CN.9/246, para 22.
See Coopers and Lybrand Limited (Trustee) fo r  BC Navigation S.A (Bankrupt) v Canpotex Shipping 
Services Limited, 1987, Federal Court o f Canada, Trial Division [CLOUT case no. 9].
See A/CN.9/246, para 22.
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has fulfilled all the conditions required by the relevant law. Certain conditions are 
common as between Kuwait and developed legal systems such as England and the Model 
Law - that the application must be made at correct time, and that the arbitration 
agreement is not null and void, inoperative, or incapable o f being performed. These 
conditions will be considered in the following paragraphs.
(a) Time for an Application to Stay
An applicant for a stay should not have delivered any pleadings nor taken any other step 
in the proceedings. Although the central purpose o f an arbitration agreement is to settle 
disputes by arbitration rather than tlirough the courts, so that if one o f the parties seeks to 
litigate, the other should be able to invoke the arbitration agreement by seeking a stay, 
nevertheless, he has to do so at the correct time. One can understand why such a party 
should have to seek a stay without delay. Should he actually participate in the 
proceedings, he must be regarded as having waived his right to arbitrate. Therefore, 
imposing some restriction on the right to seek a stay balances the right to arbitrate and 
the basic right to litigate.
Most legal systems, like Kuwait, England and the Model Law, have stipulated time- 
periods for invoking an arbitration agreement once legal proceedings have been initiated, 
in that the application to stay proceedings should usually be made before taking any step 
in those proceedings. Kuwait makes this point in Article 173(5)(i) o f CCPL 1980, which 
says that the court does not have jurisdiction to hear disputes which have been agreed to 
be submitted to arbitration, adding in Article 173(5)(ii) of CCPL 1980 that an 
abandomnent of rebuttal o f non-jurisdiction may be expressed or implied. The 
explanatory memorandum clarifies this article, stating that the legislator wished to 
elucidate the nature of resorting to the court to settle a dispute that the parties have 
agreed to refer it to arbitration. It adds that a defendant has right to seek an order from 
the court staying court proceedings and referring the matter to arbitration, but emphasises 
that the defendant must make a plea o f non-jurisdiction before delivering his first 
statement on the substance o f the dispute^*.
In England, the Arbitration Act 1996 takes a similar line in s.9(3), which states “ an 
application may not be made by person.... after he has taken any step in those 
proceedings to answer the substantive claim” while Article 8(1) o f the Model law
See Attacks no. 33-36-39/95 Comm, on 19/11/95.
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provides, “ ... if  a party so requests not later than when submitting his first statement on 
the substance o f the dispute,...”. The British Columbia Supreme Court has noted of this 
provision, “a stay of proceedings should not be granted if  it is applied for out of time. It 
would prejudice the plaintiffs to refer the matter to arbitration when the litigation process 
was well under way”^^ .
It can be appreciated then that in most jurisdictions, the court may not grant an 
application to stay unless it is made at the appropriate stage.
(b) The Validity of the Arbitration Agreement
Whatever the stage at which a stay is sought, it will not be granted if  the arbitration 
agreement is null, void, inoperative or incapable o f being performed^*. No court will 
enforce an arbitration agreement, which is a complete nullity'^"*. In Kuwait, the rules that 
govern the arbitration in CCPL 1980 do not specifically address this issue but the 
Supreme Court is of the view that an arbitration agreement shall be enforced only if  it is 
valid and capable o f being executed^*. Moreover, most modern arbitration statutes deal 
with the issue in a clear mamier. For instance, s.9 (4) o f the English Arbitration Act 1996 
states, “on an application under this section the court shall grant a stay unless satisfied 
that the arbitration agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable o f being 
performed”.
Similarly, the Model Law Article 8(1) provides, “ a court... shall, ... refer the parties to 
arbitration unless it finds that the agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable o f 
being performed”^^ .
See QueenslandSuger Corp. v “ Hanjin Jedda” 1995 [CLOUT case no. 181].
See English Arbitration Act 1996 sec. 9 (4), the Model law Art. 8 (1 )  and in Kuwait see Attack no. 
157/93 Comm, on 19/12/93.
The question that who may decide the issue o f the validity o f the arbitration agreement is discussed at 
pp. 74-79 infra. See also for the court supervision over the ruling o f the arbitral tribunal on its own 
jurisdiction in pp. 190-191 infra.
See Attack no. 157/93 Comm, on 19/12/93.
It may be mentioned that the phrase “ null and void, inoperative or incapable o f being performed” 
which appears in Art 8 (1) in the Model Law and in sec.9 (4) o f the English Arbitration Act 1996 is 
taken directly from Art. II o f the New York Convention.
Ch. 3: Judicial Support to Arbitration  78
(c) The Relationship Between the Principle of Competence -  Competence,
and the Jurisdiction of the Court to Examine the Validity of the Arbitration
Agreement^
What is the relationship between the principle o f competence -  competence^^, and the 
jurisdiction o f the court to rule upon the validity of the arbitration agreement? Who 
should decide the point if  a party challenges the validity o f that agreement - the arbitral 
tribunal or the court? This question does not currently arise under the Kuwaiti legal 
system, as Kuwait has not yet adopted the principle of competence-competence. 
Nevertheless, the question arises as to whether the principle should be adopted in 
Kuwait. Hence, we should consider how this issue is treated by modern arbitration 
legislation such as the English Act or the Model Law.
It has been seen that s.9 (4) demands than an English court camiot grant for a stay, imless 
sure o f the validity o f the ar bitration agreement. On the other hand, the arbitral tribunal is 
empowered by s.30 to rule on its own jurisdiction, and may decide on challenges thereto, 
including questions concerning the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement. 
Should the English court rule upon the question o f the validity of the arbitration 
agreement or it should leave the matter to the arbitral tribunal? It was noted earlier^** 
that a key element of the philosophy o f the Act is the recognition of party autonomy, so 
that the court should respect the parties’ desire. It was, moreover, one o f the fundamental 
principles o f the Act that the court should not intervene in the arbitration, unless the law 
clearly sanctions this. Thus the indications aie that the court should initially leave 
questions relating to the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction to be determined by the tribunal 
itself, with the court only dealing with such questions pursuant to ss. 32 (Determination 
o f preliminary point o f jurisdiction) or 67 (Challenging the award; substantive 
jurisdiction).
Yet the principle o f competence-competence does not invariably prevent the court from 
dealing with the matters relating to the validity and existence o f the arbitration 
agreement, as ss. 9 and 30 do not oblige the court always to refer disputes as to the
The coming paragraphs focus on this relation in case o f enforcing the arbitration agreement and when 
the state court has the first chance to deal with challenges dkected at the arbitration agreement. Therefore, 
it does not deal with this relation when the court is a body o f review on the decision o f the arbitral tribunal 
on its own jurisdiction. This matter is discussed in pp. 190- 191 infra.
See pp. 33-37 supra.
See pp.63-64 supra.
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arbitral tribunal's jurisdiction to the tribunal itself. In practice, in certain situations it is 
better to decide for the court to rule on the matter. Thus the DAC notes,
“ For example, cases arise where a party starts an arbitration but the 
other party, without taking part, raises an objection to the tribunal. In
such circumstances, it might very well be cheaper and quicker for the
party wishing to arbitrate to go directly to the Court to seek a 
favourable ruling on the jurisdiction rather than seeking an award from 
the tribunal”***.
And it has been held that an English court is competent to decide whether there is a valid 
arbitration agreement in terms o f s.5 of the Act**. The court has jurisdiction to determine 
whether a stay should be granted if  there is a question whether there is a valid arbitration 
agreement*^. The Rules o f the Supreme Court (Amendment 1996) in order 73 r.6 (2) 
states,
“Wliere a question arises as to whether an arbitration agreement has 
been concluded or as to whether the dispute which is the subject-matter 
of the proceedings falls within the terms of such an agreement, the 
Court may determine that question or give directions for its 
determination, in which case it may be order the proceedings to be 
stayed pending the determination o f that question”.
Birse Construction Ltd  v St D avid  Tfri**, clarifies the relationship between ss.9(4) and 30
and answers the question whether the court must always refer a dispute as to the
existence of an arbitration agreement to the tribunal whose competence is disputed. Pill 
L.J. rejected that submission, stating that in some cases it would be better for the court to 
determine the issue itself, and continuing,
“[I] f  it is clear on the evidence that a contract did or did not exist then 
the court should decide for it cannot be right to direct an issue pursuant
See DAC 1996, para 141 (iii).
See Birse Construction L td  v St D avid L td  [1999] BLR 194, this decision was confirmed in Thomas 
Dobbie Thomson Walkinshaw & Ors v Pedro Paulo Diniz, Commercial Court (Thomas J) 19 May 1999.
See CPR 1998, Practice Direction 49G, para 6(2). See also, R. Merkin, op. cit, Service Issue no 31:31 
March 2002, para 6.22.1.
[1999] BLR 194.
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to order 73, rule 6(2) or to leave the ‘dispute’ to be determined by the 
arbitral tiibunal” .
This case, furthermore, explores the procedural options o f a court facing an application 
to stay, listing them as follow:
1) It may determine on affidavit evidence that there was an arbitration agreement 
between the disputants, in which case the proceedings shall be stayed pursuant to s.9;
2) It may stay the proceedings under s.9 on the ground that the arbitral tribunal has 
jurisdiction to rule on its own jurisdiction in terms o f s.30;
3) It may decide not to determine the question immediately but may order the question 
to be considered under CPR 1998, Practice Directions 49G, para 6(2).
4) It may decide that there was no agreement to arbitrate, refiise to grant a stay, and 
therefore proceed to deal with the case.
Ward L.J. indicated that judges in such situations have discretion to take whatever course 
they thinlc appropriate, having weighed all the circumstances. One factor which should 
be taken into account is the interest of the parties in avoiding urmecessaiy delay or cost. 
The court should thus consider the likelihood o f a challenge to the ai'bitral award (under 
ss.67 and 69^ "^ ) on the basis o f lack of jurisdiction, or the non-existence of the arbitration 
agreement. It could not be in the interests o f the parties to have to return to the court for a 
definitive answer to a question, which could and should have been decided by the court 
before the arbitral tribunal embarked upon the meat o f the reference.
The Court of Appeal in Ahmed Al-Naimi v Islamic Press Agency Inc^^ further developed 
the analysis o f the relationship between ss.9 and 30. One o f the questions before the 
court o f first instance was the scope o f the arbitration clause the court being invited by 
the parties to determine this matter on affidavit evidence. Judge Bowsher QC refused to 
do so, on the ground that the arbitral tribunal should first consider this matter, staying the 
action pursuant to s.9. However, the Court o f Appeal indicated that he had to accede to 
this request, Waller L.J. opining,
“on an application under s. 9, a Court is bound to consider the 
affidavit evidence, and to spend time in so doing. There is bound to be 
argument about the strength or otherwise of the case whether the
34 The state court may bear in mind the possibility o f the challenge to the jurisdiction o f  the arbitral
tribunal (s 32), or the challenge to an arbitral award (ss67-69). 
[2000] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 522.
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arbitration clause covered the subject matter of the action in 
considering what course to take. It thus also seems to me that in the 
interest of good litigation management and the saving o f costs, the 
Court should see whether it can resolve that point on the affidavit 
evidence”^^ .
He Continued that the proper construction of s.9 was that the Court must be satisfied (a) 
that there was an arbitration clause and (b) that the subject matter of the action was 
within that clause before the Court could grant stay under that section^^.
There is an inlierent tension between the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal to rule on its 
own jurisdiction and the power o f the court to determine whether the arbitration 
agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable o f being performed. It has been seen 
that the court may consider the interests of the expediency before dealing with an 
application for a stay, as shown by the cases considered above.
The Model Law seems to adopt the same stance as the English Courts to the issue o f the 
relationship between the principle o f competence-competence and the jurisdiction o f the 
court to examine the arbitration agreement in the case o f an application to stay. This is 
seen clearly in third Working Group Report which declares that where the parties 
differed on the existence of a valid arbitration agreement, that issue should be settled by 
the court, without first referring the issue to an arbitral tribunal which allegedly lacked 
jurisdiction^^.
In the case of Cangene Corp v Octapharma AG^^, which dealt with the question of 
whether the arbitration agreement was operative, and whether its scope covered the 
dispute. Morse. J, of the Manitoba Court o f Queen’s Bench held that the arbitration 
clause shall be extended to a dispute over the termination o f the agreement. Thus the 
clause was not inoperative and the action was stayed. This shows that Article 16 does not 
oblig the court to leave jurisdictional challenges to the arbitral tribunal. Article 8(1) 
allows the court consider such challenges in deciding whether to enforce the arbitration 
agreement. Jean Charbonneau v. Les Industries A. C. Davie Inc. et. A l is another helpful
Ibid., per Lord J. Waller, at p 526, col. 1. 
Ibid.
A/CN.9/233, para 77, see also Prof. F. Davidson, International Commercial Arbitration, op. cit., para 
3.16 at p 53.
[2000] 9 WWR. 606, cited in H. Alvarez et a l ,  op, cit., p 64.
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example. The plaintiff, in this case, sued for damages caused by the delay in the delivery 
o f a fishing boat, which one o f the defendants was to construct and the other partly 
finance. The defendants sought a stay o f proceedings pursuant to Article 8 of the Model 
Law on the ground that the contract contained an arbitration clause. The coiut found that 
under the arbitration agreement the Minister o f Agriculture was to arbitrate any dispute 
arising between the parties. It was held that the arbitration clause was inoperative on the 
ground that the Minister of Agriculture could not act as an impartial arbitrator being a 
party to the contract. The court thus dismissed the defendant's application for a stay of 
the proceedings.
All these cases draw the attention to the general philosophy behinds the provisions that 
govern staying legal proceeding and the power of the arbitral tribunal to rule on its own 
jurisdiction. It is true on one hand that the purpose o f the arbitration agreement is to 
settle any dispute by arbitration, to the exclusion of competent court^*’. Moreover, the law 
and the courts should aim, wherever possible, to uphold the arbitration agreement and 
leave disputes and challenges to be resolved by the agreed authority. Yet on the other 
hand, the court may refuse to invoke the arbitration agreement, even if  a party makes a 
proper and timeous application, when it is satisfied that there is no point going to 
arbitration"^^ since the arbitration agreement is clearly null or void, inoperative or 
incapable of being performed. The court may thus avoid unnecessary delay and cost 
which would result from following the desire o f the paities as expressed in the arbitration 
agreement"^^.
Accordingly, the court should balance these policies. Its attitude towards determining 
whether an arbitration agreement is “null or void, inoperative or incapable of being 
performed” is a key matter, as this mirrors its attitude towards the arbitration agreement 
and the power of the arbitral tribunal to rule on its own jurisdiction. In principle, the 
court should respect the primacy o f party autonomy, and operate the principle
A/CN.9/207, para 59.
The parties could avoid such interaction by ensuring that there should be no cause which will require a 
court to disregard the arbitration agreement. See B.N. Kirpal, ‘The Risk o f Ambiguous Arbitration 
agreements’, in A. Berg (ed.). International Arbitration and National Courts, ICCA Congress, Series No. 
10, New Delhi, at p 15.
The source o f this inherent power to examine the arbitration agreement may be not only Art 8 (1) or sec 
9, but also by it is basic function as to delivery justice. The wards o f Lord Saville may be relevant. He says 
“Justice delayed or unnecessarily expensive justice is indeed justice denied. However ‘correct’ the final 
decision can be said to be, it w ill have produced injustice if  it took too long or was too expensive”. See M. 
Saville, ‘An Introduction to the 1996 arbitration Act’ (1996) 62 Arbitration 165 at p 166.
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competence- competence, unless the invalidity o f the agreement is obvious^^ or can be 
clearly proved" "^ .^
3.6 Judicial Relief for Breaches of the Arbitration Agreement
What is the nature o f the relief that the court is bound and empowered to grant, when a 
legal action is brought that falls within the scope o f an arbitration agreement, which it is 
then requested to enforce? Here the Model Law, the 1996 Act, and Kuwaiti law each has 
a totally different approach. Each approach shall be examined with view to 
recommending how this matter might best be dealt with in the new Kuwaiti Arbitration 
Act.
Article 8(1) of the Model Law indicates that the court “shall refer the parties to 
arbitration”. In using these words, the object o f the draftsmen o f the Model Law was to 
keep it in line with the corresponding provision o f the New York Convention 1958 -  
Article 2(3). For the sake of consistency, the lawmakers rejected the proposal to 
substitute the words “shall decline jurisdiction” . This clearly emerges from the Fourth 
Working Group Report"^^. Thus, a comt which grants a stay must refer the parties to the 
arbitration. That this is an obligation incumbent on the court was confirmed by the High 
Court o f Hong Kong (Leonard J.) in Nassetti Ettore S.p.a. v Lawton Development 
Limitecf^. The Model law has therefore adopted the idea of a compulsory reference to 
arbitration. It is hardly common for a court to instruct the parties to resort to another 
institution to settle their disputes"^^.
On the other hand, the 1996 Act has a completely different philosophy in relation to this 
question. Under s.9 the court may only grant a stay, which order cannot be interpreted as 
a judicial reference of the dispute to arbitration. The relief o f the grant of a stay cuts off 
the p la in tiffs  preferred method of enforcing his claims, leaving him to go to arbitration 
if  he wants to settle his disputes. Therefore England has not adopted the idea o f a 
compulsory reference to arbitration. The 1996 Act in this respect simply continues the 
traditional philosophy of English arbitration law. So Lord Mustill notes, “The idea o f a
Fung Sang Trading Limited v. K ai Sun Sea Products and Food Company Limited, 29 October 1991, 
Hong Kong: High Court o f Hong Kong (Kaplan J.), [CLOUT case no. 20], Nanisivik Mines Ltd. and Zinc 
Corporation o f  America v. Canarctic Shipping Co. Ltd., 10 February 1994, Canada: Federal Court of 
Appeal (Mahoney, MacGuigan and Linden, JJ.A.), [CLOUT case no. 70].
Inco Europe L td and others v First Choice Distribution (a firm) et al, [1999] 1 ALL ER (C.A), p 820 
A/CN.9/233, para 76.
See CLOUT case no. 129.
This is in many legal systems such as in Kuwait and England.
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compulsory reference was mooted before the great reforms o f the 1850s, but was 
rejected in favour o f discretionary stay ..
At the moment Kuwaiti law, like French law, obliges the court (if timeously requested to 
do so) to dismiss an action brought in breach o f an arbitration agreement, on the ground 
that it has no jurisdiction to deal with this dispute"^^. But what is the ideal approach for 
the law to take in this context? It might be argued that it is inappropriate for a court to 
relinquish its jurisdiction to another institution. Thus the idea o f a compulsory reference 
must be rejected. The court should not be required positively to refer the parties to 
arbitration. The practical and appropriate relief could be merely staying the judicial 
proceedings, and this approach is reconmiended to the Kuwaiti legislator. This relief 
should be compulsory and not permissive. Tliis is another lesson may be learnt from the 
modern arbitral systems.
It has been seen then, that the court’s power to grant to stay legal proceedings, and thus 
enforce the arbitration agreement, can be invoked only when the application to stay has 
fulfilled all relevant requirements. Most modern and healthy legal systems adopt the 
approach that in such a case the court has no discretion. It must stop the proceedings and 
refer the matter to arbitration, unless the arbitration agreement is invalid.
That is the view taken of Article 8 o f the Model Law by the Canadian Federal Couid of 
Appeal, which has opined that “ shall in article 8 clearly means must, not maÿ^^^. In 
another example the Ontario Supreme Court (Campbell J.) opines
“The Court held that with respect to matters falling within the scope of 
the ai'bitration clause. Model Law Article 8 was mandatory and 
required a stay of proceedings unless the plaintiffs discharged the onus 
o f showing that the agreement was null and void, inoperative, or 
incapable o f being performed. The court recognized a strong public 
policy in favour of upholding and enforcing agreement to arbitrate”  ^\
See Chanel Tunnel Group v Balfour Beatty Ltd. [1993] 1 ALL ER (HL) p. 679 para g-h-J.
See Art. 173/3 o f CCPL 1980. See the French treatment in Art. 1458 o f CCP 1981.
Nanisivik Mines Ltd. And Zinc Corporation o f  America V Canarctic Shipping Co. Ltd. [CLOUT case no. 
70].
Boart Sweden A.B.,et at. v Nya stromnes A.B.,et al, (1988), 41 B.L.R. 295. See also Canada: Federal 
Court o f Canada, Trial Division (Denault, J.) in BC Navigation S. A. (Bankrupt) 
V. Canpotex Shipping Services Limited, 2 November 1987, [CLOUT case no. 9]. It provides “Where a 
valid arbitration agreement exists and a party requests a transfer o f the dispute to the arbitration tribunal at 
the first opportunity. Art. 8 MAL obliges the court to refer the matter to arbitration”.
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The 1996 Act seems to adopt the same stance as the Model Law to the issue of the 
imperative duty on the comt to stay its proceedings. Since the provisions o f s 9 o f the 
1996 Act are m a n d a to ry K u w a it has to take the same line trend.
3.7 Conclusion
Any developed and healthy arbitration system must start from the fact that the interest of 
justice generally dictates that contractual agreements should be upheld. The Arbitration 
Act must feature a requirement that court proceedings be stayed in respect o f disputes 
subject to an arbitration agreement. Kuwait should deal with question o f the enforcement 
o f an arbitration agreement in one provision, like the English Ai'bitration Act 1996 s.9 or 
the Model Law Article 8, which enables the statute to treat this issue comprehensively, in 
turn helping the users of arbitration to be certain where the law stands on the issue. The 
relevant provision must state all conditions that are required to be satisfied if court is to 
grant a stay, and a stay should be the exclusive judicial relief for breaching the 
arbitration agreement by bringing legal proceedings. This remedy should be mandatory.
See sec. 4 o f 1996 Act and Shed. 1 to the Act for the mandatory provisions.
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4. Extending Contractual Time-Bars
4.1 Introduction
Arbitration agreements may well feature clauses stipulating time limits for commencing 
arbitral proceedings or for making the arbitral award^^. The agreement may provide that 
the right to go to arbitration is extinguished if  it has not commenced within the time limit 
agreed by the parties. So a clause may, for example, stipulate a time limit of three 
months after the dispute has arisen for beginning the EU'bitration, otherwise there can be 
no arbitration. The agreement may also provide that an arbitral award should be made, 
e.g. within ten months o f the first session- if  it is to be valid. Such clauses may thus 
affect the claimant’s right to aibitrate or the validity o f the ai'bitral award. Thus, 
contractual limitation clauses may have significant consequences. Contracting parties 
may resort to such clauses for different purposes. The DAG Report 1996 records one of 
the justifications as enabling commercial concerns to draw a line beneath transactions at 
much earlier stage than ordinary limitation provisions would allow^" .^ Another object 
might be to provide some limit to the uncertainties of whether a party will go to 
arbitration or not - a party would know that the other could not insist on arbitration after 
the lapse of the time limit. Thus, there are a number of logical and practical justifications 
for including such contractual time-bars^^
Time-bar clauses are recognised and enforced by many legal systems across the world, 
for example, in both Kuwait and England. However, legislative treatment of this matter 
is not always the same. The role which the court is accorded regarding time bar clauses is 
often a crucial difference. In most legal systems, the court plays no other role in relation 
to a contractual time bar, other than to recognise and enforce it. On the other hand, the 
court could have a significant role, if  it were permitted to extend the stipulated time 
limits. This diversity between legal systems raises a number o f questions. Does failure by 
the claimant to comply with a contractual time bar always entail that the claim is barred 
or the claimant’s right extinguished, or that a late arbitral award is invalid? Or can the 
claimant be relieved from the consequences of his delay or failure to comply with the 
contractual time limit? What role should the court play In such cases?
The contractual time limit is considered as a positively beneficial feature o f commercial contract. See 
Mustill & Boyd, op. cit., p 200.
Para 68.
See R. Markin, op. cit., para 11.17, Service Issue No 23: 7 April 1999.
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This section endeavours to focus on the role of the Kuwaiti court pertaining to the 
contractual time bar, dealing with how Kuwaiti legislation treats the question o f the 
effects o f failure to comply with the stipulated time, and whether the court should have 
any authority to extend the contractual time-bar. The aim of this section is to examine the 
role the state could play to support arbitration in relation to the outcome o f contractual 
limitation. It considers whether the court should be able to extend an agreed time limit, to 
give the parties another opportunity to resolve their disputes by means o f arbitration. 
What is the attitude of the Kuwaiti courts to this issue? What lessons could be learnt 
from the 1996 Act or the Model Law?
The best way to examine these issues is to consider the matter under tln’ee headings,
• Extending time for commencing arbitral proceedings.
• Extending time for making an arbitral award.
• Extending other time limits.
4.2 Extending Time for Commencing Arbitral Proceedings
The starting point here must be the treatment accorded by the 1996 Act to this question. 
The 1996 Act takes a pioneering step as regards contractual time limits for the 
commencement of arbitral proceedings. The court, under s. 12 o f the 1996 Act, has the 
authority to extend such contractual limitation periods. Neither the Model law nor the 
Kuwaiti arbitration system confers such authority. This makes the issue of this power 
particularly interesting. The following paragraphs are thus designed to focus on s. 12, 
with a view to advising whether the new Kuwaiti Arbitration Act should adopt a similar 
approach.
(a) Contractual Time Bars to Arbitration
It is quite common to find in a range o f types o f commercial contracts a clause that 
stipulates that, if  specified steps or procedures are not taken within a given period after 
the dispute has arisen, the right to arbitrate is extinguished. Prof. F. Davidson says 
“commercial contracts quite often stipulate that if  certain steps are not taken- generally 
the making of a claim within specified period o f time- then a party’s rights ai*e 
extinguished or his right to have a claim determined by arbitration is extinguished”^^ .
See Prof. F Davidson, Arbitration, op. cit., para 8.02.
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This type o f contractual time-bar is often considered as barring the right to arbitrate^^. 
This style o f agreement has been recognized as totally valid and effective. The House o f 
Lords in Atlantic Shipping and Trading Company v Loids Dreyfus and Company^^ notes, 
“It is perfectly legal to make such stipulation- it is done, e.g., every day in insurance 
policies”^^ .
(b) The Power of the Court Under s. 12 of the 1996 Act
Does the failure by the claimant to comply with the contractual time limit inevitably 
prevent a party from resolving Iris claim via arbitration, or can he be relieved from the 
consequences o f his delay or failure? Section 12 o f the 1996 Act provides that the court
has jurisdiction to extend time limits for commencing arbitral proceedings or taking
other steps as a pre-condition to ai'bitration, stating,
“ (1) Where an arbitration agreement to refer future disputes to 
ai'bitration provides that a claim shall be baired, or the claimant’s right 
extinguished, unless the claimant takes within a time fixed by the 
agreement some step -
(a) To begin arbitral proceedings, or
(b) To begin other dispute resolution procedures, which must be 
exhausted before arbitral proceedings can be begun, the court may by 
order extend the time for taking that step.
(2) Any party to the arbitration agreement may apply for such an
order (upon notice to the other parties), but only after a claim has
arisen and after exhausting any available arbitral process for obtaining 
an extension of time”.
Thus, a failure to appoint an arbitrator on time, or to give notice to determine an 
arbitrator, or to take some specified other step to commence arbitral proceedings within 
the stipulated time limit does not always lead to the loss o f the right to arbitrate.
However, that may not prevent that barred party resorting to litigation to settle the dispute. Since that 
does not affect the basic right to litigate and the nature o f the time bar does not extent to bar the claim. See 
Hardwick Game Farm v S.A.P.P.A., Ltd. [1964] 2 Lloyds Rep. 227 at 274, co l.l. Nevertheless, this surely 
depends on the nature o f the conti'actiial time limit and its effects.
^**[1922]2A.C.250.
^^Ibid,. Per Lord Dunedin, p. 256.
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(c) The Criteria for Exercising the Jurisdiction Under s.l2
However, s. 12 allows the court to act only if  either o f two conditions is met. Mance J. 
notes that the effect o f s. 12 is, piu'suant to the doctrine o f party autonomy, to introduce a 
very material restriction o f situations in which the court can grant an extension of time 
for commencement o f arbitration*^®. Thus, s. 12(3) states,
“The court shall make an order only if  satisfied -
(a) That the circumstances are such as were outside the reasonable 
contemplation of the parties when they agreed the provision in 
question, and that it would be just to extend the time, or
(b) That the conduct o f one party makes it unjust to hold the other 
party to the strict terms of the provision in question”.
Waller L. J. thus clarifies the construction o f s. 12,
“the construction o f section has, in my judgment to start from the 
assumption that when the parties agreed a time bai', they must be taken 
to have contemplated that if  there were any omission to comply with 
its provisions in not unusual circumstances arising in ordinary course 
o f business, the claim would be time barred unless the conduct o f the 
other party made it unjust that it should”®\
The following paragraphs will consider the statutory criteria for exercising this judicial 
power.
1) Circumstances outside the Reasonable Contemplation of the Contracting 
parties
If, despite a limitation clause, a party wants to arbitrate, he has to satisfy the court in 
terms o f s.l2(3)(a) that the need for an extension arises out o f circumstances that were 
“outside the reasonable contemplation o f the parties” . He has also to satisfy the court that 
it would be “just” to grant an extension of the time bar® .^ The Court of Appeal 
confirmed this in Harbour and General Works LTD. V Environment Agency,
See, Grimaldi S. P. A. v Sekihyo lines Ltd. (Q.B.D.) [1999] 1 W.L.R. 708 at p 722.
See Harbour and General Works LTD. V Environment Agency, (C.A.) [1999] 1 W.L.R. 950 at p 959. 
Per Judge Jack QC in Vosnoc L td  v Transglobal Projects Z/J [1998] 2 ALL ER. (QBD), p 990 at 1001.
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“Section 12(3)(a) does not to allow the court to interfere with a 
contractual bargain rmless the circumstances are such that, if  they had 
been drawn to the parties' attention when they agreed the provisions, 
they would at very least have contemplated that the time bar might not 
apply; that if  they had so contemplated it is then for the court to rule 
whether justice required giving an extension”®^.
It was held that a party’s failure properly to read the agreed contractual provisions 
relating to the time limit could not be deemed as circumstances outside the parties' 
contemplation so that the court could not act under s. 12 in such a case®"^ . So what 
circumstances do trigger the court’s power to extend time bars?
Neither s.l2(3)(a) nor any other provision o f the Act suggest any definition of or 
limitation to the expression “circumstances”. It was noted in the Vosnoc case that the 
subsection placed no limit on ‘the circumstances’®®. So, the law does not draw a list o f 
circumstances that merit an extension. The interpretation of ‘circumstances’ must depend 
upon the circumstances o f each individual case. Judge Jack QC in the Vosnoc case states, 
“ [T]he court should look at the whole of the circumstances in which the application for 
an extension arises”®®.
Furthermore, the court seems to have a discretionary jurisdiction to consider all 
circumstances presented before it and decide whether these were or not outside the 
reasonable contemplations o f the parties, considering all the circumstances as whole and 
focusing on those circumstances placed before the court. Geoffrey Brice QC states in 
Cathiship v Allanasons
“Thus the court is concerned not only with what the parties actually 
contemplated at that time (the relevant time is restricted to the time 
when the parties agreed the arbitration clause) but what they 
reasonably would have contemplated. This must involve a 
consideration o f the relevant transaction, or ordinary practices within
(C.A.) [1999] 1 W.L.R. atp  951-F-. 
^U bid.,^  95 \ -G-.
“  [1998] 2 ALL ER at p 991-a-.
p 1001-g-.
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that type of transaction and with the reasonable expectations o f parties 
involved in such a transaction”®^.
It is worth remembering that even if  the reasonable contemplation hurdle is negotiated, 
the applicant must still prove that an extension would be just. He must establish both 
elements in order to obtain an extension.
2) The Conduct of the other Party
Yet s.l2(3)(b) establishes an alternative ground for an extension - that the conduct o f one 
o f the parties to the arbitration agreement makes it unjust to hold the other to the strict 
terms o f the provision in question. It seems that when the court feels that the defendant’s 
conduct had not caused the applicant trouble, it will not grant an extension under s. 12
(3)(b). So in the Harbour case it was held that, as there was no obligation on the 
respondents to advise the applicants that time was about to expire, the applicants' own 
failure to read properly the relevant provisions o f the contract did not make it unjust to 
hold them to the strict terms o f the time bar® .^
If either o f two conditions is met, a party to the arbitration agreement may invoke the 
provisions o f sl2 . Section 12(2) provides,
“Any party to the arbitration agreement may apply for such an order 
(upon notice to the other parties), but only after a claim has arisen and 
after exhausting any available arbitral process for obtaining an 
extension of time” .
The qualification to that right means that an applicant has first to take any agreed steps 
and follow any agreed procedures before resorting to the court under s. 12. The applicant 
should apply without any delay, as delay is a factor which the court may take into 
account in exercising its discretion whether to or not to grant an extension. The House o f 
Lords in Comdel v Siporex emphasises this point. There are several other cases where
[1998]3 ALL ER. 714 at p 726 -e-f. 
[2000] 1 W.L.R at p 961 -li-.
69 [1990] 2 Lloyd’s Reports (HL) 207. Even this decision is made before Arbitration Act 1996 and based 
on sec. 27 o f the Arbitration Act 1950, which o f course repealed; this point seems to be still relevant. This 
since, sec. 12 is based on the old sec.27.
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the court had regai’d to the length o f the d e l a y a n d  applications have been rejected 
where not made within a reasonable time and without delay^\
(d) Section 12 and Party Autonomy
It may be observed that s. 12 is very closely related to the idea o f party a u t o n o m y I t  has 
been said its power under s. 12 will give the court “the opportunity to reconsider how to 
proceed in the light o f the philosophy underlying the Bill as whole namely that of party 
autonomy” ''®.
Generally the court should respect the agreement of the parties. Accordingly it should 
recognise a contractual time bar. However, this is not only the meaning o f the concept of 
party autonomy. Another meaning is that any jurisdiction given to the court to ignore the 
bargain that the parties have made must be completely justilied^"^. The drafters of the 
1996 Act clearly believe that justice requires the possibility o f extending a bar in the two 
situations contemplated by s. 12(3). The DAC Report of February 1996 stated clearly that 
the power given to the court by s. 12 Act could be justified in view o f the fact that it is 
fair to extend the time limit in these two cases^®. So no contractual time-bar is absolute, 
and the power conferred by s. 12 enables “the court to qualify the effect o f the party’s 
actual agreement” ®^.
The drafters’ approach is stressed in Harbour v. Environment, where Waller L.J states,
“the changes to wording of section 12 as intended to reflect the 
underlying philosophy o f the Act as being that o f ‘party autonomy’ .
By that plnase was meant ‘among other things’, that any power given 
to the court to override the bargain that the parties have made must be 
fully justified”^^ .
It may be learnt from s. 12 that it gives rein to the court to extend the contractual time 
limit where justice calls for such reaction. This is one of the ways to support party 
autonomy. As Waller L.J. says,
™ See R. Merkin, op. cit., para 11.45 (2), Service Issue No 32:30 August 2002. 
Richmond Shipping Ltd V Agro Co. [1973] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 145.
Harbour V Environment Agency, (C.A.) [2000] 1 W.L.R. 950 at 959 -f-. 
DAC 1996 Report, para 72.
Ibid., para 69.
Ibid., para.70.
See Grimaldi V SeJdhyo [1999] 1 W.L.R. 708 at 717-E-.
[2000] 1 W.L.R. at 959 -E-.
Ch. 3: Judicial Support to Arbitration 93
“The subsection is concerned with party autonomy, its aim seems to 
me that to allow the court to consider an extension in relation to 
circumstances where the parties would not reasonably have 
contemplated them as being ones where the time bar would apply”®"^.
(e) The Relationship Between s.9 (Staying Court Proceedings) and s .l2  
(Extending Time Limits)
In some cases, the application of a time bar may be an issue of contractual inteipretation. 
So in the Grimaldi case one o f the questions was whether the Hague Rules^® (which 
contain a contractual limitation clause) were incorporated into the contract, so as to make 
the time bar effective. In such a case, or when the court is asked to grant two orders - one 
under s.9 staying the proceedings, and the other under s. 12 extending the time limit - 
how should it react?
It seems that R.S.C order 73, r.21^® supports the principle o f party autonomy by allowing 
the parties to agree to the court, rather than the arbitral tribunal, determining by 
declaration issues which would otherwise fail within the jurisdiction o f the tribunal. The 
parties may wish to resolve all questions between them. Therefore, the court decides 
whetlier the time bar applies, and if  so, whether the time limit should be extended. 
However, in the absence of such agreement, the court is obliged to stay the proceedings 
and leave the contractual issue to be determined by the arbitral tribunal. Wliere a dispute 
as to whether an arbitration agreement was time-barred involved factual questions or 
substantial contractual issues, and one of the parties had objected under s.9 to its being 
considered other than by arbitrators, it was held that the matter should be refened to the 
arbitrators under the agreement, rather than being dealt with by the court under s .l2 ^ \ 
Hence, Mance J. in the case in question had to order a stay, and dismiss the application 
for an extension, without prejudice to applicant’s right to argue and contest the time bar 
point before the arbitrators^^. The arbitral tribunal may then decide the time bar issue, but
Harbour v Environment Agency, (C.A.) [2000] 1 W.L.R. at p 960 -f-.
™ It is an International Convention for the Unification o f  Certain Rules o f Law relating to Bills o f  Lading 
(Brussels, 25 August 1924).
This is as it held in Grimaldi v Sekihyo, where the court says “Although Order 73, r21 allowed parties to 
an arbitration agreement to agree to the court, rather than arbitrators, determining by declaration issues 
which would otherwise fall within the jurisdiction o f the arbitrators...”. [1998] 3 ALL ER, p 943. Order 
73, r21 provides “An application for an order under section 12 o f the Arbitration Act may include as an 
alternative an application for a declaration that such an order is not needed”.
Grimaldi v Sekihyo (Q.B.D.) [1999] 1 W.L.R., p. 7 0 9 -A -.
Ibid., p709 -B-.
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only the court may grant an extension under s,12, although the parties may of course 
contractually empower the arbitral tribunal to grant an extension^®. In such a case, the 
court cannot deal with the application under s. 12 without exhausting firstly any available 
arbitral process for obtaining an extension o f time^" .^
It may be noted that the parties may agree to postpone the decision of the court or the 
application under s. 12 imtil after the arbitral tribunal has determined the contractual 
issues, without prejudice to the claimant’s legal position if  an application under s. 12 
should prove necessary. Mance J observed
“I see no reason why the court should not encourage and give effect to 
an agreement o f this nature to delay a section 12 application until its 
need is established” ®^.
On the other hand, in the absence of such agreement, the applicant may have to invoke 
the provisions of s. 12, to protect his legal position, and the corat may, if  it thinks fit, stay 
its consideration o f the s. 12 issue, pending the arbitrators’ determination whether or not 
there is any applicable consensual time bar^®. It is worth mentioning nonetheless, that 
the corat may decide to rule on a s. 12 application on the assumption that there is an 
applicable consensual time bar^^. It seems apparent then that there is a sensible, practical 
relationship between ss.9 and 12^ .^
(f) Conclusion
It is suggested that a power to extend a contractual time -  bar- is a good idea. 
Accordingly, the new Kuwaiti Arbitration Act should have a similar provision. An 
examination of the case law under s. 12 o f the 1996 Act shows that tins is a workable 
model which relates well to the overall framework o f that statute. However, in order to 
support the tendency of party autonomy this provision should be non-mandatory. So 
there may be a consensual mechanism for extension.
See Comdel Commodities L td  v Siporex Trade SA (No.2) (HL) [1991] 1 A.C. 148, and R. Merkin, op. 
cit., para 11.31, Service Issue no 31 ; 31 March 2002.
Sec. 12 (2) o f the Arbitration Act 1996.
Grimaldi v Sekihyo (Q.B.D.) [1999] 1 W.L.R, p718 -F-.
" " 7 W .,p 7 1 8 -F -.
Ibid., p 718 - G-H, and see International Tank v Kuwait Aviation Fuelling Co. KSC  [1975] 1 ALL ER 
242.
It may be important for the successful arbitral environment to see the respondent is co-operative party or 
at least should not act to prevent the s 12 claim proceedings. This is for the sake to save time and cost. See 
ALL E R Annual Review 1998, at p 21.
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4.3 Extending Time for Making Arbitral Awards
Kuwait and England have different approaches to empowering the court to extend the 
time limit for making an arbitral award. In Kuwait Article 181 o f CCPL 1980 permits the 
arbitrating parties to agree on a time limit for making an ai'bitral award. Furthermore, it 
provides a supplementary provision in the absence of an agreed time limit. This states 
that if  the arbitration agreement does not contain a time limit, the arbitral tribunal has to 
make its decision within 6 months from the date when the parties were notified o f the 
first arbitration session. It also allows the parties to agree to extend the agreed or 
statutory date, or to authorise the tribunal to extend the date.
By contrast s.50 o f the 1996 Act provides,
“(1) where the time for making an award is limited by or in pursuance 
of the arbitration agreement, then, unless otherwise agreed by the 
parties, the court may in accordance with the following provisions by 
order extend that time.
(2) An application for an order under this section may be made -
(a) by the tribunal (upon notice to the parties), or
(b) by any party to the proceedings (upon notice to the tribunal and 
the other parties), but only after exhausting any available arbitral 
process for obtaining an extension o f time.
(3) The court shall only make an order if  satisfied that a substantial 
injustice would otherwise be done.
(4) The court may extend the time for such period and on such terms as 
it thinks fit, and may do so whether or not the time previously fixed 
(by or under the agreement or by a previous order) has expired” .
It can be noted that while Kuwait stipulates a time limit for making an arbitral award in 
the absence o f contrary agreement, in England the tribunal may make its decision at any 
time, unless the parties agree that an award has to be made within a specific time^®. Each 
approach has its advantages. Stipulating a time limit for making tlie award will clearly 
oblige the tribunal and parties to do their best to end the arbitral process within a 
reasonable time, such as 6 months. This would malce the arbitral process quicker than 
litigation. Yet this is at the expense o f party autonomy, as the parties are subject to this
Russell, op. cit., para 7-039, p 343.
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pressure, which is imposed by law not by their agreement. They should have the 
flexibility and the right to design their arbitral procedures and determine whether there 
should be a time limit for making an award or not. Yet Kuwait arguably provides that 
flexibility, given that the parties may agree to override the statutory time limit and/or 
extend that limit where it applies. So it might be said that Kuwait combines respect for 
the principle of party autonomy with encouragement for the tribunal to make its award 
within a reasonable time.
The second point is that the 1996 Act gives the court the power to extend agreed time 
limits - a power not accorded to courts in countries like Kuwait and France®®, where only 
the parties themselves may extend such limits. The Kuwaiti approach might be said to be 
flawed, as obtaining the consent o f both parties is often impractical, in particular if  the 
arbitral proceedings have already commenced. Kuwait might like to cure this defect by 
giving the court power to extend statutory or agreed time limits, indicating the 
circumstances in which the court may exercise this authority. Such a step would show 
that the court has the power to assist the arbitral process.
The third point is that s.50(2)-(3) o f the 1996 Act restricts the power o f the court to 
extend the time limit for making an arbitral award. The first qualification is that arbitral 
procedures for obtaining an extension should be exhausted before resorting to the courts 
for this purpose. The second qualification is that the court should be satisfied that 
substantial injustice would be done if  the time limit were not extended. Although the Act 
itself does not clarify what is intended here, the DAC 1996 Report notes,
“ it seems to us that these qualifications are needed so as to ensure that 
the Court’s power is supportive rather than disruptive o f the arbitral 
process. For the same reason, it seems to us that it would be a rare case 
indeed where the Court extended the time notwithstanding that this had 
not been done tlii'ough an available arbitral process”®^
Such qualifications limit the power o f the court to intervene in arbitration. Wlren court 
has authority to extend the time limit for making an award, this should not operate
Since Art. 1456 o f  CCP 1981 states “The legal or contractual deadline may be extended either by 
agreement o f the parties or, by a request o f either o f  them or o f  the arbiti al tribunal, by the President o f  the 
Tribunal De Grande Instance or, in the case contemplated by Article 1444, paragraph 2, by the President o f  
the Tribunal de commerce”.
See para 239.
Ch. 3: Judicial Support to Arbitration 97
without any limitation. It should not be able to override contractual time limits, unless it 
is satisfied that substantial injustice would otherwise be done. This test is a proper 
criterion for justifying an extension, striking a reasonable balance between supporting 
party autonomy and achieving arbitral justice. The court should, in principle, uphold any 
contractual time limit, as this is what the parties wanted. However, arbitral justice would 
require the court’s intervention, when, for example, a party has procured a delay, or 
where the award has not been made for reasons beyond the control of the tribunal, e.g. 
delay in obtaining evidence.
4.4 Extending Other Time Limits
Unless the parties agree otherwise, s.79(l) o f the English Arbitration Act 1996 gives the 
court the power to extend other time limits agreed by the parties in respect of the arbitral 
proceedings or non mandatory limits specified by the Act 1996. By virtue of s.79, the 
court is able to extend, for instance, the time limit for appointment o f an arbitrator under 
s. 16, or the 28 day time limit for appealing or challenging an arbitral award under 
s.70(3)®^. Yet, there are limitations on the discretion mider s.79. These are identical to 
those provided in respect o f the power of the court to extend the time limit for making an 
arbitral award under s.50. It should also be remembered that the provisions o f s.79 are 
non-mandatory, so that the parties may exclude the court's power to grant such 
extensions. Sadly, Kuwait lacks any similar provisions. The court has no power to extend 
any time limit o f any kind.
4.5 Conclusion
It is submitted that the Ai'bitration Act 1996 allows the courts to provide valuable 
support for the arbitral process tluough their wide ranging powers to extend time limits. 
This seems to be one of the major English innovations in arbitration. Such valuable 
provisions are to be found in neither the UNCITRAL Model Law nor the Kuwaiti 
arbitration system. It is suggested that Kuwait crystallizes these provisions in a new 
Arbitration Act,
See DAC 1996 Report, para 389 and 294.
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5. The Constitution o f an Arbitral Tribunal
5.1 Introduction
Sometimes the parties to the arbitration agreement will determine some important 
questions about the arbitral tribunal, e.g. the number o f arbitrators, the method o f 
appointing the member(s) o f the tribunal, the rules which apply in case of the failure of 
appointment, provisions covering the removal of arbitrators and the filling of vacancies. 
Where the parties agree clear rules regarding these vital questions, there should be no 
problems about the constitution o f arbitral tribunal. The parties are bound to comply with 
the agreed provisions and the courts are boimd to enforce them in line with the concept 
o f the party autonomy.
However, in other cases, the parties may not have reached any agreement on the above 
issues. Or there may be agreement, but one party might not implement his duties (e.g. 
appointing an arbitrator when obliged to do so). How does the law deal with such 
situations? What role should the court play in supporting arbitration by helping the 
parties constitute the arbitral tribunal? This section deals with how the law can help 
constitute the arbitral tribunal both in the absence o f the agreement between the parties, 
and when agreed procedures have not been complied with, with a view to determining 
how such matters might optimally be covered in a new Arbitration Act. This part is 
divided into two sections, the first section dealing with how the Arbitration Act might 
support the arbitral tribunal, the second section looking at how the court might support 
the tribunal.
5.2 The Law’s Support
Most legal systems allow the parties to determine the constitution o f the arbitral tribunal 
and any procedure for challenging ai’bitrators. More advanced systems feature provisions 
which apply where the arbitration agreement does not deal with such matters and the 
parties are subsequently unable to reach an agreement thereon. Such provisions are 
certainly found in the Model Law, which in turn provide the inspiration for the 
corresponding provisions o f the Arbitration Act 1996.
(a) The Number of Arbitrators
Article 10(1) o f the Model Law and s. 15(1) of the 1996 Act both emphasise the freedom 
of the parties to agree on the number of the arbitrators. Similar freedom is implied in the
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Kuwaiti arbitration system. As the CCPL 1980 does not prescribe a specific number o f  
arbitrators, the parties may be considered free to agree on the number. On the other hand, 
Kuwait requires an odd number o f aihitrators®®, while an even number is permissible in 
both the Model Law and the 1996 Act The justification for this restriction in Kuwait is 
the need avoid any possible deadlock in the arbitral tribunal, leading to delay, extra cost, 
and potentially rendering the process nugatory. Sadly, although modern arbitration 
systems like the Model Law and the 1996 Act impose no restriction on the freedom of 
the parties in this regard, neither do they contain any provisions to deal with deadlock®®. 
So, parties have to be aware of this practical issue before nominating the number o f the 
arbitrator(s). That being said, it is possible for the parties to nominate one o f the 
arbitrators as having decision making power in such cases, while legislation may confer 
decision-malcing power on the presiding arbitrator®®, or eontemplate reference to an 
umpire. The role o f umpire in the event o f deadlock is well established in commercial 
practice®®. Accordingly, where an arbitral tribunal consisting o f one arbitrator appointed 
by each party fails to agree, the umpire may be called to decide®^. Such possible options 
would suggest that there is no need to limit party autonomy by stipulating that there 
should be an odd number of the arbitrators merely to avoid the case o f deadlock. The 
number of the arbitrators is one of the areas where the party may have a freedom to agree 
on without any restrictions. So, the new Ai'bitration Act may support pai-ty autonomy in 
this matter and refrain from overprotective requirements, as long as the parties are able to
See Art. 175 o f CCPL 1980. This is the same as the French approach that provided in Art. 1453 o f CCP 
1981. In Egypt, this requirement is still operative, even i f  the 1994 Act does not indicate to this issue. See 
A. El-Kosheri, op. cit., p 22. In relation to the Model Law, such stipulation was considered but rejected. It 
was stated, “the number o f  arbitrators may be thought to be one o f  the issues that should be fully left to the 
parties’ discretion and agreement. However, one might consider requiring an uneven number ... Yet, while 
such requirement could enhance the efficiency o f arbitration, it may be deemed as an overprotective 
legislation measure. As to the special feature, known in some systems, o f a third arbitrator acting as an 
“umpire” or as a “referee,” it is suggested that the model law recognize such function if envisaged in an 
arbitration agreement but not include it in any “supplementary” rules”. See A/CN.9/207, para 67.
In France, this is possible only in case o f international arbitration. See, Art 1495 o f CCP 1981.
1999 Swedish Arbitration Act predicted the case o f deadlock and suggested a way to overcome this 
event by adopting the idea that the opinion o f the chairman shall prevail. See sec.30 o f 1999 Swedish 
Arbitration.
This option was rejected by the Commission to codify such rule. The justification o f this attitude is that 
in some circumstances it might lead to depriving the other members o f the arbitral tribunal from having an 
appropriate influence on decision -making. See A /40/17 para 244. However, the parties may agree on such 
issue. Since, Art. 29 is not mandatory and authorise the parties to adopt any approach as they consider fit 
and proper to avoid the possibility o f enforcing the arbitral tribunal- if  there is no majority, to continue to 
deliberate until a majority is fonned, or else issue no award. See A/CN.9/264 para 3 and Hotlzman & 
Neuhaus, op. cit., p808. See also sec.22 o f the Arbitration Act 1996 (Decision-making where no Charm in 
or Umpire).
See Prof. F. Davidson, International Commercial Arbitration, op. cit., para 7.17 at p 155.
See sec. 21(4) o f the Arbitration Act 1996.
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sort out such difficulty. The new Arbitration Act may also provide supplementaiy rules 
in such case to ensure that the arbitration goes ahead.
But what does the law say if  the parties have not reached agreement on the number o f 
arbitrators? Modern arbitration systems provide an answer. Thus, s. 15(3) o f tlie 1996 Act 
states that in this situation the tribunal shall consist o f a sole arbitrator, while Aiticle 10
(2) o f the Model Law provides that there shall be three arbitrators. Sadly, Kuwait does 
not deal with this issue. It is therefore recommended that the new Kuwaiti Arbitration 
Act provides that, in the absence o f agreement as to the number of arbitrators, the arbitral 
tribunal will consist a sole arbitrator. The English approach is preferred, because it will 
save the parties from the extra costs associated with a tliree-arbitrator tribunal. (It is not 
argued that the cost o f a tliree-arbitrator tribunal is likely to be tluee times the cost o f a 
sole arbitrator). The Model Law suggests tlu'ee, not only to meet the growing preference 
for commercial disputes to be referred to a three-arbitrator tribunal®®, but also to help 
ensure equal treatment o f the parties in the context o f international commercial 
arbitration, where the parties were likely to hail from different legal cultures^®®. This is 
not a consideration which need underpin the Kuwaiti Act.
The Kuwaiti Arbitration Act should thus recognise the parties’ freedom to determine the 
number o f the arbitrators. The choice of any number should be given effect. The 
suppletive rules may be in favour of saving time and cost, and thus may suggest a sole 
arbitrator in case of the absence o f an agreement o f the parties.
(b) The Manner in Which the Arbitral Tribunal Will Be Appointed
Once the number of the arbitrators is determined by the agreement or by virtue o f a 
statutory presumption, the next question is how will the arbitrator(s) be appointed, 
assuming this is not stipulated in the arbitration agreement, or dealt with by the parties 
subsequent agreement? Once more in modern arbitration systems statute fills such a gap. 
For instance. Article 11(3) of the Model Law states,
“Failing such agreement, (a) in an arbitration with tlrree arbitrators, 
each party shall appoint one arbitrator, and the two arbiti'ators thus 
appointed shall appoint the third arbitrator; if  a party fails to appoint
A/CN. 9/264, para 3. 
A/CN. 9/232, para 81.
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the ai'bitrator within thirty days of receipt of a request to do so from the 
other party, or if the two arbitrators fail to agree on the third arbitrator 
within thirty days of their appointment, the appointment shall be made, 
upon request o f a party, by the court or other authority specified in 
article 6
While s. 16 of the 1996 Act runs,
“(3) If  the tribunal is to consist o f a sole arbitrator, the parties shall jointly 
appoint the arbitrator not later than 28 days after service o f a request in writing 
by either party to do so.
(4) If  the tribunal is to consist of two arbitrators, each party shall appoint one 
arbitrator not later than 14 days after service o f a request in writing by either 
party to do so.
(5) If the tribunal is to consist of tlrree arbitrators -
(a) each party shall appoint one arbitrator not later than 14 days after service 
o f a request in writing by either party to do so, and
(b) the two so appointed shall forthwith appoint a third arbitrator as the 
chairman o f the tribunal.
(6) If  the tribunal is to consist o f two arbitrators and an umpire -
(a) each party shall appoint one arbitrator not later than 14 days after 
service o f a request in writing by either pmty to do so, and
(b) the two so appointed may appoint an umpire at any time after they 
themselves are appointed and shall do so before any substantive 
hearing or forthwith if  they cannot agree on a matter relating to the 
arbitration”.
Unfortunately, once more Kuwaiti law is silent on this matter, lacking such provisions as 
set out above. The new Kuwaiti Arbitration Act should therefore bring law in line with 
modern developed systems. Any such provision should fiilfil certain criteria. Firstly, it 
should provide for an appointment procedure in relation to the most common forms o f 
arbitral tribunal (e.g. a sole arbitrator, two or tlnee arbitrators). The Model Law, for 
example, prescribes the manner in which three arbitrators or a sole arbitrator will be 
appointed. Yet s. 16 o f the Arbitration Act 1996 caters for more possible cases than the 
Model Law, dealing also with the cases of a tribunal o f two arbitrators or o f two 
arbitrators and an umpire. This is preferable in the sense o f providing supportive
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supplementary provisions to assist in giving guidance to constitute the arbitral tribunal in 
most common forms. Secondly, the new Act should impose a time limit for appointing 
arbitrators, in order to encourage each party to make his appointment promptly, and thus 
to expedite the arbitral process. Such a time limit has to be reasonable and fair. The 
Model Law, for example, requires that each party should appoint his arbitrator within 30 
days o f receipt of a request to do so from the o t h e r w h i l e  s. 16 o f the 1996 Act requires 
the parties jointly to appoint a sole arbitrator not later than 28 days after service of a 
written request to do so from either one o f them.
5.3 The Court’s Support and Assistance
For an arbitration to be efficient, the national court may assist with the constitution of the 
arbitral tribunal. Arbitration may require support and assistance from the court at two 
stages, firstly at the stage o f the constitution of the arbitral tribunal, and secondly when 
an arbitrator requires to be removed.
(a) The Court’s Role in the Constitution of an Arbitral Tribunal
Arbitration law may empower the court to play an essential role in constituting the 
arbitral tribunal where the appointment procedure has failed, whether because of the 
failure o f the parties act on their agreement, or their failure to reach agreement^®®. In such 
cases one o f the parties may request the court to make the necessary appointment(s). This 
can be regarded as a classic case of court support for the arbitral process, given that the 
constitution o f the arbitral tribunal is the first step in the arbitral proceedings^®®. The 
exercise o f this power, can resolve any practical difficulty, and ensure that the progress 
o f the arbitral tribunal is not frustrated by, say, a party refusing to appoint an arbitrator, 
or refusing to agree on an appointment procedure, or making an inept appointment. Most 
legal systems confer such a role on the court - Article 11(4) o f the Model Law, for 
example, while Toulmin J. describes s. 18(3) o f the 1996 Act as, “the enabling section 
which gave the court power to intervene to assist the arbitration process by appointing an
See Art. 11 (3) (a).
It may be taken in account that the parties may agree what is to happen in case o f  failure o f the 
procedure for the appointment o f  the arbitral tribunal. In the absence o f such agreement, the court is given 
power to make an appointment. It is assumed here that there is no agreement in the event o f failure o f the 
procedure o f  the appointment o f the arbitral tribunal.
DAC 1996 Report, para 87.
Ch. S: Judicial Support to Arbitration 103
arbitrator when one o f the parties refused to assist in the process” ®^"^. Similar powers are 
conferred in Kuwait by Article 175 of the CCPL 1980.
1) The Court’s Power
Wlren there is failure to constitute the arbitral tribunal^®®, a party may resort to the court 
to secure the appointment. The Kuwaiti court- imder Article 175 o f the CCPL 1980- has 
a limited power in that it may only appoint an arbitrator. The article simply states that in 
such case the competent court will appoint the necessary number o f arbitrator(s) 
mentioning no other powers. The Model Law position is essentially the same as the 
Kuwaiti position. The provisions of the Model Law provide that under such 
circumstances, any party may request that the court take “the necessary measure” ®^®. The 
Working Group states that this plirase means that the court must itself make the 
appointment, rather than, for example, ordering an appointing authority to do so^ ®®. The 
fact that this function is entrusted to the court seems designed to avoid extra costs and 
further delay in the arbitral proceedings. A couple o f cases illustrate how the court may 
take the necessary measure to constitute the arbitral tribunal. In China Ocean Shipping 
Company v Mitrans Maritime Panama S.A., the defendant had failed to appoint his 
arbitrator, and the plaintiff applied to the Lligh Court of Hong Hong to appoint an 
arbitrator on behalf o f the defendant. The court found that the defendant had failed to 
honour his obligation to appoint an arbitrator and duly made the appointment^®^. In 
Shipping V East Asia Sawmill the court indicated that the failure o f a party to respect that 
obligation was contrary to the spirit o f arbitration, which aims to resolve a dispute 
speedily and economically. It regarded such conduct as a flagrant breach o f the 
defendant's contractual obligation to aibitrate, and so not only appointed an arbitrator, 
but also ordered the defendant to pay the costs o f the plaintiff^®®.
See R. Durtnell and Sons Ltd. v. The Secretary o f  State fo r  Trade and Industry Queen's Bench Division 
(Technology and Construction Court), [2001] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 275
This may be because o f one o f the parties fails to act as required to appoint his arbitrator, or when the 
two arbitrators are unable to agree on the thud arbitrator.
Art. 11 (4).
A/CN.9/246, Para 32.
See CLOUT case no. 59.
See CLOUT case no. 60.
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This may be contrasted with the English Act, which offers the court a number o f options 
to assist the process o f appointment where the appointment procedure has failed^'®. Thus 
under s. 18(3) those powers are -
“(a) to give directions as to the making o f any necessary appointments;
(b) to direct that the tribunal shall be constituted by such appointments 
(or any one or more o f them) as have been made;
(c) to revoke any appointments already made;
(d) to make any necessary appointments itse lf’.
Thus the court may direct a party to appoint his EU'bitrator. Its power to make the 
appointment itself might be regarded as a last resort, invoked to avoid delay, where the 
relevant party or appointing authority has already proved recalcitrant. These powers are 
so much wider than those are under CCPL 1980 or Model Law.
Neither s. 18(3) nor art 11(4) lays down any time frame within which the court must 
exercise its constitutive fonction This means any relevant application will be part o f the 
normal caseload of the court. This might be unhelpful to the notion o f arbitration as a 
speedy and economic method of settlement, if  court delays slow the arbitral process. 
Accordingly, it is recommended that a special fast-track procedure be created for such 
applications.
2) Is the Court's Power Discretionary?
Wlren the court is asked to constitute the arbitral tribunal, does it always have to do so, or 
may it decline to appoint? In England it appears that the power is discretionary, so that 
the court may decline to act, if  it judges that it is not appropriate to do so. This is clear 
from cases such as Villa v Longen. It may be noted that s. 18(3) does not offer any 
guidelines as to when it might be appropriate for the court to decline whether to 
exercise its powers. The court's discretion is thus unfe t t e r ed^However ,  if  the court 
does exercise its discretion Toulmin J notes,
“(1) The Court has a discretion under s. 18 o f the 1996 Act whether or 
not to appoint an arbitrator. (2) This discretion must be exercised
See B. Harris et al., op. cit., para [18D] at p 115. 
Ibid., atp  197.
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judicially and consistent with the principles set out in s. 1 o f the 1996 
Act and the residual discretion of the Court. (3) Consistent with s. 1(a) 
of the 1996 Act, the application should be refused if  the Court 
considers that: (a) It is impossible to obtain a fair resolution of the 
dispute; (b) by an impartial tribunal; and (c) without unnecessary delay 
or expense”^
The court's powers are probably discretionary under the Model Law as well. On the other
hand, the words of Article 175 o f C.C.P.L. 1980 do not suggest a discretionary power, as
they indicate that the competent court will appoint an arbitrator. It seems that it is hard to 
believe that this is appropriate, as courts in modern arbitral systems, always have 
discretion in dealing with any type o f application. Nonetheless, it is suggested that the 
Arbitration Act should clarify this matter and adopt the modern approach. Accordingly a 
court’s power may be discretionary. The court should show its pro-arbitration policy and 
decide on such application taking in the account the supportive inspiration toward 
arbitration.
3) Is the Decision of the Court Appeable?
Is the court's determination of such issues final? According to the provisions o f the 1996 
Act, an appeal is open albeit only with the leave o f the couit^^^. By contrast Article 11(5) 
o f the Model Law stipulates that there is no appeal from the decision of the court in this 
kind o f application. Its drafters thought the court's decision should be final, as such 
finality was, “appropriate in the view o f the administrative nature of the function and 
essential in view of the need to constitute the arbitral tribunal as soon as possible” '
The justification of the draftsmen o f the 1996 Act for not following the provision of 
Artiele 11(5) was that there could be questions o f important general principle, which 
would benefit from authoritative appellate guidance"^. It is suggested that the Model 
Law's approaeh is preferable, since it reduces the risk of dilatory tactics. It is also the
Durtnell and Sons Ltd. v. The Secretary o f  State fo r  Trade and Industry Queen's Bench Division  
(Technology and Construction Court), [2001] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 275
Leave o f the court is required for any appeal from a decision o f the court under ss. 17, 18, 21 o f the Act. 
See A/CN.9/264, para 7.
See DAC 1996 Report, para 89. R. Merkin states this may be helpful where an important point o f law 
relating to the meaning o f statutoiy provisions arises. See R. Merkin, op. cit., para 9.31, Service Issue No  
32:30 August 2002.
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case that the court’s decision on such matters is final in Kuwait"^. There is thus no need 
to recommend any change.
4) Is there any Statutory Guidance for the Court?
The CCPL 1980 provides no guidance as to the factors that the court might consider 
before making an appointment. But such guidance is to be found in certain modern 
arbitration statutes. In England the main guidance is the agreement o f the parties. Section 
19 o f the 1996 Act requires the court to have regard to any agreement between the 
parties as to the qualifications required o f the arbitrators. So, when the arbitration 
agreement contains a particular qualification of the arbitrators, the court shall respect the 
parties’ agreement. However the question whether the court is bound to follow that 
agreement may be not clear from the language o f s. 19. It is suggested that the object of 
this section be, as far as possible, to require the court to have due regard to any 
agreement o f the parties as to the qualifications required o f the arbitrator, but the court 
need not be bound by such guidance"^. Article 11(5) of the Model law is to the same 
effect, but requires the court also to have regard to
“such considerations as are likely to secure the appointment o f an 
independent and impartial arbitrator, and in the case o f a third or sole 
arbitrator shall take into account as well the advisability o f appointing 
an arbitrator o f a nationality other than those of the parties”.
The drafters o f the 1996 Act considered the reference to impartiality and independence to 
be superfluous and the reference to nationality unlawful under the Race Relations Act 
1976"^. Thus it omitted these unnecessary criteria. It is suggested that the English 
approach is sensible. There is no need to direct the court's attention to such obvious 
criteria as independence and impartiality, especially as failure to meet these criteria will 
open an arbitrator to challenge"^.
See Art. 175 o f CCPL 1980.
117 B. Harris et a i ,  op. cit., para [19C] at p 119. 
See R. Merkin 
See, “Appoin 
(2002) 2 (3), p 6.
, op. cit., para 9.12, Service Issue No 32:30 August 2002.
tment o f Arbitrators; Exercise o f Default Powers”, Arbitration Law Monthly, March
Ch. 3: Judicial Support to Arbitration 107
(b) The Court’s Role in Removing Arbitrators
Normally an arbitral tribunal operates from the time of its appointment until it completes 
its function by making the arbitral award. However, there may be circumstances in which 
a party may seek to challenge an arbitrator. Generally, modern arbitration statues contain 
provisions which specify the circumstances in which the court may remove an arbitrator. 
Such intervention may be regarded as supporting aibitration as a method o f dispute 
settlement, as parties are usually only entitled to challenge an arbitrator on the ground 
that he is not suitable to hold office and judge the disputes. Thus the power o f removal 
would inspire confidence in the arbitral process.
1) The Power of the Court to Remove an Arbitrator
The arbitration provisions o f Kuwait and England both indicate that an application to 
remove an arbitrator has to be made to the competent court, although s.24(2) o f the 1996 
Act adds that if the parties have agreed on the machinery for challenge, it must first be 
exliausted before the court can exercise its power o f removal. So, under the 1996 Act the 
parties may empower another authority to remove an arbitrator, while Article 178 o f the 
CCPL 1980 indicates that only the court may remove an arbitrator'^''. The rules, in 
Kuwait, are not clear about the reaction of the Kuwaiti court should the parties ai’bitrate 
under institutional rules which empower a third party to remove an arbitrator. On the 
other hand, the Model Law lays down special challenge procedures in Article 13. 
Respecting the autonomy o f the parties, prima facie they may agree on a challenge 
procedure, although in the absence o f agreement, the arbitral tribunal will decide on the 
challenge, subject to review by the court if  the challenge is unsuccessful.
So each of the systems mentioned deals clearly with this important issue, and inevitably 
concedes a role to the comd. However, which approach is the best? Leaving for the 
moment the question whether the court or the arbitral tribunal should decide on the 
challenge and what the grounds o f challenge should be'^ ', the freedom o f the parties to 
agree on a procedure for challenge should be recognised. This is surely one o f the areas 
where party autonomy could play its role.
™ The French approach is that the parties are at liberty to orgonise the procedure o f challenging an 
arbitrator, as they consider fit and proper. See Y. Derains, op. cit., at p 10.
The ground o f removal generally are lack o f impartiality and independence, the arbitrator's physical or 
mental incapability to perform his functions, the absence o f qualifications required by the parties, and the 
failure or refusal o f  the arbitrator to act or conduct the arbitral proceedings properly. These matters are 
discussed in Ch. 4 pp. 143-151 infra.
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2) General Comments
Certain general observations may be made regarding how arbitration legislation deals 
with the power of the court to remove an arbitrator. Firstly, it is important to empower 
the court to remove an arbitrator if  arbitration is to be properly supported. Legislation 
may recognise the parties’ freedom to agree on a challenge procedure, so that they resort 
to a third party, an institution, or even the aibitial tribunal itself, but the couit should 
have the final word.
Secondly, the legislation must specify clearly the potential grounds for removal. These 
grounds should be designed to maintain the integrity of the arbitral process. So an 
arbitrator should be removed if  he fails to act properly, impartially or independently'^^, 
or if  he lacks qualifications required by the parties, as he is no longer fit and proper to 
perform his functions.
Thirdly, the consequences of removal on the arbitral proceedings must be dealt with. In 
Kuwait those proceedings must be suspended when there is a challenge to the arbitral 
t r i b u n a l O n  the other hand, in England s.24(3) o f the 1996 Act permits the arbitral 
tribunal to continue the proceedings, and even make an arbitral award. Article 13(3) of 
the Model law is to the same effect, stressing that the challenged arbitrator may continue 
to participate in the decisions o f the tribunal. This latter approach seems preferable as 
helping avoid any possible tactical applications made to delay the progress of the arbitral 
proceedings'^''. Moreover, there should be no fear o f allowing the tribunal to make an 
award, as it may always be set aside if, e.g. the composition of the tribunal was flawed, 
or the tribunal failed to act fairly and impartially'^^. There should also be a time limit for 
the court to make its decision in order to protect the interests of both parties to avoid 
impeding the arbitral process unduly.
Fourthly, removal o f an arbitrator should not terminate the operation o f the arbitration, 
but rather create a vacancy to be filled by the court upon an application by one o f the
The meaning o f these concepts and the reaction o f  the Arbitration Act toward the concepts o f  
impartially or independently are discussed in pp. 145-148 infra.
Art. 109 o f CCPL 1980.
A/CN.9/245, para 211.
See the grounds for challenge in Art. 34 o f the model law and sec. 68 o f the 1996 Act.
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parties’ c h a l l e n g e H o w e v e r ,  the parties should have the freedom to decide on how the 
vacancy should be f i l l e d I n  the absence o f such agreement, a substitute arbitrator shall 
be appointed according to the rules that were applicable to the appointment of the 
arbitrator being replaced. The role of the court may come again to reconstitute the 
arbitral tribunal.
5.4 Conclusion
A number of lessons may be learnt from the approach of modern arbitration systems to 
the role of the court in constituting the arbitral tribunal. The first lesson is the parties’ 
freedom. The Arbitration Act has to be based on the principle o f party autonomy. It must 
therefore recognise their freedom to decide upon appointment and challenge procedures. 
Secondly arbitration legislation must establish supplementary provisions to deal with 
cases where there is no agreement between the parties regarding the constitution o f the 
arbitral tribunal. Supplementary rules should contain detailed prescriptions for common 
cases, with more general rules to cover all other cases. They should not attempt to 
prescribe detailed rules for too many different situations. The approach o f Articles 10(2) 
and 11(2) of the Model Law and ss.l5  (3) and 16 (3)- (5) of the 1996 Act is commended. 
The third lesson is that arbitration legislation must ensure that the court provides 
effective support for arbitration by avoiding umiecessary delay or extra cost when 
constituting and reconstituting the arbitral tribunal. Thus, there might be time limits for 
the court to deal with such matters as appointing or removing arbitrators. Moreover a 
specialised court could be created to deal with cases pertaining to arbitration, in order to 
emphasise the desire o f the state to support and serve arbitration. So, applications 
regarding arbitration would not be part of the caseload o f the ordinary courts, ensuring 
that speedy assistance from the court reinforced arbitration as an expeditious method of 
resolving disputes.
These lessons reflect essential themes of modern and developed arbitration systems and 
should be embodied in the new Kuwaiti arbitration act.
A/CN.9/245, paras 211.
See sec. 27(1) o f the arbitration Act 1996 and Art. 15. In relation to the model Law it has to be noted 
that words o f  Art. 15 as “a substitute arbitrator shall be appointed according to the rules that were 
applicable to the appointment o f  the arbitrator being replaced” does not preclude the parties from providing 
their own mechanism for appointing substitute arbitrator. It may mean, “the same set o f rules under Article 
11 will apply” . See Holtzmann & Keuhaus, op. cit., p 465 and see Prof. F. Davidson, International 
Commercial Arbitration, para 4.39 at p 82.
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6. The Conduct of the Arbitral Proceedings
6.1 Introduction
Unlike litigation, the rules under which arbitral proceedings are conducted mostly 
depend on the will o f the parties to the arbitration. The modern trend is to recognise their 
freedom to design the conduct o f the arbitral proceedings. Thus, the parties should make 
sure that they have adopted the fit and proper procedures to be followed by the arbitral 
tribunal in conducting the arbitral proceedings, as the maimer in which the proceedings 
are conducted will play a significant role in the success o f arbitration and enhance the 
idea that arbitration is faster and less expensive than litigation. Once the parties have 
determined how the proceedings are to be conducted, it is expected that they will follow 
the agreed procedures voluntarily. However, sometimes court assistance is needed. In 
this section the powers of the court to support the arbitral process will be considered, in 
order to see whether the law o f Kuwait measures up to best practice, especially as 
reflected in the 1996 Act and the Model Law.
6.2 Court Assistance in Securing Attendance of a Witness
An arbitral tribunal derives its jurisdiction and powers from the arbitration agreement. 
Therefore, a third paidy who is not a party to that agreement is not subject to its authority, 
and camiot be compelled to appear at an arbitration hearing as a witness. Thus, the 
arbitral tribunal cannot oblige a witness to give oral evidence or to present documents or 
other material evidence related to the subject matter o f the dispute. In practice, most 
witnesses cited by parties testify voluntarily. But where this is not the case, the fact that 
the tribunal caimot compel the attendance o f a witness may cause difficulties. A party 
may struggle to prove his case or rebut the other party’s allegations, especially if  the 
witness is his sole source of evidence. Furthermore, the arbitral tribunal may need a 
particular witness to clarify ambiguous issues, or a particular witness may be the only 
person who can answer certain key questions. So a party or the tribunal may need help in 
securing the attendance o f witnesses.
Can the court compel a witness to attend the arbitral hearing or yield documentary or 
other material evidence? Kuwaiti has realised the tribunal's need for court assistance in 
this context. Thus Article 180(l)(a) o f CCPL 1980 gives the tribunal the right to resort to 
the court to secure the attendance of a witness. Similar assistance is available under 
Article 27 of the Model Law and s.43 o f the 1996 Act. All of these systems look broadly
Ch. 3: Judicial Support to Arbitration 111
to provide the same forensic support to in arbitration as is available to the parties in 
litigation.
6.3 Court Assistance in Taking Evidence
The court may also assist the conduct of the arbitral proceedings by taking the evidence 
o f a witness for use at an arbitration hearing, where it is not possible to secure the actual 
attendance o f that witness'^''. Thus, the court may order that the witness attend for 
examination before a commissioner appointed by the court for the purpose o f taking 
evidence from a witness who is unable to attend the hearing. Or it may also request a 
foreign authority to take evidence from a witness resident in its state. Such assistance is 
available under Article 180(c) o f the CCPL 1980, Article 27 o f the Model Law and 
s.44(2)(a) of tlie 1996 Act. It can be seen why such assistance is important for the 
efficient functioning o f the arbitration. This would provide a useful means to keep the 
arbitration going ahead.
6.4 Other Support
The following paragraphs will examine other supportive powers given to the courts by 
arbitration legislation in other states, which are not to be found in Kuwait.
(a) Enforcement of Peremptory O r d e r s o f  the Arbitral Tribunal
An arbitral tribunal may sometimes require a party to do something or refrain from doing 
something. However, is there any means to force that party to comply with tribunal’s 
order? The parties may have confer on the tribunal power to deal with a party who fails 
to act in accordance with its peremptory orders'^". This would be accepted and
For instance, a witness is outside the state o f Kuwait or UK, or due to the witness’s illness.
Wlien one o f the parties fails to comply with any order or direction o f the arbitral tribunal, the later may 
make a peremptoiy order to the same effect, prescribing time for compliance with it as the tribunal 
considers fit. It is a scheme for enforcing the tribunal’s order by making them peremptoiy. Since, failure 
to comply with the order, certain consequences will follow. There are sanctions which can be applied if  
the peremptory order are not complied with.
Sec. 41 o f the Arbitration Act deals with power o f the arbitral tribunal in case o f  party’s default. In sec. 
41(7) provides a supplementary provisions for the power o f  the arbitral tribunal that may do in case if  a 
paity fails to comply with any peremptoiy order. It states “(7) If  a party fails to comply with any other kind 
o f peremptoiy order, then, without prejudice to section 42 (enforcement by court o f tribunal's peremptory 
orders), the tribunal may do any o f the following - (a) direct that the paity in default shall not be entitled 
to rely upon any allegation or material which was the subject matter o f the order; (b) draw such adverse 
inferences from the act o f non-compliance as the chcumstances justify; (c) proceed to an award on the 
basis o f  such materials as have been properly provided to it; (d) make such order as it thinks fit as to the 
payment o f costs o f the arbitration incurred in consequence o f the non-compliance”.
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recognised by virtue o f the principle o f party autonomy. However, in the absence o f such 
agreement'^' the tribunal cannot force a party to obey its orders, as it derives its power 
from the arbitration agreement. There is no doubt about the fact that a negative action 
from one o f the parties may affect the progress o f the conduct o f the arbitral proceedings. 
In such case, the court may intervene to support arbitration via assisting the arbitral 
tribunal to enforce the tribunal's peremptory orders, as under s.42 of the 1996 Act. That 
provision allows the arbitral tribunal, or a party with the leave of the tribunal, to seek the 
assistance o f the court to require a party to execute peremptory orders o f the tribunal. 
The DAC Report 1996 states,
“In our view there may well be circumstances where in the interest of 
justice, the fact that the court has sanctions which in the nature of 
things camiot be given to arbitrators (e.g. committal to prison for 
contempt) will assist the proper functioning o f the arbitral process” '^ .^
So, where a party reflises to comply with a peremptory order for discovery, and is 
prepared to suffer such sanctions as the tribunal could impose, the power of the court 
may be utilised to support arbitration by forcing the party in default to obey the arbitral 
tribunal’s order. The threat of imprisonment might force that party to comply with the 
tribunal’s o r d e r A c c o r d i n g l y ,  the court, under a pro-ai'bitration policy, may be 
prepared to use its powers to counter problems o f delay and non- co-operation'^'', 
ensuring that the defaulter complies with procedures'^^.
(b) Consolidation of the Arbitral Proceedings
In certain systems the court has the power to order the consolidation o f two or more 
arbitrations without the need for the consent of all o f the parties. It often arises that the 
same dispute involves several parties and perhaps several arbitrations. In the interests o f 
justice and to ensure a successftil aibitration, there should be a single arbitration rather
Or in case o f such agreement the court assistance may also be needed. For instance, the enforcement of
the tribunal’s order to preserve property, See Russell, op. cit., para 7-112.
Para 212.
See B, Harris et a l ,  op. cit., para [42B] at p 209.
The State court may have a discretion jurisdiction to make an appropriate order to ensure the 
enforcement o f  the peremptory orders made by the arbitral tribunal. It perhaps deals with default party in 
the same manner as any party in preach o f court order, or may just enforce the sanction threatened by the 
arbitral tribunal in their peremptory order assuming that the arbitral tiibunal itself is not able to enforce it.
See R. Merkin, op. cit., para 14.32, Seivice Issue N o 31:30 March 2002.
The provisions o f the Model Law do not provide such judicial function.
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than a series o f separate proceedings. This is to avoid the possible risk o f inconsistent 
fact-findings or conclusions'^*’ and difficulties o f time and costs'^^. Consolidation may be 
one o f the means o f mitigating these possible dangers of separate proceedings'^®,
A number o f systems have adopted this philosophy'^^. For instance, s.26 of the Australia 
Uniform Arbitration Act 1990 gives the court power to order joinder'"", while the 
Netherlands Arbitration Act 1986 s. 1046 confers jurisdiction on the court to consolidate 
the arbitral proceedings (in full or partially) with other arbitral proceedings. Section 6B 
o f the Flong Kong Arbitration Act 1982 is to the same effect. No such power is conferred 
by the Model Law nor the 1996 Act, although under s.3 5 of the latter the parties are free 
to empower the arbitral tribunal (but not the court'" ') to consolidate arbitral proceedings. 
During the drafting o f the Model Law there was a general agreement that it should not 
deal with problem of consolidation in multi-party arbitrations, on the basis that there is 
no real need for such a provision'"^. Flowever, this matter is now one of the possible 
matters for consideration by the Commission'"^, as the view has gained ground that it
Lord Demiing M.R. in Abu Dhabi Case Linquefaction Co. Ltd  v Eastern Bechtel Corporation, indicted 
“There is a danger in having two separate arbitrations in case like by two separate arbitrators on virtually 
the self-same question, such as causation”, [1982] 2 Lloyd’s Rep., 425 at 427. Consolidation could avoid 
the possible risk o f inconsistent decisions, e.g. where one o f the arbitral tribunal asks a party to do some 
thing, while the other tribunal prevents him from doing exactly the same thing, or the liability o f  A to B 
and B ’s claim against C for indemnity depends on the same or similar issues, and B risks failing against 
both. See Sir M. Mustill, ‘Multipartite Arbitrations: An Agenda for Law-Makers’ (1991) 7 (4) Arb. Int. 
393-402.
See Mistill & boyd, op. cit., at p 142. It is suggested that consolidation may be desirable in a varity o f  
cases. Such as in case o f  where more than one arbitrations arises out o f the same set o f facts or involves the 
same parties. See A/CN.9.460, para 52. Sir Mustill adds further benefit o f consolidation, as it would serve 
the trade. See his article ‘Multipartite Arbitrations: An Agenda for Law-Makers’, op. cit., 393-402 [para
(c)].
Appomtment o f  same arbitrator to arbitrations might be a solution. See Prof. F. Davidson, Arbitration, 
op. cit., para 12.06 at p 206.
In the absence o f the statutory initiative, the court may show its attitude in relation to the judicial power 
to consolidate. For instance, the US federal circuits apply a sti’aightforward rule that a court may not order 
consolidation o f arbitral proceedings unless the parties agree explicitly on such authorisation. See, J. 
Hosking, ‘Non-party Participation -  The Extent to Which Non-Contracting Parties be Encouraged or 
Compelled to Join Proceedings?’, paper presented at LCIA & AMINZ arbitiation Seminar, held on 20 Feb 
2003 in Auckland, New Zealand, at p 7. However, this is not always the case in US. Since, some courts 
have ordered consolidated hearings while others have denied consolidation. See, National Conference o f  
Commissioners on Uniform States Law at its Annual Conference, July 28- August 4, 2000 1-74, at p 27.
This is not the case before 1990 amendment to sec. 26 in Uniform Acts. Since, the court at that time 
was not permitted to consolidate the separate arbitral proceedings without an application o f all the parties. 
The view was that this treatment was not inconsistent with fundamental concepts o f commercial 
arbitration, those o f privity of contract and party autonomy. See, A.A. De Fine, ‘Consolidation o f  
Arbitration Proceedings in Australia’ (2001) 4(5) Int. A.L.R. 164-171.
Indeed, nothing said in the 1996 Act o f  the judicial role in this spectrum. According to s. 1 (c), the state 
court has no power to consolidate the arbitral proceedings. See, T. Melyk, ‘Non-party Participation -  The 
Extent to Which Non-Contracting Parties be Encouraged or Compelled to Join Proceedings? The English 
(Arbitration Act 1996) Perspective, paper presented at LCIA & AMINZ arbitration Seminar, held on 20 
Feb 2003 in Auckland, New Zealand, at p 5.
A/CN.9/216, para 37.
A/CN.9/460 -E-.
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may be desirable to have the power to consolidate into one set of arbitral proceedings 
two or more cases deriving from different arbitration agreements'"", in order to avoid the 
risk o f inconsistent decisions and avoid duplication of proceedings (hearing and 
reviewing the same witnesses and other evidence several times), with a consequent 
saving o f expense and time for all o f those involved'"^. Still, the vital question o f who 
should have authority to order consolidation as yet remains unanswered'"". The 
Commission’s decision should in any case not violate the principle of party autonomy.
Providing this kind of support meets the criticism that arbitration may not effect joinder 
o f separate arbitrations where there is significant commonality o f the facts or law or 
both'"^. It is highly desirable to have such a power o f consolidation, in order to avoid 
potential difficulties which may arise in case o f multi-arbitration.
On the other hand, giving the court power to consolidate separate arbitral proceedings 
might be considered as a negation the principle o f party autonomy'"®, as the court may 
order consolidation without need for the consent o f all parties. This would frustrate the 
agreement o f the parties to choose their own tribunal to settle their disputes, as well as 
affecting the confidentiality o f the arbitral proceedings thi’ough disclosure o f documents 
relating to several disputes in one set of proceedings'"". Conferring such jurisdiction also 
creates a serious risk that judicially imposed consolidation may impair the enforceability 
of arbitral awards in international arbitration'"", as compulsory consolidation could 
constitute a ground for resisting the enforcement of the award imder the New York 
Convention, on the basis that.
A party was unable to present his case, or
Ibid., para 51.
Ib id .,m e t)  -E-.para 53. 
A/CN.9/460 -E-.para61.
A.A. De Fine, op. cit., p l64.
See the English view against the compulsory consolidation in DAC 1996 Report, para 180 and 181. 
This seems to be not complying with contractual nature o f arbitration. The court may not consolidate 
disputes except to enforce tlie parties’ agreement. This corresponds with arbitration, as we all have been 
taught, is a creature o f contract, and therefore it is up to the users o f arbitration to provide specifically for 
multi-paity arbitration if  they want to have it. See M. Goldstein, ‘Constitution the Arbitral Tribunal for the 
Multi-Party Case: Possible Solutions for Institutional Rules’, in G. Haitwell (ed.), The commercial way to 
justice, the 1996 International Conference o f  the Chartered Institute o f  Arbitrators, The Hague: Kluwer 
Law International, 1997, 101-120 at p 104.
This also ignores the doctrine o f  private o f the contract. See F. Davidson, Arbitration, op. cit., para 
12.5.
Ibid., para 12.16.
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• The award deals with a difference not contemplated or not falling within the 
terms of the submission to arbitration, or
• It contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission, or that the 
procedure was not that agreed by the parties.
Thus the decision whether to extend this kind o f support needs careful consideration. 
Kuwait must balance the advantages and disadvantages o f consolidation powers before 
deciding whether to create them. It is submitted that the disadvantages o f this kind o f 
assistance outweigh its advantages, and it is thus recommended that no statutory power 
of consolidation should be given to the court. The new Arbitration Act should be built on 
the philosophy o f party autonomy, allowing the paidies full freedom to agree to 
consolidate the arbitral proceedings, or to empower for example the court to order 
consolidation, as suits their interests'"'.
(c) Determination of Preliminary Points of Law
In principle, the arbitral tribunal should decide all questions o f fact and law that arise in 
the arbitral proceedings. However, where the case turns on a point of law, a paify may 
wish to appeal against the arbitral award. Indeed in such circumstances a party may wish 
to ask the court to determine a preliminary issue o f law at an early stage, so that the 
award reflects that decision. Not every system contemplates this kind of assistance, but 
S.45 o f the English Aibitration Act 1996'"^ allows the court to inteiwene during the 
ai'bitral proceedings to determine a preliminary question o f law, upon an application by a 
party before the arbitral award has been made. This kind of support might be regarded as 
a procedural device for expediting the arbitral proceedings, as having a definite answer 
from the coiul regarding an important question of law may prevent any possible ftiture 
conflict, which might delay the progress o f arbitral proceedings. The English view was 
that in such special circumstances it would be cheaper and better for all to obtain a 
definitive answer from the court at an early stage'"", while also providing a mechanism 
for the development of the law in respect of matters that are commonly arbitrated'"".
The tactic o f consolidation cannot be a court initiative. This surely would comfort with the consensual 
nature o f arbitration that should not be usurped. See DAC Report May 1990, pp. 28 and 29. It seems that 
the desirability o f statutoiy provisions for the consolidation o f  the arbitral proceedings, in the absent o f  
parties’ agreement, “is highly controversial subject”. See Prof. D. Bulter, Arbitration: International 
Arbitiation Act for South Africa, July 1998, South African Law Commission, project 94, para 2.68 at p58.
There is no comparable provision in the Model Law.
DAC 1996 Report, para 218.
See R. Merkin, op. cit., para. 12.42, Service Issue No. 18: 7, August 1997.
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However, this kind o f assistance might be criticised on the ground that a party may run to 
the court every time a question o f law arose, giving him an opportunity to delay the 
progress o f the arbitral proceedings and increase the costs o f arbitration. This seems the 
better view. However, that does not mean that the power o f the court to give preliminary 
rulings on questions of law has to be removed. Rather, this method of support needs 
some safeguards to make sure that it is not misused. The 1996 Act provides such 
safeguards. Firstly, an application requires the agreement o f all o f the other parties, or the 
permission of the arbitral tribunal'"". Secondly, such an application need not have any 
impact on the arbitral proceedings, as the arbitral tribunal may continue the proceedings 
and make an award while an application is pending'"". Thirdly, the court will not 
exercise its power to rule on the preliminary issue o f law unless it is satisfied that the 
determination o f the issue is likely to produce substantial saving in expenses and the 
application was made without delay. Fourthly, the application should identify the 
question of law and state the grounds on which it is said the court should determine the 
issue o f law'"^. Fifthly, the jurisdiction in this matter is non-mandatory, so that the 
parties may agree to exclude it. Thus the possible disadvantages of this sort o f court 
assistance may be overcome by providing such safeguards. Thus, it is highly 
recormnended that the new Kuwaiti Arbitration Act adopts the approach o f the 1996 Act 
to this question. It may be suggested that this would allow too much court intervention in 
the arbitral proceedings. On the other hand, this approach would provide a usefi.il 
mechanism for offering a definitive ruling on a question of law and thus in many cases 
would shorten the arbitral proceedings'"®. At any rate, the parties can judge this matter 
and decide whether they ai'e in favour o f such intervention or not.
(d) Interim Measures
It is submitted that interim measure of protection in arbitration is an interface between 
private dispute settlement and the state courts. It is one of these aspects o f arbitral 
procedure that could not escape court involvement. Since, the effectiveness o f interim
See sec. 45 (2) o f the Arbitration Act 1996.
Ibid., sec. 45 (4).
Ibid., sec. 45 (3).
DAC 1996 Report, para 218 and 221. See also R. Merkin, op. cit., para 12.42, Service Issue No 31:31 
March 2002.
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measure o f protection depends, in the end, on its enforceability, court assistance may be 
needed.'"" Lord Mustill points out,
“there is the plain fact, palatable or not, that it is only a court 
possessing coercive powers which can rescue the arbitration if  it is in 
danger of foundering, and that the only court which possesses these 
powers is the municipal court o f an individual state” '"".
Such measures do not obstruct the arbitral process nor impede expeditious arbitral 
proceedings, but help ensure that the arbitral award is meaningful, by preserving the 
subject matter o f the dispute or the assets of a party. Fry writes,
“If  arbitration is to remain an effective means to resolve commercial 
disputes, it must accommodate the practical requirements o f those who 
resort to it. Interim measures o f protection... are a feature o f domestic 
litigation in most countries. Interim measures permit domestic courts to 
guard against the eventuality that the subject matter of the dispute will 
vanish, or be passed into the hands of a third party or that object o f the 
proceedings will be defeated. As commercial arbitration is prone to 
similar potential pitfalls, it is reasonable to expect that a similar regime 
should be available to litigants who seek a more efficient resolution of 
their disputes tlirough arbitration”'" '.
Arbitration legislation in certain states codifies the power o f the court to provide 
assistance by granting interim measures and may declare that the application by a party 
to the court for interim measures o f protection is compatible with the arbitral process'"^. 
Such codification eliminates any possible doubt about whether the court has jurisdiction 
to grant such measures (e.g. attacliments, seizure of assets, measures affecting -  or 
relating to - third parties) in matters governed by the arbitration agreement'"". It also 
ensures that seeking the court assistance does not mean that the applicant party waives 
his right to arbitrate. The rules in Kuwait are not that clear. It is true that it allows the
See J. Schaefer, ‘New Solutions for Interim measures o f protection in International Commercial 
Arbitration: English, German and Hong Kong Law Compared’ (1998) 2 (2) EJCL 1-40, para 3.1.1, at p 5. 
It is available at <http://www.ejcl.org/22/abs22-2.html> [Last visited 5 July 03],
See Coppee Lavalin v Ken-Ren Chemicals and Fertilsers Ltd, [1995] 1 AC 38.
J. Fry, ‘Recent Developments and the Way Ahead’, paper presented at LCIA & AMINZ Arbihation 
Seminar, held on 20 Feb 2003 in Auckland, New  Zealand.
A/CN.9/216, para. 39.
A/CN.9/168, para 29.
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parties to empower the arbitral tribunal to make interim raeasui'es'"". However, does such 
agreement exclude the court from any role in this regai’d? Does the applicant party waive 
his right to arbitrate when he seeks the court assistance?'"" The rules do not suggest a 
clear answer.
Article 9 o f the Model Law states, “It is not incompatible with an arbitration agreement 
for a party to request, before or during arbitral proceedings, from a court an interim 
measure o f protection and for a court to grant such measure”. It is worth mentioning that 
this article may not empower the court to grant interim measures'"". This depends on the 
legal system o f each adopting state. This article articulates two principles'"^. First, the 
court is not prevented from granting interim measure, and the existence of an arbitration 
agreement will not prevent the court from granting such measures, if  asked by one o f the 
parties. Secondly when a paity asks the court grant an interim measure, this will not be 
considered as a waiver of his right to arbitrate. Article 9 is not restricted to any particular 
type o f interim measures, and so may cover a wide o f range o f such measures, including 
measures to conserve the subject matter o f the dispute; measures to protect trade secrets 
and proprietary information; measures to preserve evidence; pre-award attachments to 
secure an eventual award and similar seizures o f assets; measures requested from third 
parties; and enforcement o f any interim measures ordered'"®.
The High Court o f Hong Hong has even concluded that it had jurisdiction to grant a 
Mareva injunction in support o f the arbitration'"". It is essentially for the national court 
in each system to determine what interim measures fall within the scope o f Article 9. For 
instance, the Federal Coint of Canada dismissed an application for an injunction on the 
grounds that the applicant had not made out a strong prima facie case for an injunction, 
nor shown that damages would not be adequate to compensate any loss he suffered. 
More importantly, it held that the remedy sought was not an interim measure within 
Article 9'?".
See Art. 173 (6) o f CCPL 1980.
See Dr A. Abd- Alftah, op. cit., pp. 168-171. In France, the arbitral tribunal can take the same interim 
measures as the state court and the arbitration agreement is not an obstacle o f the power o f the court to take 
interim measures. See Y. Derains, op. cit., 14.
See J. fry, op. cit., p 11. See also P. Sandars, IntT Encycl. Comp.L., para 171 atp 112.
A/CN.9/264, para 1 and 2.
See Holtzman & Neuhaus, op. cit., p 333.
See Katran Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Kenven Transportation Ltd. [CLOUT case no. 39].
See Relais Nordik v. Secimda Marine Services Limited. [CLOUT case no. 11].
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Section 44 o f the English Aibitration Act 1996 provides a wide range o f orders that the 
court may use to support the arbitral proceedings'^'. This provision, which is subject to 
exclusion by the p a r t i e s d e r i v e s  in part from Article 9 of the Model Law, but gives the 
court the same powers as it might exercise in legal proceedings, at the same time 
specifying a list o f orders that the court might grant e.g.:
1) Orders Relating to Property
The court is able under s.44(2)(c)(i) to make a wide variety o f orders in respect o f 
property which is the subject of arbitral proceedings, or as to which any question arises 
in the proceedings. Thus the subject matter o f the dispute may be protected, so as to 
ensure that a party in possession thereof does not perform any act in respect of it which 
could affect its probative value or render the final award worthless. So under s.44(2)(c)(i) 
the court may order the inspection, photographing, preservation, custody, and detention 
of the property, or the talcing of samples in order to prevent the property being altered, 
destroyed or disposed of, before evidence o f its existing state can be secured for the 
purpose o f arbitration. Furthermore, it may authorise the arbitral tribunal or one o f the 
parties or a third party (e.g. an expert) to enter any premises in the possession or control 
of party to the arbitration in order to take samples or make observations for the purpose 
o f obtaining fiill information or evidence.
2) Interim Injunction/ Receiver
The court may also under s.44(2)(e) grant interim injunctions, providing a party to the 
arbitration with a speedy and effective means o f preserving the status quo pending the 
outcome o f arbitration'^". Such an injunction may protect the subject matter o f the 
dispute, for example by preventing resale o f particular item by either party""". The 
provision also allows the state to order the appointment of a receiver for the pmpose o f
It may be noted that sec.44 does not contains specifically a provision expressing that a party does not 
waive his right to arbitrate by addressing him self to the state court for interim measures o f protection. 
However, the existence o f the section may be regarded as such an intention. See J. Schaefer, op. cit., para 
4.1.2.1at p 11. See also, J. Balanch, ‘Interim Measures in International arbitration and the UK Courts: the 
Current Position’, paper presented at LCIA & AMINZ Arbitration Seminar, held on 20 Feb 2003 in 
Auckland, New Zealand, at p 4.
In relation to the Model Law, Art. 9 does not prevent the operation o f any agreement which purports to 
exclude the right o f the parties to seek interim measures o f protection. The Commission Report provides 
“That understanding also provided the answer to the question whether Art. 9 would prevent parties from 
excluding in the agreement resort to courts for all or certain interim measures. Wliile the article should not 
read as positively giving effect to any such exclusion agreement”. A /40/17, para 97.
See Russell, op. cit., para 7-128.
See R. Merkin, op. cit., para 12.63, Service Issue No 25:8 December 1999.
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or in relation to arbitral proceedings, again to ensure the protection and preservation of 
property. Yet the various powers listed in s.44 are not exhaustive, as the DAC Report 
1996 noted,
“it is under this Clause that the court has power to order Mareva or 
Anton Piller relief (i.e. urgent protective measures to preserve assets or 
evidence) so as to help the arbitral process to operate effectively.
Equally, there may be instances where a party seeks an order that will 
have an effect on a third party, which only the Court could grant. For 
the same reason the Court is given the other powers listed”"".
It also worth mentioning that s.44 prescribes the manner for invoking its provisions. So 
s.44(4) requires an application by one o f the parties, either with the leave o f the arbitral 
tribunal or the agreement in writing of the other parties. However, in urgent cases s.44(3) 
allows the comf to make such order as it considers necessary for the purpose of 
preserving evidence or assets, in the absence o f permission of the arbitral tribrmal or 
written agreement from the other parties.
Compar ing s.44 with Article 9 o f the Model Law, it may be noted that the Model Law 
does not require permission from the arbitral tribunal or the agreement o f all the parties, 
nor does it describe how to invoke theassistance o f the court in this regard. This is 
because it is a statement of principle not a practical provision. Furthermore, under s.44 
the court will exercise its power only if  or to the extent that the arbitral tribimal, and any 
arbitral or other institution or person entrusted by the parties with power in that regard, 
has no power or is unable for the time being to act effectively"". Under s. 44 such a 
requirement is not found in Article 9. The court acts only as the last resort. However, 
where the arbitral tribunal cannot act (e.g. where the parties clearly deprive it of this 
power tribunal) or act effectively (e.g. it has not yet set up), the court may be a 
significant player in this spectrum.
These requirements limit the role o f the court involvement in arbitration. In principle, the 
court can only act if either the arbitral tribunal or all parties agree, unless the applicant
See DAC 1996 Report, para 214.
Sec. 44 (5) o f the Arbitration Act 1996. It was submitted in DAC 1996 Report, “the powers we have 
given the Court are intended to be used when the tribunal cannot act or act effectively, as subsection (5) 
makes clear”. See para 214.
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party can prove urgency. Furthermore, it can only act when the arbitral tribunal has no 
power or is unable for the time being to act effectively.
To sum up, it would be useful to confer on the court the power to grant interim measures 
of protection, in order to protect a party from the risk o f being unable to enforce an 
arbitral award"^, and to enliance the efficiency and efficacy o f the arbitral process"®. As 
Lord Mustill argues,
“an order is interim in the sense of being made whilst the substantive 
dispute is awaiting final adjudication and conservatory in the sense of 
being designed to ensure that the arbitral process is not frustrated in its 
last stages by the refusal of the losing party to honoui" the award” "".
Thus, it is recommended that the new Kuwaiti Arbitration Act should contain provisions 
dealing with the power o f the court to grant interim measures o f protection. A party to an 
arbitration agreement should be able to apply to the court for a wide range o f interim 
measures, and the court would have, as regards interim measures, the same powers for 
making orders as it has hi relation to legal proceedings. This procedure should not be 
used to usurp arbitration. The court’s power should be only used where the arbitral 
tribunal cannot act or act effectively. However, if  the case is not one o f urgency the court 
should not intervene without the agreement o f the parties or leave from the arbitral 
tribunal. These stipulations would ensm-e that the role of the court would be consistent 
with the principle o f party autonomy and limiting the court intervention. It should 
declare, moreover, that resorting to court assistance does not mean that the applicant 
party has waived his right to arbitrate.
6.5 General Comments on the Kuwaiti Approach to the Court’s Supportive 
Powers
Kuwait's approach to this issue is critical. This view is based on the following grounds; 
First, Kuwait does not deal with the matter o f the court’s assistance to the arbitral 
process independently, but in the context of the suspension o f the arbitral proceedings. 
Kuwait should deal with such assistance clearly in a specific provision.
See Trade Fortune Inc. V. Amagalamated M ill Supplies Ltd. [CLOUT case 71] 
A/CN.9/264, p aral.
Coppee Lavalin  v Ken-Ren Chemicals and Fertilsers Ltd, [1995] 1 AC 38
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Secondly, Kuwait clearly provides that the arbitral tribunal may seek the court's 
assistance and support, but does not indicate whether the parties may seek such 
assistance. Yet parties may need the court’s assistance in securing evidence even before 
the constitution o f the arbitral tribunal, while during the arbitral process a party may need 
assistance in calling a witness or taking evidence. Kuwait does not make clear whether 
parties may seek the court's assistance, or are reliant on the arbitral tribunal taking such 
steps. Modern arbitration systems deal clearly with this matter. For instance, Article 27 
o f the Model Law and s.43 of the English Arbitration Act 1996 both allow a party to 
seek court assistance with the permission of the arbitral tribunal or the agreement o f the 
other parties. These requirements ensure that a party does not abuse the court process by 
seeking to introduce extraneous or irrelevant evidence'®", and prevent the side-stepping 
o f an agreement between tlie parties, or a direction the aibitrators that the case shall 
proceed on a documents only basis.
The question o f who may seek the court’s assistance is important, as showing the 
system's attitude to the concept o f party autonomy, while allowing the parties to work 
together with the court to ensure an effective and successful arbitration. The modem 
approach as represented by the Model Law and the 1996 Act reflects a comprise between 
the two conflicting ideas that court assistance should be granted only upon application by 
the parties or exclusively upon request by the arbitral tribunal'®'. It is recommended that 
the new Kuwaiti Arbitration Act imports this philosophy and does not give the arbitral 
tribimal exclusive power to seek court assistance. Court assistance could be invoked in 
tliree ways
i. Upon request by a party with the approval o f the arbitral tribunal.
ii. Upon an agreement by all parties to arbitration.
iii. Upon request by the tribunal, when the parties invest it with such power.
Thirdly, according to the provisions o f Article 180 of CCPL 1980, when the arbitral 
tribunal needs to invoke court assistance, it should stay the arbitral proceedings. Thus 
such resort to the court will have a significant impact on the arbitral proceedings. The 
connection between court assistance and staying the arbitral proceedings is difficult to
Since, the other side party or arbitral tribunal can oppose the application o f  a party to seek such 
assistance, when they think that requested evidence does not justify the court assistance or it can be 
obtained by another means without the court’s involvement. See A/CN.9/WG,II/WP.41, para 32 and 33. 
A/CN.9/246, para 98.
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understand, and potentially damaging to the process. If  the law makes available the 
court’s supportive powers to aid the progress o f the arbitral proceedings, it is difficult to 
see how that end is served by the inevitable suspension o f the arbitral proceedings each 
time court assistance is invoked. It is notable that modern and healthy arbitration systems 
such as the 1996 Act and the Model Law do not insist on such suspension. It is therefore 
recommended that the Kuwaiti Act should make clear that the invocation of court 
assistance need not prompt the stay o f the arbitral proceedings.
Fourthly, the provisions o f the CCPL1980 do not indicate whether (i) it is possible to 
resort to the court during arbitration, (ii) such court assistance is compatible with 
arbitration, and (iii) the request for such assistance can constitute a waiver of the right to 
arbitrate. On the other hand, the modern trend is to empower the court to take steps 
where the arbitral tribunal itself cannot act effectively or at all, for instance in relation to 
tliird parties, in cases o f urgency, or where the arbitral tribunal has not yet been 
constituted. The court is usually allowed to grant interim measures o f protection, such as 
interim injunctions preventing the removal o f assets in order to avoid the enforcement of 
the arbitral award, or orders preserving evidence. Since such court assistance clearly aids 
the arbitral process, the new Kuwaiti Arbitration Act should provide that court assistance 
is available to the paifies to an arbitration, allowing a party to request interim measures 
from the court (even if  the arbitral tribunal also has the power to malce such orders) 
confident that such action will not be regaided as a waiver of the right to arbitrate. 
Furthermore, the Act should specify exactly the kind o f measures available.
6.6 Conclusion
It is in the interests of justice for the court to be able appropriately to assist the proper 
functioning of the arbitral process, and the new Kuwaiti Act should seek to achieve this 
by importing the approach found in modern and developed arbitration systems.
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7. The Enforcement of Arbitral Award
7.1 Introduction
The arbitral award is the fruit o f the operation o f the arbitral process. In fact, a binding 
award is one o f the objectives o f entering an arbitration agreement, as when the parties 
conclude such an agreement, they not only oblige themselves to resort to arbitration, but 
also voluntarily to enforce the arbitral award. However, the unsuccessfiil party may not 
comply with the arbitral award voluntarily, potentially defeating the feasibility of 
arbitration as a method o f dispute settlement. Thus, the successful party should be able to 
enforce the arbitral award, and so, needs an effective mechanism to force the 
unsuccessfiil party to carry out its provisions. An award without an effective enforcement 
mechanism may be worthless. This section will focus on the role o f the court in 
supporting the enforcement of the arbitral award, dealing with practical aspects of the 
enforcement o f arbitral awards in Kuwait. The section will concentrate on enforcement 
under the provisions of CCPL 1980 o f domestic arbitral awards, i.e. awards made in 
Kuwait irrespective of the nationality o f the parties. Enforcement of foreign ai'bitral 
awards, made outside Kuwait, will not be considered, as tins thesis aims at the refonn of 
the Kuwaiti arbitration system, and is not concerned with the system adopted by 
adherence to the New York Convention.
7.2 Arbitral Award
Arbitration legislation normally does not set out a statutory definition of an arbitral 
a w a r d ' b u t  it may be regarded as a final determination o f a specific issue or dispute by 
arbitration'®". Should the Arbitration Act require a specific form o f award, or leave this 
matter to the discretion o f the arbitrating parties? Certain modem arbitration systems do 
not require a definite form of ai'bitral award, but give the arbitrating parties the freedom 
to agree on the form o f the award, in line with the principle of party autonomy. For 
instance, s.52(l) o f the English Arbitration Act 1996 states, “The parties are free to agree 
on the form of an award”, while providing supplementary provisions in case o f the 
absence o f agreement. So if, for any reason, there is no agreement on the question o f the 
form and the content of the arbitral award.
However, few national arbitration acts do define the award. See A/40/17,para.49.
See Russell, op. cit., para 6-001, and Prof. F. Davidson, Arbitration, op. cit., para 17-14.
Ch.3: Judicial Support to Arbitration 125
i. The arbitral award will be in writing.
ii. It will be signed.
iii. It will contain the reasons for the awai'd,
iv. It will state the seat o f arbitration and the date o f making an award.
On the other hand, the Kuwaiti ai'bitration system requires a specific form of award, 
providing a list o f issues tliat the arbitral award should meet, or otherwise be null'®". 
Thus Article 183 CCPL 1980 requires that the award should be in writing, should include 
a copy of the arbitration agreement, a summary o f the litigant parties statements and 
documents, the grounds o f the award, its ruling, the date it was rendered, the venue, and 
signatures o f arbitrators.
The drafters of the Model Law discussed these issues'®", concluding that the Model Law 
should establish minimal formal requirements for all arbitral awards made under its 
provisions'®". Thus, Article 31 states,
“(1) The award shall be made in writing and shall be signed by the 
arbitrator or arbitrators. In arbitral proceedings with more than one 
arbitrator, the signatures of the majority of all members o f the arbitral 
tribunal shall suffice, provided that the reason for any omitted 
signature is stated.
(3) The award shall state its date and the place o f arbitration as 
determined in accordance with article 20(1)”.
Apart from the question whether this formal requirement is mandatory. Article 31(2) 
allows the parties to agree whether the arbitral tribunal should give the reasons on which 
the award is based. Thus, it can be said that the parties have the freedom to agree on the 
form of the arbitral award.
At first sight it might be suggested that the Aibitration Act, in line with party autonomy, 
should allow the parties to agree on the form of the award. But, when one considers the 
legal and practical value o f the award, one may be driven to remove any kind of liberty 
as to the form of the award, especially as the form of the award is a matter of public
See Attack no. 37/39 Comm. 6/11/1977; see also Attack no. 32/33 Comm. 16/11/1983. This is the same 
as the French treatment. See Art. 1471 -1473 o f CCP 1981.
See A/CN.9/216.
See Holzmann & Neuhaiis, op .cit, p 836.
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policy in legal systems such as Kuwait and France. It is best to defer this until it can be 
considered in the context o f the supeiwision o f the award by the court.
7.3 The Need of Court’s Assistance
An ai'bitral awai'd made by the arbitral tribunal pursuant to an arbitration agreement is 
final and binding on the parties and any persons claiming tlirough or under them. In other 
words, an award is conclusive as to the matters with which it deals, unless and until it is 
successfully challenged or appealed'®". The award takes effect from when it is made. 
According to the provisions o f Article 183 o f CCPL 1980 an arbitral award will be made 
and will take the effect from when it is signed by the sole arbitrator or by the final 
arbitrator in the arbitral tribunal, while s. 54 o f the Arbitration Act 1996 states,
“(1) Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the tribunal may decide 
what is to be taken to be the date on which the award was made.
(2) In the absence of any such decision, the date o f the award shall be 
taken to be the date on which it is signed by the arbitrator or, where 
more than one arbitrator signs the award, by the last of them”.
Once the arbitral award talces effect, there is an implied obligation upon the losing party 
to carry it out'®®. However, if  he refuses to do so, the successful party must look to the 
court for enforcement o f the award, as this lies beyond the power o f the arbitral 
tribunal.'®".
7.4 The Methods of Enforcement
What are the available enforcement methods? It seems that there are two principal routes 
that can be followed to seek the coiu't’s assistance in enforcing the arbitral award - 
raising an action, and application for leave to enforce.
(a) Enforcement by Action
This method of enforcement may not be codified in the provisions o f the arbitration 
act'"", but subject to the general rules that govern litigation. Under this method, the
The effect o f  the arbitral award as final and binding award does not affect the right o f challenge or 
appeal. See, Russell, op. cit., para 6-190.
See Redfern & Hunter, op. cit., para 10-01 at p 443.
C. Soo, “International Enforcement o f Arbitral Award” (2000) ICCLR 1.
Sec. 66 (4).o f the Arbitration act 1996 mentions this method o f enforcement.
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successful party commences a legal action based on the arbitral award as a binding 
contract'"'. As the arbitration agreement contains an implied promise to perform the 
arbitral award, a losing party who fails to honour the award breaches this obligation. The 
successful party need only present the arbitration agreement, the arbitral award, and 
show that the losing party has failed to comply with it. The successful party might resort 
to an action on the award in England, where he cannot get leave to enforce, e.g. if  the 
arbitral award is not in writing, or does not comply with agreed or statutory form.
(b) Summary Enforcement
Most arbitration systems feature a summaiy procedure that the successful party may 
follow to enforce the arbitral award. In this case, he seeks court assistance to enforce the 
arbitral award by granting leave to enforce (or order to execute). According to Article 
185 o f CCPL 1980, a party may ask the court enforce the arbitral award by granting 
leave to enforce (writ o f execution)'"^. The successful party must deposit the arbitral 
award in the Registry of the court, which was originally competent to hear the dispute'"", 
and may then apply for leave to enforce from the President of the Court. The order for 
enforcement will be endorsed on the arbitral award. Similarly, s. 6 6 o f the Arbitration Act 
1996 provides that an arbitral award may be enforced, by leave o f the court, in the same 
method as a judgement or order o f the court to the same effect.
The aim o f this kind of procedure is to facilitate the enforcement o f the arbitral award 
without a complicated regime. It is a simple, clear and speedy method o f enforcement.
7.5 The Role of the Court
The state court can be a very important player in enforcing the arbitral award. Much 
depends on the manner in which the arbitration law deals with enforcement. The 
mechanism for enforcement should be compatible with pro-arbitration policy. Tliis 
requires that the mechanism meet the “reasonable expectation” '"" o f the successful party 
to enforce the award without delay. This entails, fiirthermore, prescribing a time limit 
within which the court has to grant leave to enforce'"". Having said that the court can 
show its pro-arbitration policy by adopting presumptive principle o f enforcement.
193
See, Ruessll, op. cit., para 8-006.
This is the same French approach as provided in Art, 1475 -1477  o f CCP 1981.
See Art. 184 o f CCPL 1980.
See Redfern & Flunter, op. cit., para 10-01 at p 443.
In Kuwait for example the decision o f the state court should be declared in the next day o f the 
application to enforce the arbitral award. See Art. 163 o f CCPL 1980.
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However, the court does not always have to grant leave to enforce. Such judicial 
discretion might be considered as a test o f the level o f the support and assistance that the 
arbitral award will get from the courts. The court before dealing with such an application 
should consider the relationship between court and arbitration and the need to maintain 
this relationship on an amicable level, and should usually support arbitration by assisting 
the enforcement of arbitral awards. Enforcement tinough the court represents a classic 
case o f using the court to support the arbitral process'"". Thus, in principle, the court 
should grant leave to enforce the arbitral award, unless there are good grounds for not do 
so'"". There are a number o f cases where the court may refuse to grant leave to enforce, 
e.g. when the award is not in proper form, or its enforcement would be contrary to public 
policy. Where leave to enforce is granted by the court, the arbitral award may then be 
enforced in the same manner as a judgement o f the court, as under s. 66 of the 1996 Act.
7.6 Conclusion
The arbitration system has to guarantee the enforcement of the arbitral award, and the 
court may play a vital role in assuring its execution of the arbitral award. Such guarantee 
is established by means o f the interaction between arbitral tribunal - a private body 
chosen by the parties to decide their dispute - and the court - a state body with the 
authority and means to execute awards. The law must make it clear that the court should 
favour enforcement o f the arbitral award unless it finds a good legal reason for not doing 
so.
See DAC 1996 Report, para 273.
The supervisoiy role o f the national court over tlie arbitral award is discussed in Ch; 4, see p 168 infi'a. 
The issue here is the supportive role o f the state court to the question o f enforcement o f the arbitral award.
Chapter Four:
JUDICAL SUPERVISION OVER ARBITRATION
1. Introduction
Most modem legal systems recognise arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism, 
while also respecting the principle of party autonomy. The latter principle is one o f the 
most important features o f any arbitration system, and one of the most vital principles 
governing the drafting of new arbitration legislation. The Model law, for example, felt 
compelled to positively confirm the freedom of the parties', while s. 1(b) o f the English 
Arbitration Act 1996 states,
“the provisions o f this Part are founded on the following principles, 
and shall be construed accordingly- (b) the parties should be free to 
agree how their disputes are resolved”.
However, it is hard to accept this principle without certain limitations and judicial 
supervision in order to safeguard the public interest, since, “arbitration to a large extent 
is replacing the jurisdiction of the national court” .^
Acceptance o f the principle of party autonomy does not mean that the parties will be free 
from the demands of public policy. The DAC notes, “In some cases, o f course, the public 
interest will make some inroads on complete party autonomy, in much the same way as 
there are limitations on the freedom of contract”". Adding, “ [A]s appears from 
mandatory provisions of the Bill, there are some rules that cannot be overridden by the 
parties who have agreed to use arbitration”".
There are number o f logical justifications for the need for judicial supervision. Firstly, 
there should be judicial supervision over the arbitration agreement. This is because 
arbitration is based on a contract, and that contract should be subject to judicial scrutiny
* See A/CN.9/207, para 16-27. See also Prof. I. Szasz (Rapporteur) & T. Oyekunle (Chairman), 
‘Introduction to the Model Law o f UNCITRAL on International Commercial Arbitration’, in P. Sanders 
(ed.), Comparative Arbitration Practice and Public Policy in Arbitration, op. cit., p 36.
 ^ Dr. W. Melis (Rapporteur) & Dr. S. Hanak (Chairman), ‘Arbitration and the Court’ in P. Sanders (ed.), 
Comparative Arbitration Practice and Public Policy in Arbitration, op. ch., p 84.
 ^ DAC 1996 Report, para 19.
 ^Ibid., para 19.
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to make sure that it is not invalid, null or inoperative. Secondly, there should be judicial 
supervision over the arbitral process, as the state has an interest in ensuring the fairness, 
integrity and impartiality o f the arbitral proceedings, and so the court should ensure that 
the arbitration accomplishes its object o f obtaining the fair resolution of disputes by an 
impartial tribunal. Thirdly, there should be judicial supervision over the arbitral award, 
as it may terminate the dispute between the pai'ties, and alter their legal relations.
Yet, while judicial supervision is justified, what is the appropriate degree o f that 
supervision? The answer to this vital question must reflect a particular philosophy as to 
the proper balance between respect for the principle of party autonomy, and the interest 
o f the state in superintending the arbitral process^. Most modern arbitration systems 
impose significant limits on judicial supervision. UNCITRAL itself notes, “As evidenced 
by recent amendments to arbitration laws, there exists a trend in favour of limiting court 
involvement” .^ This has also been recognised by certain courts, e.g. the Canadian Court 
o f Appeal in Quintette Coal Limited  v. Nippon Steel Corp. “noted the world-wide trend 
toward restricting the scope o f judicial intervention in commercial ai’bitration” .^
As aforementioned, modern arbitration legislation which adopts the principle o f court 
support of arbitration with mininumi intervention, tends to delimit precisely the scope of 
judicial intervention in arbitration so that the parties and tribunal might know exactly the 
limits o f the court's jurisdiction to intervene hr the arbitration^. This is very important in 
order to increase certainty for the parties and arbitrators^, while it is also very important 
for the court to laiow that it does not have a general or residual jurisdiction. The 
draftsmen o f the Model Law comment,
“it merely requires that any instance of court involvement be listed in 
the Model Law. Its effect would, thus, be to exclude any general or 
residual powers given to the courts in domestic system, which are not 
listed in the Model Law. The resulting certainty o f the parties and the 
arbitrators about the instances in which court supervision or assistance
 ^ It was considered that the issue how to sti’ike a balance between respect for the wishes o f the parties to 
use a private system of dispute resolution and the in the public policy is one o f the delegate questions. See 
O. Chukwumerije ‘Judicial Supervision of the Commercial Arbitration: the English Arbitration Act 1996’, 
op. cit., p i76.
 ^ See, Explanatory Note by the UNCITRAL on Model Law, para 14.
’ Canada; British Columbia Court o f Appeal, 24 October 1990, [CLOUT case no. 16].
® See O. Chukwumerije, op. cit., p 176.
 ^See Holtzmann & Neuhaus, op. cit., p 216.
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is to be expected seems beneficial to international commercial
arbitration” ^^ .
It is thus important to consider the question o f judicial supervision. The first side o f the 
relationship between the courts and arbitration is their supportive role, which was dealt 
with in chapter Tlrree. The other side o f this relation is their supervisory role over 
arbitration, in the shape o f the arbitration agreement, the arbitral process and the arbitral 
award. This will be the focus of this chapter. The chapter is divided into three sections as 
follows:
Section 1 : The Judicial Supervision over the Arbitration Agreement.
Section 2: The Judicial Supervision over the Arbitral Tribunal and its Conducts.
Section 3 : The Judicial Supervision over the Arbitral Award.
A/CN.9/263, para 2.
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2. Judicial Supervision over the Arbitration Agreement
2.1 Introduction
As aforementioned,^^ the arbitration agreement is the foundation stone of arbitration, the 
source o f the obligation that the parties must settle their disputes by arbitration and not 
otherwise, and the source o f the arbitral tribunal's powers, rights, obligations and 
jurisdiction. Furthermore, it prevents the court from dealing with the dispute unless the 
parties agree otherwise'^. Yet the courts must exercise a supervisory role over it, as its 
effects cannot be triggered, if  it is invalid, null or inoperative.
2.2 The National Court and Arbitration Agreement
When should the eourt exercise supervision over the arbitration agreement? If  the law o f 
a state imposes no limit on judicial intervention, it is possible that the court may 
supervise that agreement at every conceivable opportunity. However, this is not the 
approach taken in most modern and developed arbitration systems, wliich aim to 
preclude intrusive judicial intervention in arbitration and they limit it to those cases 
where such intervention is provided for expressly by the law^^. Such an approach enables 
judicial supervision to secure the fairness and legitimacy o f the arbitration, while 
preventing the parties abusing their right to resort to the court in order to delay the 
progress o f the arbitration. Taking the view that Kuwait should embrace this approach, 
the following paragraphs consider where the court should be allowed to intervene. It is 
suggested that the court may exercise its supervisory role over the arbitration agreement 
when it is asked to exercise its supportive role. Thus, it may exercise its supervisory role 
in the following cases:
(a) Support to the Arbitration Agreement
The supportive role o f the court in this context was discussed in chapter Tln ee. The court 
should enforce the arbitration agreement, unless it finds that the agreement is null, void.
See pp. 21-23 supra.
These legal effects are considered because o f the recognition o f the principle o f party autonomy.
See O. Chukwumerije, op. cit., pi 76.
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inoperative or incapable o f being p e r f o r m e d S o  if  the arbitration agreement itself is 
challenged, and the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal thus questioned, the court would 
have to decide that the arbitration agreement is valid before enforcing it'^, as the duty o f 
the court to enforce the agreement only applies if  it is not invalid, null, inoperative or 
incapable o f being performed. I f  the court is satisfied that the arbitration agreement does 
not meet these requirements, then it may refuse to support the arbitration. The British 
Columbia Supreme Court has confirmed that in terms of Ai'ticle 8 of the Model Law the 
court is required to grant a stay o f legal proceedings, unless it finds that the arbitration 
agreement was null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed
Clearly then, the court may exercise its judicial supervision over the arbitration 
agreement by examining the agreement's validity when that is challenged, before 
deciding whether to enforce it^ .^ In particular, the court will not enforce the agreement to 
arbitrate if  it is satisfied that the arbitration agreement is:
i. null and void, i.e. never concluded or concluded but foimd to be void ab initio.
ii. inoperative or incapable o f being performed, i.e. containing such inherent 
contradictions that it camiot be given effect and or performed by the pai'ties even if  they 
were willing to do so.
The court deals with issues of the existence or validity o f the arbitration agreement 
whenever they arise, and need not always defer to the principle of competence- 
competence. Alternatively, it may exercise its supervisory power after the arbitral 
tribunal has ruled on its own jurisdiction*^, as such a ruling must always be subject to 
court scrutiny. Thus Article 16(3) o f the Model Law states,
It may be mentioned that the phrase “ null and void, inoperative or incapable o f  being performed” which 
appears in art 8 (1) in the Model Law and in sec.9 (4) o f  the Arbitration Act 1996 is taken directly from 
Art. II o f  the New York Convention.
The relationship between the principle o f competence -  competence, and the jurisdiction o f  the court to 
examine the validity o f the arbitration agreement was discussed in pp. 74-79 supra.
Cecrop Co. v Kinetic Sciences Inc. (2001), 16 B.L.R. (3d) 15, in H. Alvarez et al., op. cit., p 63.
Despite the tendency favouring the enforcement o f arbitration agreement, a stay o f legal proceedings 
should be refused where the court is satisfied that it is null and void, inoperative or incapable o f being 
performed. See Clavel v Production Musicales D onald Inc. (1994), 114 D.L.R. (4“') 441, m H. Alvarez et 
al., op. cit., p 102 and International Resource Mangement (canda) Ltd. V Kappa Energy (Yemen) Inc., 
[2001] A.J. No. 798,2001 ABCA 146, in H. Alvarez et al., op. cit., p 61.
See A/CN. 9/233, para 77.
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“if  the arbitral tribunal rules as a preliminary question that it has 
jurisdiction, any party may request, within 30 days after having 
received notice o f that ruling, the court specified in article 6 to decide 
on this matter” *^
While s.32 of the Arbitration Act 1996 is to the same effect^**. Furthermore, in terms o f 
s.32(2) the court may consider the arbitration agreement in the course o f determining a 
preliminary point of jurisdiction, either upon an application by one of the parties with 
permission o f the arbitral tribunal or with an agreement of all the other parties.
(b) Support for the Arbitral Award
The court's supervisory role may even be exercised over the arbitration agreement after 
making the arbitral award, since the invalidity o f the arbitration agreement will always 
constitute a ground for challenging the awai'd. For instance. Article 34(2)(a)(i) o f the 
Model Law enables the court to set aside the arbitral awai'd, if  it is satisfied that the 
agreement to arbitrate is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it. 
This is also a ground for refusing the recognition and enforcement o f the award in terms 
of Article 36(l)(a)(i), The 1996 Act adopts an identical ground o f challenge under 
s.67(l)(a).
2.3 Party Autonomy Is under the Supervision of the National Court
This heading alludes to the fact that the heedom  of the parties to refer their disputes to 
arbitration is restricted, as they must both conclude a valid agreement and comply with 
any mandatory provisions and public policy requirement of the law^*, otherwise they 
camiot seek assistance or support from the court.
(a) The Validity of the Arbitration Agreement
Although the court is obliged to respect the agreement to aibitrate, the principle o f party 
autonomy does not mean that the court will always enforce that agreement. If  the court 
finds the agreement invalid, it will not support it. So the court may not enforce the
It may be mentioned that the judicial supervision under the model law is available here only in case if 
the ruling o f the tribunal is positive as it has jurisdiction, while according to the provisions o f 1996 act 
there is no such limitation.
For a definition o f “substantive jurisdiction” see sec. 82(1) o f the Arbitration Act 1996.
Redfern & Hunter, op. cit., para 6-06 at p280.
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arbitration agreement, e.g. where a party lacks the legal capacity to conclude the 
agreement, or the subject matter o f the dispute is not arbitrable, or the arbitration 
agreement is inoperative. The court should initially assume the validity o f the arbitration 
agreement, but this presumption may be rebutted by the party who contends that the 
agreement is not valid proving that contention to the satisfaction of the court. The court 
may also raise the issue o f the validity o f the agreement on its own motion in court 
proceedings, where the invalidity is of a fundamental nature involving questions o f 
public policy, as where the subject matter o f the dispute is not arbitrable^^. Yet even 
though the validity o f the arbitration agreement is crucial, arbitration legislation in most 
legal systems neither specifies the reasons for the invalidity of that agreement nor 
determines the intended meaning of the terms “null and void, inoperative o f being 
performed”^^ . It has been said that preparing an exclusive list of defined reasons for the 
invalidity o f the ai’bitration agreement is “extremely difficult” '^*. This then provides an 
opportunity for the court to show a pro-arbitration attitude. The power not to enforce an 
invalid arbitration agreement should not be understood as requiring the court to examine 
in detail the validity o f the arbitration agreement^^. The court should exercise its role 
consistently with a strong presumption in favour of the validity of the aibitration 
agreement, and with the principle o f competence -competence. Thus the court should 
lean in favour o f the arbitration being allowed to progress, and the arbitral tribunal being 
allowed to make the initial ruling on its own competence, subject to ultimate court 
control. The court should thus construe narrowly the terms “null, void, inoperative or 
incapable of being performed”, and the arbitration agreement should be only held invalid 
where this is manifestly the case
(b) Mandatory Provisions
Modern arbitration legislation takes the view that the health of the process is best 
ensured by enabling parties to design their arbitral procedures, as they consider suitable 
and proper^^. Recognising the principle o f party autonomy, such legislation allows the
See Model Law Art 34 (2) (b) (i). 
Holtzman & Neuhaus, op. cit., p 303
See A/CN.9/207, para 44. The adopted approach was to include only those reasons which relate directly 
to arbitration and to leave out the other reasons relevant to any agreement or contract (e.g. mistake, 
misrepresentation or duress).
A/CN.9/233, para 77.
Albert Berg as cited in Holtzman & Neuhaus, op. cit., fn.5 at p 303. It might be added that the same 
approach could apply on the supporting the arbitral award. The court should respect the presumption o f the 
validity o f  the award which is based on valid arbitration.
See A/CN.9/263, para 26.
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parties to reach agreement about most aspects of arbitral procedure. For instance, they 
may usually agree on the seat o f arbitration, the application o f institutional rules, the
number o f arbitrators, appointment procedures including what happens when the agreed
procedure fails, the scope of the authority o f the arbitral tribunal, whether legal or other
representation is permitted, and the form of the arbitral award. On the other hand, the
principle o f party autonomy is generally subject to mandatory provisions'^ o f the law, 
which reflect the safeguards imposed by public policy, and the court must ensure that the 
parties' agreement is not contrary to these mandatory rules. It has been said,
“it is for the parties to decide how their arbitration should be
conducted, unless public interest dictates otherwise and subject also to
the mandatory provisions of the Act. Thus, the State intervenes and
diminishes the parties’ will. The legislator, thi'ough these provisions,
keeps the sovereign power o f the state in the hands of the courts. The 
arbitral tribunal is not regarded as a means o f safeguarding the 
principles o f public order and policy”^^ .
Thus we can assume that arbitration legislation will contain mandatory provisions to 
guard against major procedural defects, prevent denials o f justice and ensure due process 
of law^ **. The question what provisions should be mandatory is beyond this study. 
However, it is concerned with the proper means o f designating clearly whether 
provisions are mandatory or not. There are different approaches to this question.
1) English arbitration Act 1996
Lord Fraser of Carmylle Q.C said in introducing the Bill,
“The principle o f party autonomy is central to the Bill. Parties who are 
in dispute are able to decide how the arbitration should be conducted.
The flexibility and control, which this freedom gives to the parties, is 
o f critical importance. Having said that, the freedom is not absolute.
This indicates to the fact that the parties’ freedom is not absolute. See Durtnell v DTI [2001 1 Lloyd’s 
law Rep.275, at p 279.
See G. Zekos, ‘The Role o f  Courts in Commercial and Maritime Arbitration under English law’ (1998) 
15(1) J. Int. Arb. 51-73.
See G. Herrmann, ‘The UNCITRAL Model Law -its background, salient features and puiposes’ (1985) 
1(1)  Arb. Int. 6-29.
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There are a small number o f provisions which for reasons of public 
policy cannot be overridden” *^.
The drafters o f the Arbitration Act 1996 decided to provide a list o f the mandatory 
provisions. Thus s.4 is headed 'Mandatory and non-mandatory provisions', and runs,
“(1) The mandatory provisions of this Part are listed in Schedule 1 and 
have effect notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary.
(2) The other provisions of this Part (the "non-mandatory provisions") 
allow the parties to malce their own arrangements by agreement but 
provide rules, which apply in the absence of such agreement”.
The mandatory rules listed in Schedule 1 contain for example ss.9-11 (stay of 
proceedings); s. 12 (power o f Court to extend an agreed time limit); s.24 (power o f the 
Court to remove an arbitrator); s. 29 (immunity of an arbitrator); s.31 (objection to the 
substantive jurisdiction o f an arbitration tribunal). The Act thus aims^^, firstly, to make it 
very clear that it features provisions which cannot be overridden by tlie parties’ 
agreement, and other provisions which the parties can change or substitute as they see fit. 
The second aim is to allow easy reference to these mandatory provisions.
2) The Model Law and Kuwaiti Arbitration Law
The question o f mandatory provisions is not covered by the Model Law. A proposal was 
made during the Working Group’s second session that, “it would be useful to make 
clear in the model law (possibly in a separate article) from which provisions o f the 
model law the parties cannot derogate”^^ .
The Working Group adopted this suggestion and decided to consider which provisions 
o f the model law should be listed as mandatory^"*, hoping to clarify which provisions 
camiot be overridden by agreement^^. However, the idea was soon dropped, it being said 
that.
In the House o f Lords debate on Second Reading on Jan. 18, 1996 (vol. 568/No. 28 House o f Lords 
Official Report relating to Parliamentary Debates p. 761). See also, R. Durtnell and Sons Ltd. v. The 
Secretary o f  State fo r  Trade and Industry, [2001] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 275 QBD (T&CC), at p 279.
DAC 1996 Report, para 28.
”  A/CN.9/232, para. 77.
A/CN.9/245, para. 175.
A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.50, para. 8.
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“there are certain difficulties and other considerations which cast doubt 
on the appropriateness and need for such approval. Firstly, a 
considerable number of provisions are obviously by their content of a 
mandatory nature. Secondly, there are number of provisions granting 
freedom to the parties, accompanied by suppletive rules failing 
agreement by the parties; here the question of a mandatory nature 
appears to be a philosophical one and equally redundant. Thirdly, with 
respect to some draft Articles only part o f the provisions, (e.g. a time 
limit) is non-mandatory”^^ .
Thus the Working Group agreed that the Model Law should not contain an article 
wherein all mandatory provisions would be listed^^. Instead,
“the Working Group was agreed that the non- mandatory character of 
articles 2(e), 23 (2) and 26 (2) and (3) should be expressed in those 
provisions by words such as “unless otherwise agreed by the parties”^^ .
This decision does not mean that all those provisions of the model law, which do not 
clearly express their non-mandatory character, are necessarily mandatory^^. So the 
Model Law does not list mandatory and non-mandatory provisions, partly because it 
was thought, either umiecessaiy or unwise to include such a list, and partly due to 
drafting difficulties. However, it indicates the non-mandatory character o f an article 
either by providing an explicit freedom to the arbitrating parties, (e.g. Article 10 (1) 
states, “The parties ai’e free to determine the number of arbitrators”) or by laying down a 
provision, but giving the parties the right to agree otherwise. Thus Article 21 states,
“Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the arbitral proceedings in 
respect o f particular dispute commence on the date on which a request 
for that dispute to be referred to arbitration is received by the 
respondent” .
Ibid., para.9.
A/CN.9/246. para. 176 
Ibid., para 175.
Ibid., para 177.
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So while the Model Law does not contain an article listing which provisions are 
mandatory, as in England, the concept o f mandatory provisions is nonetheless 
recognised. So Ai'ticle 4 (dealing with waiver of the right to object) states,
“A party who Imows that any provision of this Law from wliich the 
parties may derogate or any requirement under the arbitration 
agreement has not been complied with and yet proceeds with the 
arbitration without stating his objection to such non-compliance 
without undue delay or, if  a time-limit is provided therefore, within 
such period o f time, shall be deemed to have waived his right to 
object” .
While Article 34(2)(a)(iv) runs,
“An arbitral award may be set aside by the court specified in article 6 
only if  the party making the application furnishes proof that the 
composition o f the arbitral tribimal or the arbitral procedure was not in 
accordance with the agreement o f the parties, unless such agreement 
was in conflict with a provision o f this Law from which the parties 
camiot derogate” .
Similarly in Kuwait Article 182(1) o f CCPL 1980 gives the parties great freedom to 
agree on the procediues they wish to adopt for settling their disputes. However, Article 
182/2 o f CCPL 1980 imposes a limitation on this freedom, by stating that public order 
should be respected and applied. Yet while this provision clearly contemplates that 
certain provisions will be mandatory, it tells us nothing about what provisions will relate 
to public order. It might be guessed that any agreement contraiy to basic and 
fundamental principles o f procedural fairness will have no effect, as where a party is 
denied the opportunity to defend or present his case. Such matters are undoubtedly 
related to public order"***. But what about agreements to exclude the supportive role of the 
court, or to make an umeasoned award? The question is not always simple.
Adopting the concept o f party autonomy without specifying which rules are mandatory 
as in the cases o f the Model Law and the CCPL 1980, makes it difficult to assign
See A. Abd-Alftah, op. cit., pp. 241- 257.
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provisions to one classification or the other"**. It thus falls to the court and the arbitrators 
to attempt to declare into which category specific provisions fall"*^ . They have a number 
o f forms of guidance. They may ask whether the structure and the language o f the article 
indicate anything about its nature. Equally articles setting out supplementary rules, which 
apply only in the absence of the agreement o f the parties are clearly non- mandatory. Yet 
leaving such significant matters to be thus decided may lead to different interpretations, 
and such conflict can only undermine the harmony of the system. The Model Law is 
usually considered as a sound and promising basis for the harmonisation and 
improvement of national laws, but here features a practical shortcoming. Lack of clarity 
in the legislative treatment of this question may not only frustrate party autonomy, but 
may also be a source of disappointment to the users o f arbitration"*^.
An Arbitration Act should then state clearly whether each individual provision is 
mandatory or non-mandatory. It should adopt an appropriate method for articulating the 
mandatory natiue o f a provision. The adopted method may be based on the following 
practical and theoretical considerations.
Firstly, the legislation must be made more accessible to arbitration users. The Ai’bitration 
Act should use clear and simple language, indicating in relation to each individual 
provision whether the parties may derogate from it. This could be done either by listing 
all mandatory provisions in one article (as in England) or, by stating in each article 
whether and to what extent it is mandatory.
Secondly, it would be very helpful for ideal implementation of the principle of party 
autonomy to deal with mandatory provisions in a clear manner. As the paidies’ freedom 
is restricted by mandatory rules, it is better for arbitration users to Imow in advance the 
level o f the freedom they are accorded by the Ai’bitration Act. For instance, when the 
English Ai’bitration Act 1996 is the applicable law, ai’bitration users are able to agree on 
most matters with confidence that their agreement will be fully respected, as that Act 
deals with mandatory provisions in a very clear and straightforward manner. It is
Although the language of the Model makes this an easy task in most cases.
The Sweden’ view is “the question whether a provision at the model law is a mandatoiy or non- 
mandatoiy should be left to the decision o f the arbitral tribunal or court”. See A/CN.9/263, p 60.
As Gerold Herrmann states “The disappointment o f  the parties may result from provisions which unduly 
restiict their freedom, for example, to submit future disputes to arbitration or to appoint arbitrators o f  their 
choice”. See G. Herrmann, ‘The UNCITRAL Model Law -Its Background, Salient Features and 
Purposes’, op. cit., at [(1) (a) Frustration due mandatory provisions o f national law].
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inimical to this vital principle to let the parties agree upon the arbitral procedure, and 
then find their agreement is not wholly effective, especially if  this relates to a matter 
which was very important to one o f the parties, and without which he would never have 
agreed to arbitrate (or at least never have agreed to arbitrate in that country). Suppose, 
for example, that the parties have agreed that the court has no power to remove an 
arbitrator, or have provided a time limit for commencing the arbitral proceedings 
otherwise the right to arbitrate will be waived. I f  the arbitration act does not make clear 
whether provisions in this area aie mandatoiy, the parties' expectations may be 
undermined.
Thus it is recoimiiended that the Kuwaiti Act should inform arbitration users in very 
simple terms which provisions are mandatory.
2.4 Conclusion
It has been seen that the arbitration agreement should be brought under the supeiMsion 
o f the court at different stages o f the arbitral operation. The court should not provide any 
kind o f support and assistance to the arbitration agreement if  it finds that the arbitration 
agreement is invalid. Such judicial intervention may play a significant role for the 
success o f arbitration as a mean o f resolving disputes, as thwarting arbitiation which is 
not based on a valid arbitration agreement is siuely in the interests of the pai'ties. I f  a 
party knows at an early stage that the arbitration agreement which has been concluded is 
not valid, and there is no point in to continuing the proceeding, as the court will not 
recognise or enforce the arbitral award, the parties may decide whether they wish to 
litigate or conclude a new and valid agreement to arbitrate, saving them time and money. 
Of course, these advantages do not accrue if  the invalidity o f an agreement should arise 
at a very late stage in the proceedings. Yet, following the basic principle that there is no 
arbitration if  there is no valid agreement, it is still in the interests of the parties for the 
court to strike down an awai'd based on an invalid agreement.
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3. Judicial Supervision over the Arbitral Tribunal / Arbitrator’s 
Conduct
3.1 Introduction
As was seen in chapter Tliree, when the policy o f the state is to support arbitration, the 
court may play a significant role in supporting and assisting the arbitral tribunal, with a 
view to ensuring the effectiveness o f the process. The supportive role o f the court also 
reflects the principle of party autonomy. As the parties have agreed on arbitration to 
settle their disputes, the court should respect their desire, and it is a logical consequence 
o f the principle o f party autonomy that the arbitral tribunal shall receive support from the 
court, to enable it to perform its functions properly.
The arbitral tribunal obviously has a significant role in the arbitral process, as it is in 
charge o f the conduct of the arbitral proceedings and its mandate is to resolve the dispute 
by issuing an arbitral award. Its task is to resolve the disputes referred to it, on the basis 
of evidence and submissions, according to the law chosen by the arbitrating parties"*"*. 
The Arbitration Act should provide a supportive framework to enable the arbitral 
tribunal to carry out its duties. At the same time, the court should exercise supervision 
over the conduct of the arbitral tribunal, in order to ensure that the tribunal has fulfilled 
its duties. The arbitral tribunal cannot be immune from judicial supervision, whether 
during the arbitral proceedings or after the making of the arbitral award. The rationale 
behind allowing such judicial supervision is to guar antee the integrity and fairness o f the 
arbitral process, to ensure that the arbitral tribunal posses the agreed qualifications, and 
that its conduct accords with the will o f the pai'ties, mandatory statutory provisions and 
public policy.
The concept of party autonomy does not exclude the supervisory role o f the court as 
described above, but it could be an ambition of the principle o f pai-ty autonomy to define 
the proper limits of judicial intervention in the arbitral process. In some systems the aim 
of limiting court intervention has contributed to the articulating the duties of the ar bitral 
tribunal, so that judicial intervention is kept to the absolute minimum necessary to ensure 
that the arbitral tribunal fulfils its duties.
Russell, op. cit., para, 4-002.
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Thus, tliis section will focus on the role o f the court in ensuring the proper and efficient 
conduct o f the arbitral proceedings. The aim is to explore the nature o f the relationship 
between the supervisory role o f the national court and the arbitral tribunal’s conduct of 
the arbitral proceedings, with a view to seeing how the court should deal with the 
tribunal’s failure to comply with its duties. It is important to deal with this question, 
since the arbitral tribunal’s breach of its duties is one o f the limited grounds upon which 
an arbitral award or tribunal by itself could be challenged, perhaps leading to the removal 
of an arbitrator or the setting aside of the award.
3.2 A Fair Trial
(a) Introduction
As the arbitral tribunal is acting judicially, in the sense o f being responsible to deliver 
justice, it is one of its duties to act fairly and equally, giving each party an opportunity 
not only to present his own case, but also to be aware of his opponent’s case and able to 
rebut it. Furthermore, the ar'bitrating parties should be treated alike"* .^ Thus, the arbitral 
tr ibunal should approach its task to achieve the object of arbitration as a fair resolution of 
disputes and deal with its task to do frill justice to the parties"* .^
(b) Codifying this Duty
Modern legislation tends to confirm positively the fundamental principles mentioned 
above. For instance, Article 18 of the Model Law states, “The parties shall be treated 
with equality and each party shall be given a full opportunity of presenting his case” . 
While s.33(l)(a) o f the English Arbitration provides “The tribunal shall act fairly and 
impartially as between the parties, giving each party a reasonable opportunity of putting 
his case and dealing with that of his opponent”.
In contrast, the CCPL 1980 does not explicitly impose such duties. However, the source 
of these duties may be found in the general rules which requires that the arbitral tribunal 
to comply with public order. Fair trials and equal treatment have always been regarded as 
a part o f the public order of the legal system in Kuwait. Thus, arbitral tribunals must
See Mustill & Boyd, op. cit., p 299. 
DAC 1996 Report, para 150.
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respect fimdamental principles o f litigation such as equal treatment between the parties 
and the right to defend oneself and present one’s case"* .^
The difference in these approaches may offer Kuwait a lesson. Codifying these duties 
establishes clear parameters within which the arbitral tribunal should act in order to be 
seen to be doing justice as between the arbitrating parties"*^. Moreover, it might be useful 
to impose these duties not only on the arbitral tribunal, but also on the parties, so that 
these two fundamental principles apply equally to procedures agreed by the parties. They 
must design the arbitral proceedings to ensure a fair trial. However, it is the duty o f the 
arbitral tribunal to create a fair trial even if  that means conducting the arbitral 
proceedings contrary to the agreement of the parties, since the duty to ensure a fair trial 
must be mandatory. In the context o f the Model Law, Prof. F. Davidson states,
“ The arbitral tribunal should decline to follow any such rules which 
offend against the principle. Its award would not be challengeable 
under Article 34(2)(a)(iv) on the basis that the procedure was not in 
accordance with the agreement o f the parties, as any agreement wliich 
conflicts with mandatory provision of the Model Law is effectively 
void” ’^ .
Furthermore, the duty to act fairly and treat each party with equality obviously restricts 
the power o f the arbitral tribunal to conduct the arbitral proceedings as it considers fit. 
These principles provide general guidance for the arbitral tribunal in its conduct o f the 
arbitral proceedings. For instance, when it wants to fix time limits for submission of 
statements, or presentation o f evidence, or choosing the operative language, it should not 
ask more from a party than might be reasonably expected under the circumstances^**.
Although the codification o f the principles of fairness and equality is only one sentence 
long, it would be at the heart o f the law’s regulation o f arbitral proceedings- even though 
other provisions provide the detailed mechanisms by which the goals o f equality and fair
This is the same as the French approach, which provided in Art. 1460 (2). This article indicates to the 
fact that the guiding principles o f  litigation shall always be applicable to arbitral proceedings. The view  
was that there is no difference in principle between the arbitial justice and litigious justice. See, Prof. A. 
Abd-Alftah, op. cit., p 259.
See, B. Harris et at., op. cit., p 169.
Arbitration, op. cit., para 13.36.
A/CN.9/264, para 9.
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procedure are to be accomplished^*. Prof. F. Davidson describes Article 18 of the Model 
Law as the shortest article in the Model Law, but one of the most significant^^. It may be 
noted that the Arbitration Act 1996 does not adopt the precise words o f Article 18. 
Rather it imposes a general obligation on the arbitral tribunal to act fairly and impartially 
as between the arbitrating parties, requiring the tribunal to offer each party a ‘reasonable 
opportunity’ (as opposed to ‘full opportunity’ in Model law) to put forwai'd his case and 
to deal with that o f his opponent. This wording was adopted in order to rebut any 
suggestion that a party to the arbitration is entitled to take as long as he likes to put 
forward his case or defence. The DAC stated,
“we prefer the word ‘reasonable’ because it removes arry suggestion 
that a party is entitled to take as long as he likes, however objectively 
unreasonable this may be. We are sure that this was not intended by 
those who framed the Model Law, for it would be entail that a party is 
entitled to an umeasonable time, which justice can hardly require.
Indeed the contrary is the case, for an reasonable time would ex 
hypothesi mean uiuiecessary delay and expense, tilings which produce 
injustice and which accordingly would offend the first principle o f 
Clause 1, as well clause 33 and 40”^^ .
Reference to a ‘reasonable opportunity’ sets a practical standard, while reference to a 
‘full opportunity’ invites difficulties, by giving a party too much freedom to present his 
case, creating the potential for improper delay in the progress of the arbitration and an 
imjustified increase in expense. One of the parties might rely on the term ‘full’ to 
prolong the proceedings or to make uiuiecessary submissions, simply as delaying tactics. 
For such reasons, suggestions emerged during the drafting of the Model Law to replace 
the term ‘full’. For instance, Norway proposed to replace the word ‘full’ by another 
word, for example, ‘adequate’ "^*. Obviously, this view did not prevail^
Holtzmann & Neuhaus, op. cit., p 550.
Prof F. Davidson, International Commercial Arbitration, op. cit., para 6.1, at p 94.
DAC 1996 Report, para 165.
A/CN.9/263, para 7. It may be noted that by contrast there were some fears toward that it might be 
interpreted to allow a party too little scope to present his case. Such fear was expressed by International 
Bar Association which suggested inserting the words ‘and proper’ after ‘full’, as “in the English language, 
the word “full” is rarely used on its own in this sense and the words “full and proper” constitute an 
idiomatic expression which would be well understood in the context and would be capable o f reasonably 
precise definition. By contrast, the word “full” is relatively imprecise on its own, and might be capable of 
being interpreted in an unduly restrictive sense”. [Emphasis added] See A/CN.9/263, para 8.
This o f course does not obligate the national legislator, which considers adopting the Model Law to 
rethink about this term to find out the most appropriate phrase, as it considers fit and proper.
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On the other hand, the term a ‘reasonable opportunity’ requires merely an acceptable 
standard that could be achieved without any improper delay and costs that might 
undermine the benefit of arbitrating. It is easy to agree on what constitutes a ‘reasonable 
opportunity’; while it is doubtful whether general agreement could be reached on what 
constitutes a ‘full opportunity’. Moreover, the former plirase might encourage the parties 
to present their cases expeditiously, not prolonging the arbitral proceedings 
umiecessarily, as the term ‘reasonable opportunity’ does not require the tribunal to 
respond positively each time a party applies for extra time lodge his evidence, or secure 
the attendance of witnesses, or submit statements. Use of the term ‘reasonable 
opportunity’ strikes a proper balance between fairness and expedition/economy^^.
The conclusion then is that the fundamental principles discussed above are to be found to 
any developed arbitration legislation. While these principles are implicit in the Kuwaiti 
arbitration system, they are not clearly expressed as in the Model Law and 1996 Act, It 
is therefore recommended that the new Arbitration Act explicitly obliges the arbitral 
tribunal to treat the parties with equality and give them at any stage of the arbitral 
proceedings a reasonable opportunity o f presenting their case.
(c) Failure to Comply with this Duty
The duty to act fairly and equally as between the parties requires the arbitral tribunal to 
give each party a fair opportunity to lay his arguments to the tribunal, furnish evidence in 
support of his case, and address all submissions and evidence presented by the other 
party. M ost arbitration legislation would see failure to comply with this duty as a valid 
ground for challenging the aibitral award. This is certainly so under s.68(2)(a) of the 
Arbitration Act 1996, while Article 34(2)(a)(iv) o f the Model Law provides that the 
arbitral tribunal’s failure to comply with the principles o f fairness and equality 
constitutes a valid ground for setting aside the arbitral award. A party could also rely on 
Article 34(2)(a)(ii), which provides the ground o f challenge that
“the pai'ty making the application was not given proper notice of the 
appointment o f an arbitrator or o f the arbitral proceedings or was 
otherwise unable to present his case”^^ .
See B. Harris et a t,  op. cit., para [33D] at p 170.
A /40/17, para. 302. See also, Prof F. Davidon, Arbitration, op. cit., para 18.26, at 368.
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(d) Conclusion
It can be seen that the arbitral tribunal is required to comply with the duty o f ensuring a 
fair trial in conducting the arbitral proceedings and in the exercise o f any powers 
conferred on it^ .^ Where the tribunal fails in that duty, justice calls out to the court to 
intervene to correct such procedural failing. The court should protect the injured party, 
and not allow an arbitral award to be enforced when there has been an unfair trial. This 
shows the value of judicial supervision in ensuring that arbitration obtains a fair 
resolution o f disputes, as the supervisory role o f the court provides a very important 
safeguard for the parties.
3.3 Grounds of Challenging Arbitrators
(a) Introduction
One o f the main ways in which the court may become involved in arbitration is to deal 
with challenges to the arbitrators. Normally an arbitral tribunal has authority from the 
time o f its appointment imtil it is functus officio. It is possible, however, that an arbitrator 
may be removed by the court, as most arbitration legislation allows a pai'ty to the arbitral 
proceedings to resort to the court to seek the removal of an arbitrator in certain 
circumstances. The next paragraphs ask what the statutory tests for challenging an 
arbitrator should be, and what limitation should be on court intervention in this context.
(b) The Statutory Tests for Challenging an Arbitrator
1) Qualifications
One of these grounds might be the absence o f required qualification. In certain cases, the 
parties may agree that the arbitrator should possess certain qualifications, perhaps that he 
should be a lawyer, or commercial man, or engineer, etc. Such an agreement may 
obviously limit the freedom of the party to choose an aibitrator. Modern arbitration 
legislation provides that an arbitrator who lacks agreed qualifications may be challenged 
and removed. This is certainly the case under Ai'ticle 12(2) o f the Model Law and 
s.24(l)(b) o f the Arbitration Act 1996. Sadly, such clarity cannot be found in the CCPL 
1980. It is important for the new Kuwaiti Arbitration Act to deal with this matter clearly, 
as if  it adopts the principle that no court shall intervene except where so provided by the
See Russell, op. cit., para 8-036, at p 417.
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Act, the extent of permissible court intervention must be explicitly laid out. So modern 
ai'bitration legislation explieitly provides the grounds and the procedures for challenging 
an arbitrator, to prevent court intervention on a more general basis. The court must be 
confined to deciding whether the challenged arbitrator possesses the agreed qualification 
or not. It should be open to the parties to agree on the procedure for triggering court 
involvement, with the Arbitration Act laying down supplementary provisions which 
apply in the absence o f agreement^**. The supervisory role in this context shows that the 
court safeguards not only public policy but also party autonomy, as judicial intervention 
here ensures that the constitution of the arbitral tribunal is as the parties agreed.
2) Impartiality / and Independence
Rosell stated at the Tenth Zagreb Arbitration Conference****
“one of main reasons that parties engaged in international commerce 
choose to resolve their potential or existing disputes by recourse to 
international arbitration, rather than the national courts o f one of the 
parties, is the perceived independence, impailiality and neutrality of 
arbitral tribunals. It is often said that an arbitration is only as good as 
the arbitrators conducting it, and it is fundamental that an arbitrator 
must be independent and impartial”.
Impartiality or/and independence*** are also criteria that an arbitrator should meet, or 
otherwise be subject to challenge and removal, as an arbitrator should not be biased in 
favour o f or against a particular party or its case. There are some arbitration systems, 
which adopt these two tests^^. Thus Article 12 of Model Law states, “An arbitrator may 
be challenged only if  circumstances exist that give rise to justifiable doubts as to his 
impartiality or independence”.
Sec. 24 (2), and Art. 12 o f the Arbitration Act 1996.
J. Rosel, ‘The Challenge o f Arbitrator’, paper presented in Tentli Zagrep Arbitration Conference, in 5 
Dec 2002, 1-8, at p 1.
It may be noted that there is no internationally accepted, clear-cut definition o f  the “impartiality” and 
“independence”. Since, the arbitral systems do not provide a statutory definition to the concept of 
impartiality or independence, which justify disqualify an arbitrator. It was however submitted that the an 
impartial arbitrator is one who is not biased in favour of, or prejudice against, a particular party or its case, 
and the independent arbitrator is one who has a close relationship -  financial, professional or personal- 
with a party or its counsel. See D. Bishop & L. Reed, op. cit., at p 398, Redfern & Hunter, op. cit., at pp. 
220-221 and J. Rosel, op. cit, 2.
Art. 7.1 o f  The AAA International Arbitration Rules states these two tests. It provides “Arbitrators 
acting under these rules shall be impartial and independent”. Another example is WIPO Arbiti ation Rules, 
which provides in Art. 22 (a) “Each arbitrator shall be impartial and independent”.
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On the other hand, other systems do not lay down this dual test. Thus s.24 o f the 
Arbitration Act 1996 demands only impartiality. The English approach is based on that 
the view that the inclusion o f the test of independence would give rise to endless 
argument where almost any connection- even if  remote- put forward to challenge the 
independence of an arbitrator^^. The DAC,
“considered however that a separate requirement of independence 
could give rise to endless arguments on the scope o f dependence and 
consequently of disclosure as to independence (as it has in other 
jurisdictions); and that it could frustrate also the legitimate 
expectations o f arbitration users in small, specialist fields where the 
arbitrators are commercial men in regular business contact with users 
o f those arbitrations (e.g., certain shipping, cormnodity trades and 
specialist classes of reinsurance)”.
The drafters of the 1996 Act thus emphasised that lack o f independence, unless it gives 
rise to justifiable doubts about the impartiality o f the arbitrator, is o f no significance. So, 
the concept o f independence is subsumed as a subset of the test of impartiality^"*. It is 
submitted that the English approach is consistent with practical reality, wherein parties 
may waive a strict interpretation o f independence, but may not waive the fimdamental 
requirement o f impartiality**^. So an arbitrator who is impartial but not wholly 
independent, may be not challenged and removed, whereas an arbitrator who is 
independent but is not impartial may be challenged and removed.
Other arbitration systems do not provide a general formula, but specify in detail the 
grounds for challenge, by reference to the grounds on which judges may be challenged. 
Thus in both Kuwait and France** ,^ an arbitrator may be challenged on the same grounds 
as a judge^**. There is a long list of such grounds, which might be summarised as family 
or financial relations with one o f the parties, a special interest in the outcome o f the 
dispute, the existence of current or past litigation with one o f the parties, and friendship
See DAC 1996 Report, para 102.
See D. Bishop and L. Reed, op. cit., pp. 399-400. 
See Redfern & Hunter, op. cit., p 221.
See Law No. 72.626 o f  July 5, 1972.
67 Art. 178 (4) o f CCPL 1980.
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with one of the parties. All these grounds could also be raised with regard to the 
arbitrator’s spouse.**^
Yet the list is not exclusive, as may be deduced from Article 104(5), which allows a 
judge or arbitrator to be challenged, if  there is between him and a party such an enmity 
or friendship, as would make it impossible for him to judge the case impartially.
The question o f challenging an arbitrator is obviously subject to judicial supervision, as 
it must be for the court to decide whether the challenged arbitrator is impartial or 
independent. In this it will have a wide discretion, as arbitration legislation does not 
usually provide a statutory definition o f those concepts.
However, the real question is how should the legislation deal with the concepts of 
impartiality and independence? It is suggested that lack of impartiality and lack o f 
independence should each be a ground for removal. Wliile one may be impartial even if 
not independent, lack o f independence itself may raise a question mark over an 
arbitrator, making one of the parties justifiably reluctant to participate in the arbitral 
process. Such reluctance could significantly affect his confidence in the aibitral process, 
while a party who has lost his trust and confidence in either the impartiality or 
independence of the arbitrator would probably not participate in a positive manner in the 
arbitral proceedings, with the risk that they might be rendered ineffective. Moreover, 
there seems no point in allowing a non-independent arbitrator to hear the dispute, and 
waiting until the question o f independence gave rise to justifiable doubts about his 
impartiality. Prevention is surely better than cure. Both lack o f impartiality and lack of 
independence may give rise to justifiable doubts about the fair resolution o f the dispute. 
So, retaining both as separate grounds for removal eliminates any possible doubts about 
fair resolution, helping the parties to participate effectively in the arbitral proceedings 
and to accept the arbitral award. The judicial function of the arbitrator argues for this 
approach^^. An arbitrator is involved in the administration o f justice, being selected to act 
in a quasi-judicial capacity in place o f the court. Thus, he arbitrator should ordinarily be 
impartial and non-partisan, so as to render exact justice to the parties*'**. He should not be
It is identical to the French law. See Y. Derains, op. cit., at p. 10.
See G. Eastwood, ‘A Real Danger o f  Confusion? The English Law Relating to Bias in Arbitrators’ 
(2001) 17(3) Arb. Int. 287-312.
It seems that public policy requires that the arbitrator not only be completely impartial but also that he has no 
connection with the parties or the dispute involved, which might give the appearance of their being otherwise. See, J. 
Gillis Wetter, the International Arbitral Process, published by Ocean Publication, 1979, Vol. III., at p 410.
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biased in favour o f or prejudiced against, particular party or its case. Accordingly, the 
new Arbitration Act should recognise these concepts, as the fundamental requirements 
required o f in an aibitrator''*, in line with mainstream international commercial 
arbitration*'^.
3) Effective Arbitrator
An effective arbitrator is the key to the door of good arbitration^^, and it is the duty o f an 
arbitrator to conduct the arbitral proceedings effectively. This duty implies various 
obligations that an arbitrator must comply with or else open himself to challenge and 
removal. In such cases the court will take into account all aspects o f the arbitrator's 
conduct, and all events surrounding the alleged breach o f his duty to be active in the 
conducting the arbitral proceedings. The court aims to ensui'e that the arbitration is 
properly and expeditiously conducted by a suitable arbitrator, with appropriate physical 
and mental abilities.
i. Arbitrator’s Ability
An arbitrator should be physically and mentally capable o f M filling his role as an 
arbitrator, and lack of such capacity must be a potential ground o f challenge, as it is hard 
to see a how an arbitration can be conducted properly (or at all) by a person, who is 
physically or mentally incapable^"*.
ii. Arbitrator’s Performance
An arbitrator should be challengeable where he fails to act p o s i t i v e l y T h i s  covers not 
only the case where he refuses to act, (e.g. refusing to conduct the arbitral proceedings or
Adopting these concepts would be more practical than providing an open list. So the court would ensure 
that the arbitrator is impartial and independence.
See Redfern & Hunter, op. cit., para 4.47 at p 210 and G. Eastwood, op. cit., at p 293.
D. Hacking, ‘The Effective Arbitrator’, op. cit., 237.
The question o f  the incapacity o f an arbitrator could be in some cases clear such as a physical handicap. 
However this is not always the case. Since there could only be there some doubt about his incapacity or the 
deficiency does affect his capacity to conduct the arbitral proceeding. In such clear case, the challenging 
party should satisfy the state court o f the matter o f  the incapacity o f  an arbitrator to act. See Russell, op. 
cit., para 7-70.
See Art. 14(1) o f the Model Law and Sec.24 (d) o f Arbitration Act 1996. These sections entail that the 
arbitrator has to conduct the arbitral proceedings with reasonable speed and with due diligence to act 
without undue delay. Redfern & Hunter, op. cit., para 5-19 at pp. 256-275. The arbitrator’s conduct should 
meet not only the parties’ expectations, but also the objects o f arbitration. The arbitrator’s performance is a
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to make the award*'^), but also where he takes part in the proceedings but fails to conduct 
them properly. A good example o f the latter category can be found in Wicketts and 
Sterndale v Brine Builders^^. There the arbitrator issued directions, which indicated that 
he had an inadequate comprehension o f his role, since one of his directions inhibited a
settlement o f the case, wliile another would cause a party substantial expense and might
tlneaten its continuing participation in the ai'bitration. Seymour J decided that these 
directions were enough to justify an order removing this arbitrator who would otherwise 
"'continue to demonstrate that wholly inadequate grasp o f  the nature o f  his functions and 
powers"''^^.
So, when an arbitrator’s conduct o f the arbitral proceedings would frustrate the object o f 
arbitration, the court should be able to remove that arbitrator. One o f the justifications of 
such judicial involvement is to ensure that the arbitrator must have and retain the 
confidence o f the parties and get the best out o f the arbitral process'^**. Furthermore, 
making the arbitral process effective is not only a duty of an arbitrator but also duty of 
the coiirt^**, as long as the court is not permitted to substitute its own view as to how the 
arbitral proceedings should be conducted. As the DAC notes,
“The choice by an arbitrator o f a particular procedure, unless it 
breaches the duty laid on arbitrators by Clause 33, should on no view 
justify the removal of an arbitrator, even if  the court would not itself 
have adopted that procedure. In short, this gromid only exists to 
cover...where an arbitrator so conducts the proceedings that it can 
fairly be said that instead of carrying tlirough the object of arbitration 
as stated in the Bill, he is in effect frustrating that object. Only if  the
court confines itself in this way can this power o f removal be justified
as a measure supporting rather than subverting the arbitral process” *^.
significant element for the success o f  arbitration. It is often submitted that the quality o f arbitration stands 
and falls with the quality o f arbitrators. See P. Sanders, Int'l Enzycl.Comp.L., op. cit., para 141 at p 87.
See Russell, para 7-072.
Wicketts V Brine Builders (Unrepoited, June 8, 2001) (QBD (T&CC)). See, Arbitration Law Monthly, 
(March 2002) 2 (3) 1-6.
Ibid. , p 4.
D. Hacking, op. cit., p40.
This is due to the fact that the modern function o f  the court is to ensure the effectiveness and sufficiency 
o f  arbitration. Such an approach enliances the success o f the arbitral system. It was submitted that the 
better the arbitration process works, the better would be businessmen who have to resort to it. D. Hacking, 
op. cit., p 40.
DAC 1996 Report, para 106.
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Another aspect o f the failure to act positively is where the arbitral proceedings are not 
conducted with reasonable despatch or an award is not made within a reasonable time. In 
such event, an ai'bitrator fails to fulfil his duty to perform his function without undue 
delay^ .^
Judicial supervision thus aims to prevent unsuitable or dilatory arbitrators from 
continuing in charge of the arbitral process. So, when the court is satisfied that the 
challenged arbitrator is imable to act, or that his conduct is improper, has caused 
substantial injustice to the parties, or has led to serious and inexcusable delay, it may 
remove such arbitrator. In other words, the purpose o f the supervisory role of the court 
is to ensure that the arbitrator does not frustrate the object o f arbitration as a method o f 
settling disputes. It would be wi'ong to allow such an unsuitable or dilatory arbitrator to 
remain in charge of the arbitral proceedings, as this is inimical to the general objects o f 
arbitration and the interests o f the arbitrating parties. The drafters of the Model Law 
noted,
“arbitral proceedings should be carried out with speed and efficiency.
That was precisely why the parties had resorted to arbitral procedure.
Undue delay through prevarication on the part of one of the arbitrators 
could well be grounds for recourse by the other party and an 
application for challenge o f the arbitrator”^^ .
Therefore, it should be possible to have recourse to the court to ensure that an able 
arbitrator conducts the aibitral proceedings with due speed and efficiency. The fact that 
an arbitrator cannot or does not act as might reasonably be expected, should give the 
parties the right to ask the court to remove the arbitrator. Such an application should 
allow the couit to review the entire proceedings. When it exercises its supervisory role it 
has to consider a variety of factors pertaining to the operation of the arbitration, e.g. the 
nature o f the dispute, the nature o f procedural instructions and, the character of the
An arbitrator who fails to proceed with reasonable speed in conducting the arbitral proceedings may be 
challenged. Since, an arbitiator has a duty to act with due diligence. This is not only an obvious moral 
obligation, but also a legal obligation. Since many arbitral systems have this approach. See sec. 24(1 )(d); 
sec.33 (l)(b ) o f  the Arbitration Act 1996, Art. 14 o f Model Law, A/CN.9/SR.414 at para 57 and Redfera & 
Hunter, op. cit., para 5-19 at p 256 
A/CN.9/SR 314, para 52.
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challenged arbitrator. The drafters o f the Model Law saw the following considerations 
as potentially relevant, in the Seventh Secretariat Note^"*:
i. What action was expected or required o f an arbitrator in light o f the arbitration 
agreement and the specific procedural situation? Has the challenged arbitrator done 
anything in this regai'd?
ii. Has the delay been so inordinate as to be unacceptable in the light o f the 
circumstances, including the teclmical difficulties and complexity o f the case?
in. If  the challenged arbitrator has done something and acted in a certain way, did his 
conduct fall clearly below the standard o f what may reasonably be expected from an 
arbitrator?
iv. Amongst the factors influencing the level of expectations are the ability to 
function efficiently and expeditiously and any special competence or other qualifications 
required o f the arbitrator by an agreement o f the parties.
The court may ask the arbitrator to clarify his performance before deciding on the 
challenge. It has been said that,
“from a practical point o f view however the court will consider the 
arbitrator’s view on the matter, because if  he was of the view that he 
had refused to act, and maintained Ids refusal, then the court would 
take into account that he could not be forced to continue with 
arbitration against his will”^^ .
It is also a matter o f justice to give the challenged arbitrator an opportunity to defend 
him self and his conduct. Thus the fraiuers o f the English Arbitration Act 1996 
emphasises that the arbitrator’s right to appeal’ and be heard in any application for his 
removal, is a matter o f simple justice^^. So s.24(5) confers that right. No such provision 
appears in the Model Law nor CCPL 1980. However, one may say that arbitrator has an 
implied right to appear, as there are no provisions prevent an arbitrator participating, 
upon his application, in an application for his removal.
A/CN.9/264, para 4.
Russell, op. cit., para 7-072. 
DAC 1996 Report, para 109.
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Another factor the court has to consider is the role o f the arbitrating parties in the arbitral 
proceedings. So, when the court finds that the reason for delay is, e.g. the behaviour o f 
the parties, it should reject the challenge. Thus, the failure of the challenging party to do 
all things necessary for the proper and expeditious conduct o f the arbitral proceedings, 
such as complying without delay with the arbitrator’s orders or directions, means that the 
arbitrator cannot be blamed for any delay.
(c) Limitation on the Court Intervention
1) Court’s Considerations
As aforementioned, an arbitrator or his conduct may be challenged before the court by a 
party. The court shall consider a wide range issues before judging whether the aibitrator 
has failed to act or cannot act. It must be made clear to the court that it should not 
substitute its own view about how the proceedings should be conducted, but should 
reserve the power o f removal for those cases where, rather than fulfilling the general 
object o f arbitration, the arbitrator performs in such a way as to frustrate the arbitration^^. 
The supervisory role o f the court is thus subject to this limitation. The court should ask 
whether the arbitrator has breached the duty to conduct the arbitral proceedings properly, 
and whether such breach, if  any, justifies his removal? Is it inexcusable or umeasonable 
to extent that justice demands his removal? Have the paities suffered substantial injustice 
as a result of his conduct, or will they suffer substantial injustice if  he is not removed?
2) Question of Timing
Another important limitation is the question o f the timing o f the application for 
challenge. Under s.73(l) of the English Arbitration Act 1996, a party who desires to 
challenge an arbitrator should apply to the court as soon as he becomes aware o f the 
ground for challenge. It is in his interest to apply timeously, as he loses his right to 
challenge if  he delays. So, when the complainer, despite his awareness o f the ground o f 
challenge, participates in the arbitral proceedings without making an objection, he loses 
Ihs right to object. Failure to make timeous objection is considered as a waiver of this
Ibid., para 105 -  106.
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right, precluding a challenge at a later date^^. This limitation is clearly designed to 
prevent parties from delaying the arbitral proceedings by raising late objections.
The Arbitration Act 1996 does not specify a period of time, but merely requires that any 
ehallenge to the arbitrator must be made promptly. This gives the court discretion to 
intervene in the arbitration, as long as it considers that a challenge is made in due time 
without such delay as to justify loss of the right to object. By contrast, in Kuwait, the 
provisions of Article 178 (4) o f CCPL. 1980 suggest that an application to challenge an 
arbitrator shall be made within 5 days from the date on which the other party had been 
informed of the appointment of the arbitrator, or the date when he became aware o f the 
cause for challenge, while Article 13 o f the Model Law provides a 15 day time limit for 
making a challenge. However, the question left umesolved by Article 13, is what is the 
legal effect of failure to comply with this time limit? Does such failure bar a party from 
raising the matter again, for instance, in setting aside proceedings? The logie of Article 
13 suggests that the answer is yes^^. It may be deduced from the philosophy of Article 13 
that a party, who does not object witliin its specified time limits has to be precluded from 
raising this objection once those limits have expired. That Article would be better 
expressed if  the following words suggested by Norway had been added,
“if a party does not raise an objection in the period o f time provided for 
in paragraph (2), he should be precluded from raising it not only during 
the arbitral proceedings but also under Articles 34 (2)(a)(iv) and 
Aiticle 36 (l)(a)(iv)”'’“.
The Arbitration Act 1996 s.73(l) clearly indicates that failure to raise the objection 
timeously prevents a party raising the objection later, either before the tribunal or the 
court”. Yet that provision permits a paity to retain his right to object, if  he can show that 
he did not know of the grounds for objection, and could not have discovered them with 
reasonable diligence. Many institutional rules are to the same effect^\ It may be added in 
Article 178 (5) o f CCPL 1980 requires that in all cases, an application to challenge an
Rustal V . G ill & Dujfus [2000] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 14
See Prof. F. Davidson, Arbitration, op. cit., p 98.
A/CN. 9/263. Para 4. Nevertheless, such effect, in some views, may not necessarily mean that a party 
would be also barred to raise the objection under Art. 34 (2)(a) or Art. 36(1) (a)(iv) alleging and proving 
“procedural injustice”. Even supposing that the injustice could arguably have been avoided by a timely 
challenge o f  one or more members o f  the arbitral tribunal. See, A. Broches, Commentary, op. cit., para 11 
at p 65.
A. Abd-Alftah, op. cit., p 223.
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arbitrator will not be admitted after rendering the award or conclusion the hearing. This 
time limit provides that a party cannot rely on the ground for challenge if  he fails to raise 
the objection during the arbitral proceedings.
3) Exhausting other Recourse
Another factor, which may limit court intervention, is that the parties have given the 
power to remove an arbitrator to an arbitral institution (e.g. ICC or LCIA) or a third 
party. In such cases, the court in certain systems would not consider removing a 
challenged arbitrator unless the applicant has first exliausted any available recourse. 
Such limitation found in Article 13(1) o f the Model Law’s recognition o f the parties’ 
freedom to agree on procedures for challenging an arbitrator. Thus, it gives full effect to 
any agreement on how challenge may be brought and decided upon^^. It noted early in 
the drafting process that the Model law shall,
“guarantee the parties’ freedom to agree on the procedure to be 
followed in case of challenge. In particulai', it should recognise any 
agreement as to the person or body called upon to decide about the 
challenge (e.g. the arbitral tribunal, the court o f arbitration, the 
Secretary or a special committee o f an ai'bitration association, or an 
appointing authority)”^^ .
Similarly s.24(2) of the English Arbitration Act 1996 provides,
“If  there is an aibitral or other institution or person vested by the 
parties with power to remove an arbitrator, the court shall not exercise 
its power of removal unless satisfied that the applicant has first 
exliausted any available recourse to that institution or person”.
The drafters of the Act made it clear that the exhaustion of any arbitral process for 
challenging an arbitrator is a pre-condition to the right to apply to the court^" .^ Therefore, 
both arbitration systems adopt a similar stance on this issue.
A/CN.9/264, para 2. This freedom is o f course limited and cannot exclude the role o f the court in this 
matter due to it has the final word in the application for challenge. This matter shall be discussed in depth 
in the coming paragraphs.
A/CN. 9/207, para 66.
See DAC 1996 Report, para 107.
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By contrast, the CCPL 1980 says nothing about any such limitation, stating only that an 
application for challenge shall be made to the court which had original jurisdiction to 
hear the dispute^^. This raises the question o f what could Kuwait learn from modern 
arbitration systems in this context? Before dealing with this question, some factors 
should first be considered.
4) Relevant Considerations
i. Groups of Challenge Grounds
It is notable that the model law distinguishes between two groups o f grounds o f 
challenge. The first, listed in Article 12, contains lack o f impaifiality and independence 
and failure to possess agreed qualifications. The second group, set forth in Article 14, 
covers failure or impossibility to act. The Model Law treats each group differently. 
Firstly it confirms the freedom of the parties to agree on the challenge procedure when 
the ground of challenge is one listed in Article 12, but says nothing similar in Aiticle 14. 
This poses the question whether the parties can agree on a challenge procedure in the 
case o f an aibitrator’s inability or failure to act. The Commission Report states,
“article 14, unlike articles 11 and 13 did not expressly give the parties 
the freedom to agree on procedure in case o f an arbitrator’s inability or 
failure to act. It was understood, however, that the provision was not 
intended to preclude parties from doing so, or from entrusting a third 
person or institution with deciding on such termination”^^ .
Secondly, in the absence o f agreed procedures for challenge, the Model Law gives the 
arbitral tribunal jurisdiction to rule on challenges made under Article 12, but not Article 
14. This is because there is a supplementary provision that applies where there is no 
agreement on challenge procedures So Aiticle 13(2) states,
“Failing such agreement, a party who intends to challenge an arbitrator 
shall, within fifteen days after becoming aware of the constitution of
This is similar to the French approach. See Y. Derains, op. cit., p 10. However, Y. Derains suggests that 
the parties are free to agree on the challenge procedures. He adds that the decision o f  the agreed authority 
may be final if  the parties agree on the matter and therefore the court does not have power to deal with 
challenge as a judicial review.
A /40/17, para 136, see also A. Broches, Commentary, p 69.
A/CN. 9/264, para 3.
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the arbitral tribunal or after becoming aware of any circumstance 
referred to in article 12(2), send a written statement of the reasons for 
the challenge to the arbitral tribunal. Unless the challenged arbitrator 
withdraws from his office or the other party agrees to the challenge, 
the arbitral tribunal shall decide on the challenge”.
Article 13(2) thus permits the arbitral tribunal to be the first resort for a party, who wants 
to initiate a challenge. This approach pushes back court involvement in the arbitral 
proceedings, by postponing the role of the court to the stage after the tribunal has 
decided upon the challenge. Therefore, the challenging party cannot immediately ask the 
court to with his application for challenge. When the challenge is not successftii, he may 
then in terms o f Article 13(3) pursue that challenge before the court. Thus the final 
decision on the challenge is that of thee court.
The aim of the Model Law’s approach in Article 13 is to, “strike a proper balance 
between the need for preventing obstruction or dilatory tactics and the desire o f avoiding 
unnecessary waste of time and money”^^ . One drafting suggestion was that an 
application for challenge should have to be brought to the court immediately after its 
denial by the arbitral tribunal or any other agreed body. The supporters o f this view 
believed that permitting the court’s involvement in the arbitral proceedings would help to 
avoid delay and controversy during the arbitral proceedings and reduce the risk o f later 
setting aside the arbitral award and, thus, o f waste o f time and resources^^. They thought 
it would not be acceptable to continue the ai'bitral proceedings without first resolving the 
question o f challenge by way o f a final decision on the matter Another suggestion 
was that the court should not be allowed to deal with a challenge application at all during 
the arbitral proceedings, but should only be involved by way o f an application to set 
aside the arbitral award. It was suggested that this would avoid opportunities for dilatory 
tactics by the parties Ultimately, a compromise solution was ad o p te d * p e im ittin g  
court intervention during the arbitral proceedings, but adding tluee features designed to 
reduce the possible risk and adverse effects o f dilatory tactics***  ^ - firstly, a short time 
period for resorting to the court, secondly, no appeal against the court’s decision, and
A/40/17, para 124.
A/CN.9/WG.II/WP 37, Art. 9 n .2 l. 
100 A/CN. 9/245, para 210.
A/CN. 9/233, para 110 and A/CN. 9/245, para 209. 
A/CN. 9/245, para 212.
A/CN. 9/264, para 6.
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thirdly, giving jurisdiction to the arbitral tribunal to continue the arbitral proceedings 
during the court proceedings.
On the other hand, when the challenge is based on the provisions o f Article 14, the 
Model Law does not suggest how a party goes about making the challenge***"*. There are 
no supplementary provisions along the lines of Article 13(2). It has been observed,
“Article 14 does not set forth any particular procedure to be followed 
by a party who believes that the arbitrator’s mandate should be 
terminated. The second sentence o f paragraph 1, however, requires that 
there be “controversy remain [ing]” in order for a party to request the 
court or designated authority to decide on the termination of the 
mandate. Therefore, a party presumably should at least send a 
statement of reasons for seeking termination to the affected aibitrator 
(so that he can withdraw), to the remaining members o f the arbitral 
tribunal, and to the other pai1y or paities (so that they can agree or 
refuse to agree to the termination)” ***^.
In fact, first draft of Article 14 contained just such a procedure stating,
“(a) Any party who wishes that, for any of these reasons, the mandate 
o f an arbitrator be terminated shall send a written statement of the 
reasons to the other party and to all arbitrators; (b) If, within [20] days 
after the notification, the other party does not agree to the termination 
o f the mandate and the arbitrator does not withdraw from his office, 
the party may request the Authority specified in article 17 [Aif.6 in the 
final text] to make a final decision thereon”****’.
This draft provision was considered as too detailed and likely to be relied merely to 
prolong the arbitral proceedings***^, so that it was abandoned***^.
It has been seen that the Model Law classifies the grounds of challenge into two groups, 
providing supplementary provisions in relation to one group, but not the other. 
Unfortunately, the drafters o f the Model Law do not explain the philosophy behind such
See, Prof F. Davidson, International Commercial Arbitration, op. cit., para 4.33, at p 78. 
Hotzmann & Neuhaus, op.cit., p. 438.
A/CN. 9/WG.II/WP.37, Art 11 [Art. 14 in the final text].
A/CN. 9/232, para 67.
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treatment. It might be because asking an inactive arbitrator to rule on a challenge might 
not be appropriate where it has become impossible for him to act, e.g. where he is very 
ill. However, it would better if  the drafters had explained their thinking. Thus the English 
approach to this issue is preferable, as it is comprehensive***^. It is therefore 
recommended.
ii. Who May Decide on the Challenge?
The English Act lists all gromids of challenge in one section, and deals with them all in 
the same way. This makes the procedures easy and simple. The Act also confirms the 
freedom of the parties to agree on the procedure for challenge, including the body, which 
shall decide on the challenge, but it does not contain any supplementary provision about 
the challenge procedures. It was thought
"to introduce a formal procedure for challenging the arbitrator would 
be an open invitation to delaying tactics by the respondent, o f a kind 
which English arbitration has so far succeeded in avoiding”****.
Similarly, Kuwait has no supplementary provisions regaining challenge procedures. Like 
England, in the absence of contrary agreement, the court will decide on the challenge.
On the other hand, one o f the important questions for the drafters o f the Model Law was 
whether it should feature supplementary provisions for those cases where parties did not 
regulate the issue o f challenge procedures***. Divergent views were expressed**^. One 
was that it was not in accordance with the purpose o f the Model Law to include detailed 
provisions on such a procedural question, while another was that it would be helpful if  
the Model Law laid down a mechanism for challenge, in order to avoid protracted 
controversy and delay in the arbitral proceedings. At any rate, the conclusion was that it 
might be appropriate to set forth supplementary rules to govern this matter in the absence 
of the agreement by the parties.
See Prof. F. Davidson, International Commercial Arbitration, op. cit., para 4.33, p 76.
Redfern & Hunter, op. cit., para 4-61, p 219.
See DAC on Arbitration Law- a Report on the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Arbitration 
Law-, p 24.
‘ A/CN. 9/207, para 66, and see A/CN. 9/WG.IÏ/WP.35, [Q 3-5].
A/CN. 9/216, para 45.
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Having supplementary provisions is recommended**^. However, giving the aihitrai 
tribunal statutory jurisdiction to rule on the application for challenge might be criticised. 
If  the parties have expressly empowered the arbitral tribunal, such jurisdiction could be 
justified on the basis of party autonomy. On the other hand, giving the arbitral tribunal 
this power in the absence o f the agreement by the parties might be inadvisable. One o f 
the possible grounds of criticism is practical. From a practical angle, the body which will 
decide on the challenge application is itself the subject of the challenge, as the arbitral 
tribunal, including the challenged arbitrator, who may indeed be the sole arbitrator, will 
judge the challenge. This means that the object o f the challenge is also its judge. Another 
practical issue is that the challenged arbitrator may be considered as the respondent in 
the challenge. So, how might he exercise his right to put his case? It is difficult to see 
him trying to put his case, and at the same time deciding on the challenge, performing 
two different roles simultaneously, as an arbitrator and a respondent. How could a sole 
arbitrator be both arbitrator and respondent? Does he have to leave the bench, and go to 
the defence bar to present his case? Wlro will hear his argument? Or, if  there are tlrree 
members in the tribunal, can two members hear the challenged arbitrator when he is 
putting his argument, or will he listen to his argument as a member o f the tribunal?
It seems also that giving the arbitral tribunal this statutory power to decide on challenges 
could significantly impact on the question of the confidence of the challenging party in 
the challenged arbitrator. Such confidence is, of course, a vital element in the success o f 
arbitration, and it could be affected when an arbitrator is allowed to be a judge in his own 
cause. Another possible ground for criticising the approach of the Model Law is that it 
may cause delay in the progress of the ai'bitration. This is because the arbitral tribunal 
has to consider and decide on the application for challenge, thus obliging it to spend 
some time on the challenge. Even though the application need not stay the arbitral 
proceedings, the time spent on considering the application will cause delay. The tribunal 
should spend such time making a final decision on the main subject matter of the dispute, 
and arbitration legislation should insist that it does so, rather than considering another 
issue, which could be resolved by the court, without distiu'bing the conduct of the arbitral 
proceedings.
See pp. 94-97 supra.
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Moreover, there is no time limit within which the arbitral tribunal has to make its 
decision on the challenge. It is under no obligation to deal with the challenge in a speedy 
and efficient manner. Nonetheless, the challenging party could challenge a dilatory 
arbitrator in this context on the ground of failing to act without undue delay, in terms of 
in Aiticle 14. Such an approach could make the ai'bitration more complex and cause yet 
more delay and costs. Suppose for instance, a party challenges a sole arbitrator on the 
ground o f lack o f impartiality. In terms o f Article 14(2), he must, within 15 days of 
becoming aware of those grounds, send a written statement o f the reasons for challenge 
to the arbitral tribiraal. The tribunal continue the arbitral proceedings, but delays making 
a decision on the challenge. The challenging party then becomes aware o f this failure to 
act. He could then challenge the arbitrator under Article 14. In this second challenge, he 
is able to resort to the court for a decision. Such a scenario illustrates the implications of 
the Model Law’s approach, and calls into question the wisdom o f that approach**"*. Wliat 
is the pliilosophy behind according jurisdiction to the arbitral tribunal to rule on 
challenges?
Some justifications for this approach may be found. One is that the provisions o f Article 
13(2) operate only in case o f the absence of the agreement o f the parties as regards 
challenge procedures. Their failure to agree on this matter impliedly empowers the 
arbitral tribimal to decide on the challenge. Another possible reason giving the tribunal 
this jurisdiction is that it reflects the principle o f the limited court intervention. Article 5 
o f the Model Law articulates the policy o f limiting court involvement in arbitration. One 
o f the results o f this policy is the power of the arbitral tribunal to rule on its jurisdiction 
(competence-competence), which has been respected and welcomed across the world. It 
might be said that giving the arbitral tribunal the power to rule on the challenge is 
another result o f the aim to limit the court intervention. By suggesting that a challenging 
party may not have recourse to the court as a first resort, but instead directing him to the 
arbitral tribunal, judicial intervention may be avoided.
Moreover, it might be argued that there should be no fear in allowing the arbitral tribunal 
itself to decide on the challenge, as its decision is subject to judicial review. Thus, the
Its treatment to this vital matter has been examined by number o f legislation authorities o f the States, 
which consider adopting the model law. For mstance, Tunisia, when adopted the Model Law, did not 
prefer to follow wholly the treatment o f the Model Law. It does not give a statutory jurisdiction to the 
arbitial tribunal to decide on the challenge. See Art. 58. O f the Tunisia Arbitration Code 1993.
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possible dangers of such an approach are rendered illusory in light of the safeguards 
provided by the supervisory role of the court. Moreover, the challenged arbitrator might 
not be seen as a party to the challenge, as the challenging party may discuss the matter 
with the other party, and if  they agree, this will be the end of the challenge. If, they fail to 
reach agreement, this will mean there is a dispute between the parties on the matter 
whether the challenged arbitrator should be removed or not. In this case, the arbitral 
tribunal may consider the challenge and decide on it. It would be like a judge ruling on a 
challenge to his impartiality. He does not appear as a party, does not put his case, but 
simply assesses the arguments put by the challenging party.
In conclusion, it would appear that it is desirable, when the law allows the parties to 
agree on the challenge procedure, to set out provisions, which apply if  there is no 
agreement. Such supplementary provisions help fill the gaps in the arbitration agreement, 
and should be designed to serve the general principles o f the Arbitration Act 
(particularly, the principle o f limited court intervention) and the interests of the parties.
iii. Appeal to Court Against the Challenge Decision
The right to resort to the court to review the decision o f the tribimal (or any other body) 
on the challenge is guaranteed imder the Model Law**^. The last word on the challenge 
must be the court’s, as judicial supervision over challenges ensures the fairness and 
integrity o f the challenge process. The Arbitration Act 1996 takes the same line in the 
mandatory provisions of s.24. So, the decision o f the tribunal regarding a challenge must 
always be subject to judicial review. But can there be an appeal against the court’s 
decision? The provisions of Articles 13(3) and 14(1) clearly indicate that the decision of 
the court is not subject to appeal "whether to a higher court or some person or institution 
nominated in the agreement between the parties”***’. Yet under s.24 the court’s decision 
might be appealed. In fairness, this should not directly affect the progress of the arbitral 
proceedings, as they may continue in the meantime. However, the fact that the process is 
under threat from the decision of the appeal court may indirectly affect the will o f the 
parties to participate effectively in the arbitral proceedings. Suppose for example, they 
have agreed that the arbitration is to be governed by ICC rules of arbitration. The
See Art. 13 (3) o f the Model law. Contrary to this view, in France, the decision o f the Arbitral 
institution (e.g. ICC) on the challenge may be final. Since, the parties may agree on the finality o f  the 
tribunal’s decision and waived the right to resort to the court as an appeal stage. See Y. Derains, op. cit., p
10 .
Prof. F. Davidson, International Commercial Arbitration, op. cit., para 4.25 at p 74.
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challenge procedure to be adopted is then governed by Article 2(8) and (9) o f those 
Rules. These provide inter alia for the court o f the ICC to decide upon any challenge. 
Yet its decision is subject to appeal to the court under s.24(2), with a further appeal 
against the court’s decision, lying under s.24(6.), albeit that this requires the leave o f the 
court. It is surely adequate to allow a challenge application to be considered by two 
instances - the agreed authority, and the court. This provides sufficient safeguard. Thus it 
would be better to provide that the court’s decision on any challenge shall be subject to 
no appeal.
Article 178 o f CCPL 1980 allows an appeal against the decision of the court o f first 
instance on a challenge. Moreover article 109 suggests that any challenge shall suspend 
the arbitral proceedings. In light o f the above discussion, it is recommended that 
challenges should no longer have this effect, and that the decision of the court o f first 
instance should be considered final.
iv. The Suggested Approach
Kuwait must consider the provisions of Articles 12-14 of the Model Law and s.24 o f the 
Arbitration Act 1996 in order to decide upon the nature and extent o f the supervisory role 
of the court in this context. It is surely preferable to have all possible grounds o f 
challenge dealt with in similar fashion in one article. It is also desirable to confirm 
positively the freedom of the parties to agree on a challenge procedure. Any decision on 
a challenge should be open to judicial supervision, and the decision o f the court should 
not be subject to another appeal. The general philosophy behind this approach is to 
determine the proper limits o f court intervention in arbitration, hence the freedom o f the 
parties to agree on challenge procedures. Moreover allowing the tribunal to decide on the 
challenge, unless the parties agree otherwise, protects the integrity o f the arbitral process, 
ensuring that the parties do not have to resort to the court. Yet the challenging party 
should be able to seek judicial review o f the tribunal’s decision. This safeguard is 
necessary to ensure fair procedure, and strike a proper balance between party autonomy 
and legitimate court intervention. Accordingly, the new Arbitration Act must allow the 
parties to agree on challenge procedures, and permit the arbitral tribunal itself to rule on 
the challenge, as a supplementary measure. The supplementary provisions must be 
simple and effective, and might contain time limits for making the challenge as under the 
Model Law. Having clear time limits and clearly specifying the consequences of failure
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to respect those limits would provide some stability to the process, by preventing parties 
from delaying the arbitral proceedings tluough raising late objections. The 
supplementary provision may also enhance the power of the arbitral tribunal to rule on 
the challenge, while rendering its decision subject to judicial examination, upon the 
request o f an interested party. Some time limit for appeal is desirable (e.g. 30 days after 
having received notice o f the decision on the challenge), and failure to meet this time 
limit would make that decision final. Equally the decision o f the court should be subject 
to no appeal.
(d) Conclusion
Judicial intervention to remove an arbitrator, where retention o f a “non-performing” 
arbitrator becomes intolerable is a good example o f the necessity o f judicial supervision 
even prior to the making the of arbitral award. The supervisory role o f the court over the 
arbitrator and his conduct is a vital element for the success o f arbitration. The court may 
remove a challenged ai'bitrator to give the parties another chance to constitute an arbitral 
tribunal which is able to act positively. The court must pay attention to the quality and 
conduct o f arbitrators, as this sort of judicial intervention plays a significant role in 
reinforcing the confidence in the arbitral tribunal, which is vital to the success o f 
arbitration as a method of resolving disputes. A party who has lost his confidence in the 
fairness, impartiality or ability of the arbitrator or his conduct o f the arbitral proceedings 
must have some recourse.
3.4 Ensuring Party Autonomy in Procedural Matters
(a) Introduction
It is often said that it is one o f the advantages o f arbitration is the freedom of the parties 
to agree on the procedure to be followed by the arbitral tribunal in conducting the arbitral 
proceedings, as such freedom is one o f the keys to an effective system of arbitration**^. 
For this reason, among others, modern arbitration legislation recognises this freedom and 
articulate it clearly**^. For instance, Article 19(1) of the Model Law states “Subject to the 
provisions o f this Law, the parties are free to agree on the procedure to be followed by
It is submitted that recognising the parties’ freedom to lay dawn the rules o f procedure goes a long way 
towards establishing procedural autonomy. A/CN.9/264, para 1
See Art. 19 (1) o f the Model Law and sec. 34 (1) Arbitration Act 1996.
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the arbitral tribunal in conducting the proceedings”, while s.34(l) o f the 1996 Act 
provides, “It shall be for the tribunal to decide all procedural and evidential matters, 
subject to the right o f the parties to agree any matter”. Similarly, Article 182 o f CCPL 
1980 confirms the freedom of the parties to agree on the arbitral procedure.
(b) The Role of the Court
Merely guaranteeing party autonomy does not ensure that the will o f the parties is 
respected by the arbitral tribunal. Thus the conduct of the arbitral proceedings by the 
tribimal must be subject to court supervision, so that the risk of the arbitral award being 
set aside ensures that the tribunal complies with agreed procedures. The supervisory 
function o f the court in this context shows how it safeguaids party autonomy. Court 
intervention is justified here on the ground that it is not for the tribunal to override the 
agreement o f the parties on how the arbitration is to be conducted, given that arbitration 
is the parties’ own chosen method o f dispute settlement, and they have an absolute right 
to decide on the form the arbitration should take**^. Thus, when the parties have 
adopted rules for the conduct o f their arbitration, it is the duty o f the tribunal to comply 
with those rules, and failure to do so opens the award to challenge. So Article 
34(2)(a)(iv) o f the Model Law provides
“An arbitral award may be set aside by the court specified in article 6 
only if  the party making the application furnishes proof that the 
composition of the arbitral tribimal or the arbitral procedure was not in 
accordance with the agreement o f the paifies, unless such agreement 
was in conflict with a provision o f this Law from which the parties 
cannot derogate, or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance 
with this Law”.
Similarly, breach o f agreed procedures is one o f the irregularities listed in the Ai'bitration 
Act 1996 as justifying the setting aside o f the award, s.68(2) stating
“Serious irregularity means an irregularity o f one or more o f the 
following kinds which the court considers has caused or will cause 
substantial injustice to the applicant- (c) failure by the tribunal to
DAC 1996 Report, para 173.
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conduct the proceedings in accordance with the procedure agreed by 
the parties”.
The same result may be found in Article 186(3)(a) o f CCPL 1980.
(c) Who Controls the Arbitration?
The above duty may suggest that the parties, not the arbitrators, control the arbitration. 
The question of who controls o f the arbitral process was one o f the matters discussed at 
the Sixteenth ICCA Congress*^**. There was “lively debate” *^* on the motion; “The 
parties, not the arbitrators, control the arbitration”. Fitzgerald suggested that it was the 
Eirbitrators, not the parties who controlled the arbitration. She argued that party autonomy 
is a relative principle and there is a duty on the aibitrators to conduct the arbitral 
proceedings with speed and efficiency, concluding that the arbitrators determine the 
arbitral procedure with the agreement of the parties, but must remain in control of the 
arbitral process otherwise the case could not be decided*^^. Lord Mustill shared that 
view, noting that while arbitrators direct the arbitral proceedings along the lines which 
the parties wish, they are in overall charge o f the arbitration and ultimately responsible 
for conducting an efficient and just procedure. His conclusion was that the likelihood o f 
any significant procedural agreement coming from the parties is marginal at best*^^. On 
the other hand. Prof. Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler supported the motion that the parties, 
not the arbitrators, control arbitration, grounding that view on the consensual nature o f 
arbitration and the principle of party autonomy, which is a universal legal rule 
safeguarded and enforced by the courts*^"*.
It is suggested that the latter is the better view. If, when the arbitrator accepted his 
appointment, there was an existing procedural agreement, he is impliedly bound by it. I f  
he was not happy with that procedural agreement, he did not have to accept the mandate. 
Should the parties modlfy*^^ their procedural agreement after the arbitral tribunal has
It was held in London May 12-15, 2002.
See Christopher Koch, ‘The Sixteenth ICCA Congress’ (2002) 19 (6) J. Int. Arb. 609-620.
Ib id
Ibid.
Ibid.
The freedom o f the parties to agree on the procedure is continuing one throughout the arbitral 
proceedings and not limited, for instance, to the time before the first arbitrator is appointed. A/CN.9/246, 
para 63.
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been constituted, any arbitrator who is not comfortable with the new procedural 
agreement, may resign. Prof. Plans Smit suggested that if the parties conclude a 
procedural agreement, the arbitrators should go along with it, as it is up to the arbitrators 
to make sure that the paifies do not agree to things that they do not want*^^. Even the 
duty to conduct the arbitral proceedings effectively without any undue delay does not 
justify a breach o f procedural agreement. The arbitrator may advise the parties to change 
their agreed procedui'es, but it is for the paifies to consider that advice and theirs is the 
last word. I f  the arbitrator, for whatever reason, thinks that he cannot proceed under the 
agreed procedure, he may resign*^^. To support this motion favours party autonomy, 
upholding the agreement of the parties on proceduial matters above the views of the 
arbitrators*^^. Furthermore, according to the contractual approach, when the arbitrator 
agrees to act, he concludes a contract with the parties, which obliges him to comply with 
agreed procedures. Moreover, if  an arbitrator agrees to accept payment for this important 
task, he is under a moral duty act as the parties direct. Furthermore many systems see the 
failure o f the arbitrator to conduct the arbitral process in accordance with procedure 
agreed by the parties as justifying a challenge of the award*^^.
(d) Limitation on Court Intervention
We have seen that the parties are free to agree on procedural matters, and that it is the 
duty of the arbitral tribimal to respect that agreement, or else open the award to 
challenge. However, this does not mean that this freedom is not subject to any restriction. 
Party autonomy must respect restriction imposed by the law, and if  it does not the 
arbitral tribunal need not comply with agreed procedures to the extent that they offend 
against the law. Similaify, in such circumstances the court will not set aside the award, 
merely because the arbitral procediue is not in accordance with the agreement of the 
parties. The duty o f the arbitral tribunal to comply with agreed procedures applies only 
where the agreement does not offend against the law. But what restrictions does the law 
impose?
p610.
It seems tliat the right to resign is provided to confer a degree o f  a protection upon the arbitrator. Since, 
it allows an arbitrator, who is asked by the parties to follow procedural agreement, which he is not 
comfortable to resign “without incurring liability to the parties”. See, R. Merkin, op. cit., para 12.4, Service 
Issue No. 22:4 Dec 1998.
See <http://www.icca-2002.org/working_progromme.htm.>[Last visited 5 July 2003].
See Art. 34 (2)(iv) o f the Model Law, sec.68(2)(c) o f  the Arbitration act 1996 and Art. 186 (3)(a) o f  
CCPL 1980.
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The freedom of the parties to determine the arbitral procedures is restricted by mandatory 
provisions*^**. So, it was said in the context o f the Model Law, “The freedom o f the 
parties is subject only to the provisions o f the model law, that is, to its mandatory 
provisions” *^ *. Therefore, if  the parties’ agreement conflicts with the mandatory 
provisions o f the Model Law, the arbitral tribunal does not have to comply with the 
agreed procedures, as it is obliged to follow those mandatory provisions rather than 
agreed procedures*^^. So, Article 34(2)(a)(iv) provides that it is a ground for setting aside 
the arbitral award that it breaches agreed procedures'hm/gj'j' such agreement was in 
conflict with a provision o f  this Law> from  which the parties cannot derogate, or, fa iling  
such agreement, was not in accordance with this L a w f.  [Emphasis added]
Equally, the English Arbitration Act 1996 s.4(l) is to the same effect. So such mandatory 
provisions restrict the scope o f party autonomy, in that any agreement contrary to those 
mandatory provisions will automatically be ineffective, and the arbitral tribunal should 
not comply with agreed procedures to the extent that they offend against such provisions. 
This also represents a limitation on court intervention, as where the arbitral tribunal does 
not comply with agreed procedures, on the ground that they conflict with mandatory 
rules, the court should accept this justification and should not set aside the arbitral award. 
Its role in this context is to uphold the mandatory provisions.
3.5 Conclusion
This section has considered court supervision o f the arbitral tribunal and its conduct. The 
supervisory function o f the court should be exercised, upon application o f the parties to 
the arbitration, to ensure that the arbitrator is qualified to conduct the arbitral 
proceedings, both in the sense of being competent and possessing agreed qualifications. 
The court must ensure that the arbitrator is both impartial and independent, that he is 
conducting the proceedings properly and respecting party autonomy. Failure to comply 
with such duties justifies removing an ai'bitrator or setting aside the arbitral award. Thus 
the supervisory role o f the court, as a price for allowing arbitrators to be involved in the
The concept o f mandatory provisions as a limitation on the party autonomy has been deal with in pp. 
131-137 supra. See also P. Mayer, ‘Mandatoiy Rules o f Law in international arbitration’ (1986) 2(4) Arb. 
Int. 274-293. The drafters o f the Model Law argue that the quarantining the freedom o f the parties in this 
context is subject to the fundamental principles o f  fairness. See Art. 19(3) of the Model Law and A/CN. 
9/264, para 1.
A/CN. 9/264, para 3.
See A/CN. 9/264, para 3 and Prof F. Davidson, Arbitration, op. cit., para 18.28 at p 371.
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administration of justice, like judges, seeks to ensure that arbitrators act properly and as 
envisaged by the parties.
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4, The Judicial Supervision over the Arbitral Award
4.1 Introduction
As aforementioned, the arbitral award is the fruit of the arbitration*^^. Court support of 
the arbitral award was discussed earlier in this thesis. The theme o f this section is to shed 
some light on court supervision o f the arbitral award, as the court should not merely 
support awards, but from time to time must supervise them. The supportive role sees the 
court providing an effective enforcement mechanism, to ensure that arbitration is an 
effective method o f dispute settlement, while the supervisoiy role gives an unsuccessful 
party a chance to challenge the arbitral award tluough judicial review, in order to 
guarantee the fairness, integrity and validity of arbitration as a method of adjudication. 
Judicial control over the arbitral award is not only designed to protect the interests o f the 
parties to arbitration, and to ensure its effectiveness, but also to protect the interests o f 
the legal system. Arbitration is a method o f adjudication, and the award has significant 
impacts on the rights or obligations o f the parties. It is in the interest of the legal system 
to ensure that arbitration, as a private method o f adjudication, operates judicially and the 
award reflects a true judgment, since arbitration is a vital part o f the legal system. This 
section then examines, firstly, the methods and secondly the grounds of challenging an 
award.
4.2 The Method of Challenge
(a) Introduction
How may an award be challenged? We are here looking at the role o f the courts, rather 
than appeals to another ai'bitral tribunal or some other body. By virtue o f party 
autonomy, such devices are open to the parties, but we are concentrating upon the 
relationship between the arbitration and the court*^"*. National laws, in general, provide a 
variety o f actions or remedies available to a party*^^, varying both as to procedural forms 
of challenge, and as to the grounds on which challenges may be made*^^. However, a 
common groimd between most arbitration systems is that they provide two essential
See p 120 supra.
This could be a part o f the relationship between the court and arbitration in case o f the enforcement o f  
the agreed procedures. It is the duty o f  the state court to ensure the implantation what the parties were 
agreed on. This duty is part o f  the role o f the court as safeguard to party autonomy.
A/CN. 9/264, para 1.
A/CN. 9/207, para 108.
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challenge devices - challenging an arbitral award before the court, and resisting its 
recognition and enforcement.
(b) Recourse to the Court
A party may, for a variety of reasons, decide not take active steps against the arbitral 
award, but wait until the successful party seeks court assistance and support in enforcing 
the arbitral a w a r d A t  this stage, he may raise his complaints as grounds for opposing 
an application for recognition or enforcement. The general idea of these provisions*^** is 
that the recognition or enforcement of an award may be resisted and refused. This is a 
means of indirect challenge in the form o f opposition to the recognition and enforcement 
o f the arbitral award*^^. However, a party, who desires to challenge the arbitral award, 
may choose to take the initiative and raise the matter before the court. He is acting 
positively by initiating judicial review in order to put an end to the arbitral award without 
undue delay. Most arbitration legislation recognises and accommodates such a desire*"***. 
Broadly speaking, there are two means o f thus positively challenging the award, namely, 
setting it aside and appealing against it.
1) Setting Aside
It has been said that, as the policy is that the court must have the final word in 
arbitration*"** all national arbitral systems recognise an action to set aside the arbitral 
award, but the name of this remedy varies*"* .^ For instance, Article 34 (1) o f the Model 
Law states, “Recourse to a court against an arbitral award may be made only by an 
application for setting aside”.
It may be worth to note that the state court may ask why the arbitral award was not challenged by 
positive attack where that possible. The state court, by its judicial desecration, may be legitimate to ignore 
the challenge due to the unjustified failure o f the challenging party to attack the award positively.
It is meant by provisions here that the rules that govern the recognition and enforcement o f the award. 
In Model Law Art.35 and 36; in Arbitration Act ss. 66 and 103 (New York Convention Award) and in 
CCPL 1980 Art. 185 (award made in Kuwait) and Art. 199-200 (Award made outside Kuwait).
A. Broches (Rapporteur) & Prof. G. Bernini, ‘Recourse against the Award; Recognition and 
Enforcement o f the Award’, in P. Sanders (ed.), U ncitral’s project fo r a model law on international 
commercial arbitration ,op. cit., para 17, p 209.
Art. 34 o f the Model Law, art. 186 o f  CCPL 1980, sec.67- 68 o f Arbitiation Act 1996 and Art. 1484 
French CCP 1981.141 Ibid.
P. Sanders, Int'l Enzycl.Comp.L., para 229 at 157.
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Equally ss.67 and 68 of the Arbitration Act 1996 also gives a party the right to seek 
judicial review by applying to the court to challenge the arbitral award on ground o f 
substantive jurisdiction or serious irregularity. Similarly, Article 186(3) of CCPL 1980 
allows a party to apply to the court to nullify the arbitral a w a r d T h i s  channel o f 
judicial review is mandatory, and cannot be excluded by the parties. According to Article 
187, the interested party may apply to the court which had original jurisdiction to hear 
the case, for nullification of the arbitral award. A case of nullity is only available in the 
case o f a domestic arbitral award, made in Kuwait, and where the award is not subject to 
appeal*"*"*. Any such application, when competent, is subject to the general procedure for
145commencing a case .
2) Appeal (Second Instance)
Very clearly, the provisions o f the Model law do not contemplate an appeal to the court. 
Article 34(1) states that the only recourse against the arbitral award is an action to set it 
aside*"***. The aim was to provide a single exclusive method of judicial recourse against 
the arbitral award, permitting no other means of attacking the awai'd*"* .^ There was a 
general agreement that the Model law should streamline the various types of recourse 
against the arbitral award and should provide for only one type o f challenge*"*^. The 
Commission Report noted that, “it was understood that the application for setting aside 
was exclusive in the sense that it constituted the only means for actively attacking the 
award”*"*^.
The drafters of the Model Law also considered the question whether the model law 
should allow any appeal to a court on the merits o f the award*^**, but decided against it*^*, 
as this approach reflected the attitude o f most States, and a trend was discernible to 
further reduce the remaining instances of court review. Tliis treatment would meet the 
clear trend towards limiting the intervention of the courts in arbitration*^^.
Art. 1484 French CCP 1981.
For instance, the parties do not agree on the matter o f appeal or the nature o f the arbitral award is not 
appealable according to the general provisions, which govern the system o f appeal in CCPL 1980.
See Art. 187 (1) o f CCPL 1980.
This is o f  course besides the resisting recognition and enforcement the arbitral award.
A/CN. 9/264, para 1.
A/CN. 9/232, para 14.
A/40/17, para 274.
A/CN.9/207, para 103 - 104.
A/CN.9/216, para 107.
A/CN.9/207, para 103.
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By contrast, both the English Arbitration Act 1996 and Kuwaiti CCPL 1980 accept the 
idea o f appeal to the court, albeit on completely different philosophical bases.
i. Article 186 of C.C.P.L 1980 states that an arbitrator’s award may not be 
appealed, save as is agreed by the parties prior to rendering the arbitral awai'd*^^. So an 
arbitration system may exclude the right to appeal to the court, but give the parties the 
right to agree on appeal if  they wish so*^ "*. Therefore, an appeal against the arbitral award 
is available only if the parties have so agreed. The justification of the Kuwaiti approach 
is the attempt to resolve the disputes between tlie parties by the agreed method, without 
the need for a judicial appeal, unless this is what the parties clearly wish. Another 
justification is the avoidance of the delay and costs o f an appeal.
ii. On the other hand, s.69(l) o f the 1996 Act states, “Unless otherwise agreed by 
the parties, a party to arbitral proceedings may (upon notice to the other parties and to the 
tribunal) appeal to the court on a question o f law arising out of an award made in the 
proceedings”.
The common ground between these two arbitral systems is the role o f party autonomy. 
Both allow the parties to decide whether an appeal lies to the court. The complete 
exclusion o f the right o f appeal, as under the Model Law, prevents the parties making a 
choice as to whether an appeal should be available This raises the question o f whether 
the parties should be able to agree on the extent o f judicial control
There is no doubt that modern arbitration systems emphasise the principle o f party 
autonomy, as arbitration is a consensual process, and enabling the users o f arbitration to 
design its conduct ensures the health of the arbitral process. Yet what should be the 
extent of party autonomy? Should it apply in the field of judicial control? Why should it 
not? The philosophy of limiting court intervention may require minimising certain forms 
of judicial control, but need not necessitate setting a maximum nor indeed eliminating
This is contrary the French approach, which gives the parties the right to appeal, and allow them to 
waive this right in agreement. See Art. 1482 o f  CCP 1981. Flowever, there is no appeal available in case o f  
international arbitration.
It may be mentioned that there are number o f cases where there is no appeal even if  the parties agree on 
the appeal. These are for example where the arbitrator is authorized to compromise and conciliate, or if  he 
is an arbitrator o f appeal or the value o f  the relevant action does not exceed KD 500. These are a limitation 
o f the freedom of the parties to agree on the appeal.
See, O. Chukwumerije, op. cit., 179.
This is one o f the comments o f  United Kingdom, see A/CN.9/263/ADD.3 para 36,37 and 38.
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even those means o f judicial control, which the parties themselves desire to have. 
During the drafting process of the Model Law the United Kingdom asked whether,
“the principle of party autonomy demand[ed] that if  the parties have 
agreed to avail themselves o f measures available under the local law, 
the court should be able to give effect to their agreement?”
The UK raised this question for two purposes - firstly to defend the English approach to 
appeals on questions of law, which was articulated in the Arbitration Act 1979 (and 
confirmed with some modifications in the 1996 Act). Secondly, consultations on the 
draft o f the Model Law disclosed a substantial body of opinion among users o f the 
arbitral process in England, which favoured retaining the possibility o f recourse to the 
court on questions of law. The UK suggested that the logical consequence o f the 
philosophy of party autonomy is that the parties should be allowed to have such recourse, 
if  that is what they have agreed.
The question of whether the approach of the 1979 Act did fulfil a need was considered 
by the Commercial Coui’t Committee, first by canvassing arbitrators, practitioners and 
users, and then by discussion within the Committee. The Committee concluded as 
follows:
“As regards the right of appeal to the High Court on questions of law, 
there appears to be fairly general satisfaction with the balance struck 
by the 1979 Act. We received no representations to the effect that tlie 
position should be restored to what it was before the 1979 legislation, 
and we would not ourselves favour this. Conversely, although there 
was some support for the elimination o f the special categories of 
transactions in respect of which the paities caimot contract out o f the 
right of appeal, this was a minority view. Our own opinion is that these 
special categories should be maintained....
The reference to the pre 1979 position testifies to the fact that the existence at that point 
o f an unrestricted right o f appeal, and the fact that many appeals were in fact being 
taken, were seen as undermining the attractiveness o f England as an arbitial forum. The
Ibid., para 37.
See DAC 1989 Report, para 80.
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courts were heavily involved in supervising arbitration tlirough the “special case” 
procedure, whereby the arbitral tribunal- which was presumed likely to misapply the 
law- could be required to state a case on a question of law for tlie opinion o f the court*^^. 
Thus, there was a move to restrict this right o f appeal in the Arbitration Act 1979, e.g. by 
requiring leave of the court for an appeal unless it was brought with agreement o f all 
parties, and permitting the parties to contract out of the right o f appeal*^**. Further 
restrictions were imposed in the Arbitration Act 1996, in particular the filtering 
provisions established by the House of Lords’ decision in The Nema^^^ for the role o f the 
court to grant leave to appeal
However, the other side o f the coin is that English commercial law is seen as modern and 
dynamic, and thus often selected to govern international contracts. It is believed that the 
law is kept dynamic, partly because new issues are constantly coming before the courts 
in the form o f appeals from arbitral tribimals. Therefore, the Act 1996 seeks to ensure 
that appeals on legal issues of general importance may still come before the courts, it 
being thought that the continuing availability o f appeals on questions o f law serves a 
valuable purpose in many commercial contexts as a means o f resolving and clarifying 
important points o f principle***^.
In Kuwait, when an appeal is available, it will be a ‘full appeal’ on the merits o f the 
a w a r d * i n  line with the supervisory role of the court over questions o f fact and law. 
The justification of maximising court supervision of the merits of the dispute is to 
provide legal certainty concerning the merits o f disputes. Thus, the court must ensure 
that the arbitral tribunal did not err in fact or law. This approach requires another trial o f 
the dispute. On the other hand, England allows only a ‘limited appeal’ on questions of 
law. Which approach is more appropriate? The prevailing tendency is to eliminate or 
restrict rights of appeal, in line with the trend towards limiting judicial control over 
arbitral awards. The general philosophy o f modern arbitration legislation is to limit the
R. Holmes & M. O’Reilly, ‘Appeals from Arbitral Award: Should 69 Be repealed?’ (2003) 69(1) 
Arbitration, 1-9 at p 2.
Mustill & Boyd, op cit., pp. 585-586.
[1982] AC 724.
See V. Veeder QC, "England”, op. cit., p 60.
DAC Report 1989 and see Glencore Grain Ltd. v. Flacker Shipping Ltd  [2002] (C.A) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 
487; discussed in R. Holmes & M. O’Reilly, op. cit., p8, as for a good example o f how the continuing 
availability o f this jurisdiction serves to shape and clarify English commercial law
This is exactly the same as the French treatment in Art. 1483 o f C.C.P. 1981. However, there is no 
appeal in case o f  international arbitration.
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control function of the court to the utmost. In line with tliis philosophy some would 
entirely remove the option of appeal -  as under the Model Law, even if  this thwarts the 
will o f the parties.
However, if  the legislature wished to support the principle of party autonomy and this
would offer a right of appeal, should it be a full appeal or a limited appeal? It is
recommended that there should be a limited appeal. This recommendation is based on 
the view that there should be no appeal on the substantive matters in the arbitration. 
When parties conclude an arbitration agreement, they agree to resolve their disputes via a 
decision o f the arbitral tribunal, not the court,
“so that whether or not a court would reach the same conclusion was 
simply irrelevant. To substitute the decision of the court on the
substantive issues would wholly to subvert the agreement the parties 
had made”***^.
Therefore, one o f the disadvantages of allowing a full appeal is that the decision o f the 
court may be substituted for the decision o f the arbitral tribunal. The second possible 
disadvantage is that a full appeal may damage the privacy of arbitration, which might be 
one o f the fundamental factors for choosing arbitration in the first place, and a full 
appeal- on fact and law- may make the merits of the disputes public, removing the veil o f 
privacy. The third possible disadvantage is the possibility o f misusing the right o f appeal, 
as a party may use the appeal process as delaying tactic. The fourth ground against the 
full appeal is that it would involve the parties in ordinary court proceedings, which they 
tried to avoid when they concluded the arbitration agreement.
How then does one strike a balanee between eliminating the right o f appeal and allow a 
full appeal? It has been said that,
“it is not easy to strike a balance between the need for privacy, speed 
and above all, finality in the arbitral proeess and the wider publie 
interest in some measure o f judicial control, if  only to ensure 
consistency of decisions and predictability o f the operation o f the law. 
Internationally, however, the balance has come down strongly in
The DAC 1996 Report, para 284.
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favour of finality, and against judicial review, except in very limited 
circumstances” * .
The English Arbitration Act 1996 seeks to strike a balance between denying a right of 
appeal and allowing a full appeal, as s.69(1) allows judicial review o f arbitral awards 
with regard only to questions of law***^ , and then only if the parties do not agree 
otherwise. This strikes the balance substantially in favour of the finality o f the arbitral 
award and the autonomy of the ai'bitral process*^^. It establishes the finality of the arbitral 
awards with regard to questions of fact, Bingham J., stating “The finding of fact o f an 
arbitrator are binding on the Court and the Court cannot go behind these findings so far 
as they are questions of fact” *****.
On the other hand, the court and not the arbitral tribunal has the final word on questions 
of law. This treatment gives the state court the jurisdiction to supervise the question of 
law that arise from the arbitral award and has the last word on this matter. It was said in 
Geogas S. A. v. Trammo Gas Ltd,
“The arbitrators are the masters o f the facts. On an appeal the court 
must decide any question of law arising from an award on the basis of 
full and unqualified acceptance o f the findings of fact of the arbitrators.
It is irrelevant whether the Court considers those findings o f faet to be 
right or wrong” *****.
The drafters o f the 1996 Act believed that a restricted appeal only on questions of law, is 
more consistent with the fact that the parties have chosen to arbitrate rather litigate*^*. 
The supervisory role o f the court ensures that the arbitral tribunal will not misapply the 
relevant law. It is thought that when the parties agreed on the applicable law, they 
expected that the arbitral tribunal would properly apply that law. Failure to do so 
frustrates the result contemplated by the parties and the arbitration agreement* 
Similai'ly, Lord Saville states.
Refern & Hunter, op. cit., para 9-36, p 434.
'*"^ See the Historical background o f the appeal in question o f  law in article written by R. Holmes & M. 
O’Reilly, op. cit., at p2.
Ibid. para 1.1.5, at p3.
See, Bidk Oil V Sun international [1984] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 531-533, Bremer v. Raiffeisen [1982] 1 
Lloyd’s Rep. 599-633, per Ken* L.J, “An arbitral tribunal has the final word on all questions o f  fact”.
(CA) [1993] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 215 at p 228.
DAC 1996 Report, para 285.
Ibid.
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“it seems to me that it is well arguable that this limited right o f appeal 
can properly be described as supportive o f the arbitral process. Wliere 
the parties have agreed that their dispute will be resolved in accordance 
with English law, and the tribunal then purports to reach answer which 
is not in accordance with English law, it can be said with some force 
that unless the court correct this error, the tribunal itself will have 
failed to carry out the bargain o f the parties"
Accordingly, it is submitted that a right o f appeal on a point o f law arising out o f an 
award supports party autonomy. It may be said that the Act’s approach both reinforces 
and detracts from the finality of the arbitral award. On the one hand, it endorses the 
finality o f the award in matters o f fact, while, on the other hand, giving the court 
jurisdiction to review questions o f law arising out o f the award. Yet the English approach 
to this matter is out o f step with most other countries, as users of arbitration are faced 
with the prospect o f Judicial intervention in an area that is forbidden to judges 
elsewhere'^"*, especially in states which have adopted the Model Law. Still, even if  this is 
true, the Act allows the parties to contract out o f the powers of the court under s.69 at 
any time, while they may indeed agree that their dispute is to be determined by general 
considerations o f justice and fairness rather than in accordance with the strict law^^^. The 
DAC states,
“There appears to be no good reason to prevent parties from agreeing 
to equity clause. However, it is to be noted that in agreeing that a 
dispute shall be resolved in this way, the parties are in effect excluding 
any right to appeal to the Court (there being no ‘question o f law’ to 
appeal)’’
Yet it could be said that, even if  this balance is reasonable, a limited appeal may be still 
be misused, delaying the proceedings and increasing c o s t s H o w e v e r ,  such fears may 
be met by providing further restrictions on the right of appeal, designed to control the 
relationship between the court and the arbitral award, upholding arbitral autonomy, the
(1997) 63 Arbitration 104 at p 108.
See M. Needham, op. cit., p 26
See DAC 1996 Report, para 222 and 223.
Ibid., para 222.
Î77 See suggestion to repel or reform sec. 69 o f  the Arbitration Act 1996 in R. Holmes & M. O’Reilly, op. 
cit., p 1. See the opposite view, which argues for the continued validity of s. 69 of the Arbitration Act 1996, 
by H. Dundas, ‘Appeals on Questions o f Law: section 69 revitalised’ (2003) 69 (3) Arbitration 172-183.
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finality o f the award and limited court intervention as fai* as is possible. Thus the 
Arbitration Act 1996 restricts the right o f appeal by stipulating in s.69(2) that an appeal 
will not be brought except with the agreement o f all the other parties to the proceedings, 
or with the leave of the court, while s.69(3) limits the role of the court in granting leave 
to appeal by requiring,
“(a) that the determination o f the question will substantially affect the 
rights o f one or more o f the par ties,
(b) that the question is one, which the tribunal was asked to determine,
(c) that, on the basis of the findings o f fact in the award -
(i) the decision o f the tribunal on the question is obviously wrong, or
(ii) the question is one of general public importance and the decision of 
the tribunal is at least open to serious doubt, and
(d) that, despite the agreement o f the parties to resolve the matter by 
arbitration, it is just and proper in all the circumstances for the court to 
determine the question”.
It can be seen then that an appeal can always be brought if  both parties agree - thus 
supporting party autonomy. But, if only one party wishes to appeal, extensive filters 
restrict the power o f the court to intervene. So a party who alleges error o f law must 
specify the question o f law to be determined and state the grounds on which support his 
view^^^. The appeal should be made within 28 days of the date of the award or, if  there has 
been any arbitral process o f appeal or review, o f the date when the applicant or appellant 
was notified o f the result of that p r o c e s s ^ A n  appeal on question of law cannot be used 
as a basis for judicial intervention in other arbitral matters e.g. procedural questions. 
Furthermore, this appeal can be used only on question of English law. The court held in 
Sanghi Polyesters Limited (India) v the International Investor KCFC (Kuwait)^^^, that a 
question of Islamic Law (Shari’a Law) is not a question o f English law giving rise to an 
appeal under the A ct'^ \
See sec. 69(4) o f the Arbitration Act 1996. 
See sec. 70 (3) o f the Arbitration Act 1996.
180 [2000] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 480. See also Bank O f Credit and Commerce International S. A. v Ali et a l ,  
[2000] 1 W LR735
See sec. 82 (I) o f the Arbitration Act 1996.
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The court, of course, plays a significant role in ensuring that the appeal meets the statutory 
requirements and tests. Section 69 sets out four t e s t s a l l  of which have to be satisfied 
before permission to appeal is given. The statutory criteria mentioned above - which are 
intended to discourage all but the most serious of challenges when the award is 
“manifestly dysfunctional” *^ -^ limit the power o f the court to grant leave to appeal, as 
leave to appeal will only be granted if  the court is fully satisfied that all criteria are 
fulfilled. The statutory tests are as follows*^"*:
(i) Would determination of the question substantially affect the rights of one or more of 
the parties? The court should be satisfied that the determination o f the point o f law must 
have substantial effect. So when it is o f the view that there may or may not be such a 
substantial effect, the court cannot grant leave to appeal.
(ii) Was the question one the arbitrator was asked to decide? This demands that the 
question of law concerned is one that the arbitral tribunal was asked to determine. This 
does not cover error o f law that was not raised or debated in the arbitration*^**. It follows, 
therefore, that the court cannot deal with a fresh point of law which had not be argued 
before the arbitral tribunal. *^ .^
Was the arbitral tribunal’s decision obviously wrong or open to serious doubt? The 
drafters o f s.69 proposed to make an appeal available, in the ordinary case, only where 
the arbitrator’s decision is obviously wrong. If  the matter is one of general public 
i mp o r t a n c e * t h e  test is less onerous, but the decision should still be open to serious 
doubt *^**.
(iii) Was it just and proper in all the circumstances for the court to determine the 
question? This is a new test introduced by the 1996 Act and the DAC gives its reason for 
this additional criterion as follows:
These tests are not o f course applicable to the consensual appeal.
W. Park, ‘The Interaction o f Courts and Arbitrators in England’, op. cit., at p 62.
HOK Sport Limited (Formerly Lobb Partnership Limited) v. Aintree Racecourse C. Ld., QBD (T&CC) 
2002. The question o f law in this case was “On what basis should the quantum o f  damages recoverable by 
Aintree as a consequence o f Lobb’s breaches o f its duty to warn Aintree be determined?”. See para 59 in 
this case,
Lobb V Aintree, op. cit., para 42.
This test prevents what could happen under the previous law [sec.l (4) o f the Arbitration Act 1979] 
where some applications for leave were made and given on the ground that an examination o f the reasons 
for the award revealed an error o f law that had not been raised or debated in arbitration. See DAC Report 
1996, para 286 (ii) and Russell, op. cit., para 8-063 at p 430.
Lobb V Aintree, op. cit., para 43.
For example the meaning o f a provision in a standard printed form of charterparty applied to a factual 
situation widespread in market, such as the Gulf War 1990-91. See Veeder QC, England, op. cit., p 60.
See DAC 1996 Report, para 288.
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“ ...w e think it is desirable that this factor should be specifically 
addressed by the court when it is considering an application. It seems
to us to be the basis on which the House o f Lords acted as it did in The
Nem a... The court should be satisfied that justice dictates that there 
should be an appeal; and in considering what justice requires, the fact 
that the parties have agreed to arbitrate rather than litigate is an 
important and powerful factor” *^**.
The court in Lobb v Aintree noted that the final requirement provided in s.69 is a new
test and the Act suggests no guidance as to the circumstances in which this requirement
should preclude leave to appeal being given where, otherwise, leave would be granted****. 
The court believed that it should take account of, and give weight to, the policy that 
ordinarily paily autonomy should dictate that the ai'bitral tribunal should decide all 
questions in dispute, including questions of law. However, in circumstances where the 
arbitral tribunal is obviously wrong and an erroneous decision could substantially affect 
one o f the parties, the Arbitration Act 1996 envisages that the affected party will be 
allowed leave to appeal. It follows that, in such circumstances, the responding paity must 
show that it would suffer substantial injustice if  permission to appeal was granted*^^.
The argument in favour of allowing an appeal in order to guard errors o f law is 
supportable**’\  as long as it does not conflict with party autonomy. The right of the court 
to grant an appeal should be restricted along the lines laid down by s.69 to ensure that the 
right is not misused. It is noteworthy that when the court is going to examine an 
application for leave to appeal, it must consider additionally the general principles o f the 
Arbitration Act party autonomy, limiting court involvement in arbitration, the finality of
™ Ibidi., para 290.
Lobb V Aintree, op. cit., para 55.
Ibid., para 56. See also Icon Navigation Corporation v Sinochem International Petroleum (Bahamas) 
Co Ltd, where a successful party to an arbitration wished to oppose an appeal by the other side on the basis 
that there had been an irregularity in the arbitration that would cause them injustice if  the appeal 
succeeded, they should do so when leave to appeal was sought. By Moore-Bick J, [2002] it is available at 
<http://www.richardsbutler.com/news/list/cpr_newletter_dec_02.pdf >[Last visited 31 July 2003].
It is fair enough to say that “it meets the interest o f legal certainty that there should be some uniformity 
in the decisions o f  the arbitrators in order that other traders might be sufficiently certain where they stood 
as to be able to close their transactions without recourse to arbitration, and it might be proper exercise o f  
the Judge's discretion to give leave to appeal in order to express a conclusion as to the frustrating effect o f  
the event that afforded guidance binding on the arbitrators in other arbitrations arising out o f the same 
event”. See B.T.P. Tioxide Ltd. v. Pioneer Shipping Ltd. and Armada Marine S.A., (The "Nema") HL, 
[1981] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 239 at p 2 4 1 -para (6). See also Redfern & Hunter, op. cit., para 9-35 at 434.
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the arbitral award. It is thus suggested that the English treatment of the question o f 
appeals on errors of law, even if  contrary to the modern tendency to deny the possibility 
o f appeals on this ground, provides a balanced approach on this issue.
Yet even if  England strikes a balance on this issue, which is appropriate for its legal 
system, is such an approach necessarily suitable for any other state, and in particular- 
Kuwait? There is no doubt that the English approach was largely driven by the need to 
maintain the dynamism of English commercial law. English law is one of the most 
popular systems on the world in terms o f being chosen to govern commercial contracts. 
This is because it is highly detailed, providing answers to most questions which arise in 
modern commercial practice, while at the same time is continually being refined and 
developed. As many o f the areas where English law dominates feature standard form 
contracts containing arbitration clauses, e.g. maritime law, those areas are largely 
dependent for their continuing development on new issues arising in practice coming 
before the courts in the form of appeals from arbitral awai'ds.*^"*. The English feared that 
if  that route were closed off, English law would lose its dynamism and hence its 
attraction. Thus the Act seeks to ensure that questions of law o f general public 
importance may be brought before the coui-t, even if  one party objects to this.
Is Kuwait in the same position? It might be argued that if  Kuwait aspires to its 
commercial law becoming as popular as that o f England in international commercial 
contracts, there should be some encouragement to enliance its development, and so 
Kuwait might following the English lead in this matter. Yet if  it is thought that such an 
aspiration is wholly umealistic, it is surely preferable to allow no appeal to the court on 
the grounds o f error o f law. This would not only reflect the attitude o f most states, but 
also support the tendency towai'ds reducing the instances of court review, as well as 
entrancing the finality of arbitration***^. This approach moreover, is more compatible with 
party autonomy, as when the paities conclude an arbitration agreement, they agree to 
abide by the arbitral award made by the chosen tribunal, not by the court’s decision.
194 many parties from the world wild who include London arbitration clauses in their commercial 
transactions or who refer their disputes to the Commercial Court is the best possible evidence o f this event. 
See B. Davenport QC, The UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration: The Users’ Choice’ 
(1 9 8 8 )4 (1 ) Arb. Int. 69-74.
It was submitted “there is a worldwide tendency to limit the extent of judicial intervention in respect of 
arbitration, both during its course and after the making of an award, with a view to preserving the integrity o f  the 
arbitral process and the finality o f  the arbitral award”. See J. Murray, ‘Letting Arbiters Get on With The 
Job’ (1997) 8 S.L.T 64-66 at p 65.
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Therefore the new act should provide a single exclusive method o f judicial recourse 
against the award. If the parties, fear the possibility o f en or o f law, they may agree on an 
appeal to a second arbitral tribunal. Modern arbitration legislation should be not built on 
the presumption that the parties assume that the arbitral tribunal might err in law. It 
should support arbitration and arbitrators by trusting in the arbitrator’s ability to apply 
the law correctly.
(c) Conclusion
It is recommended that a sole means of recourse against an award be created, so that the 
right to a full appeal should be abolished. Kuwait should consider carefully whether 
there should be some sort o f appeal against arbitral awards on the basis o f error o f law. 
Certainly, Kuwait is not subject to the same sort of pressures that shaped the English Act. 
Yet should the new Arbitration Act allow a limited appeal? Is there any significant need 
to justify overriding the strong tendency towards immunising the arbitral award from 
challenge on basis of error o f law***^ ? Does Kuwait need to provide for a greater degree 
of judicial supervision than other countries? The present answer should be negative. 
Kuwait should fall in with the world-wide tendency to limit the extent of judicial 
intervention in respect of arbitration with a view to safeguarding the integrity o f the 
arbitral process and finality o f the arbitral award
4.3 The Content of Judicial Supervision
(a) Introduction
Here we are looking at grounds on which the supervisory role o f the court may be 
triggered. The aim o f judicial supervision of the arbitral award is to ensure that it 
deserves judicial support, and it might be said that an award deserves such court support 
when there is no ground for challenging it. Most arbitration legislation provides a list of 
the grounds upon which the arbitral award may be challenged. Such a list is often
See Prof F. Davidson, ‘The New Arbitration A ct’, op. cit., at p l22. M. Kerr states “Rightly or wrongly- 
and I think rightly- there is no question of going back to the system which made the courts the ultimate 
over arbitrations on virtually all issues o f  law”. See his article ‘Arbitration and the Courts’, op. cit., at p 5.
It is noteworthy that adopting the limited appeal might not enhance the policy o f  state o f  Kuwaiti to be 
an attractive venue for arbitration. Since, there are some allegations that because o f  the right o f appeal 
more and more arbitration clauses in international contracts were submitting the disputes for settlements to 
arbitration under the Rules o f  Arbitration o f International Chamber o f Commerce (ICC) in Paris. See Sir P. 
Neill QC, ‘New Zealand and UNCITRAL Model Law’ (1990) 6 (3) Arb. Int. 271-280
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exclusive. This step o f providing an exclusive list o f limited grounds on which the 
arbitral award may be challenged may be considered as a further measure o f 
development and improvement of the arbitral system*^^. The purpose o f such an 
approach is to limit the judicial review of the arbitral award, while educating the 
arbitrating parties and the arbitrators about the grounds o f challenge, offering an 
opportunity to avoid these grounds if they want judicial support. The following 
paragraphs shall focus on the content o f judicial supervision over the arbitral award, to 
determine the grounds on which the court might properly intervene. It is submitted that 
the court supervision should ensure firstly that the award is not in conflict with public 
policy, secondly, that it meets the required form, and thirdly, that it does not exceed the 
jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal.
(b) Arbitral Award and Public Policy
Public policy is a matter, which usually has a significant impact on arbitration, as its 
violation destroys the arbitral operation and the consequences thereof. Public policy is 
seen as an acloiowledgement of the right of the state and its judicial authority to exercise 
ultimate control over the arbitral process. The role of the court in this matter is to 
safeguard public policy. It cannot allow an arbitral award to be effective, if  it breaches 
the public policy of that state. Although a legal system may recognise arbitration as a 
method o f adjudication, respecting the principle o f paily autonomy, there must be 
limitations. Public policy is the most important o f these limitations. Infringement of 
public policy will certainly be a ground for challenging an arbitral award and a bar to 
recognition and enforcement o f that award. This is often made explicit in legislation***^. 
For instance. Article 34(2)(b)(ii) of the Model law states that the award may be set aside 
if the court finds that ‘the award is in conflict with the public policy o f this state’, whieh 
conflict with public policy is also a ground for challenge under s.68(l)(g) o f the 
Arbitration Act 1996, and a ground for resisting enforcement under s.81(I)(c).
However, the remaining question is what is meant by the term “public policy”? It is 
understandable that there is no statutory definition o f the term, as public policy by its 
nature is relative and mutable^ ****. The difficulties of proffering a comprehensive 
definition o f public policy are thus obvious. However that does not mean that no
See Explanatory Note on the Model Law, para 42.
This cannot be seen not only in national legislation, but may be seen also in number o f international
conventions, such as New York Convention 1958.
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meaning can be given to this vital concept. It is clear that public policy must reflect the 
fundamental economic, legal, moral, political, religious and social standards o f a given 
State or extra-national community (e.g. international obligations by treaties or by United 
Nation Security Council Resolution)^***.
The concept o f public policy in civilian systems is wider than in common law systems, 
as it covers not only substantive categories o f public policy such as fundamental 
principles o f law, morality, and matters o f national interest, but also embraces 
procedural categories, such as fraud, corruption, natural justice and due process. The 
question whether the term “public policy” used in the Model Law embraced the civilian 
concept arose in the discussion of Article 34. The term ‘public policy’ was seen by a 
nmnber o f delegates as much too vague^** ,^ and there was concern that it might be 
interpreted in common law jurisdictions as not covering principles of procedural justice, 
while in civilian, inspired by the French concept o f ‘"ordre public”, such principles 
would be regarded as included^** .^ This divergence o f interpretation led to the concern 
that the list of the grounds in article 34(2) did not cover all serious instances o f 
procedural injustice where amiulment was justified, for example, the award being 
obtained by the corruption o f the arbitrator or the witnesses o f the losing party^ **"*. The 
Commission ultimately decided that the reference to “public policy” should be retained, 
but emphasised that it should be understood in its civilian sense. The Commission 
Report^**  ^noted that it was understood that the term ‘public policy’ covered fundamental 
principles o f law and justice in substantive as well as procedural respects, and would 
embrace instances such as corruption, bribery or fraud and similar serious cases^** .^ It 
added that the wording “the award is in conflict with the public policy of this state” had 
to be interpreted as including instances or events relating to the maimer in which the 
arbitral awar d was arrived at^ **^ .
A number of countries were still not happy with the concept of public policy as adopted 
by the Model Law. Therefore, when they adopted the Model Law, they added procedural
Chitty on Contracts, Vol. 1, twenty-eight Edition, paral7-004 at p837.
See the Interim Report on the Public Policy as a Bar to Enforcement o f International Arbitral 
Awards presented in the 69* conference o f International Law Association, held in London, 25-29 July 
2000, p5.
See, A/CN.9/SR.318, para 34-40.
See A/40/17, par 296.
See ibidi, para 277.
Ibid, para 297.
Ibidi, para 297 
ibidi, para 297.
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categories o f public policy, in order to avoid any possible doubt about the scope o f the 
public policy. For example, Australia, Scotland, New Zealand, India and Zimbabwe, 
have enacted modified versions of articles 34 and 36 of the Model Law, providing that 
“for avoidance o f doubt” and “without limiting the generality” o f articles 34 and 36, an 
award is contrary to public policy if: “the making o f the award was induced or affected 
by fraud or corruption”. England did not adopt the Model Law, but made this distinction 
clearly in s.68(2)(g) of the Arbitration Act 1996, which provides that the award may be 
set aside if  obtained by fraud, or procured in a way contrary to public policy.
Generally, public policy (substantive and procedural) may obviously cover a wide 
number o f matters, which may potentially affect the arbitral award. Substantive examples 
include breach o f good faith, abuse o f rights; activities that are contra bonos mores (e.g. 
piracy or terrorism, smuggling or drug trafficking) Procedural examples include breach 
of natural justice or due process. Therefore, when there is a violation of the fundamental 
principles of procedure, such as not providing a fair trial or not treating the parties 
equally, this may open the door for the arbitral award to be challenged^**^. Another 
example would be when the award is induced or affected by fraud, bribery or corruption.. 
So when a court is satisfied acts of deceit have been perpetrated on the arbitral tribunal 
(e.g. falsified certificates of ownership of the property claimed or perjured evidence) or 
on the other party (e.g. if  the tribunal was party to the fraud)^ ****, it may set aside the 
awai'd or refuse to recognise or enforce it. The court should have the same attitude when 
it is satisfied that any undue pecuniary or other advantage was offered, promised or 
given, whether directly or indirectly, to the arbitral tribunal or any witness. In other 
words, it may deny force to the arbitral award when there is evidence o f fraud, bribery or 
coiTuption. If  an award is procured by illegal means, there is a breach o f public policy.
The concept of public policy, as it is described by an English judge as “ ... a very unruly 
horse, and when once you get astride it you never know where it will carry you”^^ .^ 
[Emphasis added]. The approach o f the judiciary to public policy as a ground for 
challenging the arbitral awards is a vital matter. The court should not equate the public 
policy with national policy (in the diplomatic or foreign policy). For instance, the U.S. 
court o f Appeal, in Parsons & Whittemore v Société General de L ’Industrie^ h e l d  that
See for example Art 34 (2)(a)(iv) o f the Model Law. 
See R ussell, op.cit, para 8-045, at p 421. 
Richardson v Mellish, [1824] All ER Rep. 258.
508 F.2d 969 (2™' Cir. 1974).
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the court would not refrise to enforce the arbitral award in favour o f an Egyptian party 
simply due to the tensions at that time between U.S. and Egypt. The same attitude was 
taken in National Oil Corp. ~v~ Libyan Sun Oil Corp^^^, where the court rejected a 
challenge to an award at the enforcement stage on the ground that it was in favour of 
Libya - "a state known to sponsor international teiTorism". The U.S court noted that the 
United States still recognised the government o f Libya, had not declared war on it and 
had specifically given it permission to bring an action to confirm the award. However, 
one may wonder whether such outcomes might be different today (the war against 
t e r r o r ) ^Ne ve r th e l e s s ,  it is impossible to determine the attitude o f courts to public 
policy by statutory prescription, unless an attempt is finally made to define the concept 
more exactly. In light of the discussion above, that may prove an impossible task.
Recently, however, there has been a tendency to narrow the public policy as a ground for 
challenging an award^*"*. Systems sometimes classify the concept of public policy into 
international and domestic in order to narrow the scope of public policy as a ground for 
challenging awards which are international in the sense that although made in that state, 
the parties are not nationals o f that state. International public policy tends to be construed 
as connoting only the infringement of the most fundamental notions of morality and 
justice. This approach asks the court to distinguish between domestic and international 
public policy^ in that the policy considerations that apply in domestic relations or 
transactions do not necessary apply to international relations or transactions. It is 
believed that this approach promotes greater certainty and uniformity in that the impact 
o f public policy ground o f challenge, which largely depends on the domestic law o f the 
place o f enforcement, is thereby lessened.
733 F. Supp. 800 at 819 (Del., 1990).
See Treasa Dunworth, ‘The Use o f Arbitration to Enforce International Public Policy Setting Aside or 
Refusing Enforcement o f Awards on the Public policy Ground’ paper presented in AMINZ Conference, 
Auckland, 21-22 Feb.2003.
The International Commercial Arbitration Committee o f the International Law Association conducted a 
six years study into the application o f public policy by enforcement courts. The Committee concluded its 
work last year. Notwithstanding the very different legal and cultural traditions o f State courts, public policy  
is rarely successful in preventing enforcement o f international awards. Nevertheless, the Committee 
concluded that greater harmonisation of approach would lead to greater consistency and predictability, 
which would dissuade unmeritorious challenges to awards. The ILA Committee made a number o f  
recommendations, which were adopted at the ILA's 70* Conference in New Delhi, in April 2002. The 
Committee's Interim Report is available at www.ila-hq.org.
“International public policy” (rather than, simply, “public policy”) is increasingly referred to in 
legislation and court judgments. See International Law Association, Committee on International 
Commercial Arbitration, Interim Report on Public Policy as a Bar to Enforcement o f International Arbitral 
Award, London Conference, 2000, 1-36 at p 5. Examples for arbitration legislation are France, Portugal 
Algeria and Lebanon.
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Although neither the Model Law nor the 1996 Act refers to international public policy, 
the modern trend is towards formal adoption o f the concept of international public policy 
in national legislation?*^. So the French Code o f Civil Procedure (1981) Article 1498, 
which deals with an award made in France in an international arbitration^*^, states that an 
arbitral award shall be recognised and enforced in France, if  such recognition or 
enforcement is not manifestly contrary to international public policy. Furthermore, the 
concept of international public policy is also as a ground for setting aside an award made 
in France in international arbitration^*^. Accordingly, when the award is issued in France 
in an international arbitration, the standard of judicial review will be the standai'd of 
international public policy, while Article 1484 simply refers to (domestic) public policy 
in case of domestic arbitration. The purpose of this classification is to persuade the 
French judiciary to operate a more liberal concept of public policy in international 
arbitration.
The concept of public policy is obviously nebulous and fluid, differing in its content 
from country to country and over time.^*^ It may be influenced by the changing moods of 
the society in question or political, economic and social calculations. Nevertheless, it is 
vital element in the arbitral system, as it is invariably a constraint upon the operation o f 
the arbitral process. Even if no definitive content can be supplied for the concept, Kuwait 
should take note of the tendency towards narrowing the interpretation of public policy in 
international arbitration, so as to respect the finality of arbitral awards save where 
fundamental notions of morality and justice are violated. Thus the new act should 
explicitly recognise the existence o f two levels o f public policy, the national level 
concerned with purely domestic considerations, and the international level which is less 
restrictive in its approach^^**.
See A. Berg, ‘Distinction Domestic -International Public Policy’ (1996) XXI Yearbook at p 502.
Or with recognition and enforcement of an award rendered abroad.
See Art. 1502, 1504 and 1505.
This is known as principle o f the evolving character o f public policy. See J. Savage & E. Gaillard, op. 
cit., para 1650.
The growing recognition of nation o f international public policy is notable. This growing is not only in 
relation to enforcement o f foreign award, but also in relation to challenge an international award made in 
international arbitiation. Accordingly one may suggest being in the same line o f the movement. See P. 
Sanders (ed.). Comparative Arbitration Practice and Public Policy in Arbitration, ICCA Congress Series 
N o.3, Kluwer, New York 1986. See also International Law Association, Committee on International 
Commercial Arbitration, Interim Report on Public Policy as a Bar to Enforcement o f International arbitral 
Award, London Conference, 2000 and International Law Association, Committee on International
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(c) Form of the Arbitral Award
1) Introduction
This is one of the elements that may be brought under the supervision o f the court, since 
failure to comply with agreed or statutory requirements may open the door to challenge 
the arbitral award. Thus Article 183 of the Kuwaiti CCPL 1980 lays down statutory 
requirements for the form o f the award, and failure to justifies setting the award aside, as 
this defect in form renders it a would nullity^^*. Equally, s.68(2)(h) of the English 
Arbitration Act 1996 states that failure to comply with the requirements as to the form o f 
the award is regarded as a serious irregularity justifying a challenge. Also the Model Law 
allows a defective award to be challenged under Article 34(2)(a)(iv), on the ground that 
it has contravened a mandatory requirement^^^. Accordingly, it is important that the 
award shall meet the relevant statutory requirements in order to avoid the possibility o f 
challenge.
The next paragraphs shall consider the statutory requirements as to the form of the award 
as provided in CCPL 1980, the Model Law and the Arbitration Act 1996, to indicate the 
aspects which the court may examine in relation to the form o f the arbitral award.
2) The Matter of Writing
This is one o f the statutory requirements for the form of an arbitral award^^^. The 
requirement o f written form facilitates both enforcement and challenge while 
promoting ceitainty^^? Yet England recognises an “oral award”, if  the parties have so 
agreed. While this approach serves the principle of party autonomy, it may create 
fundamental problems such as how to prove the award or to determine exactly its
Commercial Arbitration, Final Report on Public Policy as a Bar to Enforcement o f International arbitral 
Award, New Delhi Conference, 2002.
See Art. 186 (d), this was confirmed in Attack no. 37,39/Comm. 1975 and Attack no 32,33/1983.
Even if  the Model Law does not contain particular legal consequences for the defective award, it is 
submitted that either the award does not qualify to be treated as an award at all, or else the arbitral 
procedure has contravened a mandatory provision o f the provision o f Model Law in terms o f Art. 
34(a)(iv). Art. 31 which establishes the formal requirements for all awards issued under the Model Law is 
considered mandatoiy one (except Art. 31(2) which allows the parties to derogate it). See Prof. F. 
Davidson, Arbitration, op. cit., para 17-16 at p 334; see also to the same author, International Commercial 
arbitration, para 10-43 at p 239.
See, Art. 31(1) o f the Model Law, sec. 52 (3) o f  the Arbitration Act 1996 and Art. 183 o f CCPL 1980.
See Russell, para 6-047 at 266. Since many legal systems require the award to be deposited with either 
the application to enforcement or to challenge the award. See for example Art. 185 o f CCPL 1980.
A/CN. 9/264, para 1,
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“operative part” . Thus, in the interests o f certainty the award must be required to be in 
writing.
3) The Matter of Reasons
The question whether the arbitral award should contain the reasons upon which it is 
based, is controversial. The parties may not be in favour of a reasoned award, and the 
practice o f stating the reasons upon which the award is based varies from one system to 
another^^^. The drafters o f the Model Law thought that the solution which would 
command most international acceptance plane would be to require such statement of 
reasons unless the parties agreed otherwise^^^. This approach suggests that the question 
o f a reasoned award is not a matter o f public policy. However, other systems require 
reasons without allowing the parties to contract out of this requirement. Kuwait is such a 
system, requiring a specific form of award, and stating that failure to comply with this 
statutory form may nullify the award. One o f the requirements of form is that the award 
contains the reasons upon which it is based. The philosophy behind this approach is that 
the required form is mandatory, as in the case o f a court judgement. This is exactly the 
same as the French attitude, as embodied in Article 1471 9(2) o f CCP 1981. Article 1480 
makes it clear that this provision is mandatory, and that failure to comply with this 
statutory requirement may justify a challenge^^? The rationale behind this requirement is 
that the parties must be able to understand how the arbitral tribunal arrived at its 
conclusions and thus the award. Moreover, it also enables the court to exercise 
adequately its supervisory role over the arbitral award, as a statement o f the reasons upon 
which the award was based would significantly help judicial review^^^, e.g. in 
considering a challenge on the basis o f error o f law^ *^*.
So failure to comply with requirement to provide reasons should indeed constitute a 
ground o f challenge. Yet the requirement to give reasons does not mean that the award 
should always resemble a court judgment. It is usually sufficient to explain why the
^^^Ibid, para 3.
A/CN.9/207, para 87.
However, in international arbitration, an award without reasons may be recognised and supported on 
ground of international public policy. See, Y. Derains, op. cit., 20. A. EI-Kosheri, op. cit., pp. 34-35.
See Ontrario Court o f Justice, General Division, Schreter v Gasmac Inc., [1992] B.L.R. (2d) 71 cited in 
H. Avarez et al., p244.
R. Mei'kin, op. cit., para 16.42 at Service Issue No 20:26 March 1998. For example, the court under Sec. 
70(4) could order further and better reasons be given when its view the given reason were inadequate to 
allow the state court to determine whether an error o f law was contained in the award for the purpose o f  
hearing an appeal on question o f law.
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arbitral tribunal reached its conclusion. Donaldson L.J. commented in Bremer 
Handelegsellschaft m bH V Westziicker GmbH,
“All that is necessary is that the arbitrators should set out what, on their 
view o f the evidence, did or did not happen and should explain 
succinctly why, in the light of what happened, they have reached their 
decision and what their decision is. Where [an] .. award differs from a 
judgement is in the fact that the arbitrators will not be expected to 
analyse the law and the authorities. It will be quite sufficient that they 
should explain how they reached their conclusion”^^ *.
Equally, the Court o f Cassation in Kuwait has held that an arbitral award is not measured 
according to the same criteria as a judgement. An award is not defective, if  it contains 
reasons in general or comprehensive form '^* .^
By contrast, both the Model Law and the Arbitration Act 1996 authorise the parties to 
reach such agreement on this requirement, as they see fit. Both approaches realise the 
importance o f the requirement for that those chosen to act judicially and charged with 
making a binding decision affecting the rights and the obligations of others to give the 
reasons upon which their decision is based. Yet as to whether this requirement should be 
mandatory or non-mandatory, one philosophy supports party autonomy, as well as 
recognising that not requiring reasons to be stated has certain advantages - the award 
could be rendered speedily, would be difficult to challenge, and could be appropriate for 
certain types o f arbitration, for example quality arbitration^^^. The other approach treats 
the award as equivalent to a decision of the pourt, and sees it as a matter of public policy 
that it should be rendered in the same form.
It is suggested that allowing such freedom may cause problems, especially In cases o f the 
arbitrator’s death or inability to proceed. Suppose the parties agreed that the award be 
unreasoned. One of the parties wishes to enforce the award, and the other party seeks to 
resist that. The reasons for the award are needed by the latter party to support his 
challenge {e.g. error o f law). Unfortunately, the arbitrator carmot provide reasons or is 
dead. What is the solution? It is surely preferable to have a reasoned award to avoid any 
such uncertainty. The advantages of making reasons mandatory outweigh the
[1981] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 130 at 132.
See Attack no. 19/1974 Comm. 2/6/1976 and Attack no. 46/1983 Comm. 22/2/1984.233 A/CN.9/216, para 80.
Ch. 4: Judicial Supervision over Arbitration 194
disadvantages, as such a requirement would have a beneficial influence on the decision 
o f the ai'bitral tribuna?^'*(to improve the quality of the arbitral decislons)^^^, and promote 
the certainty o f the award. It is therefore recommended that a reasoned award be 
required.
4) The Matter of Signature
It may be required that the arbitral award be signed. This may have additional 
significance, as in certain systems in the date of signature prim a facie  determines the 
date on which the award is made. This obviously helps determine such issues as whether 
the award was made within agreed time limits, or in calculating the time limit for a 
challenge. Thus it is recommended that an award be required to be signed and dated. 
However, one need not require the signatuie o f all the arbitrators, as such a requirement 
is open to practical abuse, and may cause improper delay. A dissenting arbitrator who is 
unwilling to sign should not be allowed to create a procedural obstacle for rendering the 
awai'd. Thus it is recommended that it be required that only majority of the arbitrators 
should have to sigif^^. Yet it should be required that if a minority o f arbitrators is 
unwilling to sign, this should be mentioned in the award by the other arbitrators. This is 
the rule in Kuwait (under Article 183), and also in France^^^. The Model Law goes 
further by requiring that the reasons for any omitted signature be stated^^? On the other 
hand, the Arbitration Act 1996 has no requirement at all in this regard, taking the view 
that dissenting arbitrators might not wish to be identified as such^^^ although s.52(3) 
requires that all arbitrators should be given the opportunity to sign the award, failing 
which it can presumably be challenged under s.68^ "***.
Ibid.
235 Holtzmann & Neiihaus, op. cit., at p 838 
See Art. 31 (1) o f the Model Law, sec. 52(3) o f Arbitration Act 1996 and Art. 183 of CCPL 1980.
See Art. 1473 o f CCP1982.
See Art. 31 (1) o f the Model Law.
DAC Report 1996, para 251.
R- Merkin, op. cit., para 16.18, Service Issue No 20:26 March 1998. Merkin refers the possible 
responsibility o f the arbitrator for his refusal in case o f the arbitration agreement requires all o f the 
arbitrators to sign the award. He cited Cargill International SA v Sociedad Iberica de Molturacion SA
(1997) the Times, 26 December.
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5) The Matter of Place and Date
The place where the arbitral award is made is an element that a court may examine, as it 
is significant in determining the question whether the award is domestic or foreign^"**. 
According to Kuwaiti law, the place o f signature is the place of rendering the award^"* ,^ 
which may be different from the seat o f arbitration. So an arbitral award signed in 
Kuwait is a Kuwaiti (domestic) award. By contrast. Article 31 (3) o f the Model Law 
ereates an iiTebuttable presumption^'*^ that the arbitral award is made at the place o f 
arbitration as stated in the award. So, it does not matter where an arbitrator happens to be 
when the award is signed. Accordingly, if  the place o f arbitration as determined by the 
parties or by the tribunal is Scotland, but for some reason the tribunal sits in France 
where indeed the award is signed, the award still be considered as made in Scotland. 
Meanwhile, s.52(5) o f The Arbitration Act 1996 states, “The award shall state the seat o f 
arbitration and the date when the award is made”. Fuither s. 53 automatically determines 
the place where award is treated as made '^*'*. The award will be deemed as made in 
England where it the seat o f arbitration. This is regardless of where the award was 
signed^'*?
The requirement that the award should state the date when it was made is also found in 
the CCPL 1980 and the Model Law. It is a useful requirement as the date o f the award 
will be o f assistance in calculating interest due on the award, and in determining such 
issues such as compliance with agreed time limits for making the award, and statutory 
time limits for appeals, challenges and the seeking o f corrections, interpretations and 
additional awai'ds.
The identity o f  the place at which the award was made would determine the law under which the award 
could be challenged and under which the award would be judged for certain purposes in enforcement 
proceedings. As cited in A/CN.9/216, para 79 “It was noted that the identity o f  the place o f the award 
might be relevant in enforcement proceedings under the 1958 New York Convention (e.g. Art. V, 1(e)- 
award set aside by a competent authority o f  the country in which the award was made”.
Art. 182 o f CCPL 1980.
A/CN.9/264, para 4.
This section derives from the Model Law, Art.3 1 (3). It provides “Unless otherwise agreed by the 
parties, where the seat o f the arbitiation is in England and Wales or Northern Ireland, any award in the 
proceedings shall be treated as made there, regardless o f where It was signed, despatched or delivered to 
any o f the parties” .
However the potential difficult o f  this provision is when the award states that it is signed in place 
Kuwait, thought the seat was England. In such case, each o f Kuwaiti court and English court could 
possibly have a jurisdiction. This might open the consideration o f the value o f this treatment from practical 
angle. It is submitted in case where the award states both the seat and the place where the award is made- if  
they differ-, although it may be hoped that the foreign courts constructing s.53 will understand its effect as 
being that the award signed, for example, as ‘made in Milan’ should be taken as have been ‘made in 
England’ where there is also a statement in the award that the place o f arbitration was London. See, B. 
Harris et a l ,  para [52C] at p250.
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6) Certainty and Ambiguity
All award may usually be challenged when it is uncertain or ambiguous as to its effect. 
Thus the CCPL 1980 states that an awai'd may be challenged where its text is 
contradictory, as such this contradiction makes it difficult to discern its effect. The 
Ai'bitration Act 1996 considers the uncertainty or ambiguity as to the effect of the award 
to be a serious irregularity that justifies challenging the award '^*'". This ground o f 
challenge may derive from the requirement that the award must be certain. It has been 
said
“An award must be certain in the sense that the tribunal’s decision on 
the matters dealt with must be clear from its face, as must the nature 
and extent o f the duties it imposes on the parties. If the effect o f the 
awai'd is uncertain or ambiguous, it will be susceptible to challenge
Therefore, it is required that the award must be clear exactly as to what is required to be 
done and by whom. For example when the award directs the payment of money, the 
award must be clear about the sum of the money that to be paid, by whom and to 
whom '^* .^
(d) Arbitral Award and Substantive Jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal
1) Introduction
This is another crucial element of judicial supervision of the arbitral award. The court 
must ensure, first, that the arbitral tribunal has jurisdiction, and secondly, that it does not 
exceed the scope o f that jurisdiction. As the tribunal derives its jurisdiction exclusively 
from the arbitration agreement, the court must ensure it remains within the bounds of that 
agreement. This type of supei-vision thus indirectly supports pai'ty autonomy.
2) Lack of Jurisdiction
Jurisdictional issues are often linked to the validity o f the arbitration agreement, as given 
that that agreement is the sole source o f the tribrmal’s jurisdiction, its invalidity makes it
See sec. 68 (2)(f).
See, Russell, op. cit, paia 6-093 at p 284.
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possible for a party to say that tribunal has no jurisdiction^'*^. The theory is that there ean 
be no valid arbitration without a valid arbitration agreement. We have seen that an 
arbitral award may be challenged or refused enforcement on the ground that the arbitral 
tribunal lacks jurisdiction because o f the invalidity o f the arbitration agreement (e.g. 
illegality o f the main contract). Yet we have also seen that such an allegation does not 
prevent the arbitral tribunal ruling on its own jurisdiction, by virtue o f the principle o f 
competence-competence. Of course the court has the last word in matters o f jurisdiction, 
and if  it is satisfied that the arbitral tribunal does not have jurisdiction, it will not support 
the award.
The ruling o f the arbitral tribunal on its own jurisdiction is subject to the supervision o f 
the court. Thus, s.31(4) of Arbitration Act 1996 provides that when one o f the aibitrating 
parties challenges the jiu'isdiction of the arbitral tribunal, it may rule on its own 
jurisdiction either in a jurisdictional award or as part of the award on the merits of the 
dispute. In either case such determination must surely be subject to the supervision o f the 
court. So s.67 states
“(1) A party to arbitral proceedings may (upon notice to the other 
parties and to the tribunal) apply to the court -
(a) Challenging any award of the arbitral tribunal as to its substantive 
jurisdiction; or
(b) For an order declaring an award made by the tribunal on the merits 
to be o f no effect, in whole or in part, because the tribunal did not have 
substantive jurisdiction.
(3) On an application under this section challenging an award o f the 
arbitral tribunal as to its substantive jurisdiction, the court may by 
order -
(a) Confirm the award, (b) vary the award, or (c) set aside the award 
in whole or in part” .
By contrast, the Model Law does not provide for court control over the decision o f the 
arbitral tribunal on its own jurisdiction, except where it decides that it has jurisdiction. 
However, if  it decides that it has no jurisdiction; the court has no right to review such a
Ibid., para 6-094 at p 284.
As submitted that objections to the tribunal’s jurisdiction go to the very foundation o f arbitration. See 
A/CN.9/264, para 11.
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decision . Such a ruling would presumably lead the parties to litigate, and thus creates 
the possibility that the court will decide that the issue is covered by a valid arbitration 
clause, so that the tribunal does have jurisdiction. This possibility persuaded Scotland in 
adopting the Model Law to amend Article 16(3), so that a party may appeal to the court 
against the tribunal’s ruling that it has no jurisdiction^^*.
3) Exceeding Jurisdiction
If  the arbitral tribunal has jurisdiction, but exceeds it, the court may again be involved in 
the arbitration. Its intervention may be triggered upon an allegation by the unsuccessful 
pai'ty that the arbitral tribunal exceeded its substantive jurisdiction, perhaps because the 
award covers matters beyond the scope o f that jurisdiction, or confers a remedy that the 
parties did not authorise. The award is then susceptible to challenge. So Article 
34(2)(a)(iii) of the Model Law provides that it is a ground for setting aside the award that
“the award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not falling 
within the terms o f the submission to arbitration, or contains decisions 
on matters beyond the scope o f the submission to arbitration”.
Moreover, s.67 o f the Arbitration Act 1996 declares that a party may challenge an award 
on the basis that the arbitral tribunal lacks jurisdiction, while s.68(2)(b) indicates that if  
the tribunal exceeds its powers, this is a serious irregularity justifying a challenge^^^. 
Kuwait also stated that it is a ground for setting aside the award that the arbitral tribunal 
has acted outside the scope of its jurisdictioif^^. Such provisions indirectly place a duty 
on the arbitral tribunal to act within its substantive jurisdiction and not exceed its powers. 
It is the tribunal’s responsibility to comply with its mandate^^'*. In certain systems there 
is a powerfril presumption that the arbitral tribunal aeted within its powers, which a 
challenging party has to overcome, as is seen in the decision of Ontario Superior Court
250 The idea behind making the ruling by the tribunal that it has no jurisdiction is final was that it is 
inappropriate to compel arbitrators who had mad such decision to continue the proceedings. See A/40/17, 
para 163.
The view o f the Dervaii d Committee that if  the parties were informed by the h ibunal that it lacked 
jurisdiction and thereafter resort to litigation, either party could petition the court under Art. 8 to refer the 
matter to arbitration, which it would be bound to do so if satisfied that the arbitral tribunal has jurisdiction. 
The Dervaird Committee opined that this is a veiy roundabout way. See Prof. F. Davidson, Arbitration, 
para 11.19 at p 200-201.
Sec. 68(2)(b) o f 1996 Act.
Art. 186 (a) o f  CCPL 1980.
The French CCP codified this view in Art. 1484 (2)(3), which provides that if  the arbitrator decided in 
manner incompatible with the mission conferred upon him”.
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o f Justice in Corporacion Transnational de Inversiones v. STET International (1999)^^^. 
This illustrates a positive attitude towards the award, and minimises the possibility of 
tactical challenges, unless there is strong evidence to rebut that “powerful presumption” 
and justify the coiu’t’s involvement.
4) Omission of Matters in the Award
The arbitral tribunal is expected to deal with all issues referred to it. However, suppose it 
fails to do so? Is this a ground of challenge? Under the Model Law, Article 33(3) states
“Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, a party, with notice to the 
other party, may request, within thirty days of receipt of the award, the 
arbitral tribunal to malce an additional award as to claims presented in 
the arbitral proceedings but omitted from the award. If  the arbitral 
tribunal considers the request to be justified, it shall make the 
additional awai’d within sixty days” .
Thus the making of an additional awai’d would resolve such an omission. It will be noted, 
nonetheless, that the Model Law imposes a time limit for seeking such an additional 
award, while the provision is not mandatory. What then happens if  that time limit is 
allowed to elapse, or the pai-ties contract out of this right? The Model Law does not 
provide a cleai’ answer to these questions. It might be suggested that the omission of 
issues or claims raised in by the submission might not be regarded as a ground o f 
challenge o f the arbitral award, as it is not mentioned in the exclusive list of grounds laid 
down by Article 34(2). Accordingly, an interested party might seek to enforce the 
arbitration agreement so as to resolve by arbitration the issues not covered by the arbitral 
award. The alternative view is that failure of the arbitral tribunal to deal with all issues 
referred to it in the arbitral award is a ground o f challenge on the basis that the arbitral 
proceedings were not conducted in accordance with the agreement of the parties^^^. This 
approach attempts to widen the concept o f the arbitral proceedings to cover the arbitral 
award taking the view that if  the arbitral tribunal does not comply with its mandate, the 
arbitral procedure is not conducted as agreed by the parties^^^. Each o f these arguments
See H. Alvarez et al., op. cit., pp. 212- 218.
See Art. 34 (2)(a)(iv) o f the Model Law. See also P. Sanders, Int'l Enzycl.Comp.L., para 196, p 132. 
Ibid., para 236, p 161.
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has its merits, but it would be better had the Model Law provided a clear answer to this 
question.
Section 57(3)(b) o f the 1996 Act allows an additional award, while s.68(2)(d) clearly 
treats failure by the arbitral tribunal to deal with all the issues put to it, as a serious 
iiTegularity, and thus a ground o f challenge. However, s.70(2)(b) indicates that a 
challenge may not be made imless the applicant has exhausted any available recourse^^^. 
Thus the Act supports party autonomy and the power o f the tribunal, seeing court 
intervention as a last resort. This is frirther emphasised by the fact that, if  the opportunity 
to seek an additional award has not been taken within the time limit, an interested party 
may seek the support of the court to extend the time limit^^^.
In Kuwait, as the CCPL 1980 does not deal with this matter in the context o f arbitration, 
one must look to the general principles which apply to litigation^^**. On that basis, it may 
be said that the arbitral tribimal may make an additional awar d, if  the application is made 
within six months from the date o f the original award^"^*. Otherwise, the court has 
jurisdiction to make an additional award^^* .^ Failure to deal with all issues is not a ground 
o f challenge, and the Kuwaiti system does not recognise the idea o f remission. It might 
be recommended that the arbitral tribunal should be allowed to make an additional 
award, since while an award usually terminates the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal, if 
it omits issues from the award it still has jurisdiction with respect to the issues not 
determined. This may offer a chance to the parties to return arbitration to resolve such 
issues, and prevent the court dealing with those issues, as well as offering the arbitral 
tribunal a chance to fulfil its entire mandate. If  the defect can be put right by the tribunal 
itself, without resorting to the coml, this seems a sensible solution, and is recommended 
for adoption. Yet if  the defect cannot be put right by the arbitral tribunal itself, as where 
the application is made out of time, it may be helpful be to be permitted to resort to court 
to extend such time limit, as under the 1996 Act. All the legislation examined lays down 
a time limit for an arbitral tribunal to make an additional award, in order to discourage
The Model Law does not provide such statuary requirement.
Sec. 12 o f the Arbitration Act 1996.
This is unlike the French treatment that empowers the arbitral tribunal to correct, interpret and to 
complete the award when it has omitted to rule on an element o f the claims. See Art. 1475 o f  CCP 1981. 
See Art. 126 o f CCPL 1980.
This likes the French treatment where it states that if the arbitral tribunal cannot be reconvened, this 
power shall be vested in the court. See Art. 1475 o f CCP 1981.
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delay. Yet if  a party had the option to ask the court to extend such a period, that might 
prove useful.
Kuwait might also consider designating failure to exliaust the submission as a ground for 
challenging the arbitral award. There need be no fear about the possibility o f setting 
aside in such circumstances if  the court was under an obligation not to set the award 
aside, in whole or in part, unless it were satisfied that it would be inappropriate to remit 
the matters in question to the arbitral tribunal for completion. This requirement would 
eliminate any concern that such omission does not justify setting aside the award, and 
signal the policy of the Arbitration Act to limit the exercise of the court’s power, where 
the tribunal might still play a role The English model is instructive here, as before the 
advent of the possibility of remission, the English courts had to set aside many awards 
for failure to exliaust the submission, the view being that the entire award was vitiated by 
such failure^^^.
4.4 Remedies Available to the Court
(a) Introduction
Wliat remedies does the court have when an award is challenged? Modern arbitral 
systems appear to offer the court a number o f options, but this is not the case in Kuwait. 
Therefore, the following paragraphs ask what lessons may be learnt from the modern 
systems. There are indeed a number o f types o f remedies, which are common to the 
CCPL 1980, the Model Law and the Arbitration Act 1996, e.g. the power of the court to 
confirm, vary, or set aside an award. However, in the context of setting aside, the remedy 
of remission is very important. Therefore, the following pai'agraphs deal firstly with 
setting aside, particulai'ly the effect of such and order before looking at remission as a 
device to avoid the ultimate remedy o f setting aside.
(b) Setting Aside
This remedy is available under the CCPL 1980, the Model Law and the Arbitration Act 
1996. But what are the consequences o f setting aside upon the arbitration agreement?^*"'*
See R. Merkin, op. cit., para 16:31, Service Issue no 31:31 March 2002.
According to the Art. V. (1) (e) o f New York Convention 1958 -which adopted by the Model Law 
Art.3 6 (1) (v)- where an award is setting aside in the country in which was made, this is one o f  the grounds 
for reflisal o f  recognition and enforcement. However, this now is not always true. See for example 
Chromalloy Aeroservices v. Arab Republic o f Egypt, 939 F. Supp. 907- 909 (D.D.C. 1996) and Baker
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The Model Law says nothing about the legal effects of setting aside. At one point the 
Secretariat suggested dealing with the question of how a party may pursue his claim after 
the arbitral award has been set aside^^? It proposed that if  the ground o f setting aside was 
lack o f a valid ai'bitration agreement, the party would have to litigate^^^, while if  the 
award was set aside on other grounds, there would be two possible solutions. One would 
be to conclude that the arbitration did not work, and refer the parties to court without, of 
course, taking away the option o f making an arbitration agreement^**^. The other 
possibility would be to reactivate the original arbitration agreement, on the view that it 
was still operative^*^^, as the mandate o f the arbitral tribunal would have revived when the 
award was set aside. However, neither the Working Group nor the Commission 
considered this proposal, with the result that the Model Law does not deal with the 
question.
On the other hand, both the Arbitration Act 1996 and the CCPL 1998 provide an answer 
to this matter, although they aie totally different. Their common ground is that when the 
order to set aside is based on ground that the arbitration agreement is invalid or non­
existent there can be no new arbitration. However, if  the order is based on other grounds, 
for instance, the constitution of the arbitral tribunal was not in accordance the rules 
(agreed or statutory), the laws differ as to whether a new arbitration can be resumed. 
English law takes the view that setting aside the award does not affect the validity o f the 
agreement between the parties to resolve their disputes by arbitration. Accordingly, the 
dispute shall ultimately be resolved by arbitration unless the parties agree to terminate 
their arbitration agreement^*^**. Setting aside does not revive the original jurisdiction of 
the court to hear the dispute, which was suspended by the arbitration agreement. The 
effects of that agreement continue, unless the parties agree otherwise. By contrast, in 
Kuwait an order to set aside the award automatically terminates the agreement to 
arbitrate, and invests the court with jurisdiction to determine the merits of the dispute.
Marine Ltd. V Chevron Ltd, 191 F.3d 194 (2d Cir. 1999). See also R. Mosk & R. Nelson, ‘The Effects o f  
Confuming and Vacating an international Arbitration Award on Enforcement in Foreign Jurisdictions’ 
(2001) 18(4) J.Int. Arb. 463-474.
A/CN,9/W G.n/W P.50, para 24.
Ibid.
Ibid., para 25.
Ibid., para 26.
See, R. Merkin, op, cit., para 18.28, Service Issue No.32; 30 August 2002
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Although an Arbitration Act has to favour arbitration, in such cases there may be a 
strong desire to put an end to the dispute by a judgement. So, after long ai'bitral 
proceedings and challenge proceedings, in light of the matter of time and costs, it might 
not be a good idea to let the parties (or one o f them) suffer the expenditure of extra 
money and time. Delayed justice is no justice. Thus, settling the disputes by the court in 
such cases may be a proper and practical outcome. However, this may run contrary to 
party autonomy, as the parties have chosen arbitration not litigation. It is therefore 
recommended that where a court decides to set aside the arbitral award, it shall decide 
the merits o f the dispute, as part o f the same proceedings. This suggestion would allow 
justice to be done in due time, ensuring that no extra time or costs were expended, 
contrary to the interest o f the parties. However, the parties should be allowed to contract 
out o f this jurisdiction, in line with the principle o f party autonomy. This is the approach 
taken by France, which states in CCP 1980 Article 1485,
“Whenever a court seized o f a motion to set aside does set the award 
aside, it decides on the merits o f the case within the limits o f the 
ai'bitrator’s mission, unless the parties are agreed to the contrary”.
So, when the court sets aside the arbitral award, it shall itself decide the disputes, unless 
the parties object^^**.
(c) Remission
As noted above, this type of relief is not recognised in Kuwait, although available in both 
the Model Law and the Arbitration Act 1996^^*. Article 34(4) of the Model Law states,
“The court, when asked to set aside an award, may, where appropriate 
and so requested by a party, suspend the setting aside proceedings for a 
period o f time determined by it in order to give the arbitral tribunal an 
opportunity to resume the arbitral proceedings or to take such other 
action as in the arbitral tribunal's opinion will eliminate the grounds for 
setting aside”.
270 See the same treatment in Italy. See CCP 1994 Art. 830 (2) and Tunisia Arbitration Code 1992, Art.44 
(2) and Art. 78(5).
In principle, once an award has been made, the arbitral tribunal becomes functus officio. However, 
reemission o f an award, by the court, will resunect the arbitral jurisidction to the arbitral tribunal only on 
matters remitted to it. see Aiden Shipping Co. Ltd. v Interbulk Ltd. (The Vimeira)[1986]2 Lloyd’s rep. 177
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While s.68(3) of the Arbitration Act 1996 provides, “the court may (a) remit the award to 
the tribunal, in hole or in part, for reconsideration”.
It may be mentioned that before the Model Law, remission as an alternative to setting 
aside was known only to common law systems^^^. The drafters o f the Model Law after 
some doubts about whether they should adopt it, agreed to provide this mechanism as it 
must prove useful in that it enables the arbitral tribunal to cure a certain defect and, 
thereby, save the award from being set aside by the court^ **^ .
Remission then allows procedural defects to be cured without having to vacate the 
award; by allowing the arbitral tribunal to resume the arbitral proceedings or to take such 
other step as in its view will eliminate the grounds for setting aside^ '^*. The device also 
reinforces the policy of supporting arbitration as a method o f resolving disputes, as the 
court need not always vitiate the arbitral proceedings whenever there is a defect. Thus, 
this remedy may allow the dispute to be resolved within the arbitral environment, albeit 
that it lies at the option o f the court.
It may be noted that the Model Law requires a request by a party to open up the 
possibility o f remission, its drafters not having adopted a proposal to delete the 
requirement that a party must request the remission procedure^^^. During discussions 
there was a view that the provision should be amended to provide that the court had the 
power to order remission on its own motion and not only at the request of a party 
However, the prevailing view was that the power o f the court to remit should be only at a 
request o f a party, as if  the court had the power to remit the award o f its own initiative, 
the potential costs to the parties would be much higher^*'''. By contrast, the court may 
order remission of its own initiative under the 1996 Act, Another difference between the 
Model Law and the 1996 Act is as regards the time limit o f making a fresh award in 
respect of the matters remitted. The Model law does not suggest any time limit within 
which the arbitral tribunal must make such a new award, although it empowers the court 
to determine the period of time o f suspension of the setting aside proceedings. On the 
other hand, s.71(3) o f the 1996 Act gives the arbitral tribunal tlii'ee months within which
A/CN.9/264, para 13.
Ibid., para 127.
See, A/40/17, para 307.
See Mr. Jarvin, observer ICC, in A/CN.9/SR.319, para 13.
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to make a fresh award after remission of the original award, in whole or part, subject to 
the power of the court to amend this period, as it sees fit. This is preferable. Neither 
measure provides a sanctioif^^ in case o f failure to comply with the time limit for 
making a new award, although it has been suggested that this is a minor shortcoming that 
the legislature may address^^^. It is argued that the idea that there should be a time limit 
for the arbitral tribunal to make its fresh award may not add any thing valuable, 
especially if  there is no specific sanction in event of breaching this delay. In the context 
o f remission the arbitral tribunal is still subject to the duty to act properly and without 
any delay, and thus subject to the legal consequences of breaching this general duty. 
Nonetheless, the provision o f a time limit may organise the procedures and put the 
arbitral tribunal under some kind of pressure to cure its defects in due time.
A remission system is thus recommended. It may be true that it may cause problems for 
arbitrators, particularly, if they are located in different countries, and increase the 
expenses o f the arbitral proceedings^^^. Yet it may save the parties time and money in 
cases where otherwise the award would be set aside, leaving the parties to rearbitrate or 
litigate. Thus remission system may inflict less harm on the parties than setting aside the 
award. Furthermore, the remedy would be very helpful in cases such as where the award 
is not complete, uncertain or ambiguous, or where it does not meet agreed or statutory 
formal requirements. In such cases, the court may, instead o f destroying the arbitral 
operation, remit the case to the arbitral tribimal to cure defects wliich otherwise would 
necessarily lead to the setting aside of the award. Adopting the common law approach, 
which requires the court not to exercise its power to set aside, unless it is satisfied that it 
would be inappropriate to remit the matter in question to the arbitral tribunal for 
reconsideration would add additional importance and effectiveness to the remission 
system.
See, Mr. Mataiigo (United Republic o f  Tanzania) in A/CN.9/SR.319, para 16.
The old provisions suggested remitting the award to a fresh panel. See sec.22 o f Arbitration Act 1950. 
The court, under Arbitration Act 1996, has no such power. However, failure o f the arbitrator is a ground o f  
removal.
See, B. Harris et a i ,  op. cit., para[71D] at 322.
See Mr. Szurski (Observer from Poland) in A/CN.9/SR.319, para 15. It may also possibly enforce a 
party to seek for vacancy to be filled, where an arbitrator who for some reasons cannot continue in office 
{e.g. died or ill). It is advised that a party, in such possible case, might apply for removal or vacancy at the 
same time as the application as the application o challenge an award. See R. Merkln, op. cit., para 18.30, 
Service Issue N o.32: 30 Aumist 2002.
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4.5 Limitations on Court Intervention:
(a) Restrictive List of Grounds for Challenge
When the Arbitration Act sets out a list o f ground upon which an award may be 
challenged, its aim should be to limit court supervision, by making it clear that the court 
caimot intervene except on those grounds mentioned in the Act. The policy is adopted by 
the CCPL 1982, the Model Law and the Arbitration Act 1996. The provisions o f CCPL 
1982 make it clear that the policy o f a restrictive list o f grounds o f challenge is adopted 
in Kuwait^^^ In relation to the Model Law, it was made clear that the reasons for setting 
aside the award provided in Article 34(2) are exhaustive, as indicated by the fact that the 
court may intervene “only” on those grounds^^^, which are also the grounds for refusing 
enforcement and recognition of the award under Article 36. Containing an exclusive list 
o f limited grounds on which the arbitral award may be challenged is considered to be a 
significant achievement o f the Model Law^^^. It may be noted that error o f law is not a 
gromid o f challenge under the Model Law^ "^ .^
The Arbitration Act 1996 takes a similar approach. Against the interventionist 
background o f the previous English law, it stresses that the court does not have a general 
supervisory jurisdiction over arbitration, but is limited to the specific cases where 
challenge can be made^^^. So, the list o f irregularities is closed list, which it will not be 
open to the court to extend^^^. ITowever, the chaffers o f the Act did not adopt the policy 
of the Model Law in having a similarly restricted list of grounds for resisting 
enforcement. Although s.66(3) states,
“leave to enforce an award shall not be given where, or to the extent 
that, the person against whom it is sought to be enforced shows that the 
tribunal lacked substantive jurisdiction to make the award”.
There are other grounds which are not specified, but upon which a party may rely on to 
oppose the grant of leave to enforce, such as serious irregularity, or pending appeal on a
France has the same approach. It is submitted that the grounds listed for challenging an award in art. 
1484 (domestic arbitration) and 1502 (international Arbitration) are exhaustive and any alleged basis for 
review not listed in those articles e.g. errors of law is inadmissible. See J. Savage & E. Gaillard, op. cit., para 1603. 
A/CN .9/264, para 5.
See, Explanatory Note on the model Law, para 42.
See Quintette Coal Ltd. V. Nippon Steel Corp, British Columbia Supreme Court (Esson C.J.B.C.) 1990, 
[1991] 1 W.W.R. 219 in H. Alvarez et a l, op. cit., p 218.
See DAC 1996 Report, para 280.
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point of English law or the matters of arbitrability or public policy^^^. The drafters o f the 
Act made it clear that s. 66 (3) is not a closed list^^^, the DAC remarking,
“The reason for this is that the clause does not require the court to 
order enforcement, but only to give it a discretion to do so. That 
discretion is only fettered in negative way i.e. be setting out certain 
cases where enforcement shall not be ordered. To our minds there is 
nothing to prevent a court from refusing to enforce an award in other 
appropriate cases. Unlike, for example, clause 68, there is no closed 
list of cases where leave to enforce an award may be refused”^^ .^
This then permits the court to intervene as it thinks fit and proper without any limitation. 
This might not preferable, in light of the policy of limiting court intervention, or in the 
interests of the parties, who should be able to anticipate the grounds for resisting 
enforcement. Thus it would be preferable for Ai'bitration Act to adopt the policy o f a 
closed, limited list, as under the Model Law. This would clearly delineate the 
relationship between the court and arbitration, allowing everyone to know in advance 
and the extent o f supervisory role o f the state court over the arbitral award, and curtailing 
judicial discretion.
However, what is the role o f party autonomy here? May the parties contract out o f one or 
more o f the closed list o f grounds o f challenge, and may they add additional grounds to 
that list? In relation to the first matter, provisions governing grounds o f challenge and 
judicial review are usually mandatory, but not always. Arbitration legislation may 
confirm the scope o f judicial scrutiny of arbitral awards and set out a list of grounds for 
challenge, but make these provisions non-mandatory. Both the CCPL 1982 and the 
Arbitration Act 1996 make it clear that their grounds are mandatory, so that parties 
camiot contract out of any o f them. The Model Law, on the other hand, does not address 
the question o f what is regarded mandatory or not. It may be argued that the parties 
caimot contract out the exclusive grounds for challenge an award under the Model Law, 
as they are impliedly m a n d a t o r y O n  this basis, if  the parties agreed to exclude the
para 282.
See sec. 81 (l)(a) and (c) o f the Arbitration Act 1996.
DAC 1996 Report, para 375.
^^ '^ Ibid., para 374.
See Prof F Davidson, Arbitration, 2000, para 18.21 at p 363. The wording o f  e.g. Art. 34 in permitting 
challenges only on grounds enumerated may not leave much space for contractual modification o f  the 
judicial review. One may compare the used language in 34 and the used language in e.g. Art. 10 (Freedom
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power o f the court to scrutinise the award, or if  an arbitration clause incorporated rules^^^ 
to that effect, such agreement or rules will be ineffective. Yet others argue that the 
parties may indeed contract out o f these provisions. This view is taken by the Ontario 
Court o f Justice, in Nobel China Inc. v. Lef'^^ which after reviewing the Model Law and 
the Analytical Commentaiy contained in the Report of the Secretary General o f 
LOSfCITRAL, decided that Article 34 is non-mandatory. Such divergent views are 
attributable to the failure o f the Model Law to address this issue properly.
Can the parties extend the scope o f the judicial supervision over the arbitral award? Wliat 
is the legal value of having in the arbitration agreement a clause such as the award shall 
be final and binding on both parties, except that errors o f law shall be subject to appeal. 
As aforementioned, error o f law is not a ground for challenge an award under the Model 
Law. But, if  the parties enlarge the supervisory role by agreement, would this be 
recognised? In fact, there was at one point a proposal to enable the parties to agree on 
wider scope of court intervention. However, there were some doubts about whether the 
parties could be expected to draft an agreement on the point that would adequately deal 
with this problem, while concerns were also expressed that institutional arbitration rules 
might include a provision extending judicial review, and the parties who had agreed to 
the use o f those rules might be subject to a greater degree of court intervention than they 
had expected^^^. After deliberation the Commission adopted Article 5 in its current form. 
The philosophy o f this article is that the Model Law contains a categorical and 
exhaustive enumeration of the instances in which the court may intervene, and excludes 
the theory o f general court supervision. The Article states that the court cannot intervene 
except as provided by the Model Law, thus freezing the level of court intei'vention to the 
extent found in its provisions. Articles 34 and 36 are covered by this principle, as 
matters such as setting aside and recognition and enforcement of an award are matters 
which are regulated by the provisions o f the Model Law. By requiring that any instance 
o f court involvement be listed in the provisions o f the Model Law, the effect o f Article 5
to determine the number o f arbitrators); Art. 13 (Freedom to agree on procedure for challenge o f arbitrator 
and 33(1) (parties’ freedom to vaiy the time frame within which the tribunal should announce corrections 
and interpretations to the award). Further, contractual modification to the judicial review could be difficult 
due to the discipline o f Art 5. It argues that Art.5 o f the Model Law shuts the door completely on the 
ability o f  the ability o f  the parties to modify the standards for judicial review o f arbitral award. See V. 
Raghavan, ‘Heightened Judicial review o f Arbitial Awards: Perspectives from the UNCITRAL Model 
Law and English Arbitration Act 1996 on some US developments’ (1998) 15 (3) J. Inf 1. Arb. 103-134.
For instance, ICC Rules o f Arbitration, Art. 28.6, see also article 26.9 o f LCIA Rules.
(1998) 42 B.L.R. (2”‘*) 262, see also H. Alvarez et a i ,  op. cit., p 214.
A/40/17, para 64.
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is to exclude any general or residual powers o f the court, which are not listed in the 
Model Law^ "^ .^ This philosophy aimed to create certainty for the parties and arbitrators as 
to the instances in which court supervision (or assistance) is to be expected and 
anticipated^^^
There is no doubt about that arbitration is a consensual process, the health o f which is 
best ensured by enabling its users to conduct their arbitration in whatever way they have 
agreed to be suitable. This is subject only to certain exceptions designed to ensure that 
courts are not required to countenance procedures and awards in circumstances, which 
render them objectionable. It would appear that Articles 5, 34 and 36 of the Model Law 
indicated an intention to minimise judicial controP^^, setting not only the minimum level 
of judicial control, but its maximum, eliminating even those means o f judicial control, 
which the parties themselves desire to retain^^^.
Again in the context of the Arbitration Act 1996 it seems that the scope o f judicial 
supervision cannot be expanded by agreement. An agreement to extend the scope for 
challenge is clearly rendered ineffective, firstly because the provisions o f ss.67 and 68 
are m a n d a t o r y s o  that the parties may not contract out of or alter any ground on the 
list provided in the Act. The provisions o f s. 69 (appeal on questions of law) are not 
mandatory, and therefore may be excluded by the parties. Secondly, it is one o f the 
principles o f the Act that in matters governed by it (including judicial control) the court 
shall not intervene except as provided by the Act^^^. This indicates very clearly that any 
agreement to expand judicial review would violate the limiting language o f the principle 
provided in section 1 (c).
Yet the possibility of heightened judicial review o f the arbitral award is adopted in some 
systems. For example, the United States Federal Court recognises this possibility in a 
number o f cases. Therefore, in Gateway Technologies Inc. V. Mci Telecommunications 
Corp.,^^'^ the US Federal Court of Appeal for the fifth Circuit had again to deal with the 
question o f expanded judicial review o f arbitral determinations. The parties agreed that 
the arbitral award should be final and binding on both parties, except that errors o f law
A/CN.9/264, para 2.
Ibid., para 2.
see Quintette Coal Ltd. V. Nippon Steel Corp (1990), 47 B.C.L.R. (2 ‘*) 201 (S.C). 
C/AN.9/263/ADD.2, para 36 (UK Comments).
See sec. 4 o f the Arbitration Act 1996.
See ibid., sec. 1.
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shall be subject to appeal The Coiut o f Appeal noted that, while normally only a narrow 
standard o f review was available under s. 10 o f the FAA, here the parties had 
contractually agreed to permit expanded review o f the award. It found that such a 
stipulation in the arbitration agreement was acceptable, since the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Mastrobuono v Shearson Lenham^^^ had emphasised that arbitration was a 
creature o f contract, and the FAA’ s pro-arbitration policy did not operate without regard 
to the wishes of the contracting parties^^^.
However, the question o f the ability of the users o f arbitration to expand the scope o f the 
judicial review of an award may be still unclear in the US, as the United States Court of 
Appeal for the Tenth Circuit decided in Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co.,^^^ that the parties 
are not free to interfere with judicial process by imposing on the state courts a heightened 
standards o f review of awards. This conclusion would diverge from the contrary result 
reached by the US Courts of Appeal for the Fifth and Ninth Circuits, respectively^®"^. The 
view o f the Tenth Circuit was that "expanded judicial review undermines the policies 
behind the FAA by tlmeatening the independence o f arbitration and weakening the 
distinction between arbitration and adjudication”^®^  According to the Tenth Circuit, 
Congress had through the FAA set out explicit guidance regarding judicial standards of 
review o f arbitral awards, and if  the parties have a desire broader appellate review, they 
could agree on an appeal to another arbitral tribunal or another body of second 
instance^®®.
This decision thus leaves the federal appellate courts divided on whether the users o f 
arbitration may expand the scope of judicial review o f arbitral awards. It has been said,
“This spilt highlights the tension between the federal policy in favour 
o f restrictive review o f arbitral awards and the federal policy in favour 
o f enforcing private contracts to arbitrate as written. Until the United 
States Supreme Court rules explicitly on this issue, the validity of the
™ 64 F. 3d 993 [1995].
514 U.S 52 [1995].
Another example see Lapine Technology v Kyocera Cor., 130 F. 3d 884 [9 ’^ Cir. 1997]. In this case the 
U. S. Court o f Appeal, in this case, concluded that expanding Judicial review through agreement o f  the 
parties was legally legitimate.
254 F. 3d 925 [2001].
See, D. Donovan & R. Dickson, ‘US: Parties’ Ability to Expand the Scope o f Judicial Review of the 
Arbitral Award’ (2002) 5(5) Int’l Arb.L.Rev. 58.
Ibid., 59.
Ibid.
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agreements to expand judicial review will depend upon the court in 
which enforcement o f an arbitral award is sought”®®^.
It is recommended that the Arbitration Act makes it clear whether the parties may extend 
the scope o f judicial review. Moreover, while one o f the most vital features o f modem 
arbitration legislation is to limit court involvement as much as possible, the court must 
still supervise the arbitral process. As Lord Saville states,
“Justice dictates that certain rules should apply to dispute resolution of 
this kind. Since the state is in overall charge o f justice... the courts 
should not hesitate to intervene as and when necessary, so as to ensure 
that justice is done in private as well as public tribunals”®®^.
The chief purposes o f setting forth statutory grounds upon which the court may intervene 
to supervise the arbitral award are not only to minimise and limit judicial control- by 
declaring that the court cannot be involved except upon those statutory groimds - but also 
to limit the grounds for challenging the award. If the Arbitration Act adopts tlie recent 
tendency toward limiting court involvement, this might also suggest that the parties 
should not have a free hand to tailor the role of the court. Thus, when the act decides to 
set forth grounds of challenge, this list should be appropriate, exclusive and mandatory. 
Nonetheless, when the law desires to give the arbitration users freedom to limit or extend 
the grounds o f challenge, it should state this very clearly®®®. Thus the 1996 Arbitration 
Act indicates that the provisions conferring the right to appeal on questions of law are 
not mandatory, but the other grounds of challenges ai'e®*®. Without such legislative 
permission, the extent of judicial involvement camrot be altered by a private contract®
Ibid. See also R. Greig & I. Reznik, ‘Current Developments in Enforcement o f Arbitration Awards in 
the United states’ (2002) 68(2) Arbitration 120-173. The authors’ advice to the parties and practitioners is 
clear and simple: do not agree to expand the judicial review o f an arbitral award. See p 126. See also H. 
Smith, ‘Contractual Modification of the Scope of the Judicial Review of Arbitral Award’ (1997) 8 Am. Rev. Int’l 
Arb. 147. This article criticised the allowance o f  contractual modification, while R. Solomon supports this 
allowance in his article ‘Why they Should Be Allowed’ (2003) May/July D.R.J 58-56.
Dinning, Lecture, 1995, Arbitration and Court, p 157 cited in Redfern & Hunter, op. cit., para 7-34 at p 
359.
This surly promotes confidence and stability m the legal system.
Such legislative treatment could avoid possible vital questions which could raise in the absence o f  such 
legislative treatment, e.g. the legitimacy o f the contractual extending and the judicial acceptance to such 
agreement.
Any contractual modification to the scope o f  judicial review, without legal authorisation, could possibly 
affect the statutory organisation to the relationship between the national court and arbitration. Since, the 
parties could dictate how the state court should review the arbitral award. Further acceptance such 
agreement -without the legislative decision- could possible undermine the legislative objects behind
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I :
On the other hand, this approach should not be considered as hostile to party autonomy, 
as when the parties want to enhance the standard of review they may go to another 
arbitral tribunal. This would be compatible with arbitration as simply matter o f contract.
But courts o f law should not be subject to the whims o f the parties.
(b) Time Limit for Challenge
It is quite common for legislation to prescribe time limits during which the arbitral award 
may be challenged®*^, at least in the sense of a positive challenge, where a party asks the 
court to set the award aside, or appeals to the court. There is no time limit for challenge 
at the enforcement stage, as there is usually no time limit for enforcement of an award.
Accordingly, enforcement may be resisted, even if  the time limit for positive challenge 
has expired. A time limit is very useful procedural device, introducing a degree o f 
certainty by making the aibitral award immune from challenge after a fairly short period 
of time. This also helps the speed of the process and promotes the finality of arbitration.
Time limits also obviously limit judicial supervision, as if a challenge is made after the 
time limit provided by the law, the court cannot entertain it. This is appai*ent from the 
terms o f Article 34(3) o f the Model Law and s.70 o f the Arbitration Act 1996. In Kuwait, 
the time limit is 30 days. In cases o f appeal, this time limit runs from the date of 
depositing the award in the Registry o f the court which originally had jurisdiction to hear 
the dispute®*®. In cases o f application to set aside, this time limit runs from the date o f 
notification of the award®*"*.
A limit has to strike a reasonable to balance between the interests of each party and the 
speed and efficiency of the arbitral system. The 3 months time limit provided by the 
Model Law is more generous than the 28 days allowed in England or the 30 days
adopting narrow grounds. This could also open the risk o f the extent o f judicial supervision upon the 
agreed ground of challenge. As Peter Bowman comments- on the extending the judicial review in US-, 
“courts [without legislative decision] should not enforce party-based expansions o f the grounds for review. 
In the federal context, this means that cases such as Gateway and Syncor were wrongly decided. Party- 
based expansions impinge on certain institutional interests that might underpin a legislative decision not 
permit judicial review o f arbitral awards for legal error. Wliere the applicable Arbitration Act also supplies 
the basis for the court’s subject matter jurisdiction, party-based expansions also collide with prohibitions 
on parties manufacturing the court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Party-generated expansions o f the grounds 
for review also entail substantial risks exemplified by Syncor and Gateway that the courts will conduct a 
far more scrutinizing review than the parties ever intended”. See his article, ‘On the Importance o f  
Institutions: Review o f Arbitral Awards for Legal Errors’ (2002) 19(2) J. Int. Arb. 81-116, [in his 
conclusion].
A/CN.9/264,para 1.
See Art. 186 o f CCPL 1980.
Art. 187 o f CCPL 1980.
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allowed in Kuwait. The time limit provided in the Model Law applies to all grounds of 
challenge, Including cases such as like fraud or false evidence materially affecting the 
award. In fact, it was suggested at one point that a considerably longer limit should apply 
where it was alleged that the award was procured by fraud, bribery or corruption. In the 
end, this suggestion was rejected because such extension was contrary to the need for 
speed and final settlement o f disputes in international commercial relationships®*^. 
However, the ordinary time limit risks denying recoiuse to a party who only discovers 
the fraud, etc, after a significant period of time. Such fears led Scotland, when adopting 
the Model Law to impose no time limit for challenging an award on such grounds®*®. The 
CCPL 1980 allows considerable longer period o f time in which to seek to set aside an 
arbitral award on grounds of fraud, false evidence, or the discovery o f new evidence 
which the other party had concealed. In these cases, the time limit runs from “the day on 
which the discrepancy was revealed, or the forgery was admitted or the award 
establishing tire forgery was rendered, or the day on which a witness was sentenced for 
perjury, or on which the evidence witlrlieid was revealed”®*^ . This allows the 
unsuccessful party a fair chance to challenge the award in such cases. It seems to be 
unfair to close the door of challenge in such cases.
Nonetheless, the recognition o f the exceptions considered above, does not deal with 
other cases where failure to challenge on time is excusable. The Arbitration Act 1996 is 
of interest here. Wlrile it states a general time limit for challenges, it admits o f the 
possibility o f extending this time limit under the general provisions empowering the 
court to extend time limits®*®. This discretion to extend time limits is not restricted to 
certain cases, but covers any cases where there is an adequate reason for delay and a 
good arguable case for challenge. In Aoot Kalmenft v Glencore International AG, ®*®the 
applicant sought to have an arbitral award on a jurisdictional issue set aside under s.68 of 
the Act, on the ground that that issue of should not have been dealt with in a preliminary 
award and, but in the award on the merits o f the dispute. However, the application was 
made 14 weeks after the expiry of the time limited laid down by s.70(3), and the court 
refused to extend the time limit under the power conferred by s.80(5), as there was no 
reasonable justification for the delay, which had largely been caused by the applicant’s
A/40/17, para 200 and 300.
See Prof F. Davidson, Arbitration, para 18.32 at 375.
See Art. 149 o f  CCPL 1980.
Sec. 80 (5) o f  the Arbitration Act 1996. 
[2001] 2 ALL ER (Comm) 577.
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failure to seek legal advice as to the effect o f the 1996 Act. Nonetheless, Colman J., took 
the opportunity to set out seven considerations or factors that are likely to be material 
when parties are applying for extensions o f time under the 1996 Act. These are®®® :
1- The length of the delay;
2- Whether, in permitting the time limit to expire and the delay to oceur, the 
applicant was acting reasonably in all the circumstances;
3- Whether the respondent or the arbitrator caused or contributed to the 
delay;
4- Whether the respondent would suffer irremediable prejudice, in addition 
to mere loss o f time by reason of the delay, if  the application succeeded;
5- Whether the arbitration continued during the period o f delay and, i f  so, 
what impact the determination o f the application by the court might now 
have on the progress o f the arbitration or the costs incurred;
6“ The strength o f the application;
7- Whether in the broadest sense, it would be unfair to the applicant to be 
denied the opportunity to have the application determined.
The English approach is recommended. A time limit for challenge confers the 
advantages o f having a time limit. Yet it is in the interests of justice that an arbitral 
award should not invariably be immune from challenge, simply because that limit has 
elapsed, especially where it would be unfair to prevent a challenge. So, when the court is 
satisfied that there was a justification for delay and a good case for setting aside the 
award, it should be able to allow a challenge, despite the expiry of the statutory time 
limit.
(c) Substantial Effect
Under s.68(2) of the 1996 Act, the court may only act the ground o f challenge has caused 
or will cause substantial injustice to the applicant. The purpose o f such requirement is to 
emphasise that the court no longer has a general supervisory role over the aihitral award.
320 Y. Fyfe and A. Dahlberg, ‘Guidance on Extending Time Limits and Determining Jurisdiction under the 
English Arbitration Act’ (2002) 5(1) Int. A.L.R. 9-10. See also, D. Altaras, ‘Application to extend Time 
Limit under Arbitration Act 1996 ss.67-69’ (2002) 68 (2) Arbitration 161.
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but may only intervene if  there is substantial injustice®®*. Thus, it is not enough to prove 
the ground o f challenge exists. One must also show that it has a real effect, such as a 
financial loss. In Aoot Kalmenft v Glencore International AG, the court rejected the 
challerige, as Kalmneft had failed to show substantial injustice flowing from the serious 
irregularity. The same result followed in Egmatra v Marco Trading Corp where Tuckey, 
J considered the decision of the arbitral tribunal to not allow Egmatra to submit expert 
evidence did not give rise to substantial injustice®®®. It has indeed been said,
“The test o f substantial injustice is intended to be applied by way of 
support for the arbitral process, not by way of interference with that 
process. Thus it is only in those cases where it can be said that what 
happened is so far removed from what could reasonably be expected of 
the arbitral process that we would expect the court to take action. The 
test is not what would have happened had the matter been litigated”®®®.
Nothing similar is required as a condition for setting aside the arbitral award under the 
Model Law. However, the Coimnission discussed a proposal requiring that procedural 
eiTors should be serious or material to the result in order for the award to be set aside®®"*, 
but concluded that the arbitral award might be set aside on any of the grounds listed in 
article 34(2) irrespective o f whether such ground had materially affected the award®®®. 
Yet it should be remembered that the court always has discretion in deciding whether to 
set the award aside. It need not set aside the awar d, or refuse to enforce it merely because 
it is defective. It is permitted to decide whether substantial injustice is caused by the 
alleged defect. Nonetheless, it would be preferable for the Model to make this discretion 
explicit.
The position in Kuwait is not clear. One o f the general principles o f the CCPL 1980 is 
that nullity will not result, in spite o f a provision to that effect, if  the action did not result 
in injury to the party®®®. Nevertheless, the Kuwaiti courts have set aside number o f 
arbitral awards merely on proof of the ground of challenge, without reference to 
substantial injustice. For instance, the court may set aside an award just because it does
See Egmatra AG  v. Smith &Sheriff L td  1998, (unreported) cited in Merkin, op. cit., parai8.8, Service 
Issue no: 32:30 August 2002.
322 J-1 9 9 9 J I Lloyd’s Rep 862.
DAC 1996 Report, para 280.
A/CN.9/SR.318,para 63-68.
A/40/17, para 303.
Art. 19 o f CCPL 1980.
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not contain a copy o f the arbitral agreement®®®. It is suggested that the English approach 
is preferable. Court intervention in arbitration should be available only in extreme cases, 
when the arbitral tribunal has gone so wrong in its conduct o f the arbitration that justice 
calls out for it to be corrected. Thus, it is reconmiended that statute requires that a 
ground of challenge should have to cause substantial injustice to the party in order for the 
award to be set aside. This would help ensure that the court would be in favour of 
arbitration and the finality o f the award, unless there are strong practical grounds for 
intervention.
(d) Exhausting Available Recourse
Such a requirement may limit court intervention by insisting that the challenging party 
must exhaust all available arbitral processes before seeking to trigger the supervisory 
role of the court. This requirement supports the arbitral process by demanding that a 
party utilises every means available to correct the alleged defect within that process. So, 
if  the arbitral tribunal could correct the defect, the challenging party must resort to the 
tribunal in the first instance. Only if  such resort is not possible, or the tribunal refiises to 
correct the defects can the challenge can be brought before the court. The requirement 
also supports party autonomy, as the parties must exhaust agreed processes o f review 
before resorting to the court. The Arbitration Act 1996 expresses its position on this 
matter very clearly as s.70(2)runs,
“An application or appeal may not be brought if  the applicant or 
appellant has not first exhausted (a) any available arbitral process of 
appeal or review, and (b) any available recourse imder section 57 
(correction of the award or additional award)” .
The position under the Model Law is not so clear. On one hand, a party does not appear 
to be prohibited from seeking recourse under Article 34 until he has exliausted such 
means o f recourse®®®, as Article 34 does impose such a requirement, while the parties 
cannot limit the right confeiTed by Article 34 due to its mandatory nature. On the other 
hand, one might argue that, given the emphasis, the Model Law lays on the principle of 
party autonomy, it might be suggested that an arbitral award is not finally made in terms
See Attack no 113/94 Comm. 25/10/94.
328 See Prof. F. Davidson, Arbitration, op. cit., para 18.32 at 376.
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of Article 34 until agreed processes o f recourse are exhausted®®®. In terms o f the latter 
approach, agreed processes of recourse would have to be exliausted before resorting to 
the court.
Whatever the correct interpretation o f the Model Law, the philosophy o f this approach is 
desirable. Still it would be a good idea for the Arbitration Act to deal with the matter in a 
very clear way, which leaves no doubt, perhaps along the lines o f s.70(2) o f the 1996 
Act.
5. Conclusion
This chapter examines the other side o f the relationship between the national court and 
arbitration. It shows not only the logic of the need for judicial supervision over each the 
arbitration agreement, the arbitral tribunal, its conduct and the award, but also that 
judicial involvement in arbitration is welcome in many cases. This chapter examines 
various instances where the court is seen as a guard not only o f the interests o f the legal 
system (e.g. public policy), but also o f the objects of arbitration, as the court plays a vital 
role in obtaining the fair resolution o f a dispute by an impartial and independent tribunal. 
Furthermore, judicial intervention is vital in many cases to ensure the success of 
arbitration, e.g. removing an arbitrator, where retention o f a “non-performing” arbitrator 
becomes intolerable. The court must oversee the quality and conduct o f arbitrators, as 
this sort o f judicial intervention plays a significant role in reinforcing the confidence in 
the arbitral tribunal, which is vital to the success of arbitration as a method of resolving 
disputes. A party who has lost his confidence in the fairness, impartiality or ability o f the 
arbitrator or his conduct of the arbitral proceedings must have some recourse. This 
ehapter, in addition, argues that judicial supervision is a useful means o f safeguarding 
party autonomy, for example, by ensuring that the arbitral tribunal does not ovenide 
agreed procedures or exceeds the jurisdiction it derives from the arbitration agreement. 
That being said, it is important to see judicial supervision in context. So the Arbitration 
Act should restrict the judicial supervision in order to support the arbitral tribunal, 
determining very clearly the parameters of court supervision, e.g. articulating the 
grounds o f challenging an arbitrator or the award, providing time limits for invoking
Ibid., para 18.32 at 376.
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court supervision, and ensuring that the court shall not intervene until any available 
recourse has been exhausted.
Chapter Five:
Conclusion
This thesis deals with the development of the Kuwaiti arbitration regime. It has been 
suggested that arbitration has become the most widely used dispute resolution mechanism 
in international trade transactions, and that it is important to the trade relations o f any 
state that it be able to boast an effective arbitration regime. Kuwait has an old fashioned 
and ineffective arbitration regime, and given the wholesale modernisation of arbitration 
regimes, and the increasing congruence of such regimes, the thesis has considered how 
the Kuwaiti arbitration regime might best be improved to keep pace with these 
developments. The approach taken has been to examine that system against templates 
such as the UNCITRAL Model Law on international commercial arbitration, and the 
English Arbitration Act 1996. It may be said that there is no perfect system, but lessons 
may be gleaned from different arbitral systems in order to improve the arbitral system in 
Kuwait. The question is not whether to adopt entirely this or that arbitral system, but to 
create a regime which is fair, efficient, allows the arbitral process to flourish, and finds 
the most appropriate relationship between the court and that process. It is believed that 
the existence o f a suecessflil arbitration system would encourage individuals to invest and 
arbitrate in Kuwait.
The philosophy of a successful arbitration system, must embrace factors such as the role 
o f the arbitral tribunal, the role of the parties and the role of the court. This study has 
focused on the role o f the court, given that that the role o f the court is an indispensable 
element in the success o f any arbitration system. The key task is to assign it both an 
appropriate facilitating function, (whereby it may assist in the constitution of the arbitral 
tribunal, the conduct of the arbitral proceedings and the enforcement o f the arbitral 
award) and an appropriate supervisory function, whereby it may remove an arbitrator or 
set aside an awai'd. It may also be considered where it might review the award. The 
drafters o f the new Kuwaiti Arbitration Act should consider carefiilly the relationship 
between the court and the arbitral process, so that the court may most effectively support 
that process, in order to guarantee both its effectiveness and efficiency, while at the same 
time supervising that process in order to ensure its the fairness, integrity, legality and 
neutrality.
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Tliis thesis has examined the relationship between the court and the arbitral process, 
concentrating on the arbitration agreement, judicial support for arbitration and judicial 
supervision over arbitration. Its conclusions are summarised below.
1. The Structure and Language of the New Act
The Act has to be designed to reform and simplify the law, in order to make Kuwait a 
more attractive place for arbitration. It should first of all use simple and clear language 
that a layman could understand. Freedom from teclnhcal terms and legal jargon, as far as 
this is possible, could render the conduct of arbitration in Kuwait more straightforward, 
as clarity of language should minimise any possibility of confusion or misinterpretation. 
Much benefit would also be derived from the Act adopting a logical structure. It should 
start by declaring its general principles, then the rules dealing with arbitration 
agreements, the rules governing the arbitral tribunal and its conduct, and finally the rules 
regarding the arbitral award, the methods o f challenge and its recognition and 
enforcement.
2. Supremacy of Party Autonomy
As arbitration is a consensual process, the new Act should articulate at the outset, an 
intention to emphasise paidy autonomy. This would be in step with modern trends, and 
would reflect the basis o f such healthy arbitral systems as the Model Law and the 
Arbitration Act 1996. This principle may, from a practical angle, attract the users of 
arbitration, as they must be assumed to desire significant freedom in designing the 
arbitral process. Such freedom should encompass the ability to decide where, when and 
how they would like their arbitration to run, and extend to the choice o f the members o f 
the arbitral tribunal. It would obviously embrace the extent of the tribunal’s jurisdiction, 
and might even permit the determination o f modes of challenging the arbitral award. 
Flowever, given that arbitration is a form o f private justice, which the state allows largely 
to supplant the system of public justice, there must be limitations imposed on the freedom 
o f the parties in the public interest. Thus, if  the users of arbitration require support from 
the court, they must conclude a valid arbitration agreement and comply with any 
mandatory provisions and public policy requirements to ensure the fairness and integrity 
o f the arbitration.
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3. The Object of Arbitration
The Act should articulate the principle that the object o f arbitration is to obtain the fair 
resolution of the disputes by an impartial arbitral tribunal without unnecessary delay or 
expense. More specific provisions would have to follow to achieve that object. Therefore 
there may be a need, for instance, to state the duties o f all actors in the arbitral process 
(the arbitral tribunal and the arbitrating parties).
4. Court Involvement
The support and assistance of the court is often needed in arbitration. The thesis has 
examined the range and nature o f support offered by the court. The arbitral tribunal’s lack 
of coercive power necessitates the seeking o f the aid of the court to oblige a reluctant 
party to arbitrate, to facilitate the gathering o f evidence, or to enforce the arbitral award. 
Such support is clearly vital to ensure the satisfactory outcome o f the arbitration. 
However, the other side of the coin o f court involvement is its supervisory role. This is 
the price o f court support and assistance. Such supervision is justified, since each element 
of arbitration has significant legal consequences which require judicial supervision to 
safeguard the public interest. Thus the court should not give its assistance and support to 
an invalid, null or inoperative arbitration agreement, and should ensure the fairness, 
integrity and impartiality of the arbitral proceedings. It should make sure that ai'bitration, 
as part of the legal system, accomplishes its object of obtaining the fair resolution o f 
disputes by an impartial tribunal without undue delay and expense. It should supervise 
the arbitral awai'd, given that it fundamentally alters the rights of the parties.
It was recommended that the new Act should be based on the philosophy o f striking an 
appropriate balance between respecting the principle of party autonomy, and the interests 
o f the state in superintending the process. The new Arbitration aet should delineate the 
scope o f the judicial function in ai'bitration, so that the users o f arbitration could know 
exactly the nature and extent of the functions of the court. This would be a simple but 
important step, as it would oblige the drafters o f the act to make explicit exactly how the 
court could be involved in arbitration, in order to increase certainty for the parties and 
arbitrators. It would be equally important for the court to be made aware that it does not 
have general or residual jurisdiction, other than that prescribed by the Act. The Act would 
in effect list any instance o f court involvement. The philosophy should not be to exclude
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the court from the arbitral process, but to limit its involvement to those cases, where such 
involvement whether is a supportive or supervisory capacity, would be beneficial to the 
arbitral process.
5. The Form of the Arbitration Agreement
The arbitration agreement is the foundation stone of the arbitration. Thus the new Act 
must define what constitute an arbitration agreement, and insist that the agreement be in 
writing. What meets the requirement o f writing is a fundamental matter. The definition of 
what constitutes “writing” must reflect trade practices and the needs o f the Electronic 
Commerce age. Therefore, there should be no requirement for a signature, while many 
different forms of communication should be taken to satisfy the requirement o f writing.
6. Supplementary Provisions
The new Act should allow the users of arbitration to design the arbitral provisions, as 
they see fit and proper. Thus, for example, they may agree on the number of arbitrators, 
the challenge procedure and the time limits for making the award. However, the new Act 
should set out provisions which would apply in cases of the absence of agreement or 
failure to reach an agreement, so that the law steps into what would otherwise be gaps in 
the process. Such supplementary provisions would also serve as a statutory framework in 
order to ensure the success o f arbitration as a method of resolving disputes. At the same 
time, the public interest demands that the arbitral process operates as fairly as possible. 
For such reason, some statutory provisions would establish rules so ftmdamental as to 
override any agreed terms. It is very important that such rules, safeguarding public 
policy, should be unambiguously declaied to be mandatory.
7. The Principle of Separability
It was seen that this principle deals with the question of the relationship between the 
arbitration agreement and the main contract. It stresses the autonomy o f the agreement 
from that contract, constituting the arbitration clause as a self -  contained agreement 
ancillary to the principal contract. The thesis noted that it was necessary for the 
arbitration agreement to be autonomous, as this would prevent a party from delaying 
justice being done in due time, by questioning in court the existence or the validity o f the 
arbitration agreement through questioning the validity o f the main contract. It was thus
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recommended that the new Act should adopt this principle, so that the court would 
uphold the arbitration agreement, even if  the main contract were not valid. The 
relationship between the principles o f separablity and competence -  competence (see 
below) was also explored. The conclusion was that the principle o f separability was 
closely related to, but different from, the doctrine o f competence- competence. Thus 
although certain systems conflate the two, the Act should distinguish them. Accordingly, 
although the Act should recognise both principles, the parties should be free to contract 
out o f both, or out of either one.
8. Competence -  Competence
The new Act should enshrine the importance o f the principle of Competence- 
Competence, whereby the arbitral tribunal has the jurisdiction to rule on its own 
jurisdiction, subject to ultimate judicial review. This again would help prevent dilatory 
tactics, in that a party may not stall the arbitration merely by raising an objection to the 
arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction. Under the principle o f Competence- Competence, the court 
should initially leave such questions to the arbitral tribunal to decide, subject to the 
possibility of ultimate judicial review.
9. Enforcing the Arbitration Agreement
The new Act should empower the court to enforce the arbitration agreement, which 
provides for the settlement any existing or fliture dispute by arbitration rather than by any 
other means. The court should be empowered to compel a reluctant party to implement 
his obligation to arbitrate. So, should a party to the arbitration agreement resort to legal 
proceedings, contrary to his agreement, the other party may seek court support to enforce 
the arbitration agreement. Such recourse may be regarded as an indication of the extent to 
which the arbitral system and the court supports arbitration. However, the fact that a party 
pleads the existence o f an arbitration agreement would not mean that the court must 
automatically stop the legal proceedings. The Act should require that the court has to be 
hilly satisfied that an application to stay has fulfilled all the conditions, which are 
required by the Act, e.g. the application should be made at the correct time, and the 
arbitration agreement should not be null and void, inoperative, or incapable o f being 
performed. The new Act should deal comprehensively with such matters.
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9. Extending Time Limits
This may be another potentially very effective tool, wliich the new Act may confer on the 
court in order to support arbitration. The court should be empowered to extend any time 
fixed in the arbitration agreement for commencing arbitral proceedings, and any arbitral 
time limit, whether agreed by the arbitrating parties or fixed by the Act. Arbitration 
agreements often featme clauses stipulating time limits for commencing arbitral 
proceedings, appointing arbitrators, or making the award. Such contractual limitations 
can have significant legal consequences, as for example, an award made out o f time will 
be considered invalid. Such time limits cannot occasion operate unjustly so as to thwart 
the arbitral process. Thus permitting the court (in certain defined circumstances) to 
extend those limits indicates strong state support for arbitration.
10. Constituting the Arbitral Tribunal
The arbitral tribunal is clearly vital to the arbitral process, and the constitution o f the 
tribunal is usually the first step in the arbitral operation. The Act should give the court an 
essential role in constituting the arbitral tribunal, where this is necessary, by authorising it 
to deal with all cases where the appointment procedure has failed. Thus it may be 
empowered to act where the pai'ties have not implemented their agreed procedure for 
constituting the arbitral tribunal, or indeed where they have not reached an agreement as 
to the constitution o f the arbitral tribunal. The supportive role o f the court in this context 
should ensure the efficient operation of arbitration, especially if  the court in exercising 
this jurisdiction were itself subject to a time limit.
11. Supporting the Conduct of the Arbitral Proceedings
The manner in which the arbitral proceedings are conducted will clearly play a significant 
role in the success of arbitration, and might entrance the idea that arbitration is faster and 
less expensive than litigation. The parties should be given full freedom to design their 
own procedures. Normally, it might be expected that the parties will follow these 
procedures voluntarily. However, court assistance may be needed in some cases, as 
where it is necessai'y to secure the attendance o f a witness, take evidence, enforce the 
peremptory orders of the arbitral tribunal, consolidate the arbitral proceedings, determine 
preliminai'y points o f law and grant interim measures. The new Act should codify the 
instances where the court can render its assistance to the conduct o f the arbitral
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proceedings, indicating who may seek court assistance in this context. It should be made 
clear that when court assistance is sought, the arbitral proceedings need not be stayed.
12. Enforcement of the Arbitral Award
The arbitral award is the fruit o f the arbitral operation. The availability o f a binding 
award may often be one of the reasons behind concluding an arbitration agreement. 
However, an arbitral award may be worthless without an effective enforcement 
mechanism. The Act should assign the court the key role in enforcing the arbitral award. 
The Act should provide for a simple, clear and speedy method of enforcement. However, 
the court should not be obliged invariably to support the arbitral award, but should have 
discretion as to whether to do so. The method o f exercising this discretion provides a test 
o f the extent to which the system supports arbitration. Thus, the Act should direct the 
court to enforce the arbitral award, unless it is satisfied that there aie good reasons for not 
doing so.
13. Judicial Supervision over the Arbitration Agreement
The court should exercise supeiwision over the arbitration agreement, in order to ensure 
that it does not receive effect unless it is clearly valid. The new Aet should delineate the 
extent o f this function and indicate when it may be invoked, i.e. when it is asked to 
enforce the arbitration agreement, to support the arbitral process, or enforce the arbitral 
award. It must be made clear that party autonomy is subject to court supervision. The 
recognition o f this judicial role is vital to the success of arbitration as a method o f private 
adjudication recognised by the legal system, as neither the interests o f the parties nor the 
integrity o f the legal system is served by allowing arbitration for illegal purposes.
14. Judicial Supervision over the Arbitral Tribunal and its Conduct
It has been recommended that the new Act should stress that it is the role of the court to 
support arbitration and the arbitral tribunal. Yet tlie Act must also stress that the arbitral 
tribimal is subject to the supervision o f the court. The court must be empowered to ensure 
that tlie tribunal has fulfilled its duties, and to guarantee the integrity and fairness o f the 
tribunal and its conduct. In addition, it should be empowered to ensure that arbitrators 
possess the qualifications agreed by the parties. The Act should enable the court to ensure 
that the general principles of the Act are respected by the arbitral tribunal, that the arbitral
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proceedings are being conducted properly and efficiently, and that there are no mistakes 
or procedural mishaps in the conduct o f the arbitral process. Again, the new Act should 
provide that the arbitral tribunal’s breach of its duties is one o f the limited grounds upon 
which the arbitral tribunal or its award could be challenged, a successful challenge 
leading to the setting aside o f the award or the removal of an arbitrator, depending on the 
context. The Act must thus clearly articulate the duties o f the arbitral tribunal, and specify 
the circumstances in which the court may exercise supervision over the arbitral tribunal 
and its conduct.
15. Judicial Supervision over the Arbitral Award
Given its legal significance, the award must be subject to court supei-vision. In the first 
place, tills supervision might proteet the interests o f the users o f arbitration. An 
unsuccessful party must be afforded an opportunity to challenge the award. Secondly, 
such supervision may protect the interests o f the legal system itself. Arbitration is merely 
a method o f private adjudication, albeit that it significantly impacts on the parties. It is 
thus in the interests o f the legal system to ensure that the award is made judicially. The 
new Act must therefore clearly indicate the means by which an award may be challenged 
and grounds upon which this may happen. Generally, challenges may be made via an 
application to set the award aside. The right to a flill appeal against the arbitral award to 
the court should be abolished. The retention o f a limited right o f appeal on questions o f 
law, along the lines of the English Arbitration Act 1996 might be recommended, but only 
if  Kuwait aspires to its commercial law becoming as popular as that o f England in being 
chosen to govern international commercial contracts. Any such right o f appeal should not 
be mandatory, allowing the parties may to derogate from it as they see fit, and should be 
hedged about by restrictions to ensure that it could not be abused as a dilatory tactic.
The new Act should also establish a limited set o f grounds upon which an arbitral award 
may be challenged. That set must be exclusive and comprehensive, in order to determine 
the spectrum of court involvement in arbitration, as well as making it clear to the users of 
arbitration the sort o f conduct to avoid if  they do not wish to put the award at risk. The 
Act should confer on the court options other than setting aside, particularly the possibility 
o f remission to the arbitral tribunal to cure defects (where possible) and, thereby, save the 
award from being set aside. This may help ensure that disputes are still resolved within
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the arbitral environment. Requiring that court may not set the award aside unless it is 
satisfied that it would be inappropriate to remit the matter in question to the arbitral 
tribunal for reconsideration may reinforce the arbitral process.
16. Court of Arbitration
The creation of a specific comt to deal with arbitration is recommended. Its members 
would be appointed due to their Icnowledge and experience not only in law but also in 
arbitration. This court o f arbitration may assist the success o f arbitration, as it will boast 
high quality judges, who are familiar with arbitration, and able to deal with legal 
requirements without damaging the sprit o f arbitration. Moreover the users of arbitration 
will find court applications dealt with expeditiously, without the need to be subject to the 
general provisions and caseload o f the regular courts. Accordingly, it is recommended 
that the new Act lays down a reasonable time frame for the court o f arbitration perform 
its functions.
17. Conclusion
Up till now there has been no move to modernise the Kuwaiti arbitral system, despite the 
importance of arbitration in commercial life. Yet such legislative modernisation in the 
arbitral field is a vital step, in order to seize the benefits of the increase of international 
trade and commercial activities. It is hoped that this thesis suggests the foundation o f a 
legislative framework from which to launch Kuwait as an excellent arbitral venue. It 
differs from what has gone before firstly by supporting party autonomy, secondly, by 
ensuring judicial intrusion in arbitration is the minimum compatible with the proper 
operation of the system, while at the same time, offering maximum judicial support for 
arbitration, and thirdly by adopting a liberal attitude towards arbitration and arbitrators. 
It is hoped that the thesis will provide a blueprint for the redefinition o f the relationship 
between the court and arbitration, allowing Kuwait to become a favoured forum for 
arbitration in the present millennium.
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